{
  "id": 871224,
  "name": "Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Calumet Stock Farm",
  "name_abbreviation": "Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Calumet Stock Farm",
  "decision_date": "1901-07-12",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "337",
  "last_page": "342",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "96 Ill. App. 337"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
    "id": 8837,
    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "160 Ill. 648",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
      "case_ids": [
        3129542
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill/160/0648-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "152 Ill. 484",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
      "case_ids": [
        835332
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill/152/0484-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "133 Ill. 96",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
      "case_ids": [
        5427499
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill/133/0096-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 499,
    "char_count": 10258,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.532,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 1.0873401050065135e-07,
      "percentile": 0.5640946634340458
    },
    "sha256": "89dac04ca51e8d2475dad8207181ac477a93d10bf7148bccde3c14a6d9e5c227",
    "simhash": "1:32b9d7121cdbc5e7",
    "word_count": 1800
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:02:30.133382+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Calumet Stock Farm."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. Justice Waterman\ndelivered the opinion of the court.\nAt the instance of the defendant the court instructed the jury that the plaintiff, to recover, must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the alleged accident occurred upon the premises of the defendant, or was the result of gross carelessness upon the part of the agents or servants of the defendant, and that if the plaintiff should fail to make such proof then the jury should find for the defendant.\nThe court also at the instance of the defendant instructed the jury that if the accident in question happened after the switching of the car containing plaintiff\u2019s horses onto the Pan Handle track, and while the car was being put into the train of cars then on the Pan Handle line, which took the horses from Chicago to Fort Wayne, and resulted from the carelessness of the servants or agents of that line, then the plaintiff could not recover and they should find for the defendant.\nWhile it does appear that the plaintiff\u2019s agent in ship-\" ping the horses signed a printed and written contract, by the terms of which the liability of the defendant was limited to \u00a7100 for each of the animals, it does not appear that the attention of any agent' of the defendant was called to the provisions of such contract, or that the plaintiff understood that the liability of the defendant was so limited.\nThe evidence tended to show that the accident was occasioned by the making of what is known as .a \u201cflying switch \u201d or the \u201c kicking \u201d of a freight car against that in which the plaintiff\u2019s horses were, and that such accident occurred before the car containing the horses had been turned over by the defendant to the Pan Handle road. The jury -were from such evidence warranted in finding that the accident was occasioned by the gross carelessness of the defendant; not that there was any intention to injure the plaintiff\u2019s horse, but that such methods of shifting a freight car and such carelessness as allowed it to come into the violent contact it did with the car containing the plaintiff\u2019s horses was gross carelessness. That the car containing the plaintiff\u2019s horses was struck with great violence, so much, indeed, as to throw the plaintiff\u2019s horses off their feet and cause them to be cut and bruised in many places, was testified to by witnesses for plaintiff, and defendant.\nIt is well settled in this State that a railroad company can not, by any agreement, restrict its liability for gross negligence. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Company v. Chapman, 133 Ill. 96; Wabash R. R. Co. v. Brown, 152 Ill. 484, and Chicago & Northern Railway Co. v. Simon, 160 Ill. 648.\nThe testimony as to the value of the horses before and after the accident, as well as the extent of the injuries to them, was, as is almost always the case when the value and condition of horses is under consideration, extremely variant, as is pointed out by appellant\u2019s counsel. According to the testimony of the manager for appellee the damage sustained by it amounts to over \u00a750,000, while it is endeavoring to sustain a judgment giving it only \u00a71,500.\nThere is probably no matter concerning which the opinions of experts vary more widely and in which it is so difficult to ascertain the exact facts as with reference to the value of trotting and other high priced horses.\nThe action, of the court in admitting some of the testimony offered by appellee as to value we are inclined to think ought not to have been allowed to go in over the objection of appellant. Prone as experts are to espouse the cause of the party by whom they are called, and in .many instances paid for the time and attention they give to an examination of the matter under consideration, the rule under which they alone are allowed to give opinions as to facts ought not to be enlarged. The opinions given by experts should always be based upon facts within their actual knowledge and which they are prepared to state. Having stated such facts, and thus, if at all, shown themselves to be especially qualified to give an opinion, the opinion should be based entirely upon the facts presented to them or which they state. Any man might truthfully say that he knew a certain horse and had an opinion as to its value, but such mere knowledge and mere opinion would not be sufficient to allow him to give the latter in evidence. Moreover, the opinion as to the value of a trotting horse should not be merely what the witness thinks it is worth, but what he thinks because of what he knows concerning the horse and what his acquaintance with the value of such horse is, and such opinion should always be the salable and purchasable value of such horse. While in making up the opinion as to such value, any qualities which it has, either as an earner of money or for purposes of sale, may be taken into consideration and stated.\nSetting aside, however, all of the expert testimony as to the value which we think should not have been received, the remaining evidence fairly warranted the jury in finding that the plaintiff had, by the accident, sustained damages amounting to $1,500.\nThe case may be, as counsel for appellant urged, a speculative one, that is, one, as counsel say, which has been taken up by some lawyer who defrays the expenses and trusts to the judgment for his remuneration; while such facts, if shown, might have influence with a jury, we do not see how it, under the record in this case, can affect the right of the plaintiff to retain the judgment it has obtained.\nWe find, neither in the instructions given nor refused, or in any other portion of the record, any error warranting the reversal of the'judgment of the Circuit Court, and it is affirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. Justice Waterman"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Botsford,Wayne & Botsford, attorneys for appellant.",
      "Aldrioh & Worcester and J. F. Snyder, attorneys for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Calumet Stock Farm.\n1. Common Carriers\u2014 Can Not Contract Against Gross Negligence. \u2014A common carrier can not relieve himself, by contract, from a loss resulting from his gross negligence.\n2. Railroads\u2014When Guilty of Gross Carelessness.\u2014A railroad company is guilty of gross carelessness which makes a \u201c flying switch \u201d whereby a freight car is kicked violently against another containing horses thereby injuring them.\n3. Expert Testimony\u2014Opinions of Experts to be Based upon Facts Within Their Actual Knowledge.\u2014Opinions given by experts should always be based upon facts within their actual knowledge or which they are prepared to state. Having stated such facts, and thus, if at all, shown themselves to be especially qualified to give an opinion, the opinion should be based entirely upon the facts presented to them or which they state.\n4. Evidence\u2014What a Witness as to the Value of a Trotting Horse Should State.\u2014The opinion of a witness as to the value of a trotting horse shoul 1 not be merely what the witness thinks it is worth, but what he thinks because of what he knows concerning the horse and what his acquaintance with the value of such horse is, and such opinion should always be the salable and purchasable value of the horse.\nAction in Case.\u2014Appeal from the Circuit Court of DuPage County; the Hon. Charles A. Bishop, Judge, presiding.\nHeard in this court at the April term, 1901.\nAffirmed.\nOpinion filed July 12, 1901.\nThis was an action brought against appellant for an alleged injury to three horses of appellee, caused by an accident to a car in which they were being shipped from Geneva, Illinois, to Fort Wayne, Indiana.\nThese horses were put on board of a stock car at Geneva, Illinois, on August 10, 1893; the horses were, by the bill of lading, to be transported over the Northwestern Railway to Chicago, and from there over the Pan Handle road, so-called, to Fort Wayne.\nThe declaration in one count states, in substance, that the car containing these horses arrived in Chicago late in the evening of the day on which they were shipped; that in detaching the car from the train, this car containing the horses was thrown against other cars through the willful and reckless conduct of the appellant\u2019s agents and servants in moving the same, whereby the said horses were severely and ' permanently injured. Another count charged the injury to the negligence and misconduct of the defendant.\nAppellant filed a plea of the general issue. On the trial the jury rendered a verdict for $1,500 in favor of the plaintiff, and judgment was entered on the verdict of the jury.\nThe evidence tends to show that the car containing the horses, after it had reached Chicago, was set out of the train to which it had been- attached, and was waiting in the yard of one of the said railways, and that a train of cars, in backing up to connect this car with said train, struck this car with considerable force, and the said horses, or some of 'them, were thrown down and received bruises.\nThe evidence left it somewhat uncertain as to where the car was at the time of the accident in reference to the yard owned and used by the respective railway companies, but it appears that it was struck by the train to which it was afterward attached, and which transferred the horses to Fort Wayne.\nAppellant claims that the accident did not occur in its yards, nor through the willful negligence of its servants, or employes; that the said horses nor. either of them were injured in any way to affect their value as race horses or their market value in any respect.\nIt is further claimed by appellant that the stallion Roy Wilkes and the filly Lady Roy had been severely and permanently injured for racing purposes before this alleged injury; that the horse Hutonian before the accident was a \u201c scrub \u201d and not worthy to be classed as a race horse\u2014 that his gait was neither that of a pacer, nor a trotter, and his training alternated from one gait to another until he was spoiled for either a pacer or a trotter.\nIt is also claimed by appellant that the contract under which these horses were shipped, limited the liability of the appellant company and that the evidence in the record in connection with the contract, limits any liability thereunder for loss \u00f3r damage, to the sum of $100; and further, that appellant can not be held for any accident or injury to said horses which occurred beyond the line of appellant\u2019s railway.\nBotsford,Wayne & Botsford, attorneys for appellant.\nAldrioh & Worcester and J. F. Snyder, attorneys for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0337-01",
  "first_page_order": 359,
  "last_page_order": 364
}
