{
  "id": 12126891,
  "name": "James N. Longan v. George W. Taylor et al.",
  "name_abbreviation": "Longan v. Taylor",
  "decision_date": "1889-10-31",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "412",
  "last_page": "415",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "130 Ill. 412"
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill.",
    "id": 8772,
    "name": "Illinois Supreme Court"
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  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
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    {
      "cite": "95 Ill. 626",
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      "cite": "9 Wheat. 702",
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      "cite": "1 How. 250",
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    {
      "cite": "78 Ill. 394",
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        823969
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      "cite": "78 Ill. 394",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:09:00.424280+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "James N. Longan v. George W. Taylor et al."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Per Curiam :\nThe question here is that of the liability of the sureties of a township treasurer of schools upon his official bond.\nThe circuit court refused to hold as follows, namely:\n\u201cThe entries introduced in evidence by plaintiffs, from the books kept by Longan, as treasurer, do not operate as an estoppel against defendants, to prevent them from proving that such entries are untrue. The report to the trustees, introduced in evidence as made by said Longan on the last day he was in office, and stating the amount of money then in the hands of said Longan, does not operate as an estoppel against defendants, to prevent them from proving that such amount was not then in his hands.\u201d\nAnd this refusal is assigned for error. It is clear that the circuit court was required to refuse to hold as thus requested,, by Morley v. Metamora, 78 Ill. 394, Roper et al. v. Sangamon Lodge, 91 id. 518, and City of Chicago v. Gage, 95 id. 593;. and we do not think that the ends of justice now require that we should reconsider the reasoning in their support.\nIn our opinion, the use of the words in this bond, \u201cfrom the date of his bond,\u201d does not have any effect in restricting the liability of the sureties. Without the use of those words their undertaking would have been, in theory, entirely prospective, and they could have been held liable only for defaults occurring, in legal contemplation, after they became bound by signing the bond.\nThe judgment must be affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Per Curiam :"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Mr. Oscar Allen, for the appellant:",
      "Messrs. Blinn & Hoblet, for the appellees:"
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "James N. Longan v. George W. Taylor et al.\nFiled at Springfield File\nOctober 31, 1889.\nreasurer\u2019s books\u2014entries therein, and his reports\u2014conclusive against his sureties. In a suit upon the official bond of a township treasurer of schools, the entries in his books of account of the moneys in his hands at the date of the bond, and his report at the last day of his term of office, showing the amount of school moneys then in his hands, are conclusive upon his sureties, and they are estop-ped from showing such entries and report are untrue. Sureties\u2014school ti\nAppeal from the Appellate Court for the Third District;\u2014 heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Logan county; the Hon. Cyrus Epler, Judge, presiding.\nThis was an action upon the bond of J ames N. Longan, as school treasurer of a township, William Atteberry and Joseph F. Fisher being sureties. The bond was dated June 2, 1886, and contained the provision that the principal should account for all property that came to hand \u201cafter the date of this bond.\u201d The defense was that Longan had fully accounted for all that was in his hands when the bond was made, or that came to his hands afterward, and that the liability for shortage should fall on the prior bondsmen who were such when it occurred.\nMr. Oscar Allen, for the appellant:\nThe principal question is, what effect shall be given to the entries in Longan\u2019s books and the report made by him on the last day of his office.\nThe sureties are liable only for what was actually, not constructively, in Longan\u2019s hands. The terms of the condition are that he shall account for what \u201ccomes to his hands from the date of this bond up to the time that his successor shall qualify.\u201d\nThe change in the condition was made in 1879, after the Metamora case, 78 Ill. 394, was decided. (See Laws of 1879, p. 305, sec. 58.) It is to be presumed that this change means something. That change would be naturally interpreted to mean something like this: The courts have decided that sureties are liable for what is constructively in the principal\u2019s hands; we will now make the bond so that they shall be liable only for what actually comes to his hands, and to that end the bond shall show that they are liable only for what he receives after the bond is made. To construe so plain a provision as meaning that the sureties are liable for what was not in the principal\u2019s hands after the date of the bond, is to disregard those well known rules that implications are always in favor of sureties, and that they have a right to stand upon the very terms of their bond. No unlearned man would even imagine that those words would bea? such construction. It looks like the height of injustice to construe them to mean exactly the opposite of what they say, and to make the legislature appear to have set a trap for plain, honest, unsuspicious men, who ought to be protected, instead of injured, by judicial decisions. Farrar v. United States, 5 Pet. 373; United, States v. Boyd, 15 id. 187; United States v. Irving, 1 How. 250; Bruce v. United States, 17 id. 437; Miller v. Stewart, 9 Wheat. 702.\nMessrs. Blinn & Hoblet, for the appellees:\nWhen an officer makes entries in his books, or in a report which the law requires him to make, both he and the sureties' on his bond are estopped to deny the correctness of those entries. City of Chicago v. Gage, 95 Ill. 626; Fogarty v. Reame, 100 id. 369; Morley v. Metamora, 78 id. 394; Roper v. Samgamon Lodge, 91 id. 518."
  },
  "file_name": "0412-01",
  "first_page_order": 412,
  "last_page_order": 415
}
