{
  "id": 2596564,
  "name": "Patrick R. Morgan, Appellant, v. Joseph T. Ryerson, Appellee",
  "name_abbreviation": "Morgan v. Ryerson",
  "decision_date": "1858-04",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "343",
  "last_page": "346",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "20 Ill. 343"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill.",
    "id": 8772,
    "name": "Illinois Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [],
  "analysis": {
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    "char_count": 7464,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.577,
    "pagerank": {
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      "percentile": 0.9724128704028691
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    "sha256": "70973e92d8d4d5564038e8220948b1f683cbb1c26319230d839b18f271597b08",
    "simhash": "1:86f3238c5285ffae",
    "word_count": 1319
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:54:40.778931+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Patrick R. Morgan, Appellant, v. Joseph T. Ryerson, Appellee."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Breese, J.\nThis was an action of assumpsit, brought upon a warranty given upon the sale of a horse, with a count for money had and received.\nMuch and conflicting testimony was heard on the trial, which it is the peculiar province of a jury, in such cases, to reconcile ; and an instance can scarcely be found in the books where a verdict has been set aside under such circumstances, even if it may appear to the court that the verdict may be against the weight of evidence. Lowry v. Orr, 1 Gilm. R. 70.\nThere is proof in the cause that Byerson returned the horse to Morgan so soon as he discovered the blemish, and the jury had a right to infer, from all the circumstances, that Morgan had accepted him.\nThe measure of damages in such case is, the price paid for the horse. If he is not returned, the measure of damages is the difference between his real value and the price given. Caswell v. Coare, 1 Taunton R. 566.\nWe see no objections to any of the instructions given by the court. The qualifications to the defendant\u2019s instructions were all proper.\nThe judgment is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Breese, J."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "S. Ashton, for Appellant.",
      "B. C. Larned, for Appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Patrick R. Morgan, Appellant, v. Joseph T. Ryerson, Appellee.\nAPPEAL FROM COOK.\nA verdict will not be set aside where the evidence is conflicting, even though it may be against the weight of evidence.\nWhere a horse, sold as sound, proves to be otherwise, is returned to the vendor by the purchaser, in an action by the purchaser the measure of damages is the price paid for the horse. If he is not returned, it is the difference between his real value and the price given.\nThis was an action of assumpsit, brought by the appellee against the appellant.\nThe first count of the declaration alleges that on the 11th day of April, 1856, plaintiff, at the request of defendant, purchased of defendant a certain horse for the sum of $225 ; and that said horse was sound and kind for a family horse ; plaintiff avers that said horse was not sound; but on the contrary, said horse was unsound at the time when, etc., whereby said horse ' became and was of no use or value to plaintiff; and that he, the said plaintiff, had been put to great expense in and about taking care of said horse, whereby plaintiff was deceived, etc.\nSecond count same in substance as first, alleging the purchase of a horse by plaintiff from defendant, with a warranty of soundness, etc.; and that said horse was unsound at the time when, etc.; and by means whereof there was a breach of the warranty by defendant, whereby plaintiff was damaged, etc.\nCommon counts in the usual form, etc.\nPleas\u20141st, general issue; 2nd, set off.\nIssue was joined on the pleas.\nOn the trial, plaintiff gave in evidence the bill of sale from defendant to plaintiff, with warranty of soundness of said horse, in the words and figures following, to wit:\nMr. Ryerson,\nBought of P. R. Morgan,\nOne bay horse, five years old, warranted sound and kind for a family horse, -------- $225 00\nReceived payment,\nSigned, P. R. MORGAN.\nChicago, April IIth, 1856.\nThe testimony on the part of the plaintiff below, went to show that the horse, soon after he purchased him, became lame in one of his fore legs, and that this lameness had manifested itself before the purchase by plaintiff, and rendered the horse unfit for use. On the part of the defendant below, the testimony was strong in support of the soundness of the horse, before and at the time of the sale. The horse was returned by Eyerson to Morgan in two or three weeks after the purchase.\nThe plaintiff requested the court to instruct the jury as follows:\n1st. If the jury believe, from the evidence, that the horse sold by the defendant to the plaintiff had any sprain, strain or other injury, amounting to unsoundness in one of his legs at the time of the sale to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff, after discovering such unsoundness, and without unreasonable delay returned the horse to the defendant as unsound, then the plaintiff is entitled to recover the amount paid for the horse.\n2nd. If the jury shall believe, from the evidence, that the horse was returned by the plaintiff to the defendant as unsound, and accepted by the defendant, then the plaintiff is entitled to recover back the amount paid the defendant for the horse.\n3rd. If the jury believe, from the evidence, that the horse was returned to defendant in Jun\u00e9, 1856, as unsound, and was accepted back by the defendant, then the plaintiff is entitled to recover the price paid for the horse, whether he was sound or not at the time of sale.\nTo the giving of which said instructions the defendant excepted.\nThe defendant requested the court to instruct the jury as follows :\nIf the jury shall believe, from the evidence, that at the time of the sale of the horse in question by the defendant to plaintiff, that the said horse had no permanent or incurable injury about Mm; and that if any unsoundness existed, it was only a temporary and curable injury, and did not injure the horse for services, then it was no breach of the warranty, and the defendant is entitled to a verdict.\u201d\nWhich said instruction the court then and there gave to the jury, with the following qualification after the word services: \u201c and present use while suffering under it.\u201d Also, with the following addition after the word verdict: \u201c unless the contract of sale was afterwards, by agreement, rescinded by the parties, and the horse returned to defendant.\u201d\nThe defendant then and there further requested the court to give to the jury the following instruction:\n\u201c If the jury shall believe, from the evidence, that the horse in question, at the time of the sale to the plaintiff by the defendant, was a sound horse, then the law is for the defendant, and the only question for the jury to try in relation to the soundness or unsoundness of the horse, is the question as to whether the horse was unsound at the time of the sale.\u201d\nWhich said instruction the court gave, with the following qualification after the word horse: \u201c and that the contract of sale was not rescinded at the time of his return to defendant, or at any other time.\u201d\nAlso the following:\n\u201cIf the jury shall believe, from the evidence, that the defend ant kept the horse in question for the plaintiff, after he was hurt and brought back to the stable of the defendant, then the defendant is entitled to recover the value of his keeping and attendance, if the same commenced before this suit was brought, by way of set-off, and the defendant is entitled to such judgment as the keeping and attendance was reasonably worth.\u201d\nWhich said instruction the court gave to the jury, with the following qualification after the word that: \u201c the horse was returned to defendant and contract of sale rescinded between the parties, and that\u201d.\nAnd also the following:\n\u201c If the jury shall believe, from the evidence, that the horse was sound at the time of the sale to the plaintiff, then they should find for the defendant.\u201d\nWhich said instruction the court gave to the jury, with the addition, however, after the word defendant, of the following: \u201c unless they shall also find that the horse was returned to the defendant, and the contract of sale rescinded between the parties by mutual agreement.\u201d\nTo the giving of said additions to said instructions the defendant excepted.\nThe jury found a verdict for the plaintiff, and assessed the damages at $225.\nThe defendant moved the court for a new trial, which was denied.\nS. Ashton, for Appellant.\nB. C. Larned, for Appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0343-01",
  "first_page_order": 345,
  "last_page_order": 348
}