{ "id": 5286874, "name": "Warren Springer v. Frances DeWolf", "name_abbreviation": "Springer v. DeWolf", "decision_date": "1901-02-19", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "260", "last_page": "266", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "93 Ill. App. 260" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "44 N. J. Law, 252", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.J.L.", "case_ids": [ 363346 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/njl/44/0252-01" ] }, { "cite": "34 Iowa 71", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Iowa", "case_ids": [ 111026 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/iowa/34/0071-01" ] }, { "cite": "131 Mass. 93", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mass.", "case_ids": [ 2129943 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mass/131/0093-01" ] }, { "cite": "13 Allen 168", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Allen", "case_ids": [ 2114779 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mass/95/0168-01" ] }, { "cite": "100 N. Y. 71", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.", "case_ids": [ 2199552 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ny/100/0071-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 Ill. 540", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5368456 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/107/0540-01" ] }, { "cite": "180 Ill. 143", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3197797 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/180/0143-01" ] }, { "cite": "166 Ill. 361", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5498341 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/166/0361-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 609, "char_count": 13725, "ocr_confidence": 0.554, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.15738658894784985 }, "sha256": "68c08e5b31f1e648965220eea6c2adcc19e700ae7e6ac524cc5cdac001bc4560", "simhash": "1:8f234e844d89965c", "word_count": 2341 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:02:01.878414+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Warren Springer v. Frances DeWolf." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Justice Horton\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nThe important question in this case is whether the appellant is liable for the ground rent reserved by the lease mentioned, and accruing after the conveyance by him to McGinniss. All the substantial questions presented in the brief of counsel for appellant are embraced in that proposition.\nTo determine that question we must consider whether there was privity of contract as well as of estate between the appellant and the appellee. As between the lessor \u25a0and the lessee, both exist, but the privity of estate may be terminated by an assignment of the lease by the lessee. Hot so as to the privity of contract. The lessee can not shake off his contractual liability by making such an assignment. When there is no assumption by the assignee of the obligations of the lease, then as between the lessor and the assignee there is privity of estate only, and the assignee is liable for the rent while such privity of estate exists, and no longer. But the assignee may terminate such liability by assigning the lease and going out of possession. Consolidated Coal Co. v. Peers, 166 Ill. 361.\nIn the conveyance from Slosson to the appellant dated April 4, 1889, it is provided that for $1,500 \u201c and in consideration of the assumption by said Warren Springer of all the obligations and liabilities of the lessee arising under said lease \u201d Slosson and wife \u201c sold, assigned and transferred \u201dto appellant the leasehold estate. It will be noticed that that transfer is a conveyance of such estate. It does not, in its language, purport to assign the Ipase, although it has that effect in law.\nBy their certain quit-claim, also dated April 4, 1889, said Slosson and wife conveyed to appellant the building situated upon the demised premises, in which quit-claim it is stated that said Slosson had that day \u201c sold and assigned said lease and all the right, title and interest of the lessee therein \u201d to appellant.\nIn its relation to the question now under consideration, that is, the assumption of liabilities by the appellant, we apprehend it makes but little, if any, difference whether the transfer of the leasehold estate is in form an assignment or a conveyance. The principle upon which the question of liability rests is substantially the same in either case.\nThat conveyance of the leasehold was accepted by appellant, and he went into possession of the demised premises.. A part of the consideration for such conveyance as therein, expressed was \u201cthe assumption by the said Warren Springer-of all the obligations and liabilities of the lessee, arising under said lease.\u201d What is the legal meaning and effect of that assumption ?\nThe definition of the word \u201c assume \u201d in matters of law is \u201c to take upon one\u2019s self.\u201d The word \u201c assumption \u201d used in such a connection as defined in the Century Dictionary, means \u201cthe agreement of the transferee of property to pay obligations of the transferrer which are chargeable on it.\u201d\nHad that conveyance of the leasehold stated that it was made subject to the payment of rent, etc., it would have involved or created no liability upon the part of appellant for rent accruing after he had assigned the lease and ceased to occupy the premises. -(Crawford v. NBimmons, 180 Ill. 143.) But the phraseology and formation of the sentence is such that the assumption of the obligation and liabilities of the lessee can not possibly be construed as meaning subject to such obligations and liabilities. Such assumption is a part of the consideration for the conveyance. How -can the fact that a conveyance is made subject to certain \u25a0obligations and liabilities, be construed to constitute a part \u25a0of the consideration for the making of such conveyance ? And, further: the conveyance in question only purports to convey the \u201cright, title and interest\u201d of the lessee. Without the assumption clause that would be a conveyance, and the appellant would take, subject to the obligations and liabilities of the lessee under the lease. That would have created a privity of estate only, and the appellant, by 'accepting the same, and entering into possession, would have incurred no liability except for the rent for the time he was in possession and occupancy. Hence, if the contention of counsel for appellant be correct, the assumption clause was unnecessary and did not change, or add anything to the conveyance; and the construction to be given to the conveyance would be the same as it would be if the assumption clause was not a part of it. We can not concur in that construction. It must be that that, clause means just what it says, that the appellant assumed the liabilities it expressed.\nDean v. Walker, 107 Ill. 540, cited with approval in Consolidated Coal Co. v. Peers, ante, was a proceeding against the grantee in a conveyance of real estate containing the following clause, viz:\n\u201c Subject, however, to the two trust deeds, the taxes and claims aforesaid, all of which the said party of the second part hereby assumes and agrees to pay as part of the consideration of this conveyance.\u201d\nThe grantee was held to be liable. That is the settled law for this State.\nA clause in the deed under consideration in Douglas v. Cross, 56 Howd. Pr. Rep. 330, was as follows: \u201c Subject, however, to the assumption as a part of the consideration \u201d of the conveyance to, a certain mortgage. It was there held that this language amounted to an agreement on the part of the grantee to pay the mortgage.\nIn Schley v. Pryer, 100 N. Y. 71, the clause in the deed which the Court of Appeals was called upon to construe read as follows:\n\u201cThis conveyance is made subject to two certain mortgages for \u00a74,000 each, and which said party of the second part assumes, with interest from the 22d day of August, 1871.\u201d\nThe contention in that case, as in the case at bar, was that the language was not broad enough to impose a personal liability upon the grantee. In the opinion holding that the grantee was personally liable, the court said (p. 74):\n\u201c The defendant claims that the word 1 assumes \u2019 is not broad enough to impose a personal liability upon him to pay the mortgage in question. If it had been intended simply to provide that he should take the land subject to the two mortgages, the further language in this clause, in which the word \u2018 assumes \u2019 appears, would not have been necessary. Unless that word was used to impose a personal liability upon the defendant to pay, it was wholly unnecessary and serves no purpose, and adds nothing to the force of the language used. A rule of construction requires us to give force and effect, if possible, to all the language used. That word is frequently used in deeds to impose a liability to pay upon the grantee, and we believe it is generally understood among conveyancers to impose such liability. Such effect has been \u25a0 given to the word when so used in several well considered cases in other States. (Drury v. Tremont Imp. Co., 13 Allen 168; Loche v. Homer, 131 Mass. 93; Stout v. Folger, 34 Iowa 71; Sparkman v. Gove, 44 N. J. Law, 252.) The word must therefore have the same meaning which it would have if the words \u2018 to pay\u2019 followed it. If not, what does it mean?\u201d\nThe language of the assumption clause in the case at bar is much stronger against the contention of counsel than that in the case just cited. In the latter the language was simply that the grantee assumed the incumbrances, while in the case at bar the assumption was a part of the consideration for the conveyance.\nThere are some technical objections made by appellant, such as that there is no consideration for the alleged assumption; that it does not appear that the conveyance to appellant was of the leasehold estate in question; and that such conveyance is void under the statute of frauds because it is not signed by the appellant. We have considered such objections and are of opinion that they are without merit.\nThe\u2019 appellant received a conveyance of the leasehold estate, received possession of such estate and assumed to pay the rent. There was thereby established between the appellant and the appellee a privity of contract, and a privity of estate. That privity of estate was terminated by the conveyance and transfer of possession of the demised premises to McGinnis. But the privity of contract\u2014the contractual liability of appellant, was not thus terminated. Mo valid reason is apparent to us why the appellant should not pay the rent he assumed. The decree of the Superior Court is right and is affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Justice Horton" } ], "attorneys": [ "W. H. Gimmill, attorney for appellant.", "Paddock, Wright & Billings, solicitors for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Warren Springer v. Frances DeWolf.\n1. Landlord and Tenant\u2014Privity of Estate and of Contract-Assignments by the Lessee.\u2014As between the lessor and lessee both privity of estate and privity of contract exist; the privity of estate may be terminated by an assignment of the lease by the lessee, but he can not avoid his contractual liability by such an assignment.\n2. Conveyances\u2014Effect of Assumption Clauses.\u2014Rules of construction require the courts to give force and effect to all the language used in conveyances, and where the word \u201cassume \u201d is used in an assumption clause it will be construed as imposing a liability upon the grantee.\nBill to Foreclose a Lien for Rent.\u2014Appeal from the Superior Court; the Hon. Farlin Q. Ball, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the October term, 1900.\nAffirmed.\nOpinion filed February 19, 1901.\nStatement.\u2014In this case a bill was filed by appellee to foreclose a lien for rent under a ninety-nine-year ground lease of the premises known as 188 Monroe street, Chicago. Said lease is dated November 24, 1888, and is by Calvin DeWolf, lessor, to William E. Slosson, lessee. The fee simple title to said premises passed by conveyance from Calvin DeWolf to Wallace DeWolf and from the latter to appellee prior to the filing of said bill. April 4, 1899, said Slosson executed and delivered to the appellant the following transfer or conveyance, to wit:\n\u201c For fifteen hundred dollars ($1,500) in hand paid by Warren Springer, of Chicago, Illinois, to William E. Slosson, lessee in the within lease, and in consideration of the assumption by the said Warren Springer of all the obligations and liabilities of the lessee arising under said lease, the said William E. Slosson and Katie F. Slosson, his wife, have sold, assigned and transferred, and do hereby sell, assign and transfer to the said Warren Springer all the right, title and interest of the lessee herein in and to the within described premises, with all the rights, privileges and appurtenances thereunto belonging, or in any wise appertaining, for the whole of the remainder of the term of said lease, and for all renewals and extension thereof, and all dower and other rights of Katie F. Slosson.\nSigned and sealed at Chicago, Illinois, this 4th day of April, 1889. ,\nWilliam E. Slossor, [Seal]\nKatie F. Slossor. [Seal] \u201d\nA copy of the above was inclosed in the following letter from appellant, to wit:\n\u201cWarrer Sprirger,\nKeal Estate & Loans,\n207 South Canal Street.\nChicago, May 22, 1889.\nWallace L. DeWolf, 184 Dearborn Street, City.\nDear Sir : I inclose you herewith a copy of the assignment of William E. Siosson to me, of the lease of the premises on Monroe street, as per your request this day. Please send me your written consent to this assignment as well as your assent to the extension of the time for putting the improvements on the said premises to June 1,1890, all confirming our conversation of this day, and very much oblige.\nTours truly,\n(Dictated.) Warrer Sprirger.\u201d\nAfterward the appellee and the appellant executed their, certain agreement in writing, dated July 29,1890, in which it is agreed by and between them that the time for placing the improvements on said premises be extended to January 29, 1892, and that in the meantime, appellant should, in addition to the performance of the other covenants in said lease, furnish to appellee insurance on the buildings then upon said premises in the sum of $5,000.\nAfterward the same parties, by their agreement in writing, dated June 30, 1891, further extended the time for-making said improvements to January 1, 1895, which also provided that appellant would furnish to appellee insurance upon said buildings in the sum of $6,000 \u201c in addition to the performance of the other covenants in said lease.\u201d\nUpon the said conveyance or transfer to appellant by said Siosson April 4, 1889, appellant went into possession of said premises and continued in said possession until July 29, 1897. Appellant assigned said lease to John McGinniss by his instrument in writing of that date, and-said McGinniss, under date of August 6, 1897, assigned said lease to Charles E. Miller. Subsequent to the time when appellant turned over the possession of said premises to McGinniss, nine payments were made to appellee on account of the rent due under said lease, each and all by the check of appellant, the last one being February o, 1898. The bill of complaint was filed March 3, 1898. The appellant and said tilosson, McGinniss and Miller, with others, were made parties defendant to said bill.\nIn the trial court a decree was entered wherein it was found that there was due to appellee under said lease the sum of $12,876.13, which included rent up to the time of the entry of such decree; that appellant' was personally liable therefor; that of said sum of $12,876.13 the sum of $9,293.61 accrued after the assignment to said Miller, and who is also personally liable to appellee therefor; and that the master proceed to sell the interest of the parties defendant in and to said premises. The appellant, Warren Springer, alone appealed from that decree.\nW. H. Gimmill, attorney for appellant.\nPaddock, Wright & Billings, solicitors for appellee." }, "file_name": "0260-01", "first_page_order": 284, "last_page_order": 290 }