{
  "id": 6045474,
  "name": "Maclay Hoyne, State's Attorney, Appellant, vs. John Ling, Police Magistrate, Appellee",
  "name_abbreviation": "Hoyne v. Ling",
  "decision_date": "1914-10-06",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "506",
  "last_page": "509",
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      "cite": "264 Ill. 506"
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    "name_abbreviation": "Ill.",
    "id": 8772,
    "name": "Illinois Supreme Court"
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    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
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      "cite": "116 Ill. 319",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:18:02.224693+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Maclay Hoyne, State\u2019s Attorney, Appellant, vs. John Ling, Police Magistrate, Appellee."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. Justice Carter\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis case is similar in all questions but one to Hoyne v. Danisch, (ante, p. 467,) this being an information filed against John Ling, as police magistrate of Wilmette, and the other being against Frank P. Danisch, as clerk of the municipal court of Chicago. In this case the State\u2019s attorney has appealed and appellee has filed cross-errors, while in the other case the position of the parties was reversed in that regard.\nAppellee, under cross-errors, has raised a question as to the constitutionality of the State\u2019s Attorney Salary act not raised in\u2019 the other case. He argues that the title of the act as it went into force July 1, 1912, (Hurd\u2019s Stat. 1913, p. 1252,) does not cover the provisions incorporated into the amendment of July 1, 1913. The title of the original act reads: \u201cAn act fixing and providing for the payment of the salaries of State\u2019s attorneys and their assistants, defining their duties, providing for the appointment of assistants, and to provide for the collection and disposition of the fees provided by law to be paid to the State\u2019s attorney, and to repeal all acts in conflict therewith.\u201d The original act, in the body, referred to fees, fines and penalties but did not use the word \u201cforfeitures,\u201d the last sentence of section 4 of the original act reading: \u201cAnd the State\u2019s attorney shall have no further interest in fines, conviction fees, penalties, or moneys collected by virtue of such office other than to see that they are paid to the proper authorities.\u201d The amendment of July 1, 1913, amended section 4 so as to include, specifically, \u201cforfeitures\u201d along with fines and penalties, and changed the wording of the last sentence of section 4 so as to read, \u201cthe State\u2019s attorney shall have no further interest in conviction fees, fines, forfeitures and penalties or moneys collected by virtue of such office.\u201d It also amended the title of the original act so as to read, \u201cto provide for the collection and disposition of fees, fines, forfeitures and penalties,\u201d etc. It is insisted that fines, penalties and forfeitures are not fairly included in the title of the original act, and that therefore, under the requirements of that part of section 13 of article 4 of the constitution which reads, \u201cno act hereafter, passed shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title,\u201d the amendment is unconstitutional, as not germane to the subject matter expressed in the original title.\nIt has been repeatedly held by this court that the title is not required to contain all the details afterward set out in the act; that the title need not be an index of the contents of the act; that it need only set out the subject matter in a general form. (People v. Hazelwood, 116 Ill. 319; People v. Commercial Life Ins. Co. 247 id. 92.) This court has held that the word \u201cgermane,\u201d as used in construing this provision of the constitution, means that the various provisions of an act must be allied or have a common tie; that if there is any question about a provision being within the title it will be decided on the basis whether or not the provision tends to promote the object and purpose of the act as expressed in the title. (Dolese v. Pierce, 124 Ill. 140.) A provision which tends legitimately to accomplish the legislative purpose of the subject expressed in the title is properly included in the act. (People v. McBride, 234 Ill. 146.) To render a provision of the act void because not expressed in the title it must have no connection or relation therewith. (People v. Sayer, 246 Ill. 382.) All provisions which are incidental or auxiliary to or in any reasonable'sense will promote the object as indicated in the title are legitimately included in the act. (People v. Huff, 249 Ill. 164.) The word \u201csubject,\u201d as used in the constitution, signifies the basis or principal object of the act. It may contain many objects growing out of and germane to it. Any matter or thing which may reasonably be said to be subservient to the general subject or purpose will be germane and properly included in the law. (People v. Sargent, 254 Ill. 514.) The principal purpose of the original act was to provide for the payment of fixed salaries-to State\u2019s attorneys. The word \u201cfees,\u201d as used in the title of that act, plainly included the collection and disposition of all compensation theretofore paid to them. It not only included the fees collected from fines, but the fees and commissions collected from penalties and forfeitures. The disposition of fines, penalties and forfeitures, as provided for in the act, was but incidental and auxiliary to the principal object and purpose of the law. The law is not unconstitutional for the reasons here urged. In addition to the cases already cited, the following, among many others, support this conclusion: O\u2019Leary v. County of Cook, 28 Ill. 534; Potwin v. Johnson, 108 id. 70; Donnersberger v. Prendergast, 128 id. 229; People v. Blue Mountain Joe, 129 id. 370; In re St. Louis Loan and Investment Co. 194 id. 609; Morrison v. People, 196 id. 454; Gage v. City of Chicago, 203 id. 26; Lang v. Friesenecker, 213 id. 598.\nAll the other questions necessary to a disposition of this case are disposed of in the opinion in Hoyne v. Danisch, supra. Under the conclusions reached in that case the decree of the circuit court must be reversed and the cause remanded to that court, with directions to enter a decree in harmony with the views therein expressed.\nReversed and remanded, with directions.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. Justice Carter"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Maclay Hoyne, State\u2019s Attorney, and Henry A. Berger, for appellant.",
      "Charles H. Jackson, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Maclay Hoyne, State\u2019s Attorney, Appellant, vs. John Ling, Police Magistrate, Appellee.\nOpinion filed October 6, 1914.\n1. CoxstituTional i,aw\u2014provision tending to promote purpose of act is within the title. The question whether a provision of an act is within the title is decided 011 the basis whether it tends to promote the object and purpose of the act as expressed in the title, and if the provision tends legitimately to accomplish the legislative purpose of the subject expressed in the title it is properly included in the act.\n2. Same\u2014word \u201cfees,\u201d in original State\u2019s Attorney Salary act, in force in 1912, includes '\u201cforfeiUires.\" The word \u201cfees,\u201d in the original State\u2019s Attorney Salary act, in force July 1, 1912, includes all compensation formerly paid to State\u2019s attorneys, including not only fees collected from fines, but also fees and commissions collected from penalties and forfeitures; and hence the amendment of that act in 1913 is not invalid because it added the word \u201cforfeitures\u201d to the title and to section 4 of the original act.\n3. The other questions involved in this case are decided in the case of Hoyne v. Danisch, (ante, p. 467.)\nAppeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Thomas G. Windes, Judge, presiding.\nMaclay Hoyne, State\u2019s Attorney, and Henry A. Berger, for appellant.\nCharles H. Jackson, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0506-01",
  "first_page_order": 506,
  "last_page_order": 509
}
