{
  "id": 5256799,
  "name": "Mary Lundon v. City of Chicago",
  "name_abbreviation": "Lundon v. City of Chicago",
  "decision_date": "1899-06-09",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "208",
  "last_page": "210",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "83 Ill. App. 208"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "15 Ill. App. 482",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        6046077
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app/15/0482-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "51 Ill. App. 215",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App.",
      "case_ids": [
        5112633
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill-app/51/0215-01"
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  "analysis": {
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:22:35.373210+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Mary Lundon v. City of Chicago."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. Presiding Justice Freeman\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nThis is an action for damages alleged to have been caused by falling through an opening in a sidewalk covered by a loose plank. The jury found the defendant not guilty, and the plaintiff appeals.\nAs the case must be submitted to another jury, we refrain from discussion of the evidence.\nThe court instructed the jury that, in order to find the defendant guilty of negligence, the jury must believe from a preponderance of the evidence that the city had direct notice of the dangerous conditions \u201cgiven to its officer having charge or oversight of the place in question,\u201d or that the unsafe condition had lasted long enough so that, in the exercise of reasonable care, the city ought to have known. The record does not show that the city has any such officer, nor indicate where he could be found. The city has no right to claim exemption upon the ground that some particular officer has not been notified of the dangerous condition of a sidewalk. It is the duty of the city\u2019s representatives\u2014as, for example, its police or other employes\u2014to notify the proper officer, whose duty it is to repair such places and keep them in order, and meanwhile to take proper precautions to warn people of the danger and prevent accident; and notice to such officers is notice to the city.\nAnother instruction told the jury that, if they \u201c believe from, the evidence and instructions of the court that the plaintiff has failed to prove any of the material allegations of her case,\u201d etc., then the verdict should be not guilty.\nJuries must form their conclusion as to facts from the evidence alone. Instructions of this nature have been heretofore condemned. L. S. & M. S. Ry. Co. v. Rohlfs, 51 Ill. App. 215-220; Kranz v. Thieben, 15 Ill. App. 482-484. In the case before us, certain instructions of the court are clearly erroneous, and if the jury render their verdict because they believe such instructions, they are misled.\nThe jury were also instructed that \u201c the plaintiff must prove her case by a preponderance or great weight of testimony,\u201d which is clearly misleading.\nException is taken to remarks of the court during the trial. We think some criticism is justified by this record, and that appellant may have been prejudiced. She may or may not be entitled to recover, but is entitled to another trial. The judgment of the Circuit Court is reversed and the cause remanded.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. Presiding Justice Freeman"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "C. S. O\u2019Meara, attorney for appellant."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Mary Lundon v. City of Chicago.\n1. Cities and Villages\u2014Right to Claim Exemption from Liability\u2014 Defects in Sidewalles\u2014Notice.\u2014A city has no right to claim exemption upon the ground that some particular officer has not been notified of the dangerous condition of a sidewalk. It is the duty of the city\u2019s representatives, as, for example, its police or other employes, to notify the proper officer whose duty it is to repair defective sidewalks and keep them in order, and meanwhile to take proper precautions to warn people of the danger, and prevent accidents, and notice to such officers is notice to the city.\n2. Instructions\u2014Conclusions Must be from the Evidence.\u2014Juries must form their conclusions as to facts from the evidence alone. An instruction that \u201cif they believe from the evidence and instructions of the court that the plaintiff has failed to prove any of the material allegations of her case,\u201d etc., then the verdict should be not guilty, is erroneous.\n8. Same\u2014Preponderance or Great Weight of the Evidence.\u2014An instruction that \u201c the plaintiff must prove her case by a preponderance or great weight of testimony,\u201d is misleading.\nAction in Case, for personal injuries. Trial in the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. John Barton Payne, Judge, presiding. Verdict and judgment for defendant; appeal by plaintiff.\nHeard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1898.\nReversed and remanded.\nOpinion filed June 9, 1899.\nC. S. O\u2019Meara, attorney for appellant."
  },
  "file_name": "0208-01",
  "first_page_order": 212,
  "last_page_order": 214
}