{ "id": 4761056, "name": "Joseph Vogrin, Appellant, vs. The American Steel and Wire Company, Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Vogrin v. American Steel & Wire Co.", "decision_date": "1914-04-23", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "474", "last_page": "479", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "263 Ill. 474" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "210 Ill. 115", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3303122 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/210/0115-01" ] }, { "cite": "222 Ill. 232", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3339220 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/222/0232-01" ] }, { "cite": "229 Ill. 33", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "236 Ill. 485", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3384301 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "614" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/236/0485-01" ] }, { "cite": "138 Ill. 356", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5444153 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/138/0356-01" ] }, { "cite": "210 Ill. 115", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3303122 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/210/0115-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 474, "char_count": 11239, "ocr_confidence": 0.77, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.408238598925906e-07, "percentile": 0.6464384603117788 }, "sha256": "3d0aa1fbd3a196682f66d822abce995cd233c7cd97290ea14f393eff166be489", "simhash": "1:39576e382c411689", "word_count": 1943 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:34:37.377440+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Joseph Vogrin, Appellant, vs. The American Steel and Wire Company, Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Justice Craig\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis was an action on the case to recover damages for personal injuries, brought by appellant against appellee in the circuit court of Will county. The original declaration consisted of one count, filed on September 9, 1910, to the September term, 1910. Later five additional counts were filed. General and special demurrers were filed to the original declaration and also to the five addition\u00e1l counts, and were sustained. After more than two years had elapsed since the cause of action accrued, the appellant, by leave of court, filed an amended declaration of three counts. To each of said counts appellee filed pleas of the general issue and the Statute of Limitations. The court having overruled the demurrers of appellant to the plea of the Statute of Limitations, appellant elected to stand by his demurrers and a final judgment was entered. On appeal to the Appellate Court the judgment of the trial court was affirined and a certificate of importance granted to this court.\nIt is insisted that the original declaration and the five additional counts did not state a cause of action, in that they entirely failed to state any facts showing that the plaintiff was in the discharge of his duties to his employer at the time and place when and where he was injured, and that the cause of action set up in the amended declaration was a new cause of action,\u2014one that had never been stated before,\u2014and that therefore the plea of the Statute of Limitations was a good defense. The charge in the original declaration is, in so far as its averments are material, that on the 18th day of March, 1910, the defendant was engaged in the manufacture of wire, nails, etc., and was possessed of and operating certain mills, runways and premises, and that the plaintiff on the day aforesaid, and for a long time prior thereto-, was in the employ of the defendant as an oiler, and that as such oiler, in the discharge of his duty, he ivas then and there required to- pass through, along and about said buildings, mills, runways and premises, etc., and that'the defendant so- carelessly and negligently constructed, used, managed and operated said buildings, mills-, runways and premises, that by, through and in consequence of the carelessness and negligence of the defendant in that behalf, the plaintiff, while passing by and along one of said buildings, mills and runways on said premises, in the exercise of ordinary care for his own safety, was struck by a large bundle of wire and injured, etc. We-think that by the use of the words \u201cthen and there\u201d in this count of the declaration, and the allegation immediately following stating what appellant\u2019s duties were, it charges, by reference sufficiently to admit of proof of that fact on the trial, that at the time and place of his injury the appellant was in the discharge of his duties as an employee of the appellee, although the charge is not made in the language most usually employed in common law -pleadings for that purpose. The words \u201cthen and there\u201d refer to the time and place last specified, unless some phrase is used in connection therewith which shows that a different reference was intended.. (28 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law,\u20142d ed.\u2014130; Palmer v. People, 138 Ill. 356.) This is also the rule in criminal pleadings, where the rule requiring accuracy is stronger than in pleadings in civil cases. Although a demurrer .was. sustained to this count and to the five additional counts filed before the Statute of Limitations had run, they are still a part of the record and files in the case, and may be referred to for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not the additional counts, state a new cause of action or are a re-statement of the same cause of action in a more perfect manner. Shaughnessy v. Holt, 236 Ill. 485 ; North Chicago Street Railroad Co. v. Aufmann, 221 id. 614.\nThe charges in the first, fourth and fifth additional counts, in so far as they are material here, were, in substance, as follows: That on the 18th of March, 1910, and for a long time prior thereto, the defendant was engaged in the business of manufacturing wire, nails, etc., and was possessed of and operating certain mills, runways, etc.; that on the day aforesaid, and for some time prior thereto, the plaintiff was in the employ of said defendant as an oiler, and as such oiler was required to, and did in the discharge of his duty as such oiler, pass through, along, in and about said mills, shops, factories, runways and premises of said defendant; that1 it thereupon became and was the duty of the defendant in designing, planning, locating, constructing, using, managing and operating said mills, shops, factories and runways, to exercise ordinary care and caution so as not to expose the plaintiff and other employees in and about said mills, shops, factories and runw\u00e1ys to unnecessary hazard and danger, yet the defendant so carelessly and negligently planned, located, designed, constructed, used, managed and operated said mills, shops, factories, runways and premises, that by, through and in consequence of the carelessness and negligence of the said defendant in that behalf, said plaintiff, while passing by and along one of said buildings, mills, factories, and over and across one of said runways on said premises, in the exercise of ordinary care, and caution for his own safety, was struck and hit with a large bundle of wire, etc.,\u2014concluding with averments of injury and damages. The second and third counts averred that plaintiff, as such oiler, was required, in the discharge of his duties, etc., without saying that he did, in the discharge of his duties, pass through, etc. Each count of the amended declaration was in all. material respects the same as the additional counts quoted above, with the exception that in the last clause of the sentence quoted above, after the word \u201cpremises,.\u201d the words \u201cin the discharge of his duty as such oiler\u201d were inserted, SO' that the last clause of the amended declaration reads as follows: \u201cSaid plaintiff, while passing by and along one of said buildings, mills, factories, and over and across one of said runways on said premises, in the discharge of his duty as such oiler, in the exercise qf ordinary care and caution for' his own safety, was struck and hit and injured,\u201d etc.\nAppellee does not question but that the five additional counts, as thus amended, state a good cause of action, and, conceding this, we do not think the cause of action set up in the amended declaration is any other or different from that set up in the five additional counts filed before the Statute of Limitations had run, as in cases of this kind the cause of action is the act or thing done or omitted to be done by one which confers the right upon another to sue,\u2014 that is, the act or wrong of defendant towards the plaintiff which causes a grievance for which the law gives a remedy. (Swift Co. v. Gaylord, 229 Ill. 33; Lee v. Republic Steel Co. 241 id. 372.) Here each count of the amended declaration rests upon the alleged failure of the appellee ff> furnish the appellant a safe place in which to work, and the same is true of the original declaration and.the five additional counts, although the facts are not set up' in the original declaration with the same particularity that they are in the amended declaration or in the five additional counts filed before the Statute of Limitations had run, and the words inserted by way of amendment in no manner changed the ground on which appellant had originally predicated his cause of action, viz., the failure of the appellee to furnish appellant with a safe place in which to work. The declaration in this respect is different from the declaration in the case of McAndrews v. Chicago, Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Co. 222 Ill. 232, relied on by counsel for appellee, as in the latter case no facts were averred in the original declaration showing the existence of a duty from the defendant to the plaintiff to warn him that it was about to move its cars in the manner which resulted in the injuries to the plaintiff charged in the declaration.\nThe allegation that appellant, as such oiler, in the discharge of his duty was required to pass through, along, in and about the mills, shops, factories, runways and premises of appellee, we think was sufficient to authorize the admission of proof, on the trial, of the fact that the place of the injury to appellant was one in which he was required to go in the discharge of his duties, the word \u201crequire\u201d being often used in the sense of to demand; to direct; to order or to compel. (24 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law,\u20142d ed.\u2014 601.) In this respect this case is clearly distinguishable from Mackey v. Northern Milling Co. 210 Ill. 115, in which the original declaration wholly failed to state what the duties of Mackey were, or any facts from which it appeared that at the time he was injured he was in a place where he was required to go or to be in the discharge of his duties.\nFor the reasons above given the judgments of the circuit court and of the Appellate Court will be reversed and the cause remanded, with directions to sustain the demurrer to the plea of the Statute of Limitations.\nReversed and remanded, with directions.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Justice Craig" } ], "attorneys": [ "Barr, McNaughton & Barr, for appellant.", "Knapp S\u00bf Campbell, and Snapp & Heise, (John R. Cochran, of counsel,) for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Joseph Vogrin, Appellant, vs. The American Steel and Wire Company, Appellee.\nOpinion filed April 23, 1914\nRehearing denied June 5, 1914.\n1. Negligence\u2014when declaration sufficiently states employee\u2019s duties. In an action for personal injuries, a declaration which avers the nature of the defendant\u2019s business and the plaintiff\u2019s employment, and states that in the discharge of his duty he was then and there required to do certain things, followed by an allegation stating the character of plaintiff\u2019s duties, sufficiently charges, by reference, facts which authorize proof that at the time and place of the plaintiff\u2019s injury he was in the discharge of his duties as an employee of the defendant.\n2. Same\u2014when declaration sufficiently alleges that it was plaintiff\u2019s duty to he at the place of injury. In a declaration for personal injuries, an allegation that the plaintiff, in the discharge of his duty, was then and there required to pass through a certain place in and about defendant\u2019s premises, is sufficient to authorize the admission of proof that such place was one in which the plaintiff was required to be in the discharge of his duties. (Mackey v. Northern Milling Co. 210 Ill. 115, distinguished.)\n3. Same\u2014what constitutes the cait.se of action. In an action for personal injuries the cause of action is the act or the wrong of the defendant towards the plaintiff which causes the grievance and for which the law gives a remedy.\n4. Words and phrases\u2014the meaning of \u201cthen and there.\u201d The phrase \u201cthen and there\u201d refers to the time and place last specified, unless some phrase is used in connection therewith which shows that a different reference was intended.\nAppeal from the Appellate Court for the Second District ;\u2014heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Will county; the Hon. Dorrance Dibell, Judge, presiding.\nBarr, McNaughton & Barr, for appellant.\nKnapp S\u00bf Campbell, and Snapp & Heise, (John R. Cochran, of counsel,) for appellee." }, "file_name": "0474-01", "first_page_order": 474, "last_page_order": 479 }