{
  "id": 2936791,
  "name": "Asahel Gage v. Armanella R. Brown",
  "name_abbreviation": "Gage v. Brown",
  "decision_date": "1888-06-16",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "522",
  "last_page": "524",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "125 Ill. 522"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill.",
    "id": 8772,
    "name": "Illinois Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "116 Ill. 288",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
      "case_ids": [
        2885915
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill/116/0288-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 263,
    "char_count": 4208,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.482,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 3.1676555682161145e-07,
      "percentile": 0.8636986171780672
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    "sha256": "aa28fcf0642756dd935d78e6c9d5721d6df8d35fa31ad87b3590a50c5ad05c97",
    "simhash": "1:e3882a7c3ffa70c5",
    "word_count": 718
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:30:24.873964+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Asahel Gage v. Armanella R. Brown."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. Justice Scott\ndelivered the opinion of the Court:\nAfter both parties had submitted this cause for hearing on the original and amended bills, and upon answers thereto, and upon the proofs taken, the court, against the protest of defendant, granted complainant\u2019s motion to further amend the original bill. That was done, and in the amendment made, complainant asked relief against a certain tax deed, not prayed for in the original-bill, nor by any amendment to it. Thereupon, defendant entered a motion for a continuance, on the ground of surprise by the character of the amendment; that it made an entirely separate and. distinct issue, and that as defendant is not a resident of this State, but of New Jersey, and is not now in this State, his counsel was not ready for trial upon any other issue than that presented by the bill. Counsel filed his own affidavit in support of the motion for a continuance, stating the grounds of such motion with the usual fullness. On counsel for complainant stipulating he would \u201conly use the record upon which the deed itself was issued,\u201d in support of the allegations of the amendment just made to the bill, the court overruled the motion for a continuance, and defendant saved an exception to that decision. The court then proceeded to hear further testimony, both oral and what complainant\u2019s counsel calls \u201crecord\u201d evidence, touching the matters alleged in the last amendment to the bill, and rendered a decree concerning matters alleged in the original bill, and also concerning matters contained in the last amendment to the bill.\nIt is quite evident the court proceeded erroneously. It could not properly proceed to hear the case as made by the last amendment to the bill, without first requiring defendant to answer the same. As has been seen, it made an entirely distinct and separate issue, and asked for relief not demanded by the original bill, nor by any previous amendment to it. Mo rule was laid upon defendant to answer instanter, or within any reasonable time; and it was manifest error in the court to proceed to further hear the cause upon additional proofs, without answer, unless a rule had been first laid upon defendant to answer, so that he could have been placed in default.\nThe motion to suppress certain depositions ought to have been allowed. It may be, what they contain is not very material to the real issues involved; but conceding the depositions had been returned in the condition the court found them to be, the court should have allowed the motion to suppress.\nThe question argued by counsel for complainant, that the chancellor \u201cshould have decreed without the imposition of any conditions, under the peculiar * * * circumstances of the record,\u201d can not be considered, for the reason no assignment of \u201ccross-errors\" has been \u201cwritten upon or attached to the record,\u201d as required by rule 15 of this court. What purport to be cross-errors are assigned upon a separate piece of paper, and are filed among other papers in the cause. That, this court has frequently held, is not a compliance with the rule. Ditch v. Sennott, 116 Ill. 288; Benneson v. Savage, 119 id. 135.\nFor the error indicated, the decree will be reversed and the cause remanded.\nDecree reversed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. Justice Scott"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Mr. Augustus N. Gage, for the plaintiff in error.",
      "Mr. Consider H. Willett, for the defendant in error."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Asahel Gage v. Armanella R. Brown.\nFiled at Ottawa June 16, 1888.\n1. Chancery\u2014rule to answer, after amendment of bill. After the submission of a cause for hearing, upon the pleadings and proofs, the court, against the defendant\u2019s protest, allowed an amendment of the bill asking relief not before sought, refused to continue the cause, and entered a decree embracing the new matters: Held, that the court could not properly proceed to hear the case made by the amendment, without first laying a rule upon the defendant to answer.\n2. Assignment of error\u2014must be upon the record. Cross-errors, to be considered, must be written upon or attached to the record, as required by rule 15 of this court. It is not sufficient that they are written upon a separate piece of paper.\nWrit of Error to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Lorin C. Collins, Judge, presiding.\nMr. Augustus N. Gage, for the plaintiff in error.\nMr. Consider H. Willett, for the defendant in error."
  },
  "file_name": "0522-01",
  "first_page_order": 522,
  "last_page_order": 524
}