{ "id": 5272369, "name": "Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. William F. Farrell, Adm.", "name_abbreviation": "Illinois Central Railroad v. Farrell", "decision_date": "1899-12-13", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "436", "last_page": "439", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "86 Ill. App. 436" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "174 Ill. 398", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5537331 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/174/0398-01" ] }, { "cite": "111 Ill. 646", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 828341 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/111/0646-01" ] }, { "cite": "65 Ill. 235", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2620116 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/65/0235-01" ] }, { "cite": "111 Ill. 203", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "133 Ill. 248", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5428576 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/133/0248-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 443, "char_count": 7779, "ocr_confidence": 0.52, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.5961689552170427e-07, "percentile": 0.8190720771751557 }, "sha256": "1bfc34b978bcaf4fe64bdc7017df41187c705c3095c10bd54421dafdccd2671d", "simhash": "1:a8655c86a68bc74b", "word_count": 1346 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:28:30.258939+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. William F. Farrell, Adm." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Justice Burroughs\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nThis was an action on the case in which the appellee, as administrator of the estate of Mary E. Tones, deceased, seeks to recover from the appellant damages for negligently causing the death of his decedent upon a public road crossing. A trial was had by jury, which resulted in a verdict and judgment in favor of the appellee for $5,000, to reverse which the appellant brings the case to this court and urges, as grounds therefor, that the verdict is contrary to the evidence, the damages are excessive, and the court gave improper and refused proper instructions.\nThe declaration contained four counts in all of which it is averred that appellee\u2019s decedent was in the exercise of due and ordinary care for her own safety, and was killed as the result of the negligence of appellant.\nIn the third count, the negligence charged was that the appellant failed to give the statutory signals when the train in question was approaching the road crossing. The appellee pleaded not guilty.\nThe evidence shows that the deceased was a widow, twenty-five years old, when killed, and left two daughters, one five, the other three years old, the mother supporting herself and children by working as housekeeper for her brother. That about 8:30 o\u2019clock p. m. of November 23, 1898, the deceased was killed at a public road crossing, where the tracks of appellant\u2019s railroad crosses it. She was in a buggy at the time, drawn by a horse which was being driven in a good trot by a male companion, who was going with her to a dance at a place beyond the crossing.\nThey made no stop, nor did they slacken their speed when they approached the crossing, to better enable them to ascertain if a train was about to pass, and when the buggy reached the railroad tracks the locomotive of a passenger train of appellant came along at the rate of about thirty-five miles an hour, struck their buggy and killed both of them instantly. There was a sharp conflict in the evidence as to whether or not the bell was rung or the whistle sounded, in the manner required by statute, as the train approached the crossing.\nIn this condition of the proof, the court gave the jury, at the request of appellee, the two following instructions:\n1. \u201c You are instructed that the law requires that every railroad corporation shall cause a bell of at least thirty pounds weight, and a steam whistle, to be placed and kept on each of its locomotive engines, and that it shall cause the same to be rung or whistled at the distance of at least eighty rods from the place where the railroad crosses any public highway, and that the same shall be kept ringing or whistling until such highway is reached, and if you believe \u2022from the evidence that the train in question approached the crossing in question without ringing a bell or sounding a whistle, as required by said law, and that by reason thereof, and as a result of such failure to ring a bell or sound a whistle, plaintiff\u2019s intestate, while crossing the defendant\u2019s railroad and in the exercise of ordinary care for her own safety, was struck and killed by said train, then your verdict should be for the plaintiff for whatever pecuniary damages you may believe from the evidence the next of kin has sustained by reason thereof.\u201d\n2. \u201c If you find that the defendant is guilty, under the evidence and instructions of the court, then it is your duty to assess the plaintiff\u2019s damages, and in assessing the dam-. ages you have a right to take into consideration all of the facts and circumstances shown by the evidence, bearing upon the question, and to allow such damages as you may deem a fair and just compensation, with reference to the pecuniary injuries resulting from the death of the plaintiff\u2019s intestate, to her next of kin.\u201d\nThe first instruction was calculated to give the jurors to understand that the court required them to find a verdict for the plaintiff if they believed, from the evidence, that the defendant failed to do those things therein enumerated, and by reason thereof the plaintiff\u2019s intestate was killed while crossing the defendant\u2019s railroad, and that she was then in the exercise of ordinary care for her own safety. While under the evidence, to warrant 'a verdict for the plaintiff, the jury should have been required to believe that plaintiff\u2019s intestate was in the exercise of ordinary care before attempt-, ing to cross defendant\u2019s railroad, as well as while crossing it. For \u201c one who, failing to observe due care, blindly walks into danger that the observance of due care would have enabled him to avoid, is no less guilty of contributory negligence than he who, by the observance of due care, could extricate himself from danger, but fails to make any effort for his personal safety, and because thereof, is injured.\u201d C., M. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Halsey, Adm\u2019r, etc., 133 Ill. 248, and Abend v. T. H. & I. R. R. Co., 111 Ill. 203.\nWhether or not the deceased used ordinary care to avoid the collision is shown by the evidence to have been a vital question, and one sharply contested on the trial; therefore the instruction should have been clear and certain on that point and being uncertain and calculated to mislead the jury, it was prejudicial error to give it.\nThe second instruction told the jury to allow plaintiff \u201c such damages as you may deem fair and just compensation\u201d without limiting them to the evidence or giving them any rule to estimate the damages. This was improper, for it left the jury to give such damages as they deemed the plaintiff ought to recover according to their individual notions of right and wrong, regardless of the evidence. Keightlinger v. Egan, 65 Ill. 235; Rolling Mill Co. v. Morrissey, 111 Ill. 646; and C., C., C. & St. L. Co. v. Jenkins, 174 Ill. 398. The giving of this instruction as drawn was also prejudicial error.\nCounsel for appellant urge that the verdict is contrary to the evidence, and the damages are excessive. We will not express' an opinion upon these questions, because we have concluded to reverse the judgment upon appellee\u2019s erroneous instructions.\nAs to appellant\u2019s refused instructions, we will say that the court properly refused them all, for some invade the province .of the jury on questions of fact, and others do not properly state the law applicable to the evidence, so appellant has no right to complain on that score.\nOn account of the two erroneous instructions above mentioned, we reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court and remand the case for a new trial. Be versed and remanded.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Justice Burroughs" } ], "attorneys": [ "Charles L. Capen, attorney for appellant; John G. Drennan, of counsel.", "Ewing, Wight & Ewing, attorneys for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. William F. Farrell, Adm.\n1. Contributory Negligence\u2014What is.\u2014A person who fails to observe due care and blindly walks into danger which the observance of due care would have enabled him to avoid, is no less guilty of contributory negligence than he who by the observance of due care could extricate himself from, danger, but failing to make any' effort for his personal safety, is injured.\n3. Instructions\u2014Improper Measure of Damages.\u2014An instruction which tells the jury to allow plaintiff \u2018such damages as you may deem fair and just compensation,\u201d without limiting them to the evidence or giving them any rule to estimate the damages, is improper, as leaving the jury to give such damages as they may have deemed the plaintiff ought to recover, according to their individual notions of right and wrong, regardless of the evidence.\nAction on the Case.\u2014Death from negligent act. Appeal from the Circuit Court of McLean County; the Hon. Colostin D. Myers, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the May term, 1899.\nReversed and remanded.\nOpinion filed December 13, 1899.\nCharles L. Capen, attorney for appellant; John G. Drennan, of counsel.\nEwing, Wight & Ewing, attorneys for appellee." }, "file_name": "0436-01", "first_page_order": 444, "last_page_order": 447 }