{
  "id": 5339349,
  "name": "L. Balkin Builder, Inc., an Illinois Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent",
  "name_abbreviation": "L. Balkin Builder, Inc. v. State",
  "decision_date": "1950-04-18",
  "docket_number": "No. 4023",
  "first_page": "170",
  "last_page": "175",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "20 Ill. Ct. Cl. 170"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. Ct. Cl.",
    "id": 8793,
    "name": "Illinois Court of Claims"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 429,
    "char_count": 8251,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.581,
    "sha256": "eed7082e90f0983c636c295c5ce8e38a30755f08fca6e3c188e91b5845267601",
    "simhash": "1:1b7aec503618d784",
    "word_count": 1371
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:49:12.522107+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "L. Balkin Builder, Inc., an Illinois Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "S CHUMAN, C. J.\nClaim is brought by L. Balkin Builder, Inc., an Illinois corporation, against the State of Illinois, which arises out of a contract dated November 26, 1943 for making repairs on the substructure and superstructure of the bridge' over the Illinois River at Peru, LaSalle County, Illinois.\nOne of the first questions to coiisider is whether or not the \u201cStandard Specifications for Road and Bridge Construction\u201d, adopted July 1, 1942 by the Department of Public Works and Buildings, Division of Highways, is a part of the contract in its entirety. The Departmental Report filed in this Court on February 23,-1949 on page 6 sets forth the following:\n\u201cThe Standard Specifications for Road and Bridge Construction, adopted July 1, 1942, as supplemented and amended, are to be used only when referred to in this contract as set forth in Paragraph 5.0 of the Specifications, and at no other time. Extra work is specifically provided for in the contract between claimant and respondent under Paragraph XV of the Memorandum of Agreement. Therefore, the provisions of the Standard Specifications, as alleged by claimant, do not apply, and claimant is not entitled to any further payment under this count of the complaint.\u201d\nThere is no express provision in the contract in question making said \u201cStandard Specifications\u201d a part of said contract. The only thing that appears in the record is the testimony of J. A. Todson, Chief of Operations for the Division of Waterways, who stated that general specifications are included in all contracts, and that he referred to \u201cStandard Specifications\u201d adopted July 1, 1942.\nRespondent cites Henkel Construction Company v. State of Illinois, 10 C.C.R. 538. On page 542 of that opinion the Court specifically held that the pertinent parts of the \u201cGeneral Specifications\u201d pertaining to acceptance of last payment by the contractor were made a part of the contract.\nRespondent also cites Madison Construction Company v. State of Illinois, 11 C.C.R. 64, but in that case the \u201cStandard Specifications\u201d were specifically made a part of the contract.\nRespondent also cites L. B. Strandberg & Son Co. v. State of Illinois, 13 C.C.R. 49. This case was on a motion to dismiss, and an affidavit filed in support of the motion showed the release provisions of the \u201cStandard Specifications\u201d were a part of the contract.\nRespondent cites Richardson v. State of Illinois, 14 C.C.R. 3. In that case the \u201cStandard Specifications\u201d were specifically made a part of the contract.\nRespondent cites case of Worden-Allen Company v. State of Illinois, 16 C.C.R. 138. That case was disposed of on a motion to dismiss, and the contract contained a specific provision that \u201cthe acceptance by the contractor of the last payment shall operate as and shall be a release to the Department ...\u201d\nRespondent cites the case of Hartmann-Clark Bros. Company v. State of Illinois, 17 C.C.R. 99. In that case the contract specifically provided \u201cthat the work be done according to the \u2018Standard Specifications\u2019 \u201d.\nIn looking at the contract we can find no such provision \u00e1s contended for by the respondent. On the contrary, according to the Departmental Report, the \u2018 \u2018 Standard Specifications\u201d were only to be used when referred to in the contract.\nIn the ease at bar no defenses were raised as to payment. Even though they were not raised, if the contract had the applicable provisions of the \u201cStandard Specifications\u2019 \u2019 as to release set forth, such provisions would be binding on the claimant. The Court concludes that the claim of a release is not meritorious.\nIn disposing of the above questions, it then becomes necessary to determine whether or not claimant is entitled to the relief prayed.\nUnder Count I of the complaint, the Court concludes as to paragraph 6 that claimant should be allowed 44 F.B.M. of new lumber, which figured at the rate specified of $373.00 per thousand would amount to $16.41.\nUnder paragraph 7 the Court concludes claimant is entitled to 157 F.B.M. for salvaged lumber, which figured at the rate specified of $293.00 per thousand would amount to $46.00.\nUnder paragraph 8 the evidence shows that 341.25 cubic yards of concrete were purchased by claimant for the particular job.. Claimant\u2019s Exhibit 6 shows 5 cubic yards wasted. This deducted from 341.25 cubic yards leaves 336.25 cubic yards. Claimant was paid for 330.8 cubic yards leaving 5.45 cubic yards for which payment should be made. This figured at $56.50 per cubic yard would amount to $307.92.\nThe claims under paragraphs 9 and 10 are d\u00e9nied.\nUnder Count II the evidence shows the work performed was not in the original plans, and that new plans were, submitted. Therefore, claimant is entitled to the sums claimed in paragraph 2(a), 2(b), and 2(c) in the amount of $214.80.\nThe installation of fender timbers were not shown on the plans, and claimant should be allowed the amount claimed under paragraph 2(d) in the amount of $568.13.\nParagraph 2(e) is denied, as the State allowed one-half of this amount on a questionable item.\nThere is no competent evidence as to value under Count III, and this amount is denied. The question as to the definition of the word \u201cdisposal\u201d is not decided.\nCount IV claims additional amounts for extending foundation down 4' below the contract line. Claimant\u2019s Exhibit 18 shows the installation of the concrete jacket was to extend to the bed of the stream, and specifically provided that the contractor was to verify all measurements in the field, and this was borne out by claimant\u2019s own evidence. Claimant contends \u201cStandard Specifications\u201d applies, although the contract does not so specify. Claimant alleged in its complaint that respondent requested the concrete jacket be extended four feet below the contract line. This is not borne out by the evidence. If claimant desires to be bound by the \u201cStandard Specifications\u201d, then its entire claim would have to be disallowed under the decisions previously stated. Claimant in its brief states that \u201cStandard Specifications\u201d only applied in specific instances. To this both sides agree. Under paragraph 3 of the contract the contractor agreed that it would satisfy itself as to all conditions affecting the work. For the reasons assigned, the claim in Count IV is disallowed.\nThere is no dispute as to Count V, only respondent states that the prevailing rates for labor attached to the contract were minimum. Under paragraph 19 of page 4(b) on information to bidders, the Court is of the opinion that prevailing rates in the area were to be paid, and claimant is entitled to the additional amount claimed of $825.19.\nThe Court concludes claimant is entitled to recover the sum of $1,978.45.\nAn award is entered in favor of claimant in the amount of $1,978.45.\nSupplemental Opinion\nSchuman, C. J.\nThe Court on rehearing has considered the intent and purpose of the statute \u201cWages on Public Works\u201d, and concludes that said statute was to remedy the evil of paying wages under the prevailing rate in the locality where the work was to be done, and does not affect the contractual provisions between the State and claimant in this case.\nIn fact the statute provides a declaration of policy that the State in letting public contracts shall require the payment of prevailing wage rates in the community where work is to be done, and the State shall not be a party to sub-standard wage cutting.\nIn the contract it is provided that, if rates determined by the Department are superseded after the award of the contract, adjustments are to be made.\nEvidence was submitted showing that the prevailing rate was different in the locality where the work was performed. The items as to insurance \u2022 will be deducted from the amount paid, which was $81.78, and the opinion modified to reduce the amount of $825.19 to $743.41.\nOpinion is modified to show an award in the sum of $1,896.67.\nAn award is entered in favor of claimant in the amount of $1,896.67.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "S CHUMAN, C. J. Schuman, C. J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Brown, Fox and Blumberg, Attorneys for Claimant:",
      "Ivan A. Elliott, Attorney General; C. Arthur Nebel, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "(No. 4023\nL. Balkin Builder, Inc., an Illinois Corporation, Claimant, vs. State of Illinois, Respondent.\nOpinion filed April 18, 1950.\nSupplemental Opinion filed December 15, 1950.\nBrown, Fox and Blumberg, Attorneys for Claimant:\nIvan A. Elliott, Attorney General; C. Arthur Nebel, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent."
  },
  "file_name": "0170-01",
  "first_page_order": 194,
  "last_page_order": 199
}