{
  "id": 1673332,
  "name": "Chicago & Alton R. R. Co. v. George Stallings",
  "name_abbreviation": "Chicago & Alton R. R. Co. v. Stallings",
  "decision_date": "1900-09-08",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "609",
  "last_page": "614",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "90 Ill. App. 609"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "176 Ill. 428",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "152 Ill. 466",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "108 Ill. 582",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
      "opinion_index": 0
    },
    {
      "cite": "134 Ill. 214",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
      "opinion_index": 0
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
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    "simhash": "1:7cbcdaa38f152edf",
    "word_count": 1553
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:41:07.083929+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Chicago & Alton R. R. Co. v. George Stallings."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. Justice Worthington\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nOne of the grounds upon which appellant denied liability was, that appellee and members of both switching crews were fellow-servants. This presented a question of fact to be decided by the jury, the court defining fellow-servants.\nThe first instruction given for appellee is as follows:\n\u201c If the jury believe from the evidence that the defendant is guilty of the acts of negligence charged in the declaration, and that the plaintiff was in the exercise of ordinary care for his own safety before and at the time of his injury, the defendant is liable and plaintiff is entitled to a verdict.\u201d\nThis instruction, in view of the defense that appellee and the members of the switching crews were fellow-servants, was misleading. It invaded the province of the jury. Defendant, through its servants, may have been guilty of the negligence charged, but if appellee, and the servants of defendant who were negligent, were fellow-servants, the defendant was not liable. In giving the instruction, the court in effect assumed that they were not fellow-servants. Joliet Steel Co. v. Shields, 134 Ill. 214.\nThe third instruction for appellee is also misleading. The latter part of the instruction is as follows:\n\u201c If the jury believe from the evidence that Crawford and his crew were not actually co-operating with the plaintiff and his crew at the time he was injured in the particular work in hand and in the same line of employment, or that their duties were not such as to bring them into habitual association, so that they might exercise a mutual influence upon each other promotive of proper caution, and that the plaintiff\u2019s injury resulted directly from negligently attempting to run the train in charge of Crawford\u2019s crew on the out-bound track, and thereby causing the collision with the engine upon which the plaintiff was firing at the time, and that the plaintiff was not guilty of negligence which contributed to his injury, the defendant is liable and the plaintiff is entitled to-a verdict.\u201d\nInstructions defining fellow-servants should be given to the jury with substantial accuracy. C. & 1ST. W. Ey. Co. v. Moranda, 108 Ill. 582.\nThe rule defining fellow-servants is stated in O. & E. I. E. E. Co. v. Kneirim, 152 Ill. 466, as follows:\n\u201c The rule in this State is, that where one servant is injured by the negligence of another servant, where they are directly co-operating 'with each other in a particular business in the same line of employment, or their duties being such as to bring them into habitual association, so that they may exercise a mutual influence upon each other promotive of proper caution, and the master is guilty of no negligence in employing the servant causing the injury, the master is not liable.\u201d\nEeferring to this rule as stated above, it is said in C. & A. E. E. Co. v. Swan, 176 Ill. 428:\n\u201c Two tests of the master\u2019s liability under that rule are assumed to exist: First, \u2018 Where they are directly co-operating with each other in a particular business in the same line of employment;5 and second, \u2018 where their duties are such as to bring them into habitual association, so that they may exercise a mutual influence upon each other promofcive of proper caution.5 As thus construed, the qualifying words, 1 so that they may exercise a mutual influence upon each other promotive of proper caution,5 have no application to the first, but are limited entirely to the second.55\nIt will be seen by these quotations, that it is not necessary that both of these conditions should exist. For this reason, in defining fellow-servants, it would be error to couple both conditions by the copulative conjunction \u201cand.\u201d It is sufficient if either of these conditions exist. For the same reason it would be error to instruct a jury that \u201cif they are not directly co-operating with each other in a particular business in the same line of employment, they are not fellow-servants.\u201d For they might not be so co-operating and yet might .come within the clause, \u201c where their duties are such as to bring them into habitual association, so that they may exercise a mutual influence upon each other pro-motive of proper caution.\u201d\nThis error appears in appellee\u2019s third instruction.\nBy the use of the disjunctive \u201c or \u201d in the third instruction, both tests of what constitutes fellow-servants are not applied. This is clearly seen by putting the proposition as follows : If Crawford and his crew were not actually cooperating with the plaintiff and his crew at the time he was injured in the particular work in hand and in the same line of employment, they were not fellow-servants.\nThat such an instruction would be error is so palpable as not to require argument. It excludes the second test of habitual association.\nHow this is exactly what is done by the use of the disjunctive \u201cor\u201d in the instruction as given. If \u201cnor\u201d had been used instead of \u201c or53 the law would, have been correctly stated. The jury should have been told that if neither of these conditions existed, Crawford and his crew were not fellow-servants, instead of being told that if either one of the conditions did not exist, they were not fellow-servants.\nThe case is a close one, and while it may be that the jurjr were not misled by the instructions cited, we can not say that they were not misled. Judgment reversed and case remanded.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. Justice Worthington"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Travous, Warnock & Burroughs, attorneys for appellant.",
      "Burton & Wheeler, attorneys for appellee; Hillard & Smith, of counsel."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Chicago & Alton R. R. Co. v. George Stallings.\n1. Fellow-Servants\u2014The Rule, in This State.\u2014If one servant is injured by the negligence of another servant, where they are directly co-operating with each other in a particular business in the same line of employment, or their duties are such as to bring them into habitual association, so that they may exercise a mutual influence upon each other pro motive of proper caution, and the master is guilty of no negligence in employing the servant causing the injury, the master is not liable.\n2. Same\u2014Tests of the Master\u2019s Liability.\u2014In the case of fellow-servants the tests of the master\u2019s liability are: First, where the servants are directly co-operating with each other in a particular business in the same line of employment, and second, where their duties are such as to bring them, into habitual association, so that they may exercise a mutual influence upon each other promotive of proper caution.\n3. Same\u2014Not Necessary that Both Conditions Should Exist.\u2014It is not necessary that both these conditions exist, and for this reason, in defining fellow-servants it is error to couple them by a copulative conjunction. For the same reason it is error to instruct a jury that if the servants are not directly co-operating with each other in a particular business in the same line of employment, they are not fellow-servants.\nTrespass on the Case, for personal injuries. Error to the City Court of East St. Louis; the Hon. Silas Cook, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the February term, 1900.\nReversed and remanded.\nOpinion filed September 8, 1900.\nStatement.\u2014Appellant maintained a double track between Venice and Bridge Junction. Under the printed rules of the company, north bound trains were required to take the left hand track at Bridge Junction, and south bound trains the left hand track at Venice. Between these points in the Venice yards, and near, these tracks, is a roundhouse at which the engines were put up after coming from work. From December, 1894, until August, 1897, appellee had worked at this roundhouse, but for four or five months prior to the time of his injury he had been fireman of the engine used by the day switching crew, which went on duty at seven o\u2019clock in. the morning and was due at the roundhouse at six o\u2019clock in the evening. The night crew went on duty at six o\u2019clock p. m. and performed the same duties, passed over the same tracks, arid worked in the same yards that the day crew did. The night crew sometimes arrived at the East St. Louis yards before the day crew left there, and used the same switches and tracks the day crew did. Crawford was foreman of the night crew, and Munter of the day crew. They worked with their respective crews.- On the night of the accident, Hunter, the foreman of appellee\u2019s crew, left it at about 5:30 p. m. and went to his home in Venice. Subsequently appellee\u2019s crew went from Venice to the East St. Louis yards to do some switching, and did not return until after six o\u2019clock.\nCrawford having seen Hunter in the Venice yards, concluded the day crew was in, and thought it safe to take the right-hand track. The first work for his crew was to push some eighteen or twenty cars from the Venice to the East St. Louis yards, which they were doing on the right-hand track, instead of the left-hand track, as directed by the rules. At this time the day crew had finished its work in the East St. Louis yards, and were backing up, on the proper track, to Venice. The result was a collision, in which appellee was injured.\nTravous, Warnock & Burroughs, attorneys for appellant.\nBurton & Wheeler, attorneys for appellee; Hillard & Smith, of counsel."
  },
  "file_name": "0609-01",
  "first_page_order": 629,
  "last_page_order": 634
}
