{ "id": 5280474, "name": "Vina Fields v. Paul Brown, Receiver", "name_abbreviation": "Fields v. Brown", "decision_date": "1900-05-10", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "287", "last_page": "291", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "89 Ill. App. 287" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "164 Ill. 51", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5501371 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/164/0051-01" ] }, { "cite": "70 Ill. 480", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5310074 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/70/0480-01" ] }, { "cite": "60 Ill. App. 481", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5158499 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/60/0481-01" ] }, { "cite": "54 Ill. App. 634", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "46 Ill. App. 369", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5148655 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/46/0369-01" ] }, { "cite": "144 Ill. 422", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3081156 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/144/0422-01" ] }, { "cite": "36 Ill. 79", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5214706 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/36/0079-01" ] }, { "cite": "70 Ill. 480", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5310074 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/70/0480-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 446, "char_count": 8366, "ocr_confidence": 0.529, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.2240919645422112e-07, "percentile": 0.6015202044597967 }, "sha256": "b51ae762b819dbd8db7d2790391b1e16441dff4366642c24d14ce223e0276e29", "simhash": "1:c8ccf5268b060c66", "word_count": 1487 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:30:54.280538+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Vina Fields v. Paul Brown, Receiver." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Me. Justioe Adams\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nThis is an appeal from an order overruling a motion to vacate a judgment entered by confession at the May term, 1899, of the Circuit Court.\nIt appears from the record that appellee filed May 15, 1899, his declaration on a written indenture of lease executed April 26, 1898, from appellee to appellant, of certain described premises, for a term from May 1, 1898, to April 30, 1899, at an annual rental of $2,100, payable in monthly installments of $175 each, on the first day of each month of the term. The declaration alleged non-payment of the installments of rent due respectively for the months of March and April, 1898, and claimed $30 as attorney\u2019s fees.\nA copy of the lease, signed by Yina Fields, was filed with the declaration, which contains the following warrant of attorney:\n\u201c The party of the second part hereby irrevocably constitutes Samuel H, Wright, or any attorney of any court of record of this State, attorney for her in her name, on default by law of any of the covenants herein, 'etc., to enter her appearance in any such court, waive process and service thereof and trial by jury, and confess judgment against her in favor of said party of the first part, or his assignee, for forcible detainer of said premises with costs of said suit; and also to enter her appearance in such court, waive process and service thereof, and confess judgment from time to time, for any rent which may be due to said party of the first part bv the terms of this lease, with costs and twenty dollars attorney\u2019s fees, and to waive all errors and all right of appeal from said judgment and judgments, and to file a consent in writing that a writ of restitution or other proper writ of execution may be issued immediately, and said party of the first part waiving all right to any notice or demand,\u201d etc.\nAn affidavit of Philip L. Marshall was also filed with the declaration, in which the affiant deposes that he was appellant\u2019s agent; that the signature \u201c Vina Fields\u201d to the lease was appellant\u2019s genuine signature, and was made in his presence; that a duplicate of the lease was signed by appellee by his agents, and was delivered to appellant, and that there was due appellant on the lease \u00a7370, which included $20 attorney\u2019s fees. A cognovit was filed in the usual form, confessing damages to the amount of \u00a7370, and judgment was entered accordingly.\nAppellant\u2019s counsel objects that appellee\u2019s authority to execute the lease was not proved. Appellant having joined in and accepted the lease, and having entered into the demised premises under and by virtue of the demise, she is estopped from, questioning appellee\u2019s authority or his title.\nIt is farther objected that the court was without jurisdiction and the judgment void, because the copy of lease filed with the declaration was not signed by appellee, but only by appellant.\nThe filing of the declaration, lease and warrant of attorney, and affidavit of its execution, and the cognovit, presented a case of jurisdiction. Bush v. Hanson, 70 Ill. 480.\nThe fact that appellee signed only the copy of the lease which was delivered to appellant, is immaterial. The lease executed by appellee was the original, and that executed by appellant a counterpart, and such counterpart can not be disputed or impeached by appellant, and is primary evidence as against her of the execution and contents of the lease. Wood on Landlord & Tenant, p. 324, Sec. 216.\nWhen a lease is in duplicate, it is the usual and common practice for the landlord to execute one copy and deliver it to the tenant, and for the tenant to execute and deliver the other to the landlord. In such case there is but one lease, and both landlord and tenant are parties to it and bound by it.\nIn support of the motion to vacate the judgment, appellant filed her own affidavit, and also the affidavit of one Lena Stewart, her housekeeper, showing that the demised premises were used by appellant as a house of ill-fame, and deposing that appellee had knowledge of such use, and urges this as a reason why the judgment should be vacated. This is an appeal from .the order overruling the motion to vacate the judgment, and not from the judgment. An appeal from the judgment was not prayed nor allowed, nor would such appeal lie, in view of the terms of the warrant of attorney. The question therefore is, whether the matter shown by the affidavits, even conceding that it would be a good defense to a suit on the lease, is sufficient ground for vacating the judgment. A motion to vacate a judgment is in the nature of a bill in equity to set aside the judgment, and the judgment defendant can only have such relief as he or she is equitably entitled to. Rising v. Brainard, 36 Ill. 79; Farwell v. Myer, Ib. 510; Hansen v. Schlesinger, 125 Ib. 230; Leavitt v. Kennicott, 54 Il. App. 633.\nIf the appellant used the premises for immoral purposes with appellee\u2019s consent, she is, at least, in pari delicto with appellee, if her\u2019s was not the greater fault.\nIn such case the rule in equity is that the court will not assist either party, but will leave the matter as the court finds it. Goodrich v. Tenney, 144 Ill. 422; Bishop v. Am. Preservers\u2019 Co., 157 Ib. 284, 315; Cook v. Meyers, 166 Ib. 282, 289; Paige v. Hieronymous, 180 Ib. 637.\nThe position, in which the court finds appellant in the present case, is with a judgment against her in favor of appellee. She seeks to have that judgment vacated on the ground of an illegality in respect to which her fault was as great if not greater than that of appellee. She does not come into court with clean hands. The court will leave her where it finds her. We find no reversible error in the record.\nThe order overruling.the motion to vacate judgment will be affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Me. Justioe Adams" } ], "attorneys": [ "Henry M\u00a1. Shabad, attorney for appellant.", "Knight & Brown, attorneys for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Vina Fields v. Paul Brown, Receiver.\n1. Estoppel\u2014By Lease, etc.\u2014When a person joins in and accepts a lease and enters into the demised premises under and by virtue of it, he is estopped from questioning the lessor\u2019s authority or his title.\n2. Judgments by Confession\u2014 What Confers Jurisdiction to Enter. \u2014In the confession of a judgment under a power contained in a lease, the filing of the declaration, lease, warrant of attorney, affidavit of its execution and the cognovit, presents a case of jurisdiction.\n3. Lease\u2014Execution of, in Duplicate.\u2014When alease is in duplicate, it is the usual and common practice for the landlord to execute one copy and deliver it to the tenant and for the tenant to execute and deliver the other to the landlord. In such case there is but one lease and both the landlord and tenant are parties to it and bound by it.\n4. Same\u2014Of Premises for Immoral Purposes, When Equity Affords no Relief.\u2014Where a tenant uses demised premises for immoral purposes with the consent of the lessor, both are in pari delicto and equity will decline to assist either party but will leave the matter as it finds it.\n6. Motion\u2014To Vacate Judgments, Nature of, etc.\u2014A motion to vacate a judgment is in the nature of a bill in equity to set aside the judgment, and the defendant can only have such relief as he is equitably entitled to.'\nMotion to Vacate a Judgment.\u2014Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. John Gibbons, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the March term, 1900.\nAffirmed.\nOpinion filed May 10, 1900.\nHenry M\u00a1. Shabad, attorney for appellant.\nKnight & Brown, attorneys for appellee.\nJudgment entered upon a warrant of attorney contained in a lease will be sustained.\nThis precise question upon a warrant of attorney in precisely the same form as the one at bar has been before this court and before the Supreme Court of this State, and has been decided in favor of the sufficiency of such a warrant of attorney. Werkmeister v. Beaumont, 46 Ill. App. 369; Seaver v. Seigel, 54 Ill. App. 634; Scott et al. v. Montonya, 60 Ill. App. 481; Bush v. Hanson, 70 Ill. 480; Fortune v. Bartolomei, 164 Ill. 51.\nTenant can not be heard to question landlord\u2019s power to make a lease on the authority of the agent acting on behalf of the landlord.\nAppellant took possession of the premises anti did not question the title of the landlord or the authority of his agent until after the entry of judgment in this case; appellant can not now be heard to raise the question of title. Taylor\u2019s Landlord & Tenant (8th Ed.), Sec. 629, and cases cited in note 5." }, "file_name": "0287-01", "first_page_order": 309, "last_page_order": 313 }