{
  "id": 4855687,
  "name": "The People of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, vs. Morris Lurie, Plaintiff in Error",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Lurie",
  "decision_date": "1917-02-21",
  "docket_number": "No. 10869",
  "first_page": "630",
  "last_page": "643",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "276 Ill. 630"
    }
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    "name_abbreviation": "Ill.",
    "id": 8772,
    "name": "Illinois Supreme Court"
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    {
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  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
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    "parties": [
      "The People of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, vs. Morris Lurie, Plaintiff in Error."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Per Curiam :\nPlaintiff in error, Morris Lurie, was indicted with three others, at the September term of the criminal court of Cook county, on the charge of the murder of Edward Laux by assault committed in August, 1915, one count charging the assault was committed with brass knuckles, and the second count that the assault was committed by some violent means, the more particular description of which was to the jurors unknown. At the close of the evidence on the trial the State notted the case as to all the defendants except plaintiff in error. The jury returned a verdict finding him guilty of murder, fixing the penalty at fourteen years in the penitentiary. Motions for new trial and in arrest of judgment were overruled and judgment entered on the verdict. From that judgment this writ of error was sued out.\nOn the evening of August 28, 1915, a social party was held at the home of Rudolph Kuhagan, who was living in the lower flat at 1920 South St. Louis avenue, Chicago. The party was attended mostly by young men and women of Irish extraction. Several young men of Jewish descent came to the house early in the evening and were invited in by some of the people who were attending the party, for the purpose of furnishing entertainment by singing and playing the piano. One of these young men was named Belovsky but went by the name of Gibson. Another was named Max Matnick but when entertaining went by the name of Grant. About 11:30 that evening the Jewish boys were requested, as the house was somewhat crowded, to leave, as only those who had written invitations were desired to stay. After some discussion the young Jews got their hats and left peaceably, although there is some testimony tending to show that as. they left some of the bystanders made some remarks about \u201csheeneys.\u201d According to the testimony for the defense these young men walked about a block and then stopped in a garage, and they testified that a number of the young men from the party followed and were waiting outside of the garage to injure them when they came out. Two of the young Jewish men jumped on a street car and rode some distance to Miller\u2019s restaurant, where they informed a man named Rosenberg, and some others, that the two men, Belovsky and Matnick, were in danger of being set upon and mistreated by the young men from the Kuhagan party. The testimony tends to show also that Belovsky, in the meantime, had telephoned some of his friends to the same effect. Rosenberg and those with him understood from what had been reported to them that Belovsky and Matnick were still at the Kuhagan home. Rosenberg, William Edelstein and Morris Leventhal, who were at Miller\u2019s restaurant, decided to go to Kuhagan\u2019s in an automobile to see if they could bring away the two young men they thought were there. Just as they were getting ready to go the plaintiff in error came into the restaurant and was asked by Edelstein, who knew him, to go along with them. The testimony shows that these four,\u2014Rosenberg, Edelstein, Leventhal and Lurie,\u2014got into the automobile, and then Lurie asked where they were going, and they replied they were going to get Gibson and another boy who were at the party at Kuhagan\u2019s and were afraid of being molested and wanted some friends to come and bring them home. Plaintiff in error said he thought there was a tough bunch around that neighborhood. Edelstein replied, \u201cThey won\u2019t be at the party; you let me talk to the fellow\u201d and there would be no trouble. The evidence shows, without contradiction, that plaintiff in error knew nothing about the matter until after he got into the automobile. Rosenberg drove the car to the Kuhagan home, on St. Louis avenue, where there were about twenty-five couples of young people assembled, some of them in the house and some of them apparently on the porch, about to leave for home. Rosenberg stayed in the machine and the other three left the machine and went up to the porch. The elder Kuhagan came to the door, and, apparently somewhat excited, went down to the automobile and asked what the machine was doing in front of his house. Edelstein said, in effect, \u201cWe are not looking for trouble, Mr. Kuhagan, but there are some of my friends in the house and we want to see them.\u201d Kuhagan then apologized for not having room enough to invite them into the house, and Edelstein testified that he (Edelstein) said, \u201cI hope you haven\u2019t the impression we came to the party; we just came to get the boys home.\u201d Kuhagan replied, \u201cThat\u2019s all right.\u201d Edelstein and Leventhal testified they immediately got back into .the car, the engine of which was running all the time, and started away without the plaintiff in error. In the meantime the persons at the Kuhagan party had filled up the sidewalk in front of the house and according to plaintiff in error\u2019s testimony surrounded him so they were blocking his way to the machine. There was an iron railing from the porch down to the cement walk running out to the sidewalk bordering the street. An electric light was situated some distance away, but owing to the darkness and the shade of several trees in front of the house it was impossible to see, according to the witnesses, just what took place. Plaintiff in error testified that as he turned to go to the machine Edward Laux, the deceased, grabbed hold of him, he did not know what for; that they had had no words before; that plaintiff in error gave Laux a push and turned around and ran towards the machine; that the car had already started and he had to run some distance before he could jump onto the running board; that he did not know whether Laux fell or not; that he did not look back. Nora Kuhagan, the daughter of the one who gave the party, testified that when Lurie came from the machine to the porch the porch was crowded; that she noticed Edward Laux, who was one of the guests at the party, out on the front sidewalk; that she went down to the sidewalk with her father around to where Laux was standing; that Lurie was in front of Laux and took a look right at his face and then stepped back, and that she \u201cnoticed him fixing something in his hands; I didn\u2019t know what he was doing, but I supposed he was putting something on his hands, and then all of a sudden I saw him make a blow or strike Mr. Laux right on the side of the head.\u201d 'She further testified that Laux fell right out straight, like a board, on his back, on the sidewalk; that she saw plaintiff in error run towards the departing machine, and shortly after that she fainted away. She heard no conversation between Laux and Lurie. Rudolph Kuhagan, Jr., testified that he saw plaintiff in error have his hands in his pockets; that \u201cI saw him fool with his hands; whatever he was doing I don\u2019t know; * * * he stepped up and hit him and Mr. Laux fell down; I stooped to pick up Mr. Laux and I saw he was stiff.\u201d Frank Lannartz testified that a fellow standing in front of Laux hit Laux behind the ear and then fled to the automobile. None of the other witnesses claimed they saw just what plaintiff in error did to Laux. Some of them testified that the head of deceased struck nothing but the side-' walk; others say they could not see whether he struck the iron railing Of not. Several of the witnesses who were among the Kuhagan party testified that when young Kuhagan and others ran after plaintiff in error towards the automobile several people in the automobile drew revolvers on them. All of the defendants testified that no revolvers were drawn in the automobile and that none of them had such weapons. Some of the witnesses also testified there were as many as fifteen or twenty people in the automobile and on the running board when the car was standing in front of the house and just when it was leaving. Rosenberg and the other three who came to the Kuhagan residence with him in the automobile all testified that they only saw the four people in the automobile when they were going away. One of the witnesses at the party testified that there were eight or ten in the automobile when it came up to the house, and another testified that he thought there must have been about eighteen in the machine when it came up. He stated on cross-examination that at the inquest he told the coroner that he thought there were from twelve to sixteen in the machine. It is evident from the testimony of these witnesses that they did not have any definite idea as to how many there were in the car when it came up or went away.\nThe coroner\u2019s physician, Dr. Burmeister, testified that Laux had an injury on the left side of the head, which he described in detail,' and that death was caused, in his opinion, by shock and inter cranial hemorrhage, due to the fracture of the skull, which fracture was caused by external violence; that the object which produced this fracture must have been very firm, very hard and definitely outlined, and the force or violence used must have been very severe in order to produce the punched out appearance and the fragments of bone; that in his opinion the injury could not have been produced by the bare human fist. On cross-examination he stated that the wound might have been produced by the head coming in contact with an iron railing or the corner of a hardwood step, or an object on the sidewalk if such object was a hard and well outlined one.\nLaux never recovered consciousness and died a day or two after the injury. Plaintiff in error testified positively that he did not strike the deceased,\u2014simply gave him a push or a shove. He also testified that he did not use brass knuckles and had none on his person and did not have anything in his hands when he pushed the deceased. None of those who went with him in the automobile saw him have any weapon of any kind. Young Kuhagan and his sister are the only witnesses who testified to anything indicating that he used anything but his bare fist, and we have given their testimony on this point substantially in full.\nCounsel for plaintiff in error first insists that if any offense is proven it was manslaughter, and not murder, under the statute and the authorities in this State, citing in support, among other decisions, People v. Mighell, 254 Ill. 53, and Silgar v. People, 107 id. 563. If the evidence were clear and uncontroverted that plaintiff in error did not use brass knuckles and had no other instrument or thing liable to produce death in his hands at the time but simply struck or pushed the deceased with his bare hands, then, under the statute as construed by the decisions of this court, on the facts in this case plaintiff in error could only be held guilty of manslaughter. The evidence as to the use by plaintiff in error of brass knuckles or other instrument or thing liable to produce death does not necessarily have to be direct and positive,\u2014it may be circumstantial. The evidence, however, as to the character of crime committed is of such a nature that the rulings of the trial court during the hearing of the case should have been such as not to prejudice in any way the rights of plaintiff in error.\nThe chief contention of counsel for plaintiff in error is the prejudicial attitude assumed by the court in his questions to the witnesses and remarks on the evidence during the trial of the case. When Nora Kuhagan was testifying, she stated that all of the defendants on-trial got into the auto to leave. As a matter of fact the defendant Belovsky was not present at the Kuhagan house when the automobile was there, and the court interrupted her, stating, \u201cYou mean all but Belovslcy?\u201d\nWhen counsel were asking questions to bring out who had invitations to the party, the witness on the stand said, \u201cBelovsky was there but not the others.\u201d The court interjected the statement, \u201cThey [plainly meaning all the defendants] were there.\u201d A witness was asked by counsel, \u201cThere were a number of Jewish boys at the party, weren\u2019t there?\u201d and answered, \u201cYes, sir.\u201d The court remarked, \u201cSome by invitation and some without invitations; those without invitations had no business there.\u201d It was the claim of the defense, and there was evidence tending to uphold that claim, that the first group of Jewish young men came to the house at about 10:30 that night and went into the house because they were invited to come by someone who they thought had a right to invite them. The people in the automobile, according to their testimony, went to the house to ask for friends, and counsel rightly argues that if that was their only purpose they had a right to go there and ask for their friends. A visit for that purpose would be on legitimate business, but, of course, while they were there, finding out as to whether their friends were at the house, they must act in a peaceable and law-abiding way. Counsel for one of the defendants asked a witness, \u201cAs a matter of fact they were there on invitation?\u201d The court said, \u201cNo; they came to the house and asked for an invitation.\u201d Counsel then asked the witness, \u201cThey were invited in?\u201d The court commented, \u201cIn response to their request.\u201d Counsel then took an exception to the remarks of the court, and the court said, \u201cTake it and go on, and don\u2019t waste any time about it.\u201d\nPlaintiff in error denied that he struck the deceased but claimed he only pushed or shoved him. During the examination of one of the witnesses on this question the court remarked as to the testimony, \u201cNo; he means the man that was struck and fell.\u201d Later in the trial the court,' in his remarks, again stated that the deceased \u201cwas struck.\u201d When Nora ICuhagan was being questioned as to whether Lurie had struck the deceased and how he struck him, she answered in-response to the question, \u201cDid he [Laux] strike him or make any effort to strike him, or anything of- that sort?\u201d \u201cNo, sir; he had his hands in his pockets.\u201d Counsel then said, \u201cThat is, as far as you know?\u201d The judge then commented, \u201cShe stood right beside him; it is as far as anybody could know.\u201d Counsel objected, and said, \u201cNo, she didn\u2019t say that; she was in back of him.\u201d The court replied, \u201cShe was right back of him.\u201d It is evident from reading Miss Kuhagan\u2019s testimony that there was quite a crowd around her, the deceased and plaintiff in error, and she was not clear \u201eas to just how close she did stand to Laux.\nCounsel for plaintiff in error, in cross-examining Herbert ICuhagan, asked him whether or not he was referring to \u201cyour own crowd.\u201d The witness answered, \u201cThose that had invitations.\u201d The court said, \u201cHe answered that three times; he meant his own crowd were those that had invitations.\u201d He further at this point told counsel, \u201cYou will confine yourself to direct, examination and not go fishing.\u201d When counsel asked to take an exception to this remark the court replied, \u201cAll right; take it.\u201d As we read the record counsel was not \u201cfishing\u201d in his questions but was asking proper questions on cross-examination that legitimately referred to the direct examination of the witness. The court here in his comments was clearly intimating to the jury that the only proper way to get into the Kuhagan house that evening was by written invitation and that none of the defendant\u2019s party had written invitations.\nWhen one of the State\u2019s witnesses was being cross-examined as to the number of revolvers he saw flash in the automobile as it was going away and if he did not testify differently at the coroner\u2019s inquest, the court commented,\u201cWell, you can\u2019t expect him to recall everything he said last August.\u201d In this same connection the witness was asked as to his statements as to how many were in the machine, at the coroner\u2019s inquest, as compared to his statement at this trial, and the court suggested, \u201cYou were giving your best judgment then as you are now? Is that a fact?\u201d\nWhen Mrs. Kuhagan was asked to describe how the blow was struck, the court said, \u201cI think she has described that; a woman cannot illustrate how a man is struck any better than she did.\u201d\nWhen one of the counsel for plaintiff in error asked Rosenberg which of the defendants asked him to take them to the party, counsel stated, \u201cWe cannot try them jointly unless we know which one it is.\u201d The court remarked, \u201cWe are trying them jointly.\u201d Counsel said, \u201cYes, but they are not liable jointly.\u201d The court said, \u201cOh, yes, they are; it is for the jury to fathom that out; they pass on the evidence; he can only give his best recollection.\u201d\nWhen Rosenberg was testifying as to how many people were in the automobile and whether they had revolvers or not, the court asked, \u201cYou don\u2019t know whether there were twenty guns in the back?\u201d and the witness answered, \u201cNo, sir.\u201d The judge then said, \u201cYou didn\u2019t testify to anything that took place in the back of the car?\u201d The witness answered, \u201cNo, sir,\u201d and the court said, \u201cYou didn\u2019t want to, did you?\u201d Counsel stated that he took exception to the comments of the court, and the court said, \u201cAll right; take two of them.\u201d Another counsel then said, \u201cI take another exception to that,\u201d and the court replied, \u201cTake another.\u201d After putting several more questions to the witness the court asked him, \u201cYou don\u2019t know whether you lost a couple of fellows out of the back end of your car?\u201d Counsel objected, and the court asked, \u201cThey might have fallen out, so far as you know?\u201d Counsel again objected, and the court overruled the objection and said to the witness, \u201cWhat is your answer?\u201d and the witness said, \u201cWell, I couldn\u2019t see in the back because I was driving.\u201d The court then asked, \u201cAnd if they had fallen out or jumped out you wouldn\u2019t know it, would you ?\u201d and was answered, \u201cNo, sir.\u201d\nWhen one of the defendants, Morris Leventhal, was on the stand he stated in answer to a question, that after the trouble, when they were driving away, he was wondering whether they had overdone\u2014and the court interrupted, \u201cCut out your wonderings, Mr. Witness; you understand you are sworn to tell the truth here.\u201d The witness answered, \u201cI am, your honor.\u201d The court then said, \u201cThen tell us what was said and done and cut out your conclusions, and don\u2019t let me tell you that again.\u201d\n' One of the witnesses for the defense testified that he was frightened because he thought some of the guests from the party were \u201claying for him\u201d when he was returning from the Kuhagan party, and the court asked, \u201cStill frightened, aren\u2019t you?\u201d And when Edelstein was on the stand the court said, \u201cTell the truth about the number that were in that car.\u201d\nOther comments and suggestions by the court were made while the trial was in progress, to which counsel objected, but we have set out enough to indicate the general character of the questions and statements which are relied .upon by counsel for plaintiff in error as the chief reason for a reversal.\nThe general rule is that the trial judge has a right to ask questions of witnesses or call other witnesses to the stand in order to ascertain the facts and elicit the truth as to the points at issue. No well considered authority has ever stated that the trial judge is a mere moderator or umpire between the contending parties. In order to establish justice and prevent wrong he has a large discretion in applying the rules of practice, but all this must be done in a fair and impartial manner, without in any way showing bias for or prejudice against either party to the litigation. The respective counsel in any case are usually much more familiar with the facts than the presiding judge, and as a rule the trial will proceed in a more orderly and satisfactory manner when they are allowed to examine and conduct the examination of the witnesses. It is important, however, that the trial judge should also become acquainted with the facts, and on this account he may, if necessary to ascertain them, propound questions to the witnesses. It is the judge\u2019s duty to see that justice is done, and where justice is liable to fail because a certain fact has not been developed or a certain line of inquiry has not been pursued it is his duty to interpose and either by suggestions to counsel or an examination conducted by himself avoid the miscarriage of justice, but in so doing he must not forget the function of the judge and assume that of the advocate. (O\u2019Shea v. People, 218 Ill. 352; People v. Bernstein, 250 id. 63; Jones on Evidence,\u20142d ed.\u2014sec. 815.) Rarely, if ever, is a trial judge called upon to comment on the evidence during the trial of a case except when necessary in ruling as to the admissibility of certain evidence, and then his remarks should be of such nature as to show only whether he thinks the evidence is admissible for the jury to consider for what it is worth, expressing no opinion himself as to its truth or falsity. Everyone with any experience in the trial of cases in court appreciates that any intimation, however slight and unconsciously made, by the court in the presence of the jury is liable to have the force and effect of evidence and may be most damaging to the party against whom it is made. It is not the province of the court in a criminal case, in this jurisdiction, to express any opinion on the facts, either orally or in the form of instructions, but when the evidence has all been heard the court should state the law, only, and leave the jury to judge the facts. (Weyrich v. People, 89 Ill. 90; Marzen v. People, 173 id. 43; Briggs v. People, 219 id. 330.) It is therefore an abuse of his discretion for the presiding judge to so frame his questions as to intimate any opinion as to the credibility of a witness or to convey to the jury the court\u2019s opinion of the evidence in the case. The extent to which the trial judge may purposely participate in the examination of a witness must depend very largely upon the circumstances of the particular case and the conditions which arise during the trial. The general rules that should govern the trial court and the manner in which his discretion should be exercised on such questions are well illustrated and set forth, in this and other jurisdictions, in the authorities already cited as well as in the following: Kennedy v. People, 44 Ill. 283; Burke v. People, 148 id. 70; Dunn v. People, 172 id. 582; Synon v. People, 188 id. 609; Featherstone v. People, 194 id. 325; People v. Rardin, 255 id. 9; Arkansas Central Railroad Co. v. Craig, 6 Ann. Cas. 476, and note; Glover v. United States, 8 id. 1184; South Covington Street Railway Co. v. Stroh, 57 L. R. A. (Ky.) 875, and note; 1 Wharton on Crim. Evidence, (10th ed.) sec. 452; 1 Wigmore on Evidence, sec. 784; 5 Ency. of Evidence, 381; 8 Ency. of Pl. & Pr. 71-73; State v. Keehn, 85 Kan. 765.\nWe are convinced that in the examination of the witnesses in this case the trial judge made statements and asked questions in such form as would almost certainly lead the jury to believe that he thought plaintiff in error was guilty of murder as charged in the indictment, and that he thought certain witnesses for the defense were not telling the entire truth and that certain witnesses for the State were stating the facts as they actually existed. Such an impression conveyed to the jury by the presiding judge could not be otherwise than greatly prejudicial to plaintiff in error and his defense. Appreciating fully the necessity of orderly proceedings in the trial of cases, courts of review are, and should be, reluctant to interfere and reverse a cause because of a seeming or real abuse of the discretionary duties resting upon the trial judge, but when the rights of the accused have manifestly been prejudiced by the comments on the evidence or the questions of the trial judge a reviewing court cannot sanction such practice; and where the evidence as to the guilt of the accused is close or doubtful, and the reviewing court, under the competent evidence in the record, cannot say that, regardless of this abuse of the trial court\u2019s discretion, the jury could reach no other verdict than was found, then it is the duty of such court of review to see that justice is properly administered and the accused given a fair trial. The evidence in this cause as to the guilt of -the plaintiff in error of murder, as charged in the indictment, is of such a nature that we are compelled to hold that the plaintiff in error was prejudiced by the remarks of the judge and by his method of examining certain witnesses.\nCounsel for plaintiff in error further argues that the court erred in giving the People\u2019s seventh instruction, in that the jury might conclude from it that the court was of the opinion that the assault was committed as alleged in the indictment. This instruction was so worded as to be subject to this criticism and should not have been given in that form.\nThe judgment of the criminal court will be reversed and the cause remanded.\nReversed and remanded.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Per Curiam :"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "James J. Barbour, for plaintiff in error.",
      "P. J. Lucey, Attorney General, George P. Ramsey, and D. E. Detrich, (Maclay Hoyne, State\u2019s Attorney, Marvin E. Barnhart, and Edward E. Wilson, of counsel,) for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "(No. 10869.)\nThe People of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, vs. Morris Lurie, Plaintiff in Error.\nOpinion filed February 21, 1917.\n1. Criminal law\u2014evidence of use of brass knuckles may be circumstantial. Evidence as to the use by the defendant of brass knuckles or other instrument in striking the deceased need not be direct and positive in order to justify the jury in finding the defendant guilty of murder and not merely of manslaughter, as would be required had the defendant used his bare fist.\n2. Same\u2014trial judge may question witnesses in order to ascertain truth. The trial judge has a right to ask questions of witnesses or call other witnesses to the stand in order to ascertain the facts and elicit the truth as to the points at issue, but this must be done in a fair and impartial manner, without in any way showing bias for or prejudice against either party.\n3. Same\u2014when it is the duty of trial judge to examine witnesses. In a criminal case, where justice is likely to fail because a certain fact has not been developed or a certain line of inquiry pursued, it is the duty of the trial judge to interpose and either by suggestions to counsel or an examination conducted by himself avoid the miscarriage of justice, but in so doing he must not forget the function of the judge and assume that of the advocate.\n4. Same\u2014trial judge should not comment on value of evidence offered. In ruling as to the admissibility of evidence the remarks of the trial judge should be of such nature as to-show only whether he thinks the evidence is admissible, expressing no opinion as to its truth or falsity, either orally or by instructions, and when the competent evidence has all been heard the court should state the law, only, leaving the jury to determine the facts.\n5. Same\u2014what is an abuse of discretion in examining witness. In examining a witness it is an abuse of discretion for the presiding judge to so frame his questions as to intimate his opinion as to the credibility of a witness or to convey to the jury his opinion of the evidence, but the extent to which he may participate in the examination of a witness depends largely upon the circumstances of the case and the conditions arising during the trial.\n6. Same\u2014when abuse of discretionary duties by trial judge will reverse. Where the evidence is close or doubtful and the rights of the accused have manifestly been prejudiced by comments of the trial judge on the evidence or questions put by him to witnesses, so that the reviewing court cannot say that, disregarding such abuse, the jury could have reached no other verdict under the competent evidence, it is the duty of the court of review to see that justice is properly administered and the accused given a fair trial.\nWrit op Error to the Criminal Court of Cook county; the Hon. David M. Brothers, Judge, presiding.\nJames J. Barbour, for plaintiff in error.\nP. J. Lucey, Attorney General, George P. Ramsey, and D. E. Detrich, (Maclay Hoyne, State\u2019s Attorney, Marvin E. Barnhart, and Edward E. Wilson, of counsel,) for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0630-01",
  "first_page_order": 630,
  "last_page_order": 643
}