{
  "id": 847141,
  "name": "Swift & Co. v. Patrick Ronan",
  "name_abbreviation": "Swift & Co. v. Ronan",
  "decision_date": "1903-02-18",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "202",
  "last_page": "206",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "202 Ill. 202"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill.",
    "id": 8772,
    "name": "Illinois Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "103 Ill. App. 475",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill. App.",
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        2587650
      ],
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    {
      "cite": "101 N. Y. 377",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "N.Y.",
      "case_ids": [
        2201537
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      "case_paths": [
        "/ny/101/0377-01"
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    {
      "cite": "168 Ill. 514",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
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        3188931
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      "case_paths": [
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  "analysis": {
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:56:14.201688+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Swift & Co. v. Patrick Ronan."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. Justice Hand\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe appellant, at the close of the plaintiff\u2019s evidence, asked the court that the jury be instructed to find for the defendant, which instruction was refused. This motion was renewed at the close of all the evidence and the instruction again refused. The refusal to give this instruction to the jury requires an examination of the record by this court for the purpose of ascertaining whether the evidence tends to make a case which sustains the allegations of the declaration.\nClearly there can be no recovery against appellant except on the theory that the engiqe crew causing the accident was under its control to such an extent as to establish the relation of master and servant. (Foster v. Wadsworth-Howland Co. 168 Ill. 514; Hexamer v. Webb, 101 N. Y. 377.) This seems to be conceded by appellee to be the law. He contends, however, that the relation of master and servant was established, by the proof, between appellant and the National Stock Yards Company of East St. Louis. Assuming that this is true, it would still be necessary to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the engine and crew causing the accident was that of the National Stock Yards Company acting as the servant of appellant, and this we think he has failed to do. The testimony on this point is as follows:\nQ. \u201cMr. Ron an, didn\u2019t you look around there to see what it was that struck the car, when you came out of it?\nA. \u201cI did not look; I knew it was an engine struck it.\nQ. \u201cI am not asking you w'hat you know. I ask you if you looked to see what it was that struck the car.\nA. \u201cI seen an engine; I could not say what engine; I seen an engine up there.\nQ. \u201cThat was the engine that struck the car, wasn\u2019t it?\nA. \u201cI suppose so.\nQ. \u201cYou don\u2019t know whose engine that was that came in there?\nA. \u201cI would not swear, no.\nQ. \u201cYou don\u2019t know anything about that?\nA. \u201cNo, sir; I would not swear whose engine it was.\u201d\nThe only other testimony in the record upon this point, was that of Beasley, foreman of the stock yards switching crew which was on duty at appellant\u2019s plant during-each working day, who on direct examination testified:\nQ. \u201cDo you know anything about the accident to Mr. Ronan?\nA. \u201cNo, sir, not a thing; I did not know Mr. Ronan at. all only since the last trial.\u201d\nAnd on cross-examination:\nQ. \u201cI believe you said when you were here the last-time that you were in Swift\u2019s yard with this engine on the 3d of November, but whether you were there on the occasion when this man was hurt you could not say?\nA. \u201cYes, I did; I think that is the way.\nQ. \u201cWere you there that day?\nA. \u201cI am pretty positive I was there that day, Mr. Lee, but whether I was there at the time of the accident I could hot say.\nQ. \u201cWhat other engines went in that yard besides your own?\nA. \u201cThe Bridge company, the Cotton Belt, the CloverLeaf and the Air Line, \u2014 or the Southern now.\u201d\nThis was all the testimony .as to the identity of the engine causing the accident. We do not think this can be said to tend to prove that it was the engine and crew of the National Stock Yards Company which appellee contends was occupying the position of servant to appellant, and in our opinion the question of master and servant is of no importance until the identity of the engine and crew causing the accident is established. It is apparent from the evidence that the acc-ident might have been caused by an engine of one of the railroad companies which the proof shows also went in the appellant\u2019s, yards, and that there was no evidence upon which to base a finding that it was the engine of the National Stock. Yards Company which caused the accident. It is not claimed the relation of master and servant existed between the railroad companies whose engines entered said yards, and appellant. It was vital to the case, of appellee that he connect the National Stock Yards Company engine with the accident. Failing in this, no case was made, and the court should have so instructed the jury.\nThe judgments of the Appellate and city courts will be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.\nReversed and remanded.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. Justice Hand"
      },
      {
        "text": "Mr. Chief Justice Magruder,\ndissenting: Questions of fact, in cases submitted to juries, are for the determination of the jury, and not of this court.",
        "type": "dissent",
        "author": "Mr. Chief Justice Magruder,"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "A. & J. F. Lee, and C. E. Pope, for appellant.",
      "Freels & Joyce, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Swift & Co. v. Patrick Ronan.\nOpinion filed February 18, 1903\nRehearing denied April 24, 1903.\nTrial \u2014 when it is error to. refuse peremptory instruction. Where the evidence in an action by a servant against the master for personal injury, does not tend to identify the instrumentality inflicting the injury as one under the control of the master or his servants, it is error to refuse to order a verdict by peremptory instruction.\nMagrtjder, C. J., dissenting.\nSwift & Co. v. Ronan, 103 Ill. App. 475, reversed.\nAppeal, from the Appellate Court for the Fourth District; \u2014 heard in that court on appeal from the City Court of East St. Louis; the Hon. Silas Cook, Judge, presiding.\nThis was an action on the case, brought in the city court of East St. Louis by appellee, against the appellant, to recover \"damages for an injury received by him while in its employ.\nThe facts are as follows: Appellant was engaged in a general slaughtering and packing business near the city of East St. Louis, occupying a tract of ground which was enclosed by a high board fence, with its slaughter and packing houses, yards and railway tracks. On November 3, 1900, appellee was engaged in salting the sides of beef that were being packed in a refrigerator car for shipment, and while at this work a locomotive struck the string of cars of which the car in which appellee was at work was one, with such violence that he was thrown with great force against the handle of a shovel he was then using and against a meat truck in the car, thereby producing a rupture on his right side.\nThe declaration contains but one count. After the usual allegations of ownership, user, etc., and the employment of the defendant as a laborer, it charges it was the duty of appellant to provide a reasonably safe place for appellee to work in, and, while he was in the discharge of his duty in said car and exercising ordinary care and diligence, that appellant wrongfully and negligently. caused or permitted a locomotive engine to back or run over the track and against the cars standing thereon some distance from the refrigerator car, and drive them with great force and violence against said car in which said plaintiff was at work, and thereby throw him with great violence against the shovel and the truck and then against the jamb of the door, and in the jerk and the fall the plaintiff was strained and ruptured and permanently injured, alleging loss of time, pain and suffering, expenditures for medical aid and medicine, and inability to perform heavy work or hard labor, and the damage of appellee in the sum of $5000.\nOn trial a verdict resulted in favor of appellee for the sum of $2500, which was subsequently reduced, by entering a remittitur, to $2000. Judgment was thereupon rendered, and appellant perfected an appeal to the Appellate Court for the Fourth District, where the judgment of the city court was affirmed, from which judgment a further appeal has been prosecuted to this court.\nA. & J. F. Lee, and C. E. Pope, for appellant.\nFreels & Joyce, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0202-01",
  "first_page_order": 202,
  "last_page_order": 206
}
