{ "id": 5428233, "name": "William H. Grubey v. The National Bank of Illinois", "name_abbreviation": "Grubey v. National Bank", "decision_date": "1890-05-14", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "79", "last_page": "82", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "133 Ill. 79" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "63 Tex. 190", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Tex.", "case_ids": [ 2165483 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/tex/63/0190-01" ] }, { "cite": "67 Ill. 500", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 820160 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/67/0500-01" ] }, { "cite": "113 Ill. 228", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2864476 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/113/0228-01" ] }, { "cite": "4 Ill. App. 594", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 4776485 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/4/0594-01" ] }, { "cite": "41 Ill. 382", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5218188 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/41/0382-01" ] }, { "cite": "11 Ill. App. 543", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5779383 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/11/0543-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 Ill. 493", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "opinion_index": -1 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 380, "char_count": 7179, "ocr_confidence": 0.496, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.138363859351185e-08, "percentile": 0.47116550038245475 }, "sha256": "97493ff998662cafce8c6051c5bb5a1665e7896dd964dfe7a007e3332c03e5c2", "simhash": "1:4b5da16091b51cf3", "word_count": 1244 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:35:59.913163+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "William H. Grubey v. The National Bank of Illinois." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Per Curiam :\nThis was an action of assumpsit, brought by the National Bank of Illinois, at Chicago, against William H. Grubey, on a promissory note, as follows:\n\u201cChicago, III., May 9,1887.\n\u201cSixty days after date I promise to pay, to the order of myself, $1000, payable at 113 S. Clark. Value received, with six per cent per annum until paid.\n(Signed.) Wm. H. Grubey.\u201d\nIndorsed: \u201cPay to the order of the National Bank of Illinois, at Chicago.\u2014Wm. H. Grubey.\u201d\nThe declaration contained one special count on the note, and \u2022also the common counts. The defendant pleaded the general issue, and when the cause was called for trial, plaintiff entered \u00a1a nolle prosequi as to the common counts. A trial was had before a jury, resulting in a judgment in favor of plaintiff for the amount of the note, and interest, which, on appeal, was \u2022affirmed in the Appellate Court.\nOn the trial in the Superior Court, the plaintiff read in evidence the note described in the declaration, and the defendant claimed, as a defense, that the note was given for gambling transactions on the Board of Trade, and was therefore void. No question is raised in the argument in regard to the ruling \u2022of the court on instructions, but it is claimed that the court \u2022erred in refusing certain evidence offered by the defendant, and this is the only ground relied upon to reverse the judgment.\nThe defendant was a witness in his own behalf, and he was asked whether or not any grain bought by him, as shown by certain statements, was received by or delivered to him. The \u25a0court refused to allow the witness to answer the question, and this is the first error complained of. It will not be necessary to stop to inquire whether the court erred in this regard or not, \u00a1as the next question propounded to the witness, which was answered, substantially embraced all contained in the other one, \u00a1and if the court erred, the error did no harm. It was as follows : \u201cI will ask you whether or not, during the time covered by these statements that you have seen, you were called on by Mr. Henrotin, as your broker, to receive or deliver or pay for \u00a1any grain?\u201d Answer, \u201cNo, sir.\u201d\nIt is next claimed that the court erred in refusing to allow the witness to answer the following question: \u201cNow, were the several transactions shown in these statements in fact settled between you and your broker ?\u201d The defense relied upon was that the transactions were gambling contracts. The statements alluded to in the question show, as well as does defendant\u2019s testimony, that the transactions were between the defendant, \u25a0 . through his broker, and third parties; and the Appellate Court; ' held, and we think properly, that \u201c what settlements were made- ' between defendant and Henrotin were immaterial, and had no-tendency to prove that Henrotin had, as agent for the defendant, engaged in gambling transactions with those parties.\u201d\nIt is also argued that the trial court erred in sustainingappellee\u2019s objection to the question, \u201cNow, I will' ask you,. Mr. Grubey, whether or not the parties to whom these privileges were sold, exercised the option given them, and \u2018put\u2019 and. ) \u2018called\u2019 the wheat ?\u201d The witness stated, in answer to a question put by the court, that he did not do any of the business on the Board of Trade himself, and, of course, could not, of his-own knowledge, answer the question. What may have been reported to him by his broker was not competent evidence. The broker himself was a competent witness, and should have-been called if the defendant desired his evidence.\nWhether the note in question was given for gambling transactions on the Board of Trade was purely a question of fact,, and, so far as appears, the question was fairly submitted to-the jury, or, at all events, no such errors intervened on the-trial, in the ruling on questions of evidence, as would authorize a reversal of the judgment.\nThe judgment will be affirmed. ' Judgment affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Per Curiam :" } ], "attorneys": [ "Mr. Francis A. Biddle, and Mr. John S. Stevens, for the appellant:", "Mr. Matthew P. Brady, for the appellee:" ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "William H. Grubey v. The National Bank of Illinois.\nFiled at Ottawa May 14, 1890.\n1. Evidence\u2014to prove a gambling transaction. To prove that certain dealings of a party on the board of trade, through his broker, with third persons, were gambling contracts, the party was asked if the several transactions shown in a certain statement were in fact settled between such party and his broker: Held, that the question was properly disallowed, as the settlements between the party and his broker had no tendency to prove that the broker had, as agent, engaged in gambling transactions with third parties.\n2. Same\u2014hearsay. Where one deals on the board of trade only through his broker, a question put to the former as a witness in his own behalf, calling for a statement of facts not within his personal knowledge, but only such facts as had b\u00e9en reported to him by his agent, is properly disallowed. In such case the broker should be called to testify to the facts.\n3. Error\u2014in excluding evidence\u2014cured by its subsequent admission. The court refused to allow a party called as a witness in his own behalf, to answer a certain question, but allowed him to answer another question which embraced all matters contained in the former one : Held, that if the refusal to allow the witness to answer the first question was error, it did no harm.\nAppeal from the Appellate Court for the First District;\u2014 heard in that court on appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Elliott Anthony, Judge, presiding.\nMr. Francis A. Biddle, and Mr. John S. Stevens, for the appellant:\nIn order to show the intention of the parties to this particular transaction, it was competent to show how they were in the habit of dealing together in like transactions prior to the one in controversy. Phillips v. Roberts, 90 Ill. 493; Doan v. Duncan, 17 id. 272; Golderwood v. McCrea, 11 Ill. App. 543.\nAppellant insists, that having been permitted to testify that the broker never called upon him to receive, deliver or pay for any of the grain, he should have been allowed to answer this question, immediately following: \u201cHow were, if you know, all the several transactions shown in these statements in fact settled between you and your broker ?\u201d\nThe assignment of a note based upon a gambling consideration does not in any manner affect the maker\u2019s defense. Crim. Code, sec. 131; Mallett v. Butcher, 41 Ill. 382; Chapin v. Dake, 57 id. 296 ; Tenney v. Foote, 4 Ill. App. 594; Pearce v. Foote, 113 Ill. 228.\nMr. Matthew P. Brady, for the appellee:\nIt was shown by appellant\u2019s testimony that all the business he had on the board of trade was transacted for him by Henrotin, and that personally he had no knowledge of it, and gave it no attention. It was therefore immaterial to inquire whether or not appellant had received any grain that had been bought for him,\u2014delivery to his broker would have been sufficient.\nThe settlement between appellant and his broker was immaterial on the question of the character of the dealing with third parties.\nAppellant having no personal knowledge of the dealings, could not testify as to them. The defense of the principal can not be proven by the statements made to him by his agent. Primm v. Legg, 67 Ill. 500; Olive v. Hester, 63 Tex. 190." }, "file_name": "0079-01", "first_page_order": 79, "last_page_order": 82 }