{
  "id": 5792401,
  "name": "Ella C. Quinlan v. John J. Badenoch",
  "name_abbreviation": "Quinlan v. Badenoch",
  "decision_date": "1898-10-21",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "481",
  "last_page": "483",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "78 Ill. App. 481"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "116 Ill. 576",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
      "opinion_index": 0
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
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    "ocr_confidence": 0.585,
    "pagerank": {
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    "simhash": "1:96b2b6925e35779c",
    "word_count": 873
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:24:05.225079+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Ella C. Quinlan v. John J. Badenoch."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. Presiding Justice Freeman\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nThis is an action brought to recover - damages from the appellee, charging that, as chief of police of Chicago, be imprisoned the appellant without authority of law, and against her will, for a long space of time, to wit, three weeks.\nThe defense pleaded, first, not guilty; sec'ond, justification; and third, that appellant consented to the arrest and detention.\nThe bill of exceptions does not preserve the evidence, but states generally that there was evidence introduced tending to prove, among other things, \u201c that the plaintiff voluntarily consented to said arrest and detention, and evidence tending to sustain each and every contention as to fact by plaintiff or defendant, as embodied by implication in the instructions of the court.\u201d\nAfter a trial, extending over a period of more than two weeks, the jury returned a verdict finding the appellee not guilty. It is sought to set aside this verdict and obtain a. new trial, not upon any claim that it was not justified by the evidence, nor even that appellant was in any way prejudiced by instructions which are complained of, but because it is claimed that certain instructions as given by the court do not accurately state, when carefully analyzed, and the phraseology of separate instructions combined, a correct principle of law.\nIt is not every error in an instruction which will justify a reversal and a new trial. It must appear that the error was prejudicial, and that substantial justice has not been done. Dacey v. The People, 116 Ill. 576, and cases there cited.\nThe Supreme Court says in the above mentioned case: \u201c The position assumed by counsel is that if error is found in the instructions, the judgment must then be reversed, whether such error operates to. the prejudice of the defendant or not. Such is not the law.\u201d\nIn this case it is contended that substantially the same statement as to the law relating to the right to arrest and imprison without a warrant, made in an instruction complained of by appellant, is contained in one of the instructions asked for and given in his behalf, and the contention appears to be well founded.\nIt is, we think, true, that the instructions in question may be open to some criticism; but it does not appear, and from a careful examination we can not perceive, that the alleged error was prejudicial to the appellant.\nThe bill of exceptions states that there was evidence that one Holmes had committed certain murders, and that information came daily to the appellee during the entire time appellant was in custody, to the effect that the plaintiff was guilty as accessory before the fact, of such murders and other felonies. An accessory before the fact to the crime of murder \u201cshall be considered as principal and punished accordingly.\u201d (Sec. 274 Criminal Code, Rev. Stat.) Such a criminal offense is a felony, and in the presence of such evidence, and without the full evidence before us, we can not say that appellee was not justified in making the arrest without a warrant. Section 342, Criminal Code, Rev. Stat., gives authority to so arrest when a criminal offense has in fact been committed and the officer has reasonable ground for believing that the person arrested has committed it.\nIf, as stated in the bill of exceptions, there was \u201c evidence tending to prove that the plaintiff voluntarily consented to said arrest and detention,\u201d and the jury believed such evidence, it is difficult to see upon what ground they could justly allow damages therefor.\nUpon this record it does not appear that the verdict and judgment in favor of the appellee were not properly rendered and that substantial justice has not been done.\nThe judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. Presiding Justice Freeman"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Rufus Cope and W. A. Lemma, attorneys for appellant.",
      "\u25a0 Charles S. Thornton, corporation counsel, and Frank Hamlin, attorneys for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Ella C. Quinlan v. John J. Badenoch.\n1. Bill op Exceptions\u2014Improper Statement of Evidence in.\u2014A bill of exceptions which does not preserve the evidence, but states generally that there was evidence introduced tending to prove, among other things, that the plaintiff voluntarily consented to an arrest and detention, and evidence tending to sustain each and every contention as to fact by plaintiff or defendant, as embodied by implication in the instructions of the court, is improperly framed so far as questions arising upon the evidence is concerned,\n2. Instructions\u2014Reversible Error in.\u2014It is not every error in an instruction which will justify a reversal and a new trial. It must appear that the error was prejudicial and that substantial justice has not been done.\n3. Arrests\u2014Authority to Make. \u2014Authority to arrest a person wh en a. crimin'al offense has, in fact,\u2019 been committed, and the officer making the arrest has reasonable ground for believing that the person arrested' has committed it, is given by Section 342 of the Criminal Code.\nTrespass, for false imprisonment. Trial in the Superior Court of Cook County, the Hon. Arthur H. Chetlain, Judge, presiding. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Appeal by defendant.\nHeard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1898.\nAffirmed.\nOpinion filed October 21, 1898.\nRufus Cope and W. A. Lemma, attorneys for appellant.\n\u25a0 Charles S. Thornton, corporation counsel, and Frank Hamlin, attorneys for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0481-01",
  "first_page_order": 491,
  "last_page_order": 493
}