{ "id": 2929653, "name": "Jesse Kinsley v. The City of Chicago", "name_abbreviation": "Kinsley v. City of Chicago", "decision_date": "1888-03-28", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "359", "last_page": "363", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "124 Ill. 359" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "88 Ill. 221", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5339442 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/88/0221-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 Ill. 560", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2813212 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/102/0560-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 Ill. 475", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2819180 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/101/0475-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 U. S. 82", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "88 Ill. 221", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5339442 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/88/0221-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 Ill. 560", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2813212 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/102/0560-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 485, "char_count": 8813, "ocr_confidence": 0.499, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.995149566090356e-07, "percentile": 0.9359393153809353 }, "sha256": "79fbd1a5e136c6997b41175ed3537de2147669532eb62fe01f32357e007e5b87", "simhash": "1:13c8cb130c3b8100", "word_count": 1561 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:59:21.850055+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Jesse Kinsley v. The City of Chicago." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Chief Justice Sheldon\ndelivered the opinion of the Court:\nThis is an appeal from a judgment of affirmance by the Appellate Court for the First District, of a judgment of the Criminal Court of Cook county, for a penalty for keeping a meat market in the city of Chicago, and selling meats without a license, in violation of sections 1575 and 1579 of the revised ordinances of said city, as amended by the ordinances of July 10,1882, and February 26, 1883. The'only question presented by the record in this case is as to the validity of the aforenamed sections, in imposing a license fee of fifteen dollars per annum upon vendors of meats.\nThe city\u2019s claim of authority for the requirement of the license is under the two following grants of powers of the general Incorporation act, under which the city of Chicago is organized:\n\u201cFiftieth\u2014To regulate the sale of meats, poultry, fish, cheese, . lard, vegetables, and all other provisions, and to provide for a place and manner of selling the same.\u201d\n\u25a0\u201cSeventy-eighth\u2014To do all acts, make all regulations which may be necessary or expedient for the promotion of health or the suppression of disease.\u201d\nAlthough there is nokhere given, in express terms, the power to license, it is insisted, on-behalf of the city, that as the power to regulate is expressly given, that power includes the power to license. This precise point was so adjudged by this court in Chicago Packing Co. v. City of Chicago, 88 Ill. 221, where it was held, that the 81st clause of section 62 of the general Incorporation act, giving cities and villages the power to direct the location of, and regulate the management and construction of, packing houses, etc., confers the power to license such establishments, as one of the means of regulating the same. It is admitted by appellant\u2019s counsel, that if that decision be adhered to, the judgment here must be affirmed, and a reconsideration is asked of the doctrine announced in that case.\nIt is said, that in examining the terms used in conferring the various powers as enumerated in the general Incorporation act, we find, in many instances, the words \u201cto regulate\u201d stand alone, not coupled with either of the words \u201cto license\u201d or \u201cto tax;\u201d that in other instances the words \u201cto license\u201d or \u201cto tax,\u201d or both,' are added to the words \u201cto regulate,\u201d whence it is argued that the legislature did not intend that the power \u201cto regulate\u201d should carry with it and include, ipso facto, the power to license,\u2014that the power here containing merely the words \u201cto regulate,\u201d reading it in the light of the whole act, and applying the canons of interpretation applicable to municipal charters, the omission of the words \u201cto license\u201d is tantamount to an express denial of a power to license. We think this a too technical construction to be applied. After an attentive consideration of the ingenious argument of counsel in this respect, we fail of being satisfied that our former construction of the power in question, in 88 HI., was erroneous, and we must still adhere thereto, regarding to license a business a legitimate means of the regulation of the business. All licenses issued by the city are made subject to the ordinances of the city, and upon a licensee violating any of the provisions of such ordinances, his license may be revoked by the mayor. The issuance of a license which may be promptly revoked upon the failure of the licensee in the observance of the regulations of the city concerning his occupation, is an efficient means of securing the faithful observance of such regulations. Regulations in respect to the selling of meats have relation to health and disease, and we think the city of Chicago has the power to require all sellers of meats to be licensed, under the charter power to regulate the selling of meats, and under the power to \u201cmake all regulations which may be necessary or expedient for the promotion of health or the suppression of disease.\u201d\nIt is next insisted, that if the power \u201cto regulate\u201d confers the power to require a license, then the license fee can not be fixed at such a sum as will result in producing a revenue for the city; that to sanction such a result there must be expressly given the power \u201cto tax.\u201d Cooley on Taxation, (1st ed.) 408, in speaking of grants of power to license, remarks: \u201cWhere the grant is not made for revenue, but for regulation, merely, a much narrower construction is to be applied. A fee for the license may still be exacted, but it must be such a fee, only, as will legitimately assist in the regulation, and it should not exceed the necessary or probable expense of issuing the license and of inspecting and regulating the business which it covers. If the State intends to give broader authority, it is a reasonable inference that it will do so in unequivocal terms.\u201d Under the narrow rule of construction thus laid down we would not regard the amount of the license fee in this case as obnoxious to objection. But this court has always applied a more liberal rule of construction in reference to license fees. Wiggins Ferry Co. v. East St. Louis, 102 Ill. 560; Howland, v. City of Chicago, 108 id. 500; Braun v. City of Chicago, 110 id. 186; Distilling Co. v. City of Chicago, 112 id. 19; Dennehy v. City of Chicago, 120 id. 627. In the above cases license fees in quite large amounts, and, manifestly, in part, at least, for revenue, were sustained. And the force of those decisions, in their application to the present case, is not avoided by the fact that there was given, there, express power to tax, license and, regulate, as the license fees were sustained under the power to license, and not under the power to tax.\nThe judgment of the Appellate Court will be affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Chief Justice Sheldon" } ], "attorneys": [ "Mr. C. B. Sampson, and Messrs. Barnum, Rubens & Ames, for the appellant:", "Mr. Frederick S. Winston, and Mr. John W. Green, for the appellee:" ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Jesse Kinsley v. The City of Chicago.\nFiled at Springfield March 28, 1888.\nX. Municipal corporations\u2014license for the sale of meats, etc.\u2014power to require license to he taken out. Under the grant of power \u201cto regulate the sale of meats, poultry, fish, cheese, lard, vegetables, and all other provisions, and to provide for a place and manner of selling the same,\u201d a municipal corporation may require that a license shall be obtained for the selling of such articles.\n2. An incorporated city having the power \u201cto make all regulations which may be necessary or expedient for the promotion of health or the suppression of disease,\u201d has the right to require all sellers of meats to take out a license. Regulations in respect to the selling of meats have relation to health and disease.\n3. Same\u2014license fee\u2014whether it may he exacted\u2014and as to the amount. Under a power to regulate a calling or business, merely, with no express powers of taxation, a license fee may be exacted, and the fact that such fee may exceed the necessary or probable expense of issuing the license and inspecting the business it covers, will not render the fee exacted illegal or unreasonable.\nAppeal from the Appellate Court for the First District;\u2014 heard in that court on appeal from the Criminal Court of Cook county; the Hon. Bollen S. Williamson, Judge, presiding.\nMr. C. B. Sampson, and Messrs. Barnum, Rubens & Ames, for the appellant:\nMunicipal corporations must in all cases show a plain and clear grant for the authority they assume to exercise. 1 Dillon on Mun. Corp. secs. 16, 87, 89.\nThe enumeration of the occupations that cities may license implies the exclusion of all others. Thomas v. Railroad Co. 101 U. S. 82; City of Cairo v. Bross, 101 Ill. 475.\nIn clauses 9, 13, 14, 15-22, 24, 33, 34, 49, 50, 52, 53, 54, 57, 58, 60, 65, 66, 79, 81, 82, 92 and 93, of section 1, article 5, of the Incorporation act, the word \u201cregulate\u201d is not coupled with either the words \u201cto license,\u201d \u201cor to tax.\u201d This would seem to indicate that by the use of the words \u201cto regulate,\u201d no power to license or tax is conferred.\nMr. Frederick S. Winston, and Mr. John W. Green, for the appellee:\nThe power to exact a license in this case is found in article 5, section 1, clauses 50 and 78, of the act relating to cities and villages. Licensing is one of the proper modes of regulating an occupation.\nIn some of the States a license is issued under the police .power, but the exaction of a license fee with a view to revenue would be an exercise of the power of taxation, which must be clearly given. Cooley\u2019s Const. Lim. sec. 201.\nIn this and some other States, under the power to license, the city is not confined to the exacting of a mere nominal sum. Wiggins Ferry Co. v. City of East St. Louis, 102 Ill. 560; Howland v. Chicago, 108 id. 500; Braun v. Chicago, 110 id. 186; Distilling Co. v. Chicago, 112 id. 19; Dennehy v. Chicago, 120 id. 627.\nThe power to regulate a business or Occupation includes the power to license, as one of the appropriate means of regulation. Provision Co. v. Chicago, 88 Ill. 221." }, "file_name": "0359-01", "first_page_order": 359, "last_page_order": 363 }