{
  "id": 1163681,
  "name": "Peter D. Hansen, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent",
  "name_abbreviation": "Hansen v. State",
  "decision_date": "1999-04-27",
  "docket_number": "No. 98-CC-3032",
  "first_page": "437",
  "last_page": "442",
  "citations": [
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      "cite": "52 Ill. Ct. Cl. 437"
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. Ct. Cl.",
    "id": 8793,
    "name": "Illinois Court of Claims"
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    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
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      "reporter": "Ill. Ct. Cl.",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:19:27.557513+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Peter D. Hansen, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "ORDER\nHess, J.\nRefore this Court is Respondents motion to dismiss. Respondent filed this motion on February 25, 1999, and as of March 27, 1999, Claimant has failed to file a response. 74 Ill. Adm. Code 790.200(b) requires any objection to a motion to be filed with the Clerk of the Court within 15 days; therefore, any response by Claimant is denied and will not be considered.\nClaimant suffered injuries because of an automob\u00fce accident, which occurred on Interstate 57. He was a passenger in his own vehicle, travehng northbound, when a vehicle owned by the State of Illinois, traveling southbound, crossed the median and struck Claimants vehicle. Apparently, Claimant suffered injuries to his head and hips and continues to have medical problems.\nHowever, as was discovered at the deposition of Claimant, the seatbelt on Claimants seat, which was fastened around Claimant, failed to engage. Claimants deposition testimony further revealed that, in the medical opinion of Claimants doctor, the cause of his injuries was his impact with the windshield and dashboard. This impact obviously would have been eliminated or reduced had Claimants seatbelt functioned properly.\nRespondents motion to dismiss illustrates these points from the deposition and outlines the applicable law. Respondent is correct in its assertion that the Court of Claims regulations require claimants to first exhaust all remedies available against any other tortfeasor before proceeding against the State.\nRule 790.60 of the Court of Claims Regulations (74 Ill. Adm. Code 790.60) and section 25 of the Court of Claims Act (705 ILCS 505/25 (1998)) require that any person who files a claim against the State of Illinois in the Court of Claims must first exhaust all remedies available. Furthermore, Rule 790.90 of the Court of Claims Regulations (74 Ill. Adm. Code 790.90) provides that failure to comply results in dismissal of the claim. This Court has applied these regulations in numerous situations. In Boe v. State (1984), 37 Ill. Ct. Cl. 72, the Court ruled that Claimant\u2019s action could not proceed because Claimant had failed to sue an uninsured 18-year-old with no assets who was the cause of the accident. Here, Claimant failed to sue Ford Motor Company, a multi-national, multi-million dollar company whose design defect was the apparent cause of Claimant\u2019s injuries. The requirement of exhaustion of remedies has been applied in a variety of other cases. Lyons v. State (1981), 34 Ill. Ct. Cl. 268 (failure to comply with the statute of limitations as to other tortfeasor does not result in exhaustion); Morge v. State (1994), 47 Ill. Ct. Cl. 348 (Exhaustion is an \u201cinescapable requirement\u201d to maintaining an action in the Court of Claims.).\nHere, the record is clear that Claimant has failed to exhaust all of the remedies available to him. Therefore, this matter must be dismissed.\nORDER\nHess, J.\nThis matter is before the Court on Claimant\u2019s petition for rehearing, pursuant to our Rule 790.220 (74 Ill. Adm. Code 790.220), Respondent\u2019s response to Claimant\u2019s petition for rehearing, and Claimant\u2019s reply to Respondent\u2019s response to Claimant\u2019s petition for rehearing. The Court being fully advised in the premises states as follows:\nRespondent filed a motion to dismiss based upon Claimant\u2019s failure to exhaust administrative remedies (74 Ill. Adm. Code 790.60). Claimant failed to timely respond to Respondent\u2019s motion to dismiss. The Court, by order ' dated April 27, 1999, granted Respondent\u2019s motion to dismiss. Said motion and order were based on Claimant\u2019s deposition testimony where he admitted that his seatbelt failed to properly engage at the time of the accident. The Court therefore agreed with Respondent\u2019s reasoning that the proper course of action would be to pursue any remedies available against the manufacturer of the vehicle. Claimant then filed the instant motion.\nClaimant\u2019s motion alleges that the. Court of Claims has erroneously applied our Rule 790.100. (74 111. Adm. Code 790.100.) Claimant argues that because Rule 790.100 requires the State to file a response in a case within 60 days that a motion t\u00f3 dismiss filed after the running of that 60 days requires leave of Co\u00fart. Claimant continues this argument by stating that a motion to dismiss filed under Rule 790.60 is asserting an affirmative defense; therefore, Rule 790.100 requires leave of Court. Claimant then begins a lengthy discourse on the difference between motions to dismiss pursuant to sections 2\u2014 619 and 2 \u2014 615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 619, 5/2 \u2014 615.) While Claimant\u2019s statement of the law of the two sections is accurate, it has no effect on the Court\u2019s reasoning.\nAs required by our Rule 790.220 (74 Ill. Adm. Code 790.220), a motion for rehearing must present, \u201cpoints supposed to have been overlooked or misapprehended by the Court; with authorities and suggestions concisely stated in support of the points.\u201d The reasons Claimant presents are the above-noted discourse on sections 5/2\u2014 615 and 5/2 \u2014 619 motions to dismiss and the fact that Respondent submitted Claimants deposition testimony without the Court reporters affidavit. Claimant further states that the motion to dismiss should be reconsidered because the deposition testimony of Claimant failed to offer enough proof, in Claimants opinion, to overcome the hurdle of summary judgment or motion to dismiss. (At this point in the petition for rehearing, Claimant inserted a one-sentence statement regarding motions for summary judgment. The Court is unaware of any previous reference to a motion for summary judgment and cannot see any relevance to the instant proceedings.) While Claimants discourse on sections 5/2 \u2014 615 and 5/2 \u2014 619 is well noted, Claimant\u2019s belief that a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust remedies, pursuant to Rule 790.60 must be filed within 60 days of the complaint is impracticable. The Attorney General\u2019s office has a large caseload and virtually all Rule 790.60 motions are dependent on discovery. To require the Respondent to file a Rule 790.60 motion within 60 days would effectively render said section moot. The Court does not wish to do so at this time.\nRegarding Claimant\u2019s concern of Respondent submitting Claimant\u2019s deposition transcript without the reporter\u2019s statement, the Court rejects said-argument, as Claimant also cited from said deposition. Indeed, the Court reviewed prior pleadings in this case regarding the final issue cited by the Claimant and reread the following transcript from Claimants deposition testimony, cited by Claimant in a previous pleading.\n\u201cQ. Did the seat belt restrain you?\nA. Not completely.\nQ. In your opinion and from your regular life experience, did the seat belt react the way that they are designed to do so?\nA. I don\u2019t think so.\nQ. And why don\u2019t you think so?\nA. \u2019Cause I still got injured.\nQ. Did it engage and lock at the time of the impact to prevent you from going forward?\nA. No.\u201d\nClaimant notes in his petition for rehearing that enough evidence was not presented in the nine pages of deposition transcript to overcome the burden of a motion to dismiss. Said argument appears to be based on a quantity rather than quality argument. The Court does not find this argument persuasive. Claimant admitted in his deposition that the seatbelt failed to engage and lock, therefore the motion to dismiss based upon failure to exhaust remedies was proper.\nAccordingly, Claimant\u2019s petition for rehearing is denied.\nAt this point in the brief, Claimants comes close to accusing the Respondent of presenting false evidence to the Court when Claimant states, \u201cInstead, there is [sic] attached nine (9) pages of unsworn documents from a purported deposition transcript of the claimant.\u201d The Court finds no basis or reason to doubt the genuineness of said deposition transcript, despite Claimants urging to the contrary.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Hess, J. Hess, J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Razzano & Kinzer (Joseph R. Yurgine, PC., of counsel), for Claimant.",
      "Jim E. Ryan, Attorney General (Jacqueline K. Williams, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "(No. 98-CC-3032\nPeter D. Hansen, Claimant, v. The State of Illinois, Respondent.\nOrder filed April 27, 1999.\nOrder on petition for rehearing filed December 10, 1999.\nRazzano & Kinzer (Joseph R. Yurgine, PC., of counsel), for Claimant.\nJim E. Ryan, Attorney General (Jacqueline K. Williams, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent."
  },
  "file_name": "0437-01",
  "first_page_order": 633,
  "last_page_order": 638
}