{
  "id": 5855709,
  "name": "Francis Hutchison v. Louis H. Sullivan",
  "name_abbreviation": "Hutchison v. Sullivan",
  "decision_date": "1900-02-27",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "664",
  "last_page": "667",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "87 Ill. App. 664"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 356,
    "char_count": 6467,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.542,
    "sha256": "01264194d05369278d66960b000f49c2e9f136e39c847ffa9cf05a2d0f53b047",
    "simhash": "1:fe7ee377fcf84b10",
    "word_count": 1094
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:29:28.737909+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Francis Hutchison v. Louis H. Sullivan."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mc. Justice Freeman\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nThis is a suit upon the common counts, wherein appellee seeks to recover for services rendered in the preparation of preliminary plans and sketches for a proposed \u201c Coliseum Building,\u201d which it was then hoped might be erected on what is described as the \u201c Old Base Ball Grounds,\u201d in the city of Chicago.\nAppellee testifies that the purpose of the plans and sketches was to enable appellant \u201c to place the matter intelligently before the people that he wished to interest financially; \u201d that the price agreed upon for these preliminary or promotion plans was $400, and that he stated to appellant \u201c that my interest must be protected, so that when the matter passed out of Mr. Hutchison\u2019s hands I should be sure that-1 would be the architect of the building when the building was erected; \u201d to which he states appellant agreed. In other words, appellee\u2019s version of the agreement is that he was to prepare the preliminary or promotion plans, upon the condition that if the scheme succeeded and the building should be erected, he should be its architect, and if the scheme did not succeed, then he was to receive $400 from appellant for the preliminary plans.\nAppellant on the other hand, claims that the contract contained no such condition. His statement is to the effect that after preparing the promotion sketches, appellee refused to permit them to be used for the purpose for which they were made, viz., to be shown to prospective investors as a means of promoting the scheme, thus violating the agreement; that the agreement was that appellee should receive $400- in sixty days for the preliminary plans to be used for promotion, which were to be furnished in thirty days, and that subsequently appellee endeavored to force him into signing a new contract in writing, wherein he should agree to make appellee architect of the building if constructed. This proposed contract bearing appellee\u2019s signature, was introduced in evidence, together with the following letter:\n\u201cMay 4, 1898.\nFrancis Hutchison, Esq.,\n664 W. Adams St., City.\nDear Sib : I learn from Mr. O\u2019Eeill\u2019s office that you \u25a0 have not yet affixed your signature to our contract with reference to the proposed Coliseum. Kindly do so without further delay, as I shall otherwise not be in a position to show any documents to your people on Saturday, as I desire to have my own relations to the project definitely established, and this at present can only be done through your signature to the document..\nYours truly,\nLouis H. Sullivan.\u201d\nThe cause was submitted to the court without a jury.\nThe statute provides that either party may submit to the court written propositions to be held- as law in the decision of the case. (Sec. 42, Practice Act.) In accordance with this provision, appellant\u2019s counsel submitted the following :\n1. That if the plaintiff entered into a contract with the defendant to furnish promotion plans for a Coliseum building for the sum of $400 to be paid in sixty days, and the plaintiff afterward notified the defendant that he would not allow the defendant the use of the plans for the purpose for which the defendant contracted for the same, that is, in the promotion of the building of the Coliseum, unless the defendant should sign a contract with the plaintiff for all the work of an architect on the said Coliseum, which contract contained an agreement making the said contract a lien on the defendant\u2019s interest in the land, the plaintiff can not recover and the finding should be for the defendant.\nThis proposition is in effect that if the court finds the facts as appellant claims they are shown to be by evidence introduced in his behalf, then, under the law applicable to such a state of facts, the finding must be in his favor. The contention between the parties is one of fact, viz., what was the contract. Appellant claims the contract was that appellee should furnish promotion plans, for which he was to be paid $400 in sixty days. If this was the contract and appellee afterward refused to perform his part of it unless appellant would sign a new contract with additional provisions forming no part of the original agreement, then appellee would not be entitled to recover and the court should have so held as a proposition of law. If, on the other hand, the contract as originally made contained an addi-' tional provision that appellant should sign a written contract like the one in evidence as a condition precedent to being furnished with the promotion plans, and he refused so to do, then, under the law applicable to such facts, appellee might recover. Appellant was, however, entitled to have the court hold as law a proposition stating a correct rule applicable to his theory of the case so far as it was sustained by evidence. The court may have found the facts against appellant, but having refused to hold, as requested, a correct rule of law applicable to one state of the facts which there is evidence to support, we can not now determine whether the judgment is based upon a finding of the facts in favor of appellee, or upon an erroneous view of the law.\nWe think it -was error to refuse to hold appellant\u2019s first proposition as law, and the judgment of the Superior Court must be reversed and remanded.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mc. Justice Freeman"
      },
      {
        "text": "Mr. Justice Shepard,\ndissenting.\nIn my opinion the proposition of law referred to was properly refused to be held. It contains only a partial hypothesis based upon appellant\u2019s theory of the case, and has no reference to appellee\u2019s theory, which, as disclosed by the evidence, admitting all that appellant\u2019s evidence shows the contract to have been, is that the contract included the further element that appellee should be employed as architect of the building if the same should be proceeded with.",
        "type": "dissent",
        "author": "Mr. Justice Shepard,"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "James F. Hutchison, attorney for appellant.",
      "Felsenthal, D\u2019Ancona & Foreman, attorneys for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Francis Hutchison v. Louis H. Sullivan.\n1. Practice\u2014Propositions of Law.\u2014Under the statute providing that parties may submit to the court written propositions to be held as law in the decision of the case, either party may submit propositions embodying his theory of the case as exemplified by the evidence.\nAssumpsit, for services of an architect. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Axel Chytraus, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1899.\nReversed and remanded.\nMr. Justice Shepard dissenting.\nOpinion filed February 27, 1900.\nJames F. Hutchison, attorney for appellant.\nFelsenthal, D\u2019Ancona & Foreman, attorneys for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0664-01",
  "first_page_order": 670,
  "last_page_order": 673
}
