#### Fish Furniture Co. v. Alice J. Jenkins.

1. Practice—Entry of Orders After the Term.—Orders vacating a judgment and for a new trial, entered at a term subsequent to that at which the judgment is entered, are void.

Appeal, from the County Court of Cook County; the Hon. R. W. S. Wheatley, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term. 1898.

Reversed and remanded, with directions.

Opinion filed May 8, 1899.

*552Statement of the Case.—This cause was pending in the County Court upon an appeal from the judgment of a justice of the peace. Upon December 20, 1897, which was of the December term of the County Court, the cause was called for trial, and appellee, the plaintiff in the suit, appearing, a jury trial was had in absence of appellant, the defendant there, and a verdict and judgment resulted in favor of appellee. On January 15,1898, which was of the next January term of the court, an order was entered purporting to vacate the judgment of December 20th, and ordering that the defendant (appellant) pay costs. On March 26, 1898, an.order was entered that defendant (appellant) pay the amount of $17.75 costs in compliance with the order of January 15, 1898. On April 2, 1898, an order was entered overruling the motion for a new trial, and purporting to enter judgment upon the verdict of December 20,1897. On April 11, 1898, an order was entered overruling a motion entered upon April 6, to set aside judgment of April 2. The appeal is from the judgment of April 2, 1898, and the bond recites that if is also from the order of April 11, 1898.

Samuels & Seligman, attorneys for appellant.

Dost. W. Campion, attorney for appellee.

Me. Justice Seaes

delivered the opinion of the court.

The judgment entered by the County Court on December 20, 1897, is final, and has not been affected by any of the orders entered subsequent to that time. This judgment was of the December term, and the order of January 15, 1898, which purported to vacate it, was of the January term. Mo motion to vacate was entered of the December term.

There is no showing of any matter which would be ground of error coram nobis. Consequently the order of January 15, 1898, was inoperative, and the various orders entered subsequent thereto are of no effect. There being two judgments of record in the cause, one of which is valid, *553viz., the judgment of December, 1897, and the other of which is invalid and a nullity, viz., the judgment of April 2, 1898, it follows that the court should, upon motion of appellant, have eliminated the latter and void judgment from the record, and it should also eliminate from the record all of the void orders entered subsequent to the final judgment of December 20, 1897. Keeler v. The People, 160 Ill. 179.

The judgment entered as of April 2, 1898, is reversed and the cause remanded, with directions to eliminate from the record all of the orders above considered which are subsequent to the judgment of December 20, 1897. Reversed and remanded with directions.