John F. Gilpatrick, for the use of Joseph Cowgill, Pltff in Error, v. George Foster, Deft in Error.
ERROR TO JO DAVIES.
An endorsement upon a note is like a receipt, subject to explanation, and where wholly uncertain, unless explained, must be rejected as a nullity.
This was an action originally commenced before a justice of the peace. From his decision, an appeal was taken to the Circuit Court of Jo Davies, and came on for trial, without the interven*358tion of-a jury, before Sheldon, Judge, at the March term, 1850, of said Court. An issue was found for appellant, and a judgment was rendered against Foster, for the sum of thirty-three dollars, and seventy-three cents. A motion for a new trial was overruled.
The bill of exceptions shows a note executed by Foster to Gilpatrick, as follows: “ one day after date I promise to pay John F. Gilpatrick or bearer, ninety-seven dollars and T\\, for value received,” dated 3d January, 1848, which was the only evidence offered by the plaintiff. The defendant insisted upon the allowance of certain sums endorsed upon the note as credits •, which endorsements are as follows :
“May 17, 1848.. Eeceived on the within 14 70 cents.”
“ August the 4th, 1848. Eeceived on the within, 50”
“April 18, Eeceived on the within, 5,00.”,
The plaintiff asked leave of the Circuit Court to amend the endorsement on the note, which reads, “Eeceived on the within 50,” so as to make it read fifty cents; which was denied. All the endorsements were read by the defendant, which was all the testimony offered. The error assigned was the allowance of a credit of fifty dollars by the Circuit Court upon the strength of the endorsement made on 4th August, 1848.
Higgins & Strother, for Pltff in Error.
The note constituted a good cause of action for the amount. The endorsements thereon were in the nature of receipts, and if there was any ambiguity whatever in the case, it was on the part of the defence.
The endorsement was no part of the note. 21 Vermont, 222; McDaniels v. Lapham, 1 Aiken, 311; 2 Mass., 397; 5 Iredell, 276.
The endorsement is in the nature of a receipt and is ambiguous. 15 Verm., 215; 1 D. Chip. R., 227.
T. Campbell & E. S. Leland, for Deft in Error.
Trumbull, J.
This was an action originally commenced before a justice of the peace, on a promissory note for ninety - seven dollars and seventeen cents. The only question in the *359case arises out of an endorsement on the back of the note which is as follows: “August the 4th, 1848. Received on the within, 50” There is no dot or mark of any kind either before or after the “50” to determine whether it means fifty dollars, fifty cents, or fifty something else.
There were some other credits upon the note, but not in any manner connected with the one in question, so as to afford the least clue to its meaning. The only evidence in the case was the note with its endorsements, and the Circuit Court held the endorsement in question to mean a credit of fifty dollars, which still left a balance due the plaintiff, after deducting the other credits about which there was no controversy. Nothing can be more uncertain than a credit of “50” on the back of a note. It may mean fifty pounds, fifty bushels, or fifty anything else, though it was most probably intended for fifty dollars or fifty cents, but which, if either, we cannot tell, and because it is wholly uncertain, the credit, unless explained, must be rejected as a nullity. “ If an agreement be so vague and indefinite, that it is not possible to collect the full intention of the parties, it is void; for neither the court nor jury can make an agreement for the parties.” Chitty on Contracts, 73; Wainwright v. Straw, 15 Vt., 219.
An endorsement of a credit upon the back of a note, is no part of the note itself. The plaintiff’s cause of action, was made out by the production of the note, and though the defendant was entitled to the benefit of the credits endorsed upon it, if intelligible, yet it was no part of the plaintiff’s case to explain them for the benefit of the defendant.
The endorsement of the credit upon the note being in the nature of a receipt for money, is subject to explanation by parol, and if the defendant can explain what it means, he will be entitled to the benefit of it, otherwise, it must be rejected as a nullity.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
Judgment reversed,.