{ "id": 3130155, "name": "Catherine Shaw et al. v. E. Hanson Camp", "name_abbreviation": "Shaw v. Camp", "decision_date": "1896-03-30", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "425", "last_page": "430", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "160 Ill. 425" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "64 Ga. 63", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ga.", "case_ids": [ 55290 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ga/64/0063-01" ] }, { "cite": "23 Ill. App. 236", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 863658 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/23/0236-01" ] }, { "cite": "23 Ill. 76", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "127 Ill. 223", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5411033 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "244" } ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/127/0223-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 Mass. 242", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mass.", "case_ids": [ 2106111 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/mass/108/0242-01" ] }, { "cite": "127 N. Y. 92", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.", "case_ids": [ 2239463 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ny/127/0092-01" ] }, { "cite": "19 Conn. 7", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Conn.", "case_ids": [ 6753607 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/conn/19/0007-01" ] }, { "cite": "31 Ill. 306", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 8500511 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "351" } ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/31/0306-01" ] }, { "cite": "8 Johns. 189", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Johns.", "case_ids": [ 2134511 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/johns/8/0189-01" ] }, { "cite": "51 Me. 376", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Me.", "case_ids": [ 665456 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/me/51/0376-01" ] }, { "cite": "20 La. Ann. 236", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "La. Ann.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "148 Ill. 572", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "52 Barb. 194", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Barb.", "case_ids": [ 1950238 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/barb/52/0194-01" ] }, { "cite": "19 Ill. 146", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 441737 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "280" } ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/19/0146-01" ] }, { "cite": "4 Gilm. 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Gilm.", "case_ids": [ 2562756 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/9/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "10 Mass. 457", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mass.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "24 Ill. App. 474", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "138 Ill. 654", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "53 Md. 216", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Md.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "84 Ill. 286", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2652055 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/84/0286-01" ] }, { "cite": "2 Ohio, 35", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ohio", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "17 Conn. 511", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Conn.", "case_ids": [ 6753020 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/conn/17/0511-01" ] }, { "cite": "20 Ill. 392", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2598287 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/20/0392-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 Ill. 167", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2872522 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/114/0167-01" ] }, { "cite": "60 Ill. 244", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 8500569 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/60/0244-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 613, "char_count": 10367, "ocr_confidence": 0.579, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.5153063570437094e-07, "percentile": 0.9234604025176757 }, "sha256": "6e999ee73dc411fdf57b266736b22f8d991f7a259bf883be51fcb8d6e9718120", "simhash": "1:4aa69262ccec08ae", "word_count": 1898 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:56:12.471606+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Catherine Shaw et al. v. E. Hanson Camp." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Justice Cartwright\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAppellee filed a claim in the county court of Piatt county, against the estate of Edward Swaney, deceased, and the claim was rejected. In the circuit court, on appeal, there was a trial by a jury and a verdict for the claimant for \u00a7852.50, upon which judgment was entered. The judgment was affirmed by the Appellate Court and a certificate of importance granted, under which the case is brought to this court.\nOn the trial the claimant offered in evidence the instrument upon which his claim was founded, together with proof of the signature of the deceased. The instrument was as follows: .\n\u201c$750.00. Bement, III., Dec. 27,1890. \u201cAfter my death date I promise to pay E. Hanson Camp, or order, the sum of $750, without interest at...... per cent per annum from date, value received.\u201d\nFollowing the above there was a power of attorney, in the usual form, to confess judgment, and the signature of Edward Swaney. To the introduction of this instrument objection was made and overruled, and it is insisted that the ruling was wrong, for the reason that the instrument was not a promissory note. It is conceded that a promissory note may be made payable on the death of a \u25a0certain person, or at a fixed time thereafter, or on demand after such death; but it is claimed that this instrument was not payable at a time fixed, and that the words \u201cafter my death date\u201d should be construed to mean some uncertain time after that event. We do not regard the instrument as subject to the objection made. It did not become due until the death of the maker, which was an event certain to occur, but by its terms it became due at once after the occurrence of that event. There is nothing in the language to indicate that the money was to be paid at some uncertain time after the maker\u2019s death. The objection was properly overruled.\nIt is next argued that there was no evidence to prove a delivery. It was proved that the maker of the note handed it to William M. Camp with directions to deliver it to the payee, who was then somewhere in the northwest, traveling for a coal company. William M. Camp was a banker and a brother of the payee, and had in his possession other papers of the payee for safe keeping during his absence. These papers were kept in a private envelope of the payee, in a safety-box in the bank. William M. Camp had the key to the safety-box, and the note remained there, with the other papers of the claimant, until his return, after the death of the maker. The note was delivered without condition, and after it was placed in the envelope it was held by William M. Camp as the agent of the claimant. Such a delivery, by which the maker lost all control of the note and William M. Camp held possession as agent for the payee in like manner as he held the other papers of such payee, was sufficient. Thompson v. Candor, 60 Ill. 244 ; Gordon v. Adams, 127 id. 223.\nIt is next contended that the evidence showed that the note was intended as a gift, and that the court improperly modified an instruction stating that if the evidence showed that it was given or intended as a gift or legacy by the deceased to the claimant there would be no consideration for the promise, by adding thereto the following: \u201cUnless you should believe it was intended to take effect as a gift at once and in the lifetime of deceased, but not to be paid until after the death of the maker. \u201d The modification was wrong, since a promissory note intended as a gift is a mere promise to make a gift in the future, which is not enforcible. (Williams v. Forbes, 114 Ill. 167; Richardson v. Richardson, 148 id. 563.) But there was practically no evidence upon which to base the instruction as asked. A witness, who was an attorney, testified that he had a hazy recollection that he had a conversation with somebody who spoke of providing or giving or letting the claimant have something, and whether it could be done best by will or by a note; but he did not know anything about what the conversation was or what was said about it, and did not know whether the talk was with the deceased or with John M. Gamp, and could not state the time or place of the conversation. This was the only evidence tending in any degree to impeach the consideration of the note, and it was so unsubstantial that if competent it would be wholly insufficient for such purpose. The instruction as asked should have been refused, but as the jury could not find, from the evidence, the fact npon which the rule stated was based, it was immaterial that the rule was changed by the modification.\nThere was no error in the modification or refusal of other instructions asked by defendants.\nAfter the jnry had retired and remained out some time they requested the court to give them further instructions, and an instruction was given in compliance with such request. It is claimed that the court had no power to call the jury before the bar and give this further instruction. Such a practice is not improper, where, as in this case, equal opportunity is given to each party to submit further instructions. Lee v. Quirk, 20 Ill. 392.\nThe judgment of the Appellate Court will be affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Justice Cartwright" } ], "attorneys": [ "S. R. Reed, I. A. Buckingham, and Lodge & Hicks, for appellants:", "Norman H. Camp, for appellee:" ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Catherine Shaw et al. v. E. Hanson Camp.\nFiled at Springfield March 30, 1896.\n\u2022 1. Bills and notes\u2014words \u201cafter my death date I promise to pay\u201d construed. A written instrument in the form of a promissory note, commencing, \u201cAfter my death date I promise to pay,\u201d etc., becomes due at once after the death of the maker, and is a good promissory note.\n2. Same\u2014delivery of note to payee's agent\u2014when sufficient. The unconditional delivery of a note to a third person who holds possession, as the payee\u2019s agent, until after the death of the maker, is a good delivery, where the maker thereby loses control of the note.\n3. Same\u2014note intended as a gift is not enforcible. A promissory note intended as a gift is a mere promise to make a gift in the future, and is not enforcible.\n4. Instructions\u2014when an improper modification is immaterial. The improper modification of an instruction stating a correct rule of law is immaterial, where the evidence is not' sufficient to support a finding of the fact upon which the rule is based.\n5. Trial\u2014when proper to recall jury and give additional instruction. It is not improper practice for the court to call the jury before the bar after they have retired and remained out some time, and give them an additional instruction, when equal opportunity is afforded each party to submit further instructions.\nAppeal from the Appellate Court for the Third District;\u2014heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Piatt county; the Hon. Edward P. Vail, Judge, presiding.\nS. R. Reed, I. A. Buckingham, and Lodge & Hicks, for appellants:\nA negotiable bill of exchange or promissory note must be payable at a time certain. 1 Randolph on Com. Paper, sec. 109.\nA note may be payable on the death of a certain person, or \u201con demand after my decease,\u201d or \u201cone day after date or at my death.\u201d It will, however, be unavailing as a- note if delivery is postponed until then. 1 Randolph on Com. Paper, sec. 113; Tiedeman on Com. Paper, sec. 25.\nAs delivery constitutes part of the complete execution of a note, it follows that no delivery can be made after the death of the maker, by his executor. 1 Randolph on Com. Paper, sec. 221; Clark v. Sigourney, 17 Conn. 511; Bromage v. Loyd, 9 Exch. 32; Gough v. Findon, 7 Exch. 48; Clark v. Boyd, 2 Ohio, 35.\nNor can it be delivered by the maker\u2019s agent after death, as death revokes agency. Mechem on Agency, secs. 239, 240; Turnan v. Temke, 84 Ill. 286.\nWhile a note remains in the maker\u2019s hands, or in the hands of his agent, to whom it has been given for the purpose of delivery, it is still undelivered and incomplete. 1 Randolph on Com. Paper, sec. 222; Tiedeman on Com. Paper, sec. 34a; Brind v. Hampshire, 1 M. & W. 365; King v. Lambton, 5 Price, 428; Devries v. Shumate, 53 Md. 216; 1 Parsons on Notes and Bills, 48, 50; Barrows v. Barrows, 138 Ill. 654; Hayes v. Boylan, 141 id. 505; Daniel on Neg. Inst. sec. 63.\nNo delivery of a note or deed can be complete without the acceptance of the payee or grantee. Tiedeman on Com. Paper, 34a; Reynolds v. Moshier, 24 Ill. App. 474; Herbert v. Herbert, Breese, 360; Maynard v. Maynard, 10 Mass. 457; Hulick v. Scovill, 4 Gilm. 159; Bryan v. Wash, 2 id. 564; Curtis v. Gorman, 19 Ill. 146; Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 95 id. 280; Kinne v. Ford, 52 Barb. 194.\nA note executed and intended as a mere gift cannot form the ground of recovery in an action at law, and is revocable until paid. Richardson v. Richardson, 148 Ill. 572; Williams v. Forbes, 114 id. 171.\nNorman H. Camp, for appellee:\nA note or bill payable at a certain time after the death of a person, whether it be the maker, payee or drawee, would be negotiable, for the person would be sure to die, and hence the payment is not conditional. 1 Daniel on Neg. Inst. sec. 46, p. 54; Tiedeman on Com. Paper, p. 56, sec. 25; 1 Parsons on Bills and Notes, 40; Cooke v. Colehan, 11 Strange, 1217; Coleman v. Cooke, Willes, 393; Story on Bills and Notes, (6th ed.) sec. 27, p. 31; Raffey v. Greenwell, 10 A. & E. 222; Mortee v. Edwards, 20 La. Ann. 236; 2 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 326, 327.\nWhenever no time is specified on the face of the instru7 ment, it is presumed to be payable on demand. Tiedeman on Com. Paper, secs. 24, 25c.\nWhere a note does not specify any day or time of pay7 ment, it is by law deemed payable on demand, and therefore is construed as if it contained the words \u201cpayable on demand\u201d on its face. Story on Promissory Notes, sec. 29; Porter v. Porter, 51 Me. 376; Green v. Grebilbis, 8 Johns. 189; Archer v. Claflin, 31 Ill. 306; White v. Smith, 77 id. 351.\nThe note imports a consideration. Bristol v. Warner, 19 Conn. 7; Carnwright v. Gray, 127 N. Y. 92; Dean v. Carruth, 108 Mass. 242.\nIf delivery is made to another for the payee, without condition, his acceptance of it'may be presumed, and the delivery will be complete. Gordon v. Adams, 127 Ill. 223; Thompson v. Candor, 60 id. 244; Bodley v. Higgins, 73 id. 375; Walker v. Walker, 42 id. 311; Parsons on Bills and Notes, p. 49; Byles on Bills, (6th ed.) p. 235; Tiedeman on Com. Paper, secs. 34, 34a; Masterson v. Cheek, 23 Ill. 76; Wiley v. Stewart, 23 Ill. App. 236; Elliott v. Deason, 64 Ga. 63." }, "file_name": "0425-01", "first_page_order": 425, "last_page_order": 430 }