{ "id": 5538386, "name": "Alfred B. McChesney v. The City of Chicago", "name_abbreviation": "McChesney v. City of Chicago", "decision_date": "1898-04-21", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "75", "last_page": "78", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "173 Ill. 75" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "85 Ill. 597", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2778316 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/85/0597-01" ] }, { "cite": "2 Gilm. 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Gilm.", "case_ids": [ 2558731 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/7/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "113 Ill. 283", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2865932 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "354" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/113/0283-01" ] }, { "cite": "141 Ill. 302", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5458215 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/141/0302-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 397, "char_count": 7569, "ocr_confidence": 0.603, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.0002152141536284e-07, "percentile": 0.9057636178788802 }, "sha256": "7dfc8031eac08493dbb15cf9bfd4cf627b7c6990cd9ae2889b65448ef841bc19", "simhash": "1:7668cc69c722dae0", "word_count": 1262 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:15:43.178236+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Alfred B. McChesney v. The City of Chicago." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Justice Magruder\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis is an appeal from a judgment of the county court, confirming a special assessment. The special assessment was for the construction of a cement sidewalk on both sides of Sixty-fifth street from Cottage Grove avenue to Drexel avenue in the city of Chicago. The appellant appealed and filed a number of objections, all of which were overruled, except that one objection was so far sustained as to result in a reduction of the assessment' from ninety-six cents to seventy-five cents per front foot. Exception was taken to the action of the court in overruling the objections.\nFirst\u2014It is said that the ordinance is invalid, as not sufficiently specifying the locality of the improvement, because the first section thereof ordains \u201cthat a sidewalk six feet in width be constructed on both sides of Sixty-fifth......, from Cottage Grove avenue to Drexel avenue, adjoining the lot line.\u201d It is said that the omission after the word, \u201cSixty-fifth,\u201d leaves it uncertain what is meant,\u2014whether the meaning is \u201cSixty-fifth street,\u201d or \u201cSixty-fifth place,\u201d or \u201cSixty-fifth court.\u201d We think it manifest that the word omitted is \u201cstreet.\u201d The ordinance must be viewed as a whole, and one part or section of it may be referred to for the purpose of explaining another part or section. (Steele v. Village of River Forest, 141 Ill. 302). In the latter part of the first section of the ordinance, after specifying how the sidewalk is to be constructed, the following words are used: \u201cThe said sidewalk is to be laid to conform to the established grade of said street,\u201d etc. The words, \u201csaid street,\u201d evidently refer back to the Sixty-fifth........, along both sides of which the sidewalk is to be constructed, showing that the word omitted was the word \u201cstreet.\u201d Moreover, the ordinance is entitled \u201cAn ordinance for sidewalk on both sides of Sixty-fifth street,\u201d etc. The meaning of the omission in the ordinance is so plain, that we cannot regard the action of the court, in overruling the objection as to the insufficiency of the locality therein specified, as being erroneous.\nSecond\u2014The estimate of the cost of the improvement, as made-by the commissioners, is objected to because it shows the same omission after the word \u201cSixty-fifth,\u201d as occurs in the ordinance. Inasmuch, however, as the report of the commissioners, presenting their estimate, recites the ordinance, the omission explains itself in the same manner as it is explained by the terms of the ordinance already set forth. The objection, therefore, is \"without force.\nIt is furthermore contended that the estimate of the cost is void upon the alleged ground that it does not show that appellant has not constructed the sidewalk along his property according to the provisions of section 1 of the ordinance. This contention is without merit, because the estimate does show what it is claimed that it does not show. Section 1 of the ordinance contained a proviso that the owner of any lot fronting on the sidewalk should be allowed fifteen days after the taking effect of the ordinance, in which to construct the sidewalk opposite his land, and thereby relieve the same from assessment, the work to be done under the superintendence of the department of public works. The estimate, after reciting that the commissioners were appointed to make an estimate of the cost of so much of the improvement as shall not have been made by said owners within the time aforesaid, contains the following statement: \u201cand the sidewalk in front of the lots * * * described as follows, to-wit:\u201d (here follows description of appellant\u2019s lots), \u201cnot having been constructed, we submit herewith our estimate of the cost of so much of said contemplated improvement as has not been made by the owners,\u201d etc.\nIt is claimed that the description of appellant\u2019s property in the report of the commissioners, giving an estimate of the cost of the improvement, is defective upon the alleged ground that the portion of the description, reading as follows, \u201cSec. 23, 38, 14,\u201d is indefinite and uncertain. It is said that it cannot be told what the figures \u201c38, 14,\u201d mean or refer to. There can be no doubt that the abbreviation \u201cSec.\u201d means \u201csection,\u201d so that the reference here is to section 23. (Hill v. Blackwelder, 113 Ill. 283; Bowen v. Prout, 52 id. 354; Blakeley v. Bestor, 13 id. 708; Law v. People, 80 id. 268; Jackson v. Cummings, 15 id. 449; Taylor v. Wright, 121 id. 455). This being so, the figures, which follow the designation of the section, clearly refer to the township and range, as if the word \u201ctownship\u201d was inserted before \u201c38\u201d and the word, \u201crange,\u201d before \u201c14.\u201d (Atkins v. Hinman, 2 Gilm. 437). The court will take judicial notice of the meaning of such abbreviations as are here used, but if this were not so, parol evidence is admissible to explain their meaning\". (Paris v. Lewis, 85 Ill. 597; 1 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law,\u20142d ed.\u2014pp. 99,100). Such parol evidence was here introduced. A surveyor, put on the stand as a witness, was asked the question: \u201cDoes the phrase \u2018Sec. 23, 38, 14\u2019 have any well-defined meaning among surveyors?\u201d and answered as follows: \u201cSurveyors understand that \u2018Sec.\u2019 means \u2018section;\u2019 that by the \u201838\u2019 is meant township, and \u201814\u2019 for the range.\u201d\nThe same observations already made apply to, and explain the meaning of, the abbreviations used to describe the subdivision lying in said section 23. The description gives the numbers of the lots and the number of the block in appellant\u2019s subdivision of a certain five acres, which can be easily located within the section.\nIt is conceded by the appellant that in the assessment roll his property is fully and accurately d\u00e9scribed, and described without any abbreviations'. Nor is it claimed that appellant built any sidewalk within the fifteen days specified in the ordinance. The right property was assessed and by the right description. It cannot be said, therefore, that appellant has been injured in anyway by any misdescription.\nThe judgment of the county court is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed,.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Justice Magruder" } ], "attorneys": [ "David G. Robertson, for appellant.", "Charles S. Thornton, Corporation Counsel, and John A. May, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Alfred B. McChesney v. The City of Chicago.\nOpinion filed April 21, 1898.\n1. Special assessments\u2014ordinance must be viewed as a whole. A special assessment ordinance must be viewed as a whole, and one part may be referred to for the purpose of explaining another.\n2. Same\u2014omission in ordinance not fatal if it may be supplied by reasonable intendment. A section of an ordinance providing that a sidewalk be constructed \u201con both sides of Sixty-fifth......, from,\u201d etc.,\nis not void for uncertainty where another section requires the sidewalk to be laid to conform to the established grade of \u201csaid street,\u201d and the ordinance is entitled \u201cAn ordinance for sidewalk on both sides of Sixty-fifth street,\u201d etc.\n3. Courts\u2014court will take judicial notice of abbreviations used in describing property. A description of property in the commissioners\u2019 estimate of the cost of the improvement as lying in \u201cSec. 23,38,14,\u201d is not uncertain in that regard, as the courts will take judicial notice that the figures \u201c38\u201d and \u201c14,\u201d as so used, refer, respectively, to township and range.\n4. Evidence\u2014parol evidence is admissible to explain abbreviations. Where property is described as lying in \u201cSec. 23, 38,14,\u201d parol evidence is admissible to show that such description has a well-defined meaning among surveyors.\nAppeal from the County Court of Cook county; the Hon. Richard Yates, Judge, presiding.\nDavid G. Robertson, for appellant.\nCharles S. Thornton, Corporation Counsel, and John A. May, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0075-01", "first_page_order": 75, "last_page_order": 78 }