{ "id": 5785613, "name": "Morris Beifeld v. International Cement Co.", "name_abbreviation": "Beifeld v. International Cement Co.", "decision_date": "1898-12-23", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "318", "last_page": "323", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "79 Ill. App. 318" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "67 Ill. App. 110", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5193212 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/67/0110-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 Ill. 199", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 826318 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "203" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/89/0199-01" ] }, { "cite": "57 Ill. 319", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "45 N. Y. 766", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.", "case_ids": [ 2049801 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ny/45/0766-01" ] }, { "cite": "36 Me. 384", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Me.", "case_ids": [ 634679 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/me/36/0384-01" ] }, { "cite": "10 Wis. 331", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wis.", "case_ids": [ 8708901 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wis/10/0331-01" ] }, { "cite": "78 Ill. 116", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 823976 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/78/0116-01" ] }, { "cite": "6 Ill. App. 621", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 4745419 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "639" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/6/0621-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 528, "char_count": 11242, "ocr_confidence": 0.537, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.17033444807013845 }, "sha256": "d5eb5d31a6e812e1d9665e2d8291650c408135b33d6a936062dee9ee89b3e893", "simhash": "1:6d5e8ef0c2527794", "word_count": 1939 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:55:44.895596+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Morris Beifeld v. International Cement Co." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mb. Pbesiding Justice Fbeeman\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nAppellant contends that the County Court had no jurisdiction of the exceptions filed by appellee, because they were not, it is said, filed within thirty days, and that therefore the plea should have been sustained and the exceptions dismissed.\nThe statute provides that exceptions to the claim or demand of any creditor of the assignor may be filed within thirty days after the filing of the report of the assignee containing a list of the creditors, \u201c with a true statement of their respective claims.\u201d Thereupon the clerk is directed to cause notice to be given to the creditor whose claim is objected to, returnable at the next term of the County Court, \u201c and the said County Court shall at the next term proceed to hear the proofs and allegations of the parties in the premises, and shall render such judgment thereon as shall be just, and may allow a trial by jury therepn.\u201d\nThe claims of the appellant herein grew out of a contract made by him with the insolvent, as a sub-contractor, for the mason work of a warehouse in process of erection. The claim now in controversy was for \u201c $350 for money advanced by him to pay laborers employed by said Armstrong.\u201d It is stated that this sum was due at the time of the assignment, for labor performed by said laborers \u201c within six months of the making of said assignment; that said laborers are entitled to a preference in said estate,\u201d and that the appellant \u201c is entitled to a preference therefor, said claims having been assigned \u201d to him by said laborers.\nThe appellee within thirty days filed \u201cin the assignment proceedings its exceptions to all the claims and demands of Morris Beifeld herein,\u201d setting forth in detail certain specific objections to each, including the claim now under consideration. It is true that these exceptions were not in distinct and separate form filed against each of appellant\u2019s claims in separate covers as separate cases. But the exceptions themselves were specific, excepting to what is therein described as \u201csaid pretended preferred claim filed Decernber 13, 1894, for the sum of $350.85.\u201d When the matter came on for hearing, the County Court, having jurisdiction of appellant\u2019s claims and the exceptions thereto, properly, as we think, ordered the exceptions to the different claims to be separated, and gave leave to appellee to file separate exceptions to the claim now before us. This was done, and the court denied appellant\u2019s motion to dismiss the exceptions filed. In this we find no error. The court undoubtedly had jurisdiction of the subject-matter and the parties. While it is true that the new or amended exceptions to appellant\u2019s claim contained some allegations broader and more specific than were originally filed, yet they are substantially the same, and if they were not, the court had power under the statute to allow amehdments as to other pleadings; and such was the practical effect of the order allowing separate exceptions to be filed and of the denial of appellant\u2019s motion to dismiss. The fact that a new summons was issued after the \u201c separated \u201d or amended exceptions were filed, or that the- case was treated, as appellant alleges, as a new suit, did not divest the court of its jurisdiction originally acquired, nor change the rights of the parties.\nIt is further contended that the court erred in refusing to appellant the same right of preference upon the claims for wages assigned to him, which the laborer themselves would have had under the statute. The statute provides that \u201c all claims for the wages of any laborer or servant which have been earned within the term of three months next preceding \u201d the assignment, which are filed within three months thereafter, and allowed by the court, shall \u201c be preferred and first paid to the exclusion of all other demands and claims: Provided, further, that such claims .for wages of any laborer or servant shall recite upon their face that they are for such wages; \u201d and when exceptions are taken the court, in adjudicating such claims, is required to find \u201c that the claim so adjudicated and settled is for wages of such laborer or servant.\u201d Eev. Stat., Chap. 10 b, Sec. 6.\nThere is no serious doubt expressed that such claims for wages filed by the laborer or servant himself are entitled to be preferred under this statute. But another question is presented when, as in the case at bar, the assignee of such claims seeks the benefit, in his own name, of the preference which the statute gives. It is said that such right of preference is statutory only, is purely personal to the laborer or servant, and not capable of assignment.\nIn the present case the appellant states his claim as \u201c being for money advanced by him to pay the laborers who were employed by said Armstrong.\u201d\nIt appears that when the employes of the insolvent, engaged in doing the work under his contract, learned that the assignment had been made, they told appellant that they would not go on with the job unless they were paid. Appellant then told them to go on and he would pay them. He did so, taking an assignment of their claims, which were sworn to by the assignors.\nAppellant\u2019s claim is then just what he states it to be \u201c for money advanced.\u201d It does not recite upon its face that it is for wages, and clearly could not do so. He claims a preference merely as an assignee.\nIt has been held in this State, prior to the passage of the provision enacted in 1895, making claims for liens arising under the mechanic\u2019s lien act assignable and providing that proceedings to enforce them may be maintained by and in the name of the assignee (Rev. Stat., Chap. 82, Sec. 22), that such claims were not assignable. Said Mr. Justice Bailey, Phoenix Mut. Ins. Co. v. Batchen, 6 Ill. App. 621, 639, \u201cWe. think the lien given by the statute to a mechanic or material-man is so far a personal right that the proceeding to establish it, even if the right itself should be held to be assignable in equity, should be carried on in the name of the assignor rather than that of the assignee. Whether a mechanic\u2019s lien is assignable at all, is a question upon which the authorities are far from being harmonious. In C. & V. R. R. Co. v. Fackney, 78 Ill. 116, the Supreme Court of this State expresses a grave doubt as to whether the liens given by the statute upon the property of railway companies are susceptible of assignment. In other States courts of the highest respectability have held that mechanics\u2019 liens are not assignable so as to enable the assignee to prosecute in his own name suits to establish and enforce them. Caldwell v. Lawrence, 10 Wis. 331; Pearsons v. Tincker, 36 Me. 384; Rollin v. Cross, 45 N. Y. 766. These authorities we are inclined to follow.\u201d\nThis statement is, we think, applicable to the preference given by the statute to a laborer or servant.\nIn view of the language of the statute we are of the opinion that the right of preference thereby given to the claim of laborers or servants for wages is not assignable so as to enable the assignee to prosecute in his own name in an assignment proceeding, a suit for its enforcement.\nNeither do we think that appellant is entitled to the right of subrogation. It does not appear that he was under any necessity or obligation for his own protection, or that of any interest which he represented, to pay these claims. \u201c In Hough v. .\u00bfEtna Life Insurance Co., 57 Ill. 319, this court recognized and applied the doctrine that a mere stranger or volunteer can not, by paying a debt for which another is bound, be subrogated to the creditor\u2019s rights in respect to the security given by the real debtor. But if the person who pays the debt is compelled to pay for the protection of his own interests and rights, then the substitution should be made.\u201d Young v. Morgan, 89 Ill. 199, 203.\nThe payment in this case was not at the request, express or implied, of the insolvent or his assignee. At .the most, it involved only the convenience of appellant, in case he should be compelled to hire other laborers to take the place of any who would abandon the job.\nWe are of the opinion, however, that appellant is entitled to prove up these claims as assignee of the laborers, and to have them allowed if the proof shall warrant. The judgment of the County Court is therefore reversed and the cause remanded.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mb. Pbesiding Justice Fbeeman" } ], "attorneys": [ "Pam, Donnelly & Glennon, attorneys for appellant.", "David S. Geer, attorney for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Morris Beifeld v. International Cement Co.\n1. Voluntary Assignments\u2014Exceptions to Claims.\u2014The County Court has power to order joint exceptions to claims of creditors separated, and to allow amendments to such exceptions.\nS. Same\u2014Laborer's Wages\u2014Preferences Not Assignable.\u2014The right of preference given to the claims of laborers or servants for wages is not assignable so as to enable the assignee to prosecute, in his own name, a suit for its enforcement in an assignment proceeding.\n3. Same\u2014Subrogation of Claims.\u2014A mere stranger or volunteer can not, by paying a debt for which another is bound, be subrogated to the creditor\u2019s rights in respect to the security given by the real debtor. But if the person who pays the debt is compelled to pay, for the protection of his own interests and rights, the substitution is to be made.\n4. Same\u2014Rights of Assignees of Claims for Labor.\u2014Assignees of laborers\u2019 claims are entitled to prove them up as a general creditor.\nVoluntary Assignment.\u2014Appeal from the County Court of Cook County; the Hon. Richard Tates, Judge, presiding.\nHeard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term,1 1898.\nReversed and remanded.\nOpinion filed December 23, 1898.\nStatement.\nAppellant filed with the assignee of one Armstrong two claims against the insolvent estate, one for breach of contract and the other for money expended to pay laborers employed by the insolvent under his contract with appellant, to which claims the appellee filed joint exceptions. The County Court having compelled appellee to elect which of the two claims it desired the exceptions to stand against, a hearing was had upon the exceptions to the claim for breach of contract. Judgment allowing the claim was entered, which judgment wras affirmed in this court. International Cement Co. v. Beifeld, 67 Ill. App. 110.\nThe court gave leave \u201c to separate the exceptions \u201d and \u201c to file separate exceptions,\u201d and directed the clerk \u201c to file that part of the exceptions taken from the original exceptions as of January 11, 1S95.\u201d After the first claim had been disposed of, as above stated, exceptions were accordingly filed against the claim of Beifeld to recover the amounts which he had paid to laborers employed by the insolvent Armstrong in the course of the performance of his contract, or so much of it as he did perform.\nThese exceptions were filed a year after the date of the filing of the original joint exceptions. Summons was issued against the appellant, which was dul y served. He appeared and filed a plea setting up that the exceptions were not filed within thirty days after the report of claims filed by the assignee, as required by statute. The court denied appellant\u2019s motion to dismiss the exceptions, and upon hearing dismissed Beifeld\u2019s claim, and the latter appeals.\nPam, Donnelly & Glennon, attorneys for appellant.\nDavid S. Geer, attorney for appellee." }, "file_name": "0318-01", "first_page_order": 328, "last_page_order": 333 }