{ "id": 5385987, "name": "The People ex rel. Town of Atlanta v. The Town of Oran et al.", "name_abbreviation": "People ex rel. Town of Atlanta v. Town of Oran", "decision_date": "1887-09-27", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "650", "last_page": "656", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "121 Ill. 650" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "50 Mo. 194", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mo.", "case_ids": [ 980532 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/mo/50/0194-01" ] }, { "cite": "5 Ohio St. 42", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ohio St.", "case_ids": [ 509788 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ohio-st/5/0042-01" ] }, { "cite": "105 Ill. 653", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2788215 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/105/0653-01" ] }, { "cite": "5 Ohio St. 409", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ohio St.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "92 Ill. 225", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2742918 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/92/0225-01" ] }, { "cite": "82 Ill. 385", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5314671 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/82/0385-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 Ill. 272", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "3 Gilm. 597", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Gilm.", "case_ids": [ 2461925 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/8/0597-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 Ill. 544", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2650276 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/84/0544-01" ] }, { "cite": "3 Mon. 364", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mon.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "12 Ill. 60", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "84" } ], "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "103 Ill. 75", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "97 Ill. 84", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2842110 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/97/0084-01" ] }, { "cite": "82 Ill. 435", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5313701 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/82/0435-01" ] }, { "cite": "81 Ill. 157", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "84 Ill. 554", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "63 Ill. 254", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2611123 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/63/0254-01" ] }, { "cite": "105 Ill. 653", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2788215 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/105/0653-01" ] }, { "cite": "82 Ill. 385", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5314671 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/82/0385-01" ] }, { "cite": "97 Ill. 84", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2842110 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/97/0084-01" ] }, { "cite": "81 Ill. 157", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 625, "char_count": 13159, "ocr_confidence": 0.475, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.26422888440571e-07, "percentile": 0.8697037935416312 }, "sha256": "2cf7b0a8743a2d79b16532f527355f5a87eab16adab28de77b95041039f0558c", "simhash": "1:aae35fa0a877285c", "word_count": 2295 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:53:49.573722+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "The People ex rel. Town of Atlanta v. The Town of Oran et al." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Justice Craig\ndelivered the opinion of the Court:\nThis, was a petition in the name of the People, on relation of the town of Atlanta, in Logan county, for mandamus, to compel the supervisor and assessor of the town of Oran to meet-with the supervisor and assessor of the town of Atlanta, and. agree as to the amount of indebtedness of the town of Atlanta, which the town of Oran shall assume on account of certain territory being detached from the town of Atlanta and joined to the town of Oran.\nIt appears from the petition, that in March, 1872, by an order of the board of supervisors of Logan county, six sections-of land were detached from the town of Atlanta and joined to-the town of Oran.. It also appears, that at the time the order was made there wa-s a legal bonded indebtedness existing\" against the town of Atlanta, which the people of the six sections had assisted in making, amounting to the sum of $50,000.. It also appeared that the town of Oran had never paid or assumed any portion of such indebtedness, but refused to make-any arrangement with the town of Atlanta in relation thereto.\nTo the petition the town of Oran pleaded the Statute of' Limitations, as follows: \u201cAnd for a plea in this behalf, defendants say that the petitioner ought not to maintain the said . petition against them, the said defendants, because they say that the supposed cause of action in said declaration mentioned did not accrue to the petitioner within five years next before the commencement of this suit, in manner and form as petitioner has above complained against them, the defendants; \u25a0and this the defendants are ready to verify.\u201d The petitioner demurred to the plea, but the court overruled the demurrer, and petitioner electing to abide by its demurrer, the petition was dismissed and judgment rendered against it for costs. The judgment of the circuit court was affirmed in the Appellate Court, and to reverse the latter judgment the petitioner brings the record here by appeal.\nThe petition was filed under sections 32, 33 and 35, chapter 139, of the Revised Statutes of 1874, which statute, it is claimed, required the supervisor and assessor of the town of Oran to meet the supervisor and assessor of the town of Atlanta, on notice, and determine the proportion of the indebtedness to be borne by each town. The three sections of the statute are as follows:\n\u201cSec. 32. When a town possessed of or entitled to money, xights or credits, or other personal estate, shall be divided' or altered, such personal estate, including moneys, shall be apportioned between the towns interested therein, by the super-' visors and assessors of such towns, according to the amount of taxable property in the town divided or altered, as the same \u2022existed immediately before such division or alteration, to be ascertained by the last assessment list of such town; and such \u2022supervisors and assessors shall meet, for the purpose aforesaid, \u2022as soon as may be after the first town meeting subsequently held in such town.\n\u201cSec. 33. Whenever a meeting of the supervisors and as\u2022sessors of two or more towns shall be required in order to carry into effect the provisions of this\" article, such a meeting may be called by either of said supervisors; but the supervisor calling the same shall give at least ten days\u2019 notice, in writing, to all the other officers, of the time and place at which such meeting is to be held.\n\u201cSec. 35. Debts owing by a town so subdivided or altered shall be apportioned in the same manner as the personal property of the town, and each town shall thereafter he charged' with its share of such debts according to such apportionment.\nAs has been 'seen, no steps were taken by the town of Atlanta to require the town of Oran to assume or pay a portion of the debt until more than ten years after the territory was-taken from one town and added to the other, and the question raised by the demurrer is, whether this long delay is a bar to-the proceeding. If, after the territory was detached from Atlanta and added to Oran, the result was that the latter named; town became indebted to the former, or to the bondholders,\u2014that the debt was of an ordinary character, such as one individual or town may owe to another,\u2014no argument is required to show that the Statute of Limitations would run against such-a debt. But it is insisted by counsel for appellant that such is not the nature or character of the debt, but, on the other-hand, the money sought to be recovered is a trust fund, and* hence is protected from the operation of the statute.\nThere is nothing in the language of the statute indicating-that a debt of this character is a trust fund, or that the relation of trustee and cestui que trust exists between the parties. The statute merely declares that debts owing by a town so-divided shall he apportioned, and each town shall be charged with its share of such debts according to such apportionment. Under the language of the statute, the town of Atlanta had the right, by pursuing the course pointed out in the act, to require-the town of Oran to pay a certain portion of its bonded indebtedness. By accepting the territory it became a debtor, and, was legally bound to pay a certain portion of the indebtedness of the town of Atlanta; but we see nothing in the act or the-transaction from which the conclusion can be reached that the liability thus created established a trust, or that the one town held any money in trust for the other.\nBut if the transaction assumed the character of a trust, as-contended by appellant, it is not such a trust as is exempt from-the operation of the Statute of Limitations. In Hayward v. Gunn, 82 Ill. 385, this court held: \u201cTo exempt a trust front the bar of the Statute of Limitations, it must, first, be a direct trust; second, it must be of the kind belonging exclusively to the jurisdiction of a court of equity; and third, the question must arise between the trustee and cestui que trust.\u201d See, also* Governor v. Woodworth, 63 Ill. 254, and >Vood on Limitations* sec. 215, where the same doctrine is announced. Here all the-elements in the case cited are wanting. It is not a direct or-express trust. It is not of that character belonging exclusively to a court of equity. Nor does the question arise between trustee- and cestui que trust. No such relation exists between the two-towns. We think, therefore, it is clear that there is no such-trust made out by the facts relied upon in this case as to prevent the bar of the Statute of Limitations.\nIt is also contended that a public right of a municipal corporation is involved, and upon that ground the Statute of' Limitations can not be pleaded as a defence to the action. In County of Piatt v. Goodell, 97 Ill. 84, we had occasion to consider to what extent municipal corporations might be barred by the Statute of Limitations, and we there held that municipal corporations, in all matters involving mere private rights, as contradistinguished from public rights, strictly so called, are subject to limitation laws to the same extent as private-individuals ; but in all matters involving strictly public rights, they are not subject to the limitation laws, as such. See, also* School Directors v. School Directors, 105 Ill. 653.\nNo public rights are involved in this ease,\u2014the controversy relates solely to two townships. The real question is, whether the town of Atlanta shall recover money from the town of Oran. This matter does not concern the State or the people of the-State. We fail to see how the public can be interested in this, transaction to any greater extent than they would be in an action which one citizen might bring against another to recover \u25a0 money claimed to be due on a contract. The public w\u00fcl neither-lose nor gain if the town of Atlanta is required to pay all of its-indebtedness, nor will it affect the public if the town of Oran is required to contribute. No public interest being involved, the Statute of Limitations might properly be pleaded.\nIn the argument much reliance is placed on the case of County of Logan v. City of Lincoln, 81 Ill. 157. In that case the Statute of Limitations was held not to be available as a defence, but the facts in that case are so different from the case, under consideration that the decision can have no bearing here. The same rule of law is, however, declared in that case that was announced in County of Piatt v. Gooclell, swpra, as will be seen from the following language of the court: \u201cOur understanding of the law is, that as respects all public rights, or as respects property held for public use upon trusts, municipal corporations are not within the operation of the Statute of Limitations; but in regard to contracts or mere private rights the rule is different, and such corporations, like private citizens, may plead or have pleaded against them the Statute of Limitations.\u201d\nWe perceive no ground for disturbing the judgment of the Appellate Court, and it will be affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Justice Craig" } ], "attorneys": [ "Messrs. Blinn & Hoblitt, for the appellants: \u2019", "Mr. Oscar Allen, for the appellees:", "Messrs. Beach & Hodnett, also for the appellees:" ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "The People ex rel. Town of Atlanta v. The Town of Oran et al.\nFiled at Springfield September 27, 1887.\n1. Limitations\u2014as applicable to municipal corporations. Municipal corporations, in all matters involving mere private rights as contradistinguished from public rights, as, the liability of one town to another to pay money to or for the other, are subject to the limitation laws to the same extent as private individuals.\n2. Same\u2014in suit to compel contribution for indebtedness of a town from which territory has been taken. In a proceeding by one town from which territory has been taken, against the town to which it was attached, to compel the latter to contribute to the payment of the indebtedness of the former town, the Statute of Limitations of five years may be pleaded as a bar.\n3. If a town having a bonded indebtedness is divided, and part of its territory attached to another town, a proceeding to apportion the indebtedness between the two towns so that each may thereafter pay its proportionate share thereof, must be brought within five years after the right has accrued, or it will be barred. There is no trust in such a case to take the case out of the operation of the statute.\nAppeal from the Appellate Court for the Third District;\u2014 heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Logan county; the Hon'. Geobge W. Hebdman, Judge, presiding.\nMessrs. Blinn & Hoblitt, for the appellants: \u2019\nThe indebtedness of a town before its territory is detached must he apportioned, and the town to which the territory is attached contribute its part, under the statute. Bev. Stat. chap. 139, sees. 32, 33, 35; Hensley Township v. People, 84 Ill. 554.\nThe Statute of Limitations can not he pleaded to defeat a trust, or to any public right of a municipal corporation. 2 Dillon on Mun. Corp. secs. 668, 673; Logan County v. City of Lincoln, 81 Ill. 157.\nMr. Oscar Allen, for the appellees:\nThe Statute of Limitations applies to mandamus. Peoria County v. Gordon, 82 Ill. 435.\nThe Statute of Limitations may be pleaded against municipal corporations. County of Piatt v. Goodell, 97 Ill. 84.\nThe statute need not be pleaded when the facts are apparent \u25a0on the face of the petition. Ilett v. Collins, 103 Ill. 75.\nPublic rights of corporations which are not barred by the Statute of Limitations, are only those which concern the people of the State, generally. Dillon on Mun. Corp. sec. 533; City of Alton v. Transportation Co. 12 Ill. 60; County of Piatt v. Goodell, 97 id. 84; 7 Wait\u2019s Actions and Defences, 23.\nIn England only matters not barred are charitable trusts. Grant\u2019s Corp. 560, note 10.\nThe applicant for mandamus must show diligence, or the writ \"will be refused. Territory v. Potts, 3 Mon. 364; Dillon on Mun. Corp. (2d ed.) see. 694, note, and cases cited.\nThis application might have been made as long ago as 1872. Hensley Township v. Bailey, 84 Ill. 544.\nA condition precedent to relief is the giving notice of meeting do apportion. Diligence should be shown or relief will be refused. It was not given for thirteen years in this case. It \u25a0ought to have been given at once. Bev. Stat. 1874, p. 1070, sec. 32; Shelburne v. Robinson, 3 Gilm. 597.\nLaches must be fully explained. Breit v. Yeaton, 101 Ill. 272, and eases cited.\nFor other reason than the delay of petitioner, the court was justified in dismissing the petition.\nMessrs. Beach & Hodnett, also for the appellees:\nThe Statute of Limitations runs against all trusts except express trusts, and such as are cognizable only in courts of equity. Hayward v. Gunn, 82 Ill. 385 ; Governor v. Woodworth, 63 id. 254; School Directors v. School Directors, 16 Bradw. 651; Angell on Limitations, sec. 166; Wood on Limitations, 436.\nMunicipal corporations are within the operation of the Statute of Limitations. Ramsey v. Clinton, 92 Ill. 225; County of Piatt v. Goodell, 97 id. 84; Cincinnati v. Evans, 5 Ohio St. 409; School Directors v. School Directors, 105 Ill. 653 ; Wood, on Limitations, sec. 53, p. 93; Lane v. Kennedy, 5 Ohio St. 42; Cincinnati v. Presbyterian Church, 8 id. 298; School Directors v. Georges, 50 Mo. 194; Dillon on Mun. Corp. (3d ed.)secs. 668-676, and cases cited." }, "file_name": "0650-01", "first_page_order": 650, "last_page_order": 656 }