{ "id": 4779244, "name": "The People of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, vs. John Peters, Plaintiff in Error", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Peters", "decision_date": "1914-10-16", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "122", "last_page": "131", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "265 Ill. 122" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "148 Ill. 296", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3060629 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/148/0296-01" ] }, { "cite": "251 Ill. 185", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3435096 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/251/0185-01" ] }, { "cite": "160 Ill. 501", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3130465 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/160/0501-01" ] }, { "cite": "65 Ill. 58", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2618911 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/65/0058-01" ] }, { "cite": "135 Mass. 530", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mass.", "case_ids": [ 724666 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mass/135/0530-01" ] }, { "cite": "23 Colo. 300", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Colo.", "case_ids": [ 5258521 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/colo/23/0300-01" ] }, { "cite": "116 Am. St. Rep. 32", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Am. St. Rep.", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 806, "char_count": 17797, "ocr_confidence": 0.788, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.780475529803594e-07, "percentile": 0.8965283304161749 }, "sha256": "179b54c8af057afc242914b7d1aaf7f0ce61f7063be1b149e1cf8941288e21b1", "simhash": "1:cefaa059d9d5cdb0", "word_count": 3241 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:16:59.611789+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "The People of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, vs. John Peters, Plaintiff in Error." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Justice Carter\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff in error, John Peters, was found guilty of bribery in the circuit court of St. Clair county- and sentenced to the penitentiary. He has brought his case to this court on writ of error.\nPeters was the proprietor of a saloon in the south-eastern part of St. Clair county. Charles Webb, the State\u2019s attorney of that county, accompanied by various officers and others, visited the saloon one evening about October 3, 1913, and caused the arrest of Peters for keeping and operating a slot machine. It was arranged that the machine should be delivered the next morning to a man who would come around with a van collecting a number of slot machines confiscated at the same time in that locality. Peters was instructed to go before a justice of the peace the following morning and give bond for his appearance before the grand jury or take such other course permitted by law as he desired. Accordingly he went before a justice of the peace on the following day, waived preliminary examination and gave bond. At the time he was arrested for operating the slot machine he said to the State\u2019s attorney that he had been a good friend of his and had supported him during his campaign for election\" and thought the State\u2019s attorney ought not to force him to pay a fine for operating the machine. The State\u2019s attorney testified that he replied that he could do nothing else. Three or four days later, while the State\u2019s attorney and one Curtis A. Betts were on their way to lunch in the city of East St. Louis they met plaintiff in error. According to the State\u2019s attorney, Peters said, \u201cNow, Charley, I would like to have this thing kept out of the courts and it ought to be fixed up,\u201d and when the State\u2019s attorney replied that he did not know how it could be done, Peters said, \u201cOh! you know and I know how these things are done, and you know you can lose that case.\u201d The State\u2019s attorney testified that he replied that he did not want to talk to plaintiff in error about it. Betts testified, and so far as he heard the conversation he substantially agreed with Webb\u2019s testimony. Peters stated on the stand that he said to Webb, \u201cI would like to square it and get out of it; it troubles my mind, and I have never been in trouble in my life before.\u201d The State\u2019s attorney testified that later, on October n, at a restaurant in East St. Louis where he was eating lunch with his assistant, A. B. Davis, Peters, who had taken his lunch at the same place, passed his table and whispered in the State\u2019s attorney\u2019s ear that he wanted to see him about that matter. The State\u2019s attorney testified that he said, \u201cI will be in my office at three o\u2019clock, in the Arcade building,\u201d and that Peters said, \u201cI will be there at three o\u2019clock; you know what I want.\u201d After Webb left the restaurant he saw Betts and talked over the matter with him. Betts was a newspaper reporter on one of the St. Louis papers and had been for several months doing detective work and looking up evidence for State\u2019s attorney Webb. They arranged a plan to have the conversation between Webb and Peters overheard when the latter came in, in the afternoon. In the back room of the State\u2019s attorney\u2019s office was a rattan couch covered with bed clothing apparently reaching very near the floor. Webb and Betts called to their assistance Charles P. Webb, a young man twenty-six years old and a nephew of the State\u2019s attorney, and one Schenck, of about the same age. The two young men crawled under the couch shortly before Peters was to appear. Betts and a constable were instructed to be in an adjoining room at three o\u2019clock. At that time, according to the State\u2019s attorney\u2019s testimony, the plaintiff in error came into the office and Webb took him into the back room, where the couch was situated, and they sat down near a table. The State\u2019s attorney testified that he asked Peters what he wanted, and the latter, replied, \u201cOf course you know what I want; I don\u2019t want to be indicted; I don\u2019t want to be fined; I a.m not making a great deal of money down there where I am running this saloon and cannot afford to pay a fine, and I want it fixed up.\u201d The State\u2019s attorney testified that he replied he did not think he could fix it up; that Peters said, \u201cWell, I brought $20 that I expected to fix it up' with;\u201d that after the State\u2019s attorney told him that the smallest amount he could fix it up with was $135 of $140 under the law and that it could not be settled out of court, Peters said, \u201cI know it has been done and I know those things are done;\u201d that after some further talk the State\u2019s attorney said, \u201cWhat do you want to do?\u201d and Peters replied, \u201cWell, I want to pay you $20, and, besides, I am going to buy my brother\u2019s saloon, out near Washington Park, * * * . and I will be able to run a poker game in that saloon and make from $20 to $40 a month; * * * it will be outside of St. Louis and nobody can bother me and I will pay you anywhere from $25 to $40 a month, depending on the value of the game;\u201d that the State\u2019s attorney then said, \u201cI will not take your $20 but I will send a man in here and you can talk with him.\u201d \u2019 Webb then sent Betts into the room where plaintiff in error was. Betts testified that Peters handed him a $20 bill and that he asked Peters what it was for, and the latter replied, \u201cYou know all about this;\u201d that thereupon Betts asked, \u201cWell, is this carrying out the understanding you reached with Webb just now?\u201d and Peters said, \u201cYes, that is it.\u201d Thereupon Peters handed Betts the $20 bill and asked for a receipt for it, which Betts gave him. Webb and the constable then came into \u25a0 the room and Webb stepped to the couch and lifted it from over the two young men. Webb then ordered the constable to arrest Peters. When the couch was lifted Peters raised his hands and said, \u201cOh! my God!\u201d and also something to the effect that he thought before that the State\u2019s attorney was smart but now he knew it. The two young men testified substantially the same as to what took, place in the room as did Webb and Betts.\nPeters\u2019 account of the transaction was, that when he went to the State\u2019s attorney\u2019s office Webb first asked him to go to a saloon down-stairs and have a drink; that after they returned they went into a back room and the following took place: \u201cI went in and we sat down at a long table, and he says, \u2018Do you know what the costs in this case is?\u2019 I says, T have no idea, Charley,\u2019 and he says, \u2018The costs is $115,\u2019 and I says, \u2018Gee! That much for the first offense?\u2019 and he says, \u2018Yes, I get $15 out of that.\u2019 I says, \u2018Is that all you get out of it?\u2019 and he says, \u2018That is all.\u2019 And he says, \u2018How much are you willing to pay?\u2019 and I says, T don\u2019t know, Charley; I won\u2019t say; I may say too much or not enough.\u2019 And he says, \u2018You will tell somebody,\u2019 and I said, \u2018No, I won\u2019t,\u2019 and he says, \u2018Oh! you will tell somebody,\u2019 and.I says, \u2018No, I won\u2019t; I won\u2019t even tell my wife; I know my business.\u2019 And he says, \u2018How will $25 do?\u2019 I studied awhile and I said I was a poor devil and it was hard to make a living, and I says, \u2018Now is your time to show leniency for what I done for you,\u2019 [when Webb was a candidate,] and he says, \u2018All right; $20 will do.\u2019 He says, T will not take it myself; I will send a man in and he will take it/ and I said, \u2018All right; it is up to you; I am satisfied.\u2019 \u201d His account of what took place after Webb walked out and Betts came into the room is substantially the same as that given by the other witnesses. Webb testified positively that he did not first take Peters down to a saloon and treat him.\nCounsel for plaintiff in error first argue that if he is guilty of any criminal offense in this case, under our statute it is the offense of an attempt to commit bribery and not the offense of bribery itself. Section 31 of the Criminal Code, so far as it applies to this question, reads as follows: \u201cWhoever corruptly, directly or indirectly, gives any money or other bribe * * * to any State\u2019s attorney * * * after his election, * * * either before or after he is qualified, with intent to influence his act, vote, opinion, decision or judgment on any matter, question, cause or proceeding which may be then pending, or may by law come or be brought before him, in his official capacity, or to cause him to execute any of the powers in him vested, or to perform any duty of him required, with partiality or favor, or otherwise than as required by law, * * * the person so giving, and the officer so receiving any money * * * with intent or for the purpose or consideration aforesaid, shall be deemed guilty of bribery, and shall be punished by confinement in the penitentiary for a term not less than one year nor more than five years.\u201d Section 32 of the Criminal Code reads: \u201cEvery person who shall offer or attempt to bribe any * * * State\u2019s attorney or other officer, ministerial or judicial, * * * in any of the cases mentioned in the preceding section, and every such officer who shall propose or agree to receive a bribe in any of such cases, shall be fined not exceeding $5000.\u201d\nBribery, under the common law, is usually defined to be the giving or receiving anything of value, or any valuable service, intended to influence one in the discharge of a legal duty. (4 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law,\u20142d ed.\u2014907; 1 Russell on Crimes,\u20147th Eng. and 1st Can. ed.\u2014627; 3 Greenleaf on Evidence,\u201416th ed.\u2014sec. 71; 3 Wharton on Crim. Law,\u201411th ed.\u2014sec. 2214; Rex v. Vaughan, 4 Burr. 2494.) At common law bribery was a misdemeanor, and the distinction between bribery and the attempt to bribe was of little practical importance, as the offer to bribe, though there was no acceptance or delivery of the gift or reward, was indictable and punishable in the same way as if there had been both delivery and acceptance. (State v. Ellis, 97 Am. Dec. (N. J.) 707, and authorities cited in note; Rudolph v. State, 116 Am. St. Rep. 32, and note.) In many States and jurisdictions, as in Illinois, separate statutes have been enacted as to bribery and the attempt to bribe and different punishments fixed for the two offenses. What are the necessary elements of the crime of bribery and that of an attempt to bribe will depend, therefore, quite largely upon the wording of the particular statute under consideration. In some jurisdictions, in order to constitute bribery the act of at least two persons is essential and it must be proved that the minds of the two concur, (Newman v. People, 23 Colo. 300; 2 Ency. of Evidence, 763;) while in others, upon the full and complete delivery of the bribe or money, so that it is out of the possession and control of the person making the delivery with the corrupt intention, on his part, of influencing the public official, the offense is complete, although the official received it in ignorance or retained it solely for the purpose of public justice. (Commonwealth v. Murray, 135 Mass. 530; Henslow v. Fawcett, 3 Ad. & Ell. 51.) The gist of either offense is the tendency of the bribe to pervert justice. Such being the case, the attempt to bribe, as well as the completed act of bribery, is dangerous and injurious to the community at large, for, as this court has said in Walsh v. People, 65 Ill. 58, \u201cthe offer is a sore temptation to the weak or the depraved. It tends to corrupt, and as the law abhors the least tendency to corruption it punishes the act, which is calculated to debase and which may affect prejudicially the morals of the community.\u201d The legislature, in passing the two sections of the Criminal Code in question, evidently thought that the completed act was more serious and corrupting in its tendency than an ineffectual attempt to bribe. Reading these two sections together, did the legislature intend that in order to constitute the crime of bribery the acts of two persons were essential?\u2014that of him who gives and him who receives, the minds of the two concurring ? Or did they intend that the offense of bribery was complete if the public official took the money or other thing offered as a bribe but not with a corrupt intent? No one reading this record would for a moment contend that the State\u2019s attorney was guilty of bribery. In the common understanding of that term no one would argue that he had been bribed. If he, instead of having Betts receive the $20, had in his interview told plaintiff in error positively that he would not accept the money under any circumstances and ordered him out of his office, it would hardly be contended that plaintiff in error would then be guilty of more than an attempt to bribe. Bishop, in discussing bribery and the attempt to bribe, says: \u201cSince bribery is misdemeanor and attempt is the same it is of little consequence which form of the doctrine we follow, the result in either case being the same. But it promotes a desirable uniformity in the terms of the law to treat of the unaccepted offer as an attempt,\u2014not as the substantive crime.\u201d (2 Bishop\u2019s New Crim. Law, sec. 88.) Greenleaf says: \u201cThe misdemeanor is complete by the offer of the bribe, so far as the offer is concerned. If the offer is accepted both parties are guilty.\u201d (3 Greenleaf on Evidence,\u201416th ed.-\u2014sec. 72.) If the offer is accepted with a corrupt motive both parties are guilty of bribery, even though the public official changes his mind and breaks his promise. (Sulston v. Norton, 3 Burr. 1235.) This offer was not accepted by the State\u2019s attorney in any \u25a0 true sense of the meaning of that word. We must assume that the legislature had in mind, in the passage of these two sections of the Criminal Code distinguishing between bribery and the attempt to bribe, the common law as it existed at that time. This being so, the conclusion logically \" follows that they did not intend that a person should be \u2022 guilty of the offense of bribery unless the bribe was accepted. It must therefore be held that plaintiff in error cannot, on the facts in this record, be held guilty of bribery.\nCounsel further argue that plaintiff in error, under these facts, was not guilty even of an attempt at bribery. With this we do not agree. This case does not come within the reasoning of this court in Love v. People, 160 Ill. 501, where it was held that the offense of burglary there under consideration was committed at the instigation and encouragement of the owner of the premises, but rather comes within the reasoning of this court in People v. Smith, 251 Ill. 185, and People v. Hartford Life Ins. Co. 252 id. 398, where it was stated it was not in violation of the law to find out whether offenses were being committed and to take precautions to ascertain whether the suspected persons would commit the offense. The evidence justifies the submission of this last mentioned offense to a jury.\nCounsel further contend that the court erred in refusing to permit plaintiff in error to testify as to his intention in giving the $20 to Betts for the State\u2019s attorney. The prevailing rule of law, sustained by the great weight of authority, is, that whenever the motive, intention or belief of a person is relevant to the issue it is competent for such person to testify directly on that point. (Jones on Evidence,\u20142d ed.\u2014sec. 170.) This court has held that where the intent is an important element constituting the offense the accused has the right to testify what his intention was in the commission of the act. (Wohlford v. People, 148 Ill. 296.) The court erred in not permitting plaintiff in error to answer the question. We do not think, however, we would reverse for that error alone, as a reading of his examination shows that he gave practically a complete statement as to what his intention or motive was.\nFor the reasons stated the judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded.\n\u201e Reversed and remanded.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Justice Carter" } ], "attorneys": [ "H. E. Schaumleffel, and D. J. Sullivan, for plaintiff in error.", "P. J. Lucey, Attorney General, Charles Webb, State\u2019s Attorney, and George P. Ramsey, (A. B. Davis, of counsel,) for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "The People of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, vs. John Peters, Plaintiff in Error.\nOpinion filed October 16, 1914.\n1. Bribery\u2014at common lava, bribery and attempt to bribe were punished in the same way. At common law, bribery was a misdemeanor and the distinction between bribery and attempt to bribe was of little practical importance, as the offer to bribe, although there was no acceptance or delivery of the gift or reward, was indictable and punishable in the same way as though there had been delivery and acceptance.\n2. Same\u2014in Illinois both parties must have acted corruptly to constitute bribery. Under section 31 of the Criminal Code the offense of bribery requires not only a corrupt motive upon the party offering the bribe but also a corrupt motive on the part of the person accepting the same, and if the officer sought to be bribed merely accepts the money with the intention of bringing the other party to justice the offense is only an attempt to bribe.\n3. Same\u2014effect where State\u2019s attorney arranges trap for suspected briber. The facts that the State\u2019s attorney secretes witnesses in his room to overhear a conversation between himself and a person who he believes is about to offer him a bribe, and that he pretends to accede to such person\u2019s overtures and sends a third person into the room to receive the money \"offered, do not relieve the act of its criminal character as an attempt to bribe.\n4. Sami;\u2014defendant has a right to testify as to his intent in paying money. In a prosecution for bribery the question of the defendant\u2019s motive, intention or belief in paying over the money is an important 'element of the offense, and the defendant has a right to testify as to what such motive, intention or belief was.\nWrit op Error to the Circuit Court of St. Clair county; the Hon. George A. Crow, Judge, presiding.\nH. E. Schaumleffel, and D. J. Sullivan, for plaintiff in error.\nP. J. Lucey, Attorney General, Charles Webb, State\u2019s Attorney, and George P. Ramsey, (A. B. Davis, of counsel,) for the People." }, "file_name": "0122-01", "first_page_order": 122, "last_page_order": 131 }