{ "id": 5278406, "name": "City of Chicago v. William Wilkie et al.", "name_abbreviation": "City of Chicago v. Wilkie", "decision_date": "1900-04-17", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "315", "last_page": "323", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "88 Ill. App. 315" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "6 Ind. 351", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ind.", "case_ids": [ 1446584 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ind/6/0351-01" ] }, { "cite": "48 Ala. 291", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ala.", "case_ids": [ 5498512 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ala/48/0291-01" ] }, { "cite": "14 Nev. 365", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Nev.", "case_ids": [ 8578144 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nev/14/0365-01" ] }, { "cite": "1 Mo. 359", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mo.", "case_ids": [ 8855155 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mo/1/0255-01" ] }, { "cite": "43 Ala. 400", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ala.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "176 Ill. 340", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3157086 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "348" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/176/0340-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 Ill. 644", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "130 Ill. 283", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 Ill. 221", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5339442 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/88/0221-01" ] }, { "cite": "124 Ill. 359", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2929653 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/124/0359-01" ] }, { "cite": "176 Ill. 346", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "175 Ill. 445", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3160792 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/175/0445-01" ] }, { "cite": "176 Ill. 9", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3158249 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/176/0009-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 Fed. Rep. 71", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.", "case_ids": [ 3836578 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f/93/0071-01" ] }, { "cite": "148 Ill. 397", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3060379 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/148/0397-01" ] }, { "cite": "148 Ill. 372", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3060878 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/148/0372-01" ] }, { "cite": "27 Ill. App. 423", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 4949665 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/27/0423-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 Ill. 500", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2684380 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/79/0500-01" ] }, { "cite": "123 Ill. 111", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2920904 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "115" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/123/0111-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 756, "char_count": 19222, "ocr_confidence": 0.563, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.1813549812920936e-07, "percentile": 0.7725282439246458 }, "sha256": "f81ec38e50b68509b06a74510d63560de1f0d61e4d5f09253d3d86be1c398aa0", "simhash": "1:be30d693b78d9170", "word_count": 3270 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:36:14.009445+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "City of Chicago v. William Wilkie et al." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Presiding Justice Horton\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nIn this case seventy-nine master plumbers (appellees), joining as complainants, filed a bill in chancery in the Circuit Court to enjoin the city of Chicago (appellant) from enforcing what is commonly known as the \u201c Plumbers\u2019 License Ordinance.\u201d To said bill, as amended, appellant filed a general demurrer, which was overruled, and a final decree entered, perpetually enjoining appellant as per prayer of the bill.\nThe bill charges that the city authorities have made demand upon appellees to take out licenses and.pay therefor a license fee of thirty dollars each, and threaten to arrest appellees should they engage in their business of plumbing in said city without having procured such licenses, and that they fear that should appellees so engage in their said business that they will be prosecuted and fined by a magistrate and that, in case such fine is not paid, they will be arrested and imprisoned.\nIt is also charged in said bill that appellees believe said ordinance to be unconstitutional and void, and that they have been examined and received a certificate as to their qualifications from an examining board created under Sec. 500, Hurd\u2019s Stat. of Ill., as to Cities and Villages (Sec. 3, Act of \u201997, as to licensing plumbers), and are thereby authorized to conduct their said business as master plumbers without procuring a license under said ordinance.\nFirst. Has a court of chancery jurisdiction to entertain this bill ? That is the question here first presented. It is the well-settled law of this State that, as a general rule, a court of chancery will not interfere to restrain the enforcement of a municipal ordinance where the party complaining has a full and complete remedy at law.\nIn Poyer v. Village of Des Plaines, 123 Ill. 111, 115, the court says:\n\u201c The legality or illegality of the ordinance is purely a question of law, which the common law court is competent to decide. * * * When ordinances have been enacted by the proper authority, a court of equity will not interfere, by injunction, to restrain their enforcement in the appropriate courts upon the ground that such ordinances are alleged to be illegal, or because of the alleged innocence of the party - charged.\u201d\nYates v. Batavia, 79 Ill. 500, was a bill tiled to enjoin the prosecution of suits and to settle the legality of an ordinance concerning the \u201c sale or giving away of intoxicating liquors.\u201d The court disposed of the contention in these words:\n\u201c A court in chancery has no jurisdiction of the subject-matter of this litigation, nor is it in the power of the parties to waive the question of jurisdiction and compel it to try the cause. Whatever defense, if any, existed to the several actions against complainants, was complete in a court of law where they were pending, and the court very properly dismissed them from that forum.\u201d\nv\\\nIn Skakel v. Roche, 27 Ill. App. 423, the court states the rule very clearly in these words (page 426):\n\u201c The general rule is well settled, and has been repeatedly announced in this State, that a court of equity will not entertain a bill to restrain prosecution under a municipal ordinance on the ground of- the alleged illegality of such ordinance. The validity of an ordinance of the character here involved can only be tested by appeal from a fine imposed under it.\u201d\nTo the same effect are Chicago Pub. Stk. Exchange v. McClaughry, 148 Ill. 372; C., B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. City of Ottawa, 148 Ill. 397; High on Injunctions, Secs. 1243 and 1244; Strang v. Richmond, P. & C. R. R. Co., 93 Fed. Rep. 71.\nIt is held in Cicero Lumber Co. v. Town of Cicero, 176 Ill. 9, that there are two exceptions to the general rule above stated, viz.: \u201c First, to prevent irreparable injury, and second, to prevent a multiplicity of suits \u201d (p. 32). Equity jurisdiction was there entertained upon the theory that otherwise irreparable injury would result to the complainant.\nIn City of Chicago v. Collins, 175 Ill. 445, the bill was filed to enjoin the enforcement of a city ordinance providing for the licensing of vehicles. In that bill there were three hundred and seventy-three complaints. By the stipulated facts it appeared that there were 300,000 persons in Chicago \u201c similarly situated,\u201d and in whose behalf the bill was filed. The ordinance involved exacted a license fee from all owners of wheeled vehicles which are used upon the public streets of Chicago for private purposes exclusively. It was there held that that ordinance was void and that upon the facts there appearing, a court of equity had jurisdiction upon the theory that it would prevent a multiplicity of suits.\nThe court below, sitting as a court of chancery, had jurisdiction to entertain the bill of complaint in this case for the reason that it would prevent a multiplicity of suits.\nSecond. Are the city ordinances valid which provide that master plumbers must procure a city license ?\nAppellees have not'seen fit to appear in this court and aid the court in the investigation of authorities. The cases examined by us are mostly included in the numerous citations by counsel for appellant.\nThe bill of complaint, referring to \u201c The Revised Code of Chicago,\u201d passed April 8, 1897, states that it is therein provided by Sec. 1415, as follows :\n\u201c Any person desiring to engage in or work at the business of plumbing in the city of Chicago as a master plumber, shall first obtain a license so to do for each establishment or place of business to be maintained by him, and shall pay for such license a fee of thirty ($30) dollars per year; said license fee to be paid for during the month of Hay of each and every year.\u201d x\nAnd that it is therein provided by Sec. 1421, as follows :\n\u201c No person shall perform any plumbing work without having first obtained the license herein provided for, under penalty of a fine upon conviction of not less than fifty ($50) dollars nor more than one hundred ($100) dollars for each and every offense.\u201d\nThe bill also refers to an enactment by the general assembly of this State entitled \u201c An act to provide for the licensing of plumbers and the supervising and inspecting of plumbing,\u201d approved June 10, 1897 (Hurd\u2019s Stat., Ch. 24, Sec. 498). Said act provides that in every city of 10,000 inhabitants or more, a board of examiners of plumbers shall be appointed. Sec. 4 of said act is as follows:\n\u201c Said board of examiners shall, as soon as may be after the appointment, meet and then designate the times and places for the examination of all applicants desiring to engage in or work at the \"business of plumbing within their respective jurisdiction. Said board shall examine said applicants as to their practical knowledge of plumbing, house drainage and plumbing ventilation; and, if satisfied of the competency of such applicants, shall thereupon issue a certificate to such applicant authorizing him to engage in or work at the business of plumbing, whether as master plumber, or employing plumber, or as a journeyman plumber.\n\u201c The fee for a certificate for a master plumber or employing plumber shall be five ($5) dollars; for a journeyman plumber it shall be one ($1) dollar. Said certificate \"shall be valid and have force throughout the State, and all fees received for said certificates shall be paid into the treasury of the city, town or village where said certificates are issued.\u201d\nBy amendment to said bill it is charged that the common council of the city of Chicago, after said enactment by the general assembly, passed an ordinance creating a board of examiners, as provided by said act, and stating the substance of said ordinance. Sec. 5 of said ordinance, quoted in full in brief of counsel for appellant, is as follows:\n\u201c Section 5. Said board of examiners shall, as soon as may be after appointment, meet at such time and place as the commissioner of health may designate, and proceed to carry out the provisions of this ordinance. Said board shall examine applicants as to their practical knowledge of plumbing, house drainage and plumbing ventilation, and if satisfied as to the competency of any such applicant, and upon receipt of the fee hereinafter provided for, shall issue a certificate to such applicant authorizing him to engage in or work at the business of plumbing, either as master plumber, as employing plumber, or as a journeyman plumber, as the case may be, and according to the terms of the application made by such applicant. Provided, however, that the issuance of the certificate and the payment of the examination fee as herein provided shall not entitle any master plumber or employing plumber to whom such certificate is issued to engage in the business of master plumber or employing plumber in the city of Chicago, until such master plumber or employing plumber has obtained a license so to do, in accordance with the provisions of section 1415, article 1, chapter 50, of the Revised Code of Chicago (1897). The fee for the examination and certificate of a master plumber or employing plumber shall be five ($5) dollars, in addition to the sum charged for a license fee, as provided for in section 1415, Revised Code, as aforesaid, and for the examination and certificate of a journeyman plumber it shall be one ($1) dollar. All fees received for said examinations and certificates shall be paid into the city treasury.\u201d\nBy the statute of this State which relates to cities, villages and towns, it is provided that the \u201c city council in cities\u201d shall have power (Hurd\u2019s Stat., Ch. 24, Sec. 62, clause 66):\n\u201c To regulate the police of the city or village, and pass and enforce all necessary police ordinances.\u201d\n(Clause 78):\n\u201c To do all acts, make all regulations which may be necessary or expedient for the promotion of health or the suppression of disease.\u201d\nIt is the theory of the bill of complaint that said sections 1415 and 1421 of the city ordinances are repealed or superseded by said legislative enactment of 1897; that appellees having received certificates as master plumbers from said \u201c Board of Examiners of Plumbers,\u201d they are thereby authorized to \u201c work at the business of plumbing in the city of Chicago\u201d as master plumbers, without procuring any other license or authority so to do, and that neither sections 1415 and 1421, nor section 5 of said ordinance of 1898 can be enforced as against them.\n\u201c'An ordinance may derive its validity from several different grants of power, and not depend solely upon any single section or clause of a statute.\u201d Gundling v. City of Chicago, 176 Ill. 346; Kinsley v. City of Chicago, 124 Ill. 359.\nThe express power reposed in the common council \u201c to do all acts,\u201d necessary or expedient for the promotion of health by implication, confers the power to regulate all such business and occupations as affect the health of the people. Kinsley v. City of Chicago, supra; Chicago Pkg. Co. v. City of Chicago, 88 Ill. 221; People v. Chicago Gas Trust Co., 130 Ill. 283; C., P. & W. Ry. Co. v. Marseilles, 84 Ill. 644.\nAll ordinances and regulations for the preservation of the health and safety of the inhabitants are within the police power of the city of Chicago. The power to \u201c pass and enforce all necessary police ordinances \u201d is expressly conferred upon the common council.\nBut whether express or implied, clearly the power exists in the common council to regulate the business of master plumbers in said city. In considering said two clauses, 66 and 78, the Supreme Court in the very recent case of Gundling v. City of Chicago, 176 Ill. 340, 348 (affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States), says:\n\u201c Under these two provisions express authority is granted the municipality to pass all ordinances or requirements tending to promote the public health, morals, security, comfort and welfare of the community. Such legislation is included within the provisions authorizing the enactment of police regulations. The most important of police powers is that of caring for the health of the community, and .that is inherent in a municipality, and may be exercised whether expressly granted or not, because the preservation of the health of the public is indispensable to the existence of the municipal corporation. Ferguson v. City of Selma, 43 Ala. 400.\n\u201c The regulation of the police power is hardly susceptible of exact definition, as the exigencies of each case are varying, and the cases are innumerable where the health of the inhabitants of the municipality may be in some degree endangered. When the city council considers some occupation or thing dangerous to the health of the community, and, in exercise of its discretion, passes an ordinance to prevent such a danger, it is the policy of the law to favor such legislation, as being humane and essential to the preservation and protection of the community. Municipalities are allowed a greater degree of liberty of legislation in this direction than any other. The necessity for action is often more urgent and the consequences of neglect are more detrimental to the public good in this than in any other form of local evil. It being clear that the public health and welfare of a large class in the community would be sub-served and protected by ordinances regulating the sale of tobacco in one of its manufactured forms, an ordinance directed to the protection of the health or welfare of that particular class of the community would be a police regulation within the power of a city to enact under the power expressly granted by paragraphs 66 and 78. An ordinance of this character is not in conflict with any principle of the common law or with any public or general statute, and infringes no private right not necessarily infringed in the interests of good government. It subserves the public welfare, protects the health of the community, and is included \u25a0within the express powers granted the city council. The ordinance was not void.\u201d\nIn the case last cited the point was specifically presented and considered that the ordinance, which provided that no person should keep and expose for sale cigarettes in the city of Chicago without having first procured a license, was null and void for want of power in the common council to pass the same. But the Supreme Court held that the ordinance was within the express powers conferred by said clauses 66 and 78. It will not be contended, we apprehend, by any one, that the regulation of plumbing is not material to the health of the people of this city.\nThird. It is also the theory of said bill of complaint that appellees having obtained certificates from said \u201c Board of Examiners of Plumbers\u201d can not be required to obtain license to conduct the business of master plumbers in said city.\nThat was not the intention of the legislature and is not the construction to be given to said act, approved June 10, 1897. So far as we are advised, this question has never been passed upon by the Supreme Court or any Appellate Court in this State. Similar questions have been considered, however, by courts in sister States. Simpson v. Savage, 1 Mo. 359; Ex parte Siebenhauer, 14 Nev. 365; Welch v. Mayor, etc., 48 Ala. 291; Ambrose v. State, 6 Ind. 351.\nSo far as appears by said act a certificate by the Board of Examiners of Plumbers is valid during the lifetime of the party. There is no provision for its revocation or termination or requiring a re-examination. It is also provided that \u201c said certificates shall be valid and have, force throughout the State.\u201d There is no reason to believe, either from the language of said act or for any other reason apparent to us, that it was intended by the legislature that a certificate by said board in Chicago should authorize the party named therein to conduct the business of a plumber in every other' city and every village and town in the State having 10,000 inhabitants in defiance of their local laws and ordinances. Neither was it intended that a certificate issued by such a board in any one of the smaller cities of this State should authorize a person to conduct such business in the city of Chicago where the conditions are or may be entirely different and in defiance of the ordinances and regulations there in force adopted by the common council or prescribed by the board of health or other proper authorities. The said ordinance requiring that master plumbers shall procure a license and pay a license fee therefor are valid and are not rendered null and void by the said legislative enactment approved June 10, 1897.\nFor the reasons indicated the decree of the Circuit Court is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to dismiss said bill of complaint for want of equity.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Presiding Justice Horton" } ], "attorneys": [ "Charles M. Walker, corporation counsel, Colin C. H.", "Fyffe and William Howard Fitzgerald, assistant corporation counsel, attorneys for appellant.", "No appearance by appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "City of Chicago v. William Wilkie et al.\n1. Ordinances\u2014When a Court of Equity Will Not Restrain Enforcement of.\u2014A court of equity will not entertain a bill to restrain prosecution under a municipal ordinance on the ground of the alleged illegality of such ordinance. The validity of an ordinance of the character here involved can only be tested by appeal from a fine imposed under it.\n2. Same\u2014Exceptions to the Rule that a Court of Equity Will Not Restrain the Enforcement of an Ordinance.\u2014There are two exceptions to the general rule above stated, viz.: First, to prevent irreparable injury; second, to prevent a multiplicity of suits.\n3. Same\u2014May Derive Validity from Different Grants of Power.\u2014 An ordinance may derive its validity from several different grants of power, and not depend solely upon any single section or clause of a statute.\n4 Cities and Villages\u2014Police Poivers.\u2014The city council in cities has power to regulate the police of the city, to pass and enforce all necessary police ordinances, and to do all acts and make all regulations which may be necessary or expedient for the promotion of health or the suppression of disease.\n5. Police Powers\u2014Includes Regulation\u25a0 of All Such Business and Occupations as Affect the Health of the People.\u2014The express power reposed in the common council of a city to do all acts necessary or expedient for the promotion of health, by implication confers the power to regulate all such business and occupations as affect the health of the people.\n6. Same\u2014Ordinances and Regulations for Preservation of Health.\u2014 All ordinances and regulations for the preservation of the health and safety of the inhabitants are within the police power of the city of Chicago. The power to pass and enforce all necessary police ordinances is expressly conferred upon the common council.\n7. Construction of Statutes\u2014Acf of June 10, 1897, Licensing Plumbers.\u2014The act of the General Assembly entitled \u201cAn act to provide for the licensing of plumbers and to supervise and inspect plumbing,\u201d does not expressly or impliedly deprive cities and villages of the power to require a license in order to conduct the business of a master plumber.\nBill for Injunction.\u2014Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. John Gibbons, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1899.\nReversed and remanded with directions.\nOpinion filed April 17, 1900.\nCharles M. Walker, corporation counsel, Colin C. H.\nFyffe and William Howard Fitzgerald, assistant corporation counsel, attorneys for appellant.\nNo appearance by appellees." }, "file_name": "0315-01", "first_page_order": 339, "last_page_order": 347 }