{
  "id": 5268393,
  "name": "Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. v. Henry C. Petersen",
  "name_abbreviation": "Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. v. Petersen",
  "decision_date": "1900-01-02",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "375",
  "last_page": "378",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "86 Ill. App. 375"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "83 Ill. App. 332",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App.",
      "opinion_index": 0
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
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    "ocr_confidence": 0.564,
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    "simhash": "1:4609faa00d2e9764",
    "word_count": 1022
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:28:30.258939+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. v. Henry C. Petersen."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. Justice Shepard\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nAppellee was a brakeman in the employ of the Chicago and Northwestern Railway Company, and at the time of receiving the injury for which he sued to recover damages was one of a crew of men, all employes of such company, engaged in the act of transferring, by the aid of a locomotive, also belonging to the said Northwestern Company, the special car \u201c Wanderer\u201d from the depot of said company to the yards or depot of the appellant company.\nThe work was accomplished, and the special car was coupled to a string of passenger cars, belonging to the appellant company, standing by themselves on a track in appellant\u2019s yard near its passenger depot. While engaged, as was a part of his duty, in uncoupling the Northwestern locomotive from the special car, something caused the string of appellant\u2019s cars, to which the special car had been attached, to be suddenly moved from the further end, thus causing the drawbars of the special car and the locomotive to come quickly and forcibly together, and the appellee\u2019s hand was caught between them and badly injured.\nWe understand the theory of appellee\u2019s case, in part, at least, to be that the cars were suddenly moved and the injury occasioned through some improper and negligent act of the appellant, or for which the appellant was responsible. But the point is persistently made by the appellant that the record wholly fails to disclose by what force or agency the cars were moved or caused to be moved, or that the appellant was in any manner connected therewith, or in other words, the record wholly fails to disclose any negligence by appellant.\nThis point is sought to be met by counsel for appellee, in their brief, by referring to the testimony of appellee, as follows :\n\u201c I do not know what moved the car, only what I heard afterward. I did not see anything strike either end of the train.\u201d\nNo other evidence whatever is referred to by the appellee as even tending to show what caused the car to be moved, nor can we find any after a most diligent search of the record for it.\nTrue, it is said by counsel for.appellee, that \u201cwhile he (appellee) was so engaged an engine or other agency caused the Lake Shore train to back violently against the \u2018 Wanderer \u2019 while appellee was still engaged in the act of uncoupling, and thereby he was injured.\u201d But we can not find a word of evidence to sustain the statement, and if there were evidence, in the very words of counsel, it would not, alone, convict appellant of negligence, for it is not said the \u201c engine or other agency \u201d belonged to the appellant, or that appellant was in any way responsible for or connected with it.\nAnd there is the further statement in the brief for appellee that \u201c we must confess we have little patience with appellant\u2019s claim that the record fails to disclose what caused the string of cars to bump violently the car \u2018Wanderer.\u2019 A careful reading of the record itself will leave no fair-minded person in doubt upon that.\u201d\nWhile such a statement by counsel, no matter how eminent, can not supply the lack of evidence, we have, with a desire to be included in the class of persons referred to, given \u201c careful reading \u201d to the record with, perhaps, more patience than counsel ought to have required us to maintain in doing work he should have done, but without any of the success he so sanguinely asserts would result from our reading.\nThe testimony of appellee, as quoted, is the only evidence in the record that has any bearing, directly or by inference, upon the question of what force or agency caused the ears to be moved. If we might guess that the string consisting of several cars could only have been moved, in the ordinary course of things, by the power of a locomotive applied to it, it would not follow that it was a locomotive belonging to the appellant, or one for the movements of which appellant was responsible.\nThe yard of appellant was, at least inferentially, not its private yard in the sense that it was used only for the cars and locomotives of the appellant, for at that very tim\u00e9 the special car and locomotive handling it, both belonging to other corporations, were rightfully being moved about in the yard, and non constat, if the cars were forcibly and suddenly shoved ahead by a locomotive, it was by one that was in no sense the property or under the control of appellant.\nWe have heretofore held, in conformity with well-understood law, that in order to entitle a plaintiff to recover for the negligence of a defendant it is essential there should be evidence tending to prove, at least with reasonable certainty, that the injury was actually inflicted by the defendant. Crane Co. v. Stammers, 83 Ill. App. 332.\nWe have no purpose of trenching upon the functions of the jury to determine when, and under what circumstances, negligence as a matter of fact has been committed, but to uphold a verdict finding a defendant guilty of negligence there must be at least some evidence tending to prove such fact, and there was none in this case.\n'We observe no other substantial error in the record, but for that pointed out the judgment will have to be reversed and the cause remanded.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. Justice Shepard"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Pam, Donnelly & Glennon, attorneys for appellant.",
      "Asay & Clare, attorneys for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. v. Henry C. Petersen.\n1. Negligence\u2014Recovery for Personal Injuries\u2014Measure of Proof. \u2014In order to entitle a plaintiff to recover for the negligence of a defendant it is essential that there should be evidence tending to prove at least with reasonable certainty, that the injury was actually inflicted by the defendant.\nAction in Case, forpersonal injuries. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Joseph E. Gary, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1899.\nReversed and remanded.\nOpinion filed January 2, 1900.\nPam, Donnelly & Glennon, attorneys for appellant.\nAsay & Clare, attorneys for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0375-01",
  "first_page_order": 383,
  "last_page_order": 386
}
