{
  "id": 833761,
  "name": "The County of Union v. Martin V. Ussery et al.",
  "name_abbreviation": "County of Union v. Ussery",
  "decision_date": "1893-10-27",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "204",
  "last_page": "209",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "147 Ill. 204"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill.",
    "id": 8772,
    "name": "Illinois Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "136 Ill. 22",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
      "case_ids": [
        2993262
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill/136/0022-01"
      ]
    },
    {
      "cite": "4 Cush. 453",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Cush.",
      "opinion_index": 0
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 493,
    "char_count": 11032,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.518,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 3.4685403761442303e-07,
      "percentile": 0.8810984733086755
    },
    "sha256": "60c60929870e9ae2c43391c725d1954e265e84e2400485b07fdfdcdbe5f4f01b",
    "simhash": "1:9b5ecd6e56fc3514",
    "word_count": 1878
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:37:31.642722+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "The County of Union v. Martin V. Ussery et al."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. Justice Wilkin\ndelivered the opinion of the Court:\nThis was a proceeding, in the court below to contest an election on the proposition to allow domestic animals to run at large in the county of Union. The petition alleged, that at an election held on the 8th of November, 1887, a majority of the votes cast were for that proposition, and it thereupon became lawful for domestic animals to run at large in said county until the 5th day of November, 1891, when the board of canvassers for the general election held on the third of that month, at which the question was again voted upon, declared the majority of votes cast to be against it, which last election is alleged to have been irregular, illegal and void. The circuit court sustained the petition, and gave judgment accordingly, from which the county of Union appeals.\nThe fifth and sixth grounds of contest set up in the petition are as follows: .\n\u201cFifth\u2014That none of the ballots counted by the judges of the said pretended election against domestic animals running at large could lawfully be counted, for the reason that none of said ballots had the official endorsement thereon required by law, and which is a condition precedent and mandatory, and must be complied with before the ballot can be lawfully-counted.\n\u201cSixth\u2014That all the ballots cast at said pretended election were illegal and void because they did not contain a clear statement of the proposition to be voted upon, nor the words \u2018Yes\u2019 and \u2018No,\u2019 and there were no places left in which the elector might indicate his choice; neither did the said ballots contain on the back or outside of the ballot a fac simile of the signature of the county clerk, as required by law as a condition precedent to their being counted.\u201d\nTo each of these the defendant filed a general demurrer, which the court overruled, and no further answer being made thereto, they were taken as confessed.\nIt appears that in addition to the general tickets provided by the county clerk, he furnished the judges in the several precincts others in this form: \u201cStock Law Ballot: For domestic animals running at large; against domestic animals running at large.\u201d Of these, 463 were cast with a cross to-the left of the word \u201cfor; \u201d 541 with a cross to the left of the-word \u201cagainst363 with the words \u201cagainst,\u201d etc., erased, and 402 with the words \u201cfor,\u201d etc., erased.\nThe circuit court sustained the fifth and sixth paragraphs-of the petition, and held that the counting of all ballots on the proposition of animals running at large was unlawful,\u2014 that the election held on that subject was not held in accordance with the law of this State, and was therefore void. It also held, that if any of the ballots cast on that subject could have been lawfully counted, it would have been only those upon which the voter had indicated his choice by erasing the-contrary proposition, which would have resulted in a majority of thirty-nine votes for allowing domestic animals to run at-large.\nThe contention of counsel for appellant is, that nothwithstanding the act in force July 1, 1891, providing for printing and distributing ballots, for the nomination of candidates, to-regulate the manner of holding elections, and to enforce the secrecy of the ballot at all elections, upon the question of permitting domestic animals to run at large the ballots must still be prepared and the election conducted in conformity with the act in force July 1, 1874, entitled, \u201cAn act to revise the law in relation to permitting animals to run at large.\u201d It is clear that a large majority of the voters at the election in question did not so understand the law, because they manir festly attempted to conform to the act of 1891, and if the position insisted upon could be maintained, it would be impossible to escape the conclusion reached by the court below, that their ballots could not be counted, leaving the result to depend upon those in which the voter\u2019s choice was indicated by erasures. It is admitted, however, that if, at elections held on the subject of animals running at large since the act of 1891, the ballots and conduct of the election must conform to the provisions of that act, the judgment of the circuit court should be affirmed, and we shall direct our attention to that, question only.\nIt can not be denied that the title of the election law approved June 22, 1891, is broad enough to include the regulation and manner of holding elections on the subject in question. It is, an act \u201cto regulate the manner of holding elections and to enforce the secrecy of the ballot.\u201d It is not claimed that elections on domestic animals running at large are excepted from the provisions of the act. Section 16 provides : \u201cWhenever a constitutional amendment or other public measure is proposed to be voted upon by the people, the substance of such amendment or other public measure shall be clearly indicated upon the ballot, and two spaces shall be left upon the margin, one for votes favoring the amendment or public measure, to be designated by the word \u2018Yes,\u2019 and one for votes opposing the amendment or measure, to be designated by the word \u2018No,\u2019 as the form herein given.\u201d Then follows a form of the ballot, and the requirement that \u201cthe elector shall designate his vote by a cross, marked thus (X).\u201d By section 35: \u201cAll acts and parts of acts inconsistent with the provisions of this act are hereby repealed.\u201d If, therefore, voting upon permitting animals to run at large in a county is voting upon a public measure, within the meaning of section 16, that part of the act of 1874 which provides for the form of ballots and manner of voting is expressly repealed.\nBut counsel for appellant say, the words \u201cor other public measure\u201d must be limited to \u201clike measures of equal breadth, affecting like territory,\u201d with \u201cconstitutional amendments.\u201d This position is based upon the maxim ejusdem generis, from which is deduced the rule, that \u201cwhen general words follow an enumeration of particular cases, such words apply only to cases of the same kind as those expressly mentioned,\u201d or, stated in different language, the word \u201cother,\u201d following an enumeration of particulars, embraces enumerated particulars of like nature only, unless a broader sense is obviously intended. (Harlow v. Tufts, 4 Cush. 453.) As will be readily seen, the rule invoked can not be made applicable to the proposition stated by counsel. There is nothing in it which authorizes the limiting of the language, \u201cother public measures,\u201d to \u201clike measures of equal breadth, affecting like territory.\u201d \u201cLike measures of equal breadth, affecting like territory,\u201d would include only \u201cconstitutional amendments,\u201d rendering the words \u201cor other public measures\u201d meaningless. All that is required by the rule is, that the general words be restricted to a sense analogous to the less general. (Endlich on Interpretation of Statutes, sec. 400; Misch. v. Russel, 136 Ill. 22.) \u201cConstitutional amendments\u201d affect the rights of all the people of the State. Analogous thereto are all authorized changes in county, town and city governments. They are public measures of the same kind. Where things inferior are enumerated, general words will not embrace those which are superior, but we know of no authority for holding the converse of that rule of construction.\nl\u00edo authority is referred to, neither have we found any, to the effect that \u201cpublic measure\u201d means only a measure affecting the people of the whole State. The generally accepted meaning of the language is, measures interesting the public, as distinguished from those of private concern, only. Turning to the statute we find provision made for voting upon many questions of public interest in counties and smaller subdivisions of the State government, such as the alteration of county lines, the formation of new counties, the removal of county seats, uniting counties, issuing bonds, adopting township organization, etc. In all such cases the form of the ballot is given, as, for example, \u201cFor county bonds\u201d and \u201cAgainst county bonds \u201cFor new county\u201d and \u201cAgainst new county\u201cFor additional tax\u201d and \u201cAgainst additional tax.\u201d If, as contended, section 16, supra, can only be applied to elections on public measures directly affecting the people of the whole State, all these elections must still be by ballots in the old form, and this, we have no hesitancy in saying, was not the intention of the legislature in adopting our present system of \u201cballot reform.\u201d To so construe the statute would lead to confusion, and tend to defeat, in a measure, at least, its wise purposes. The fact that under section 3, chapter 8, the ballots \u201cfor\u201d and \u201cagainst\u201d animals running at large are to be deposited in a separate box, is an additional reason for holding that section inconsistent with the provisions of the act of 1891.\nWe are clearly of the opinion that the election was irregular and void, in not conforming to the requirements of the act of 1891.\nThe judgment of the circuit court will be affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. Justice Wilkin"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Messrs. Kabbakeb & Lingle, for the appellant.",
      "Messrs. Gbawfobd & Dodd, for the appellees."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "The County of Union v. Martin V. Ussery et al.\nFiled al Mt.Vernon October 27, 1893.\n1. Election law\u2014domestic animals running at large. The act of June 22, 1891, to regulate the manner of elections and to enforce the secrecy of the ballot, repeals the act of July 1,1874, entitled \u201cAn act to revise the law in relation to permitting animals to run at large,\u201d in respect to the manner of conducting elections.\n2. Same\u2014voting upon a public measure. Since the passage of the act of 1891, a vote upon any public measure, such as allowing domestic animals to run at large, must be had in pursuance of section 16 of that act. The ballots must designate the measure to be voted on, and must contain the words \u201cYes\u201d or \u201cNo,\u201d and the elector must designate his vote by a cross marked to the left of the word \u201cYes\u201d or the word \u201cNo,\u201d as he may see fit to vote.\n3. Same\u2014statute construed. The words \u201cor other public measure,\u201d following the words \u201cwhenever a constitutional amendment,\u201d etc., is proposed to be voted on, in section 16 of the Election law of 1891, are not limited to measures affecting the whole territory of the State.\n4. Statutes\u2014rule of construction. Where general words follow an enumeration of particular cases, such words will apply only to cases of the same kind as those expressly mentioned,\u2014or, in other words, the word \u201cother,\u201d following an enumeration of particulars, embraces enumerated particulars of like nature only, unless a broader sense is obviously intended. A construction should not be given that will render the general words meaningless. All that is required by the rule is, that the general words be restricted to a sense analogous to the less general.\n5. Where things inferior are enumerated, general words will not embrace those which are superior; but there is no authority for the converse of this rule.\nAppeal from the Circuit Court of Union county; the Hon. Joseph P. Eobabts, Judge, presiding.\nMessrs. Kabbakeb & Lingle, for the appellant.\nMessrs. Gbawfobd & Dodd, for the appellees."
  },
  "file_name": "0204-01",
  "first_page_order": 204,
  "last_page_order": 209
}