{
  "id": 5373787,
  "name": "John Brennan v. The People of the State of Illinois",
  "name_abbreviation": "Brennan v. People",
  "decision_date": "1884-05-19",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "535",
  "last_page": "538",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "110 Ill. 535"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill.",
    "id": 8772,
    "name": "Illinois Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "47 Ill. 468",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
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        5269987
      ],
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      "case_paths": [
        "/ill/47/0468-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "84 Ill. 569",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
      "case_ids": [
        2654774
      ],
      "opinion_index": -1,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill/84/0569-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "28 Ill. 209",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
      "opinion_index": -1
    }
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:18:15.024927+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "John Brennan v. The People of the State of Illinois."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. Justice Dickey\ndelivered the opinion of the Court:\nPlaintiff in error was jointly indicted and tried with two others, in the circuit court of Christian county, upon a charge of burglary. The indictment contains two counts. The defendants were each convicted upon the second count, and sentenced to the penitentiary. It is sought to reverse this conviction upon the sole ground that the second count of the indictment is bad.\nThe statute is: \u201cWhoever * * * willfully and maliciously, without force, (the doors and windows being open,) enters into any * * * freight or passenger railroad car * * * with intent to commit * * * larceny, * * * shall be deemed guilty of burglary. \u201d The count in question, with appropriate introductory matter, charges that plaintiff in error and his co-defendants, \u201cwillfully, maliciously, * * * without force, did * * * enter into a freight railroad ear, * * * then and there being open, with intent, \u201d etc. The only objection made to the sufficiency of the count is, that it fails to say that the doors and luindows were open,\u2014it simply says the cwr was open. This is rather form than substance. We will not say, that had this objection been taken before trial, the circuit court might not have properly sustained it,\u2014 of this we express no opinion. But it is not made until after trial, conviction and sentence. The attention of the circuit court does not appear to have been called to this alleged defect, in any part of the proceedings. There was no demurrer to the count, no motion to quash before trial, and no motion in arrest after conviction. It must be presumed, in fin's condition of the record, that the proof on the trial did show that the doors and windows of the car were open at the time of the unlawful entry, otherwise the court would not have entered judgment of sentence upon the verdict. It appears from the whole record that this defendant had satisfactory notice of the matter for which he was to be tried. He could not have been taken by surprise by proof that the doors of the car were open. The offence was sufficiently identified, so that he can never hereafter be called to answer for that felonious entry into that car, upon an indictment saying the doors and windows were open.\nWe feel it our duty to affirm the judgment in this case.\nJudgment affirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. Justice Dickey"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Messrs. Craig & Craig, for the plaintiff in error:",
      "Mr. James McCartney, Attorney General, for the People,"
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "John Brennan v. The People of the State of Illinois.\nFiled at Springfield May 19, 1884.\nCriminal law\u2014burglary of ear\u2014sufficiency of indictment after verdict and sentence. A count in an indictment for burglary, after the appropriate introductory matter, charged that the defendants \u201cwillfully, maliciously, feloniously and burglariously, without force, did then and there enter into a freight railroad car, * * * then and there being open, with intent, then and there, therein feloniously and burglariously to steal, take and carry away,\u201d etc. No objection was taken to the same before trial, or by motion in arrest of judgment. On error it was objected that the count was bad for not stating that the windows and doors of the car were open: Meld, that as the objection was to the form rather than the substance of the indictment, even if well taken at an earlier stage of the proceeding it could not avail on error, and that it would be presumed the evidence showed that the doors and windows of the car were open at the time of the unlawful entry.\nWrit of Error to the Circuit Court of Christian county; the Hon. William R. Welch, Judge, presiding.\nThis was an indictment found by the grand jury of Christian county, at the November term, 1881, of the circuit court, against Charles Green, John Brennan and Charles Doyle. The second count of the indictment charged that the defendants, on the ninth day of September, A. D. 1881, \u201cat the county aforesaid, willfully, maliciously, feloniously and burglariously, without force, did then and there enter into a freight railroad car of one John King, Jr., there situate, the said freight railroad car then and there being open, with intent, then and there, therein feloniously and burglariously to steal, take and carry away divers goods and chattels of said John King, Jr., and with intent to feloniously steal, take and carry away the goods and chattels of Lewis Selby and Thomas Menta, then and there being in said freight railroad car, contrary,\u201d etc. The jury, on a trial, found the defendants guilty as charged in the second count of the indictment, and fixed their punishment at three years in the penitentiary. To reverse the judgment on this verdict, John Brennan prosecutes this writ of error.\nMessrs. Craig & Craig, for the plaintiff in error:\nThe second count of the indictment, under which the conviction was had, is bad, in not charging that the doors and windows of the car were open. For all that appears, the doors and windows may have been closed, and the whole side knocked out, or it might have been an open flat car. There could be no burglary in that case.\nThe same objection that can be made to an indictment, or might be made on motion in arrest of judgment, can be urged on error. Sweeney v. People, 28 Ill. 209.\nMr. James McCartney, Attorney General, for the People,\nurged that the objection being to the form of the indictment, should have been made before trial and conviction, or by motion in arrest, if the defect was not such as to be cured by the verdict,\u2014citing Bishop on Crim. Pr. secs. 1284, 1285; Rev. Stat. chap. 110, sec. 63; Keedy v. People, 84 Ill. 569.\nThe offence is so well described in the count, as to present a bar to a second indictment. Morton v. People, 47 Ill. 468."
  },
  "file_name": "0535-01",
  "first_page_order": 535,
  "last_page_order": 538
}
