{
  "id": 5295218,
  "name": "West Chicago St. R. R. Co. v. Ida G. Petters",
  "name_abbreviation": "West Chicago St. R. R. v. Petters",
  "decision_date": "1901-06-20",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "479",
  "last_page": "483",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "95 Ill. App. 479"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "167 Ill. 204",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
      "case_ids": [
        3092381
      ],
      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "212"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill/167/0204-01"
      ]
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  "analysis": {
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    "simhash": "1:9882e39c8a8705c9",
    "word_count": 1740
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:45:04.207129+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "West Chicago St. R. R. Co. v. Ida G. Petters."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. Presiding Justioe Adams\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nThis is an appeal from a judgment recovered by appellee against appellant, for the sum of $5,000. The evidence for appellee tends to show that she was going west, in a sleigh driven by a Mr. Butterworth, on the north or west-bound track of appellant on Twelfth street, in the city of Chicago, in the evening of February 24,1898; that the sleigh turned into Twelfth street when they were a little west of Kedzie street (which crosses Twelfth street a number of blocks east of Millard avenue), and when they were about nine feet west of Millard avenue, a west-bound car of appellant came up behind the sleigh or cutter and crashed into it, causing the injuries complained of. Also, that the snow was deep and piled up on both sides of the track, so that it was impracticable to drive except in the railway track. The evidence of appellant tended to prove that the cutter could have been cohveniently driven on the north side of the north track, and that the driver of the cutter suddenly turned onto the track when appellant\u2019s car was so short a distance from it that the motorman of the car could not stop it in time to avoid the collision.\nAppellant\u2019s counsel rest appellant\u2019s claim for reversal of the judgment solely on alleged errors of the court in giving and refusing instructions. It is claimed that the court erred in giving plaintiff\u2019s fourth instruction, and in refusing defendant\u2019s instructions 19, 21, 23, 24 and 25. These will be considered in the order mentioned.\nInstruction 4 commences thus:\n\u201c If the jury find from a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff was injured, as charged in her declaration, by reason of the alleged negligence of the defendant,\u201d etc.\nThe sole objection to the instruction is that the word \u201c alleged \u201d is used in it. It is true that the word is unnecessary, but we can not perceive that the appellant could have been in any way prejudiced by its use.\nInstruction 19. \u201c The court instructs the jury that no presumption of negligence arises against the defendant from the mere fact, of itself, that the plaintiff was injured in connection with the defendant\u2019s car.\u201d\nThis instruction is, as we think, substantially included in instruction 6, given at appellant\u2019s request, which is as follows :\n\u201c 6. The jury are instructed that the plaintiff can not recover in this case against the defendant company unless they find that she had a preponderance of the evidence supporting the propositions:\n1st. That the plaintiff was not at the time of the accident guilty of any failure to exercise ordinary care for her own safety, which proximately contributed to her injury.\n2d. That the defendant company was guilty of negligence in the manner charged in the declaration.\n3d. That such negligence was the proximate, direct cause of the plaintiff\u2019s injuries in question, if any.\nAnd if you find from the evidence that the plaintiff has failed to sustain these propositions, as stated, or that she has failed to sustain any one of them, she can not recover against said defendant company, and you should find the defendant not guilty.\u201d\nInstruction 21. \u201c The jury are instructedThat, even if they believe from the evidence in this caseJthat the defendant, by its servant or servants, shortly before the accident, saw the driver of the sleigh in question driving near the track where the injury occurred, yet, as a matter of law, they had a right to presume that the said driver was a person of ordinary prudence and would exercise ordinary and reasonable precaution to avoid danger, and the defendant\u2019s servant or servants had a right to act on that presumption until said servant or servants saw something in his conduct to indicate to the contrary.\u201d\nThere was no error in refusing this instruction. What appellant\u2019s servants in charge of the car might or might not assume was a question for the jury. Louisville, etc., Ry. Co. v. Patchen, 167 Ill. 204, 212.\nInstruction 23. \u201c If the jury believe from the evidence that the sole cause of the injury to the plaintiff was the negligent manner in which the sleigh in question was driven or managed \u2014 if the jury believe from the evidence that the sleigh was negligently driven or managed, then the court instructs the jury to find the defendant not guilty.\u201d\nThe court, by instruction 6, above quoted, told the jury that there could be no recovery unless they found from the evidence that the defendant was negligent as charged in the declaration, and that such negligence was the direct and proximate cause of the plaintiff\u2019s injuries. This clearly excluded recovery, if the jury believed from the evidence that the sole cause of the accident xvas the negligent driving of the sleigh. Besides, the theory of appellant as to the cause of the accident was that the sleigh was suddenly turned into the track so close to the approaching car that the motorman could not avoid the collision, and so the accident was occasioned by the negligent driving of the sleigh. This theory was fully submitted to the jury by appellant\u2019s instruction 8, as follows:\n\u201c 8. The court instructs the jury that while, if you believe from the evidence that the occupants of the sleigh in question were driving along the street in such a position that they were likely to be injured by the advance of the car, the motorman in charge of the defendant\u2019s car was bound to use ordinary care to prevent such threatened injury, if he knew, or by the exercise of ordinary care might have known, the danger, and if by using ordinary care lie might have avoided it, yet if the jury believe from the evidence that the said sleigh was driven in front of the car so suddenly that the said motorman had no such notice of any danger to the occupants of the said sleigh as to give such motorman an opportunity to avoid the danger by the exercise of such presence of mind, and of such ordinary care as is to be expected from men of ordinary coolness and prudence under such circumstances as -were then surrounding him, and if the jury further believe from the evidence that at the time of the accident and prior thereto the car of the defendant was being operated with ordinary care, then the plaintiff has no right to a verdict in her favor.\u201d\nInstruction 24. \u201c The court instructs the jury that while the defendant in operating its said car at the time and place in question was bound to have regard to the rights and safety of others, yet it was not obliged to be all the while on its guard against the not reasonably to be expected, the unusual and extraordinary, and if the jury believe that the crossing of the track by the sleigh in which the plaintiff was riding, if it did cross the track, was, under all the circumstances in evidence, extraordinary, not reasonably to be expected, of unusual, then it became the duty of the defendant to stop its car only so soon as the servant or servants in charge thereof had notice or knowledge, or by the exercise of ordinary care could have had notice or knowledge of the crossing of the track by the said sleigh; and if the jury further believe from the evidence that such notice or knowledge was insufficient for the said servant or servants by the exercise of ordinary care to stop said car without injuring the said plaintiff, then the jury must find the defendant not guilty.\u201d\nWe find no evidence in the record that the crossing of the track, if it was crossed, by the sleigh, was unusual and extraordinary, and we apprehend that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to prove that, in the city of Chicago, it is unusual and extraordinary for a vehicle, moving in a certain direction, to be driven into and upon a street car track some distance from, and in front of, a street car moving in the same direction in the same track. The result of such an investigation might be that, instead of being unusual and extraordinary, it is quite common. The instruction, if given, would have left the jury to guess whether it was usual or unusual, ordinary or extraordinary. The sixth instruction, above quoted, informed the jury that appellant was not liable in case the sleigh was driven in front of the approaching car so'suddenly that the motorman, in the exercise of ordinary care, under the circumstances, could not avoid the collision, and such is the law, whether the so driving the sleigh was, or not, unusual and extraordinary.\nInstruction 25. \u201c The court instructs the jury that if they believe from the evidence that the injury to the plaintiff was the result of an accident which occurred without the negligence of the defendant, as charged in the declaration, they should return a verdict of not guilty.\u201d\nThis instruction is fully included in the sixth and other instructions given. It is needless to repeat what has been frequently said as to the repetition, in different language, of instructions given. The jury were fully and fairly instructed.\nThe judgment will be affirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. Presiding Justioe Adams"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "John A. Rose and Louis Boisot, Jr., attorneys for appellant; W. W. Gurley, of counsel.",
      "Francis J. Woolley, attorney for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "West Chicago St. R. R. Co. v. Ida G. Petters.\n1. Instructions \u2014 Word \u201cAlleged\u201d Unnecessary, but Not Error to Use. \u2014 In an instruction in a personal injury case which states that \u201c The plaintiff was injured by reason of the \u2018 alleged \u2019 negligence of the defendant,\u201d etc., the word \u201c alleged \u201d is unnecessary, but the defendant is in no way prejudiced by its use.\n3. Same \u2014 Stating What a Servant of Company May Assume, May be Refused. \u2014 An instruction which states that, as a matter of law. the servant of a street car company may assume certain things therein specified and act thereon without being guilty of negligence, is properly refused.\n3. Same \u2014 When Properly Refused. \u2014 Instructions which are covered by other instructions in the case are properly refused.\nAction on the Case, for personal injuries. Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Marcus Kavanagh, Judge, presiding. Heard in this court at the October term, 1900.\nAffirmed.\nOpinion filed June 20, 1901.\nJohn A. Rose and Louis Boisot, Jr., attorneys for appellant; W. W. Gurley, of counsel.\nFrancis J. Woolley, attorney for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0479-01",
  "first_page_order": 503,
  "last_page_order": 507
}
