{ "id": 5253267, "name": "North Chicago St. R. R. Co. v. Ida M. Lehman, formerly Ida M. Campion", "name_abbreviation": "North Chicago St. R. R. v. Lehman", "decision_date": "1899-04-11", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "238", "last_page": "240", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "82 Ill. App. 238" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "80 Ill. App. 71", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5784473 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/80/0071-01" ] }, { "cite": "72 Ill. App. 81", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5241233 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/72/0081-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 329, "char_count": 6133, "ocr_confidence": 0.493, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1139090377163063e-07, "percentile": 0.5713705702533236 }, "sha256": "0624d6a57656549b695022310c874e5c5ec4ab0cf006472d439c7828924c75ea", "simhash": "1:da4de7c75a45e41d", "word_count": 1069 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:39:38.340689+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "North Chicago St. R. R. Co. v. Ida M. Lehman, formerly Ida M. Campion." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Justice Shepard\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nThe appellee sued to recover for personal injuries sustained by her through the alleged negligence of appellant, by its servants, in causing the horse, behind which she was riding in a buggy, to become frightened and run away and cast her to the ground, etc.\nThe allegations of the declaration concerning her injuries, in addition to the money expended in endeavoring to be cured, and her being prevented from attending to her affairs and business as a school teacher, are, that \u201c many of the bones of her body were broken, and also by means of the premises, she was and became sick, sore, lame and disordered, and so remained for a long space of time, to wit, from thence hitherto.\u201d\nThe declaration contains no specific allegation that she suffered any bodily or mental pain, as the result and because of her injuries.\n' The second instruction given to the jury at the request of the appellee (plaintiff) was as follows:\n\u201c The court instructs the jury that if they find the defendant guilty under the law and the evidence in this case, then in estimating plaintiff\u2019s damages you will take into consideration the pain and suffering caused by the injury to the plaintiff in body and mind, if any such appear from the evidence, the loss of time resulting to the plaintiff from said injuries, if any such appears from the evidence, and the extent and nature of the injuries received by the plaintiff, whether permanent or otherwise, if any such appear from the evidence, reasonable expenses incurred by the plaintiff in and about endeavoring to be cured of such injuries, if any such appear from the evidence, and assess such damages as the jury may believe from all the evidence before them in this case, the plaintiff has sustained or will sustain by reason of said injuries.\u201d\nAppellant insists that the giving of such instruction constituted error, because of the lack of any allegation in the declaration of suffering in mind, and of any evidence in the case tending to establish such mental suffering.\nThere was evidence that tended to show she suffered severe pain.\nMental pain is undoubtedly a proper element of damage to be considered by a jury, when it arises directly out of and is a part of the physical suffering that it endured as the result of an injury. C. C. Ry. Co. v. Canevin, 72 Ill. App. 81; C. C. Ry. Co. v. Anderson, 80 Ill. App. 71.\nRut we know of no authority or principle that admits of it being taken into account in estimating the compensation to be awarded to an injured person, where neither it, nor anything from which it may be directly inferred, is averred in the declaration\u2014in other words, where the plaintiff does not lay claim to damage on account of it. Proof of it, with no averment to support the proof, does not aid the lack of averment.\nIt is not enough, in this case, to say that mental pain is the direct result or concomitant of severe physical pain, and therefore need not be specially averred, for there is no averment that any bodily pain was suffered.\nThe general averment that \u201c manj^ of the bones of her body were broken,\u201d and that she \u201c became sick, sore, lame and disordered,\u201d was probably all that was squired by way of averment, to support evidence of particular bones of her body being broken, but it was not sufficiently specific from which, as a matter of pleading, to infer the arising of mental pain as a result.\nHad it been appropriately averred that in consequence of the injury the plaintiff suffered severe pain and anguish of body and mind, or had a specific physical injury been averred, from which severe bodily pain might be inferred, the evidence that tended to show that appellee suffered severe bodily pain, would probably have justified the instruction\u2014because of mental pain being concomitant with severe physical pain, and of the rule that mental pain directly growing out of and through physical suffering may be consideren in estimating damages; but without an averment in some of such respects, we should be upholding a looseness in pleading that even modern liberality in that direction has not extended to.\nIt may be, the verdict being small, the'jury did not consider the element of pain, either bodily or mental, but we can not know it. In a close case, the jury should be accurately instructed as to the law involved.\nTor error in the instruction, the judgment will be reversed and the cause remanded.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Justice Shepard" } ], "attorneys": [ "Egbert Jamieson and John A. Rose, attorneys for appellant.", "Edward J. Walsh, Sr., and Thomas W. Prindeville, attorneys for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "North Chicago St. R. R. Co. v. Ida M. Lehman, formerly Ida M. Campion.\n1. Damages\u2014Mental Pain, When a Proper Element.\u2014Mental pain is a proper element of damages to be considered by a jury, when it arises directly out of and is a part of the physical suffering endured as a result of an injury.\n2. Pleading\u2014Averments of \u201c Mental Pain.\u201d\u2014The general averment that \u201c many of the bones of her body were broken,\u201d and that she \u201cbecame sick, sore, lame and disordered,\u201d is a sufficient averment to support evidence of particular bones being broken, but is not sufficiently specific as a pleading from which to infer mental pain as a result.\n3. Same\u2014Absence of Averments as to Mental Pain.\u2014Mental pain can not be taken into account in estimating the compensation to be awarded to an injured person, where neither it, nor anything from which it can be directly inferred, is averred in the declaration. Proof of mental pain with no averment in the declaration to support it does not aid the lack of such an averment,\n4. Mental Pain\u2014Not the Result of Physical Pain.\u2014It is not enough in this case, to say that mental pain is the direct result or concomitant of severe physical pain, and therefore need not be specially averred, for there is no averment that any bodily pain was suffered.\nAction for Personal Injuries.\u2014Trial in the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Charles G. Neely, Judge, presiding. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff; appeal by defendant. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court, at the March term, 1899.\nReversed and remanded.\nOpinion filed April 11, 1899.\nEgbert Jamieson and John A. Rose, attorneys for appellant.\nEdward J. Walsh, Sr., and Thomas W. Prindeville, attorneys for appellee." }, "file_name": "0238-01", "first_page_order": 236, "last_page_order": 238 }