{
  "id": 2937305,
  "name": "Frank S. Weigley v. Canute R. Matson et al.",
  "name_abbreviation": "Weigley v. Matson",
  "decision_date": "1888-05-09",
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  "first_page": "64",
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    "id": 8772,
    "name": "Illinois Supreme Court"
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:30:24.873964+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Frank S. Weigley v. Canute R. Matson et al."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Per Curiam :\nThe opinion of the Appellate Court for the First District, in this case, is as follows:\n\u201cBailey, J.: The complainant having obtained a judgment against one Sea, and having levied his execution upon the property of his debtor, seeks, by his bill, to have certain prior judgments and executions against the same debtor, and in favor of other creditors, vacated and declared null and void, so as to give priority to the complainant\u2019s execution. The judgments attacked were entered by confession, and no claim is made that the indebtedness for which they were entered was not justly and in good faith due, nor are there any allegations of fraud or collusion. The claim to relief is based solely upon certain alleged irregularities on the entry of said judgments.\n\u201cThe bill admits that said judgments purport to have been entered in open court, in term time, but it is alleged, that, in fact, the branch of said court presided over by the judge before whom said judgments purport to have been entered, was not in session on that day, and had not been opened \u00bfor that term; that the declarations and cognovits were presented to the judge out of court; that he there indorsed thereon directions to enter judgments, and that said papers, with such indorsements, being filed with the clerk, said judgments were entered by him.\n\u201cIt is the settled rule of law, that the record of a court showing a judgment by confession in open court, imports verity, and can not be contradicted by parol evidence. (Boche v. Beldam, 119 Ill. 320.) The record of such judgment is the only proper evidence of itself, and is conclusive evidence of the fact of the rendition of the judgment, and of all the legal consequences resulting from that fact, both as against the parties to the judgment and all others whose interests may be affected thereby. Koren v. Roemheld, 7 Ill. App. 646; Richardson v. Beldam, 18 id. 527; Jasper et al. v. Schlesinger et al. 22 id. 637.\n\u201cThe complainant, then, by admitting that the judgments which he is seeking to have set aside purport to have been entered in open court, in term time, admits the existence of judgment records which furnish conclusive evidence that said judgments were so entered, and he has therefore precluded himself, by such admission, from insisting that the contrary is the fact.\n\u201cIt is alleged that the executions are void, because they were issued and delivered to the sheriff before the judgments were actually entered upon the records of the court. As the judgments were a part of the proceedings of the court in term time, it is not material whether the record of the judgments were actually written up or not at the time the executions were issued. Buck was the conclusion reached by us, on full consideration of this question, in Jasper v. Schlesinger et al. supra.\n\u201cThe point is made, that the provision of the warrants of attorney as to attorney\u2019s fees was fraudulent as to other creditors, in that it appropriated the amount of such fees to the payment of the attorneys of the judgment creditors, without consideration. It is claimed, that to the extent of such fees, at least, the judgments should be vacated., A stipulation, by which a debtor agrees to pay the fees of his creditor\u2019s attorney in case the latter is compelled to resort to legal proceedings to collect his debt, is an agreement which is not only eminently just, but which rests upon a good and valuable consideration. It is not in the nature of a gratuity, but is a contract, by which the debtor, in part consideration of the credit given him, agrees to indemnify his creditor against the consequences of his neglect or refusal to pay, whereby the creditor may be subjected to the necessity of employing and paying an attorney.\n\u201cWe are of the opinion that the bill presented no grounds for relief. The demurrer was therefore properly sustained. Decree affirmed.\u201d\nUpon an examination of the bill, and after full consideration of the arguments of appellant\u2019s counsel, we have come to the same conclusion as that reached by the Appellate Court. The reasons stated in the opinion of the court in support of the decision are satisfactory, to our minds, and meet our approval. We therefore adopt the opinion of the Appellate Court as our own opinion in the case.\nThe judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Per Curiam :"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Messrs. Weigley, Bulkley & Grant, for the appellant:",
      "Messrs. Flower, Remy & Holstein, for the appellees:"
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Frank S. Weigley v. Canute R. Matson et al.\nFiled at Ottawa May 9, 1888.\n1. Record imports verity\u2014parol evidence. The record of a court, showing a judgment by confession in open court, imports verity, and can not be contradicted by parol evidence. The record of such judgment is the only proper evidence of itself, and is conclusive evidence of the fact of its rendition, and of all the legal consequences resulting therefrom, both as against the parties, and all others whose interests may be affected thereby.\n2. Confession of judgment\u2014including an attorney\u2019s fee\u2014consideration. A stipulation in a warrant of attorney for the confession of a judgment, .by which a debtor agrees to pay the fees of his creditor\u2019s attorney in case the creditor is compelled to resort to legal proceedings to collect his debt, is an agreement which is not only eminently just, but which rests upon a good and valuable consideration.\n3. Execution\u2014before judgment entered. Where judgment is taken in term time, it being a part of the proceedings of the court in term time, it is not material whether the record of the same is written up, or not, at the time \u2022an execution is issued thereon.\nAppeal from the Appellate Court for the First District;\u2014 heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. M. F. Tuley, Judge, presiding.\nMessrs. Weigley, Bulkley & Grant, for the appellant:\nA judgment by confession can be either entered in term time or vacation, and if in term time, it can only be in open court. Conkling v. Ridgely, 112 Ill. 40; Anderson v. Field, 6 Bradw. 314.\nThe entry of a judgment is a judicial act, and the judge can not perform such an act except when sitting in open court .and acting as a court. Ling v. King, 91 Ill. 571.\nIf the judgment were confirmed in vacation, then no execution could be valid when issued before the judgments were entered upon the record. Ling v. King, 91 Ill. 571; Cummins v. Holmes, 109 id. 15.\nAttorney\u2019s fees confessed by an insolvent debtor are fraudulent as against bona fide creditors.\nMessrs. Flower, Remy & Holstein, for the appellees:\nThe record, showing these judgments were confessed in open court, imports verity, and can not be contradicted. Richardson v. Beldam, 18 Bradw. 529; Freydendall v. Baldwin, 103 Ill. 329; Wiley v. Southerland, 41 id. 25; Roche v. Beldam, 119 id. 320.\nA stipulation for the payment of attorney\u2019s fees, in a promissory note, in the event of an action to collect the same, is valid and enforcible. Nickerson v. Sheldon, 32 Ill. 372.\nA judgment entered by confession upon a warrant of attorney may properly include attorney\u2019s fees, if authorized by warrant of attorney. Ball v. Miller, 38 Ill. 110; Clawson v. Munson, 55 id. 394; Dunn v. Rodgers, 43 id. 260; Haldeman v. Life Ins. Co. 120 id. 390; Smith v. Silvers, 32 Ind. 321 ; Parkam v. Pulliam, 5 Coldw. 487.\nThe hill fails to show want of jurisdiction, or fraud in the rendition of the judgments."
  },
  "file_name": "0064-01",
  "first_page_order": 64,
  "last_page_order": 67
}