{ "id": 206627, "name": "John Gipson, Jr., Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent", "name_abbreviation": "Gipson v. State", "decision_date": "1999-03-04", "docket_number": "No. 88-CC-0569", "first_page": "54", "last_page": "64", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "51 Ill. Ct. Cl. 54" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. Ct. Cl.", "id": 8793, "name": "Illinois Court of Claims" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "40 Ill. Ct. Cl. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. Ct. Cl.", "case_ids": [ 3112685 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-ct-cl/40/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "47 Ill. Ct. Cl. 186", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. Ct. Cl.", "case_ids": [ 3139899 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "191" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-ct-cl/47/0186-01" ] }, { "cite": "433 N.E.2d 1301", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "89 Ill. 2d 506", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5493797 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/89/0506-01" ] }, { "cite": "28 Ill. Ct. Cl. 229", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. Ct. Cl.", "case_ids": [ 5335643 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-ct-cl/28/0229-01" ] }, { "cite": "45 Ill. Ct. Cl. 203", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. Ct. Cl.", "case_ids": [ 5495713 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-ct-cl/45/0203-01" ] }, { "cite": "34 Ill. Ct. Cl. 268", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. Ct. Cl.", "case_ids": [ 2712102 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "272" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-ct-cl/34/0268-01" ] }, { "cite": "39 Ill. Ct. Cl. 63", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. Ct. Cl.", "case_ids": [ 5493888 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "72" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-ct-cl/39/0063-01" ] }, { "cite": "47 Ill. Ct. Cl. 318", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. Ct. Cl.", "case_ids": [ 5857716 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-ct-cl/47/0318-01" ] }, { "cite": "48 Ill. Ct. Cl. 461", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. Ct. Cl.", "case_ids": [ 516069 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-ct-cl/48/0461-01" ] }, { "cite": "46 Ill. Ct. Cl. 20", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. Ct. Cl.", "case_ids": [ 5501203 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "24" }, { "page": "24" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-ct-cl/46/0020-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 814, "char_count": 19566, "ocr_confidence": 0.823, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.3608438240779088e-07, "percentile": 0.6360162310621198 }, "sha256": "e4c38808b8e0603d69b7b9e0be6f2c47a55a91f0dcb3cf46ef55729f028377a7", "simhash": "1:00f402c790a177a8", "word_count": 3140 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:39:21.929612+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "John Gipson, Jr., Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ORDER\nSommer, C.J.\nThis claim returns before the Court on Claimant\u2019s petition for rehearing. In his petition, Claimant challenges the Court\u2019s ruling concerning Claimant\u2019s failure to exhaust other remedies, initially noting that Respondent had never raised the exhaustion issue and asserting that it therefore had been waived. Claimant cites Wilson v. State (1994), 46 Ill. Ct. Cl. 20, 24. Without referring to any authority for the proposition, Wilson expressly held:\n\u201c[T]he failure to raise the defense of the Claimant\u2019s failure to exhaust other remedies is non-jurisdictional [sic]. If it is not raised prior to trial, it is waived.\n# S #\nThe failure to exhaust remedies is not jurisdictional.\u201d (Id.)\nThus, Wilson purportedly stands for the proposition that a Claimant\u2019s failure to exhaust remedies is nothing more than an affirmative defense. For reasons that will be explained below, we disagree and overrule Wilson.\nSubsequent to Wilson (but without ever directly referring to it), the Court has carefully scrutinized the exhaustion requirement and has concluded that exhaustion of administrative remedies is a mandatory element of the Court's subject matter jurisdiction. Devaney v. State (1996), 48 Ill. Ct. Cl. 461; Morge v. State (1994), 47 Ill. Ct. Cl. 318.\nWhile it is undoubtedly true that, in most instances, it is the Respondent which brings the exhaustion issue to the Court\u2019s attention, silence on the Respondent\u2019s part cannot vest this Court with jurisdiction which is otherwise not granted to it. As a matter of law, subject matter jurisdiction is incapable of being waived. (I.L.P. Courts section 24.) Accordingly, jurisdictional issues may be raised at any time, even by the Court itself. (Neylon v. State (1986), 39 Ill. Ct. Cl. 63, 72.) Thus, Respondents failure to raise the exhaustion issue here is of no consequence, for, as a matter of law, exhaustion of administrative remedies is an element of the Courts subject matter jurisdiction which cannot be waived.\nClaimant next argues that an exception to the exhaustion requirement should be created for him because, he contends: (1) he was completely unaware of the existence of the particular administrative remedy until apprised of it in the Courts decision dismissing his claim; and (2) his vehicle has most likely deteriorated and/or run up large storage charges over the years so as to render the remedy meaningless. A review of the record reveals that Claimant has had the benefit of legal advice and representation since the alleged seizure of his vehicle:\n\"If the Court were to waive the exhaustion of remedies requirement merely because Claimant waited until it was too late to avail himself of the other remedies, the requirement would be transformed into an option, to be accepted or ignored according to the whim of all claimants.\u201d Lyons v. State (1981), 34 Ill. Ct. Cl. 268, 272.\nThe Court also notes that, aside from the cited administrative remedy, Claimant certainly could have elected to timely pursue a replevin action in circuit court for the prompt return of his vehicle. Claimants request for an exception is therefore rejected.\nAccordingly, the Court having reviewed the petition for rehearing and the complete record herein and having given due consideration to Claimants contentions, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, it is hereby ordered that Claimants petition for rehearing is denied.\nREVISED OPINION\nPer Curiam\nThis claim arises from the Secretary of States retention of Claimants 1980 Chevrolet Corvette and the Secretary\u2019s revocation of the Corvette\u2019s title and vehicle registration, following its seizure by the Alton police department pursuant to section 4 \u2014 107(i) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/4 \u2014 107(i)) due to its removed and falsified vehicle identification number (\u201cVIN\u201d).\nOn January 13, 1998, the Court denied this claim due to Claimant\u2019s failure to exhaust his administrative review remedy, which we raised sua sponte and which we held was jurisdictional.\nClaimant petitioned for rehearing, urging that exhaustion of remedies, required by section 25 of the Court of Claims Act (705 ILCS 505/25), is not a jurisdictional requirement and that the requirement was waived because the Respondent never raised the issue in this case. Claimant relied on Wilson v. State (1994), 46 Ill. Ct. Cl. 20, 24 (\u201cfailure to exhaust other remedies is non-jurisdictional\u201d) (Patchett, J.), which found a waiver of exhaustion due to the Respondent\u2019s failure to raise the issue before trial.\nOn December 22, 1998, the Court denied rehearing and reaffirmed our holding that the Claimant\u2019s failure to exhaust his administrative review remedy was jurisdictional.\nThe Court adheres to this conclusion and to the denial of this claim, but in light of persisting confusion over jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional \u201cexhaustion\u201d requirements, issues this modified opinion to supersede the order of January 13,1998, and December 22,1998.\nFacts\nThe essential facts of this case are undisputed. In April or May of 1986, Claimant purchased a 1980 Chevrolet Corvette from one Thomas Payne of St. Louis, Missouri. The vehicle then had a California certificate of title which was transferred by Payne to the Claimant. Claimant then applied for and received an Illinois certificate of title.\nOn or about June 11, 1986, Claimant\u2019s vehicle was seized by the Alton police and delivered into Respondent\u2019s custody. The seizure was effected pursuant to section 4\u2014 107(i) of the Vehicle Code, which designates vehicles with altered or removed VINs as contraband:\n\u201cIf a vehicle 8 8 8 is found to have the manufacturer\u2019s identification number removed, altered, defaced or destroyed, the vehicle 8 8 8 shall be seized by any law enforcement agency having jurisdiction and held for 8 8 8 identification. In the event that the manufacturer\u2019s identification number 8 8 8 cannot be identified, the vehicle 8 8 8 shall be considered contraband, and no right of property shall exist in any person owning, leasing or possessing such property, unless the person owning, leasing or possessing the vehicle 8 8 8 acquired such without knowledge that the manufacturer\u2019s vehicle identification number had been removed, altered, defaced, falsified or destroyed.\nIt shall be the duty of the State\u2019s Attorney 8 8 8 to make application to the Circuit Court on final determination of any prosecution arising out of the seizure, for an order to sell the property so seized; and the court, if satisfied that the property did not at the time of its seizure, possess a manufacturers identification number, and that this number cannot be ascertained, shall make an order that the property be disposed of 8 8 8 and shall fix the time, place, manner and nature of such disposal. 8 8 8.\u201d\nThe evidence indicates that the VIN had been obliterated from the Corvette\u2019s engine, transmission, and frame, and that the VIN appearing on the front dashboard (1) was a VIN for a different year vehicle and (2) did not match a confidential VIN located inside the door panel.\nClaimant was criminally charged with possessing the Corvette with knowledge that its VIN had been removed or falsified. For reasons that do not appear on record, the criminal charges against the Claimant were abandoned in October, 1986, and no application was made under section 4 \u2014 107(i) of the Vehicle Code for an order to sell the Corvette. On March 20, 1987, the Secretary of State revoked the Corvettes title and registration, and has refused to return the Corvette to Claimant.\nExhaustion of Remedies\nBefore reaching the merits of Claimants liability arguments, the Court must examine whether the Claimant has exhausted his remedies as to this claim. Exhaustion of remedies is a specific \u2014 and mandatory \u2014 requirement of all Claimants in this Court under the terms of section 25 of the Court of Claims Act. 705 ILCS 505/25:\n\u201c\u00a725. Exhaustion of other remedies for recovery \u2014 Exception. Any person who files a claim before the court shall, before seeking final determination of his or her claim exhaust all other remedies and sources of recovery whether administrative or judicial; except that failure to file or pursue actions against State employees, acting within the scope of their employment, shall not be a defense.\u201d See, also, Court of Claims Regulations 6 and 9, 74 Ill. Admin. Code \u00a7\u00a7790.60, 790.90.\nSection 25 actually encompasses two procedural requirements in its mandate that Claimants \u201cexhaust all other [1] remedies and [2] sources of recovery\u201d before a final ruling by this Court. This Claimant failed to satisfy both branches of our exhaustion requirement.\nExhaustion of Other Antecedent Remedies\nThe first branch of section 25 incorporates the common law requirement that a litigant must exhaust all \u201cother remedies\u201d that may be invoked before seeking relief in this Court, i.e., remedies available in another judicial or administrative forum that can provide the Claimant with the same relief (damages) as sought in this Court or with alternative relief that avoids the claim.\nThis Claimant has failed to exhaust this kind of antecedent \u201cother remedy\u201d by failing to invoke the statutory remedies against the Secretary of States revocation: (1) the administrative hearing in the Secretary\u2019s office, and (2) administrative review in the circuit court.\nThe record reflects that the Secretary\u2019s refusal to return the Corvette to the Claimant relied upon his revocation of the Corvette\u2019s title and registration, which in turn appear to rely on the contraband and ownership provisions of section 4 \u2014 107(i) of the Vehicle Code. The Vehicle Code gives Claimant a right to a hearing from these revocations in section 2 \u2014 118(a) (625 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 118(a)):\n\"(a) Upon the suspension, revocation or denial of the issuance of a license, permit, registration or certificate of title under this Code of any person the Secretary of State shall immediately notify such person in writing and upon his written request shall, within 20 days after receipt thereof, set a date for a hearing and afford him an opportunity for a hearing as early as practical \u00bb # 6 \u201d\nThe Secretary\u2019s order of revocation on its face reflects that a copy of the order was never served on the Claimant. On the record before us, we must find that Claimant\u2019s right to a hearing to contest the revocation has not been exercised. Because of the apparent lack of statutory notice, it appears that this right can still be exercised under the statute, in which event Claimant must exhaust this avenue of relief before seeking an adjudication in this Court.\nThis is a classic failure to exhaust an administrative remedy; the hearing could have reversed the Secretary\u2019s determinations and his basis for withholding the vehicle. This Court has a long history of summarily enforcing this type of exhaustion. See, e.g., Watkins v. State (1992), 45 Ill. Ct. Cl. 203; McKendree v. State (1973), 28 Ill. Ct. Cl. 229.\nMore fundamentally, however, the Secretary\u2019s revocation is ultimately subject to administrative review in the circuit court, i.e., judicial review under the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 101 et seq.) (the \u201cARL\u201d). The ARL is made applicable by section 2 \u2014 118(e) of the Illinois Vehicle Code. 625 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 118(e):\n\u201c(e) The action of the Secretary of State in suspending, revoking or denying any license, permit, registration or certificate of title shall be subject to judicial review in the Circuit Court \u00b0 \u201c * and the provisions of the Administrative Review Law '\"are*** adopted and shall apply to and govern every action for the judicial review of final acts or decisions of the Secretary of State hereunder.\u201d\nThis administrative review remedy is jurisdictional. Claimant\u2019s failure to exhaust it is therefore also jurisdictional. Circuit court review under the ARL is statutorily the sole method of adjudicating the alleged impropriety of the Secretary\u2019s actions and divests this Court of jurisdiction to do so. This divestiture of our jurisdiction is codified in section 8(a) of our Act. 705 ILCS 505/8(a):\n\u201c\u00a7 505/8. Jurisdiction. The court [of claims] shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine the following matters:\n(a) \u00b0 \u00b0 \u00b0 provided, however, the court shall not have jurisdiction 5 * * to review administrative decisions for which statute provides that review shall be in [the] circuit court.\u201d\nAccordingly, when the ARL is applicable to a decision, this Court cannot adjudicate that decision. When a claim before us, like this one, is based on such a decision which is alleged to be illegal or wrongful, this Court cannot determine the merits of such allegations, but must defer to the determination of the circuit court and reviewing courts. But if that statutory method of review has not been invoked to provide a judicial determination, as it has not been in this case, this Court is left without authority to grant relief on the basis of the disputed decision.\nThus, this Claimants failure to exhaust this remedy is more than a failure to exhaust a merely \u201calternative\u201d remedy. Administrative review is not an alternative to adjudication by this Court. For a claim in this Court that is based on a disputed State decision that is reviewabl\u00e9 under the ARL, administrative review in the circuit court is a jurisdictionally necessary remedy.\nExhaustion of Alternative Sources of Recovery\nThe second branch of the section 25 exhaustion of remedies requirement is the Claimants duty to \u201cexhaust all other # * sources of recovery\u201d before an award by this Court (705 ILCS 505/25). This exhaustion requirement is a creature of statute.\nThis requirement mandates that Claimants pursue other \u201csources\u201d {i.e., potentially liable parties) of recovery {i.e., money) for the same damages as are being sought from the State in this Court. Claimants must pursue other potentially culpable parties (e.g., other tortfeasors) who may be hable for some or all of the same damages that are being sought from the State. (This requirement most frequently arises in tort cases, but it is not limited to tort claims.)\nThis branch of the statutory exhaustion requirement serves a different purpose than the purely procedural policies served by the classic exhaustion of \u201calternative remedies\u201d doctrine. This duty to pursue \u201calternative sources\u201d is aimed at dollars, not procedures. As this Court has pointed out many times, the requirement to exhaust \u201calternative sources of recovery\u201d is intended to make the State the payor of last resort and the payor of the smallest feasible share of any shared liabilities, and is driven by fiscal prudence policies.\nIn this case, the Claimant obviously had judicial remedies against the person who sold the many-VIN Corvette to him (unless, of course, he was guilty of participating or knowing about the falsification of VINs, in which case that would bar his recoveiy in this Court). The record is devoid of evidence of efforts by this Claimant to pursue any relief against the seller. This record requires us to conclude that the Claimant has failed to exhaust this potential source of recoveiy, and thus failed to satisfy the alternative source branch of the section 25 exhaustion rule.\nComments on Denial of Rehearing\nIn his petition for rehearing, Claimant relies on Wilson v. State, supra, in seeking to convince us that we can waive, and that we should waive, the exhaustion requirements. Claimant relies on Wilsons holding that the section 25 exhaustion requirement (which, as observed above, is really two requirements) is \u201cnon-jurisdictional\u201d and thus is subject to waiver in appropriate circumstances. However, Wilson and section 25 do not control here.\nWilson correctly held that the statutory exhaustion requirement(s) of section 25 of the Court of Claims Act\u2014 which by its terms is a mandate on Claimants rather than a limitation on the Courts authority \u2014 is not a jurisdictional requirement, and thus is susceptible of waiver in appropriate and extraordinary circumstances.\nHowever, under section 8(a) of the Court of Claims Act, the failure to exhaust an \u201cadministrative review\u201d or other statutory judicial review remedy as to a material issue in a case before this Court in sl jurisdictional failure, as pointed out above. Wilson did not involve an administrative review issue and the Wilson opinion did not address this kind of exhaustion nor the section 8(a) jurisdictional issue, which are controlling here.\nBecause this Claimants failure to exhaust his administrative review remedy is jurisdictional and not waiveable we need not address Claimants proffered excuses for his failure to pursue that remedy. We also need not consider a theoretically-possible waiver of Claimants failure to pursue the seller of the vehicle (i.e., alternative source exhaustion) because that issue is now moot. We only note, in passing, that even in his petition for rehearing, the Claimant failed to offer any justification for his failure to pursue the seller.\nConclusion\nFor the foregoing reasons, and upon a full and considered review of the record and the parties\u2019 arguments, this claim and rehearing must be denied. Accordingly, it is hereby ordered:\n1. This claim is denied;\n2. Claimant\u2019s petition for rehearing is denied;\n3. This Court\u2019s prior orders of January 13, 1998, and December 22, 1998, are withdrawn, and this modified opinion is entered in lieu thereof.\nSection 4 \u2014 107(i) was enacted in 1975, was declared unconstitutional in 1982, and was reenacted with modifications in 1985. People v. One 1979 Pontiac Grand Prix (1982), 89 Ill. 2d 506, 433 N.E.2d 1301 (\u00a74 \u2014 107(i) unconstitutional); see, 1982 Op. Atty. Gen. 64 (No. 82-023) (\u00a74 \u2014 107(i) void as of its enactment). The General Assembly re-enacted \u00a74 \u2014 107(i) with the following added language to address the constitutional deficiences identified by the Supreme Court in One 1979 Pontiac Grand Prix, supra; \u201c8 8 8 unless the person owing, leasing or possessing the vehicle or part acquired such without knowledge that the manufacturer\u2019s vehicle identification number has been removed, altered, defaced, falsified or destroyed.\u201d Public Act 83 \u2014 1473, eff. January 1,1985 (Laws of the State of Illinois, 83rd General Assembly, Vol. II, p. 3653).\nThis Court has been reluctant to find waivers of such mandatory requirements. We did so in Wilson \u2014 as to \u201calternative source\u201d exhaustion \u2014 due to the Respondent\u2019s inexcusable delay in not raising the issue until after trial. We have also applied a rule of reason to the alternative source exhaustion requirement, see Blumstein v. State (1995), 47 Ill. Ct. Cl. 186, 191 (frivolous actions not required to be pursued); Tank v. State (1987), 40 Ill. Ct. Cl. 1 (factually unprovable actions not required). This Court has been far stricter, and seemingly unwavering, in requiring exhaustion of antecedent administrative remedies. Failure to pursue available redress elsewhere is almost never excusable, and litigants\u2019 failure to do so wastes the limited resources of this Court and thus prejudices consideration of other litigants\u2019 claims.\nClaimant argued: (1) his ignorance of the law; and (2) ineffectiveness of the remedy (i.e., his regaining possession) due to likely depreciation of the vehicle once Claimant learned about administrative review from this Court\u2019s opinion.", "type": "majority", "author": "Sommer, C.J. Per Curiam" } ], "attorneys": [ "Phillip R. Rice, for Claimant.", "Jim Ryan, Attorney General (Terence J. Corrigan, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel, for Respondent." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 88-CC-0569\nJohn Gipson, Jr., Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent\nOrder on petition for rehearing filed December 22, 1998.\nRevised opinion filed March 4, 1999.\nPhillip R. Rice, for Claimant.\nJim Ryan, Attorney General (Terence J. Corrigan, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel, for Respondent." }, "file_name": "0054-01", "first_page_order": 250, "last_page_order": 260 }