{ "id": 5103412, "name": "Timothy Meeker et al. Appellees, vs. Sophia Steepleton et al. Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Meeker v. Steepleton", "decision_date": "1923-10-20", "docket_number": "No. 15479", "first_page": "337", "last_page": "339", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "309 Ill. 337" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "251 Ill. 200", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3434253 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/251/0200-01" ] }, { "cite": "296 Ill. 87", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5057535 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/296/0087-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 247, "char_count": 4242, "ocr_confidence": 0.773, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0721195595542827e-07, "percentile": 0.5599986717372326 }, "sha256": "d3df405eb190eda2bff229624b15f97f31bb64c11de3df7d83461226dcd4d2d5", "simhash": "1:e2ee7b5b7c54ec2d", "word_count": 762 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:31:34.062933+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Timothy Meeker et al. Appellees, vs. Sophia Steepleton et al. Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Justice Thompson\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nOliver Meeker died testate seized in fee of certain lands in Mercer county. By the fifth clause of his will, which was duly probated, he devised to his five surviving children \"the use, occupation, rents and profits of all real estate owned by me at time of my decease,\u201d and by the sixth clause he devised \u201cto the heirs of\u201d each of his children (naming them) one-fifth of said real estate in fee, to be enjoyed by them after the death of all his children. The life tenants, claiming under the rule in Shelley\u2019s case to be the owners in fee of the real estate devised, filed their bill in partition and a decree was entered as prayed. This appeal followed.\nWhen the ancestor by any conveyance takes an estate of freehold and in the same conveyance the estate is limited to his heirs in fee, \u201cheirs\u201d is a word describing the extent or quality of the estate conveyed and not a word designating the persons who are to take it. (Peacock v. McCluskey, 296 Ill. 87; Bails v. Davis, 241 id. 536; Baker v. Scott, 62 id. 86.) This is a rule of property firmly established in this State and must be applied by the court in determining the estate devised where the testator uses language bringing the devise within the rule. (Winter v. Dibble, 251 Ill. 200; Carpenter v. VanOlinder, 127 id. 42.) In determining whether the word \u201cheirs\u201d is used in its technical sense we dismiss from our minds all reference to the rule in Shelley\u2019s case, for it is strictly a rule of law and in no sense a rule of construction. In determining the intention of the testator words must be given their ordinary meaning. When the word \u201cheirs\u201d is used in a will there is a strong legal presumption that it is used in its technical sense, as denoting the whole of the indefinite line of inheritable succession. It is contended in this case that the word \u201cheirs,\u201d as used in the sixth clause of the will, means \u201cchildren,\u201d but we find nothing in the context of the will to indicate that the testator intended to use it in that sense. The word \u201cheirs\u201d is generally a word of limitation, and is not to be construed as a word of purchase unless there are other controlling: words showing such intention by the person using it. The clear and unambiguous language used by the testator, under the well established principles of law, devises all his real estate to his five children in fee, and the chancellor properly awarded partition.\nThe decree of the circuit court is affirmed.\nDecree affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Justice Thompson" } ], "attorneys": [ "D. A. Hebel, for appellants.", "Cooke, Sullivan & Ricks, and Walter L. Mannon, (Homer D. Dines, of counsel,) for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 15479.\nDecree affirmed.)\nTimothy Meeker et al. Appellees, vs. Sophia Steepleton et al. Appellants.\nOpinion filed October 20, 1923.\n1. Wills \u2014 rule in Shelley\u2019s case is not a rule of construction. In determining whether the word \u201cheirs\u201d in a devise is used in its technical sense the rule in Shelley\u2019s case is not considered, as it is not a rule of construction but a rule of law, which must be applied if the testator uses language bringing the devise within the rule.\n2. Same \u2014 when word \u201cheirs\" is used as describing quality of estate devised. Where there is a devise of a freehold to one person and in the same- instrument the estate is limited in fee to his heirs, the word \u201cheirs\u201d is regarded as describing the extent or quality of the estate devised and not as designating the persons to take it.\n3. Same \u2014 zvord \u201cheirs,\u201d used in a will, is presumed to be used in its technical sense. Where the word \u201cheirs\u201d is used in a will there is a strong legal presumption that it was used in its technical sense, as denoting the whole of the indefinite line of inheritable succession.\n4. Same \u2014 when rule in Shelley\u2019s case applies. Where the testator by one clause in his will devises to his five named children \u201cthe use, occupation, rents and profits\u201d of all his real estate, and by the next clause devises \u201cto the heirs of\u201d each of such named children one-fifth of said real estate in fee, to be enjoyed after the death of all his children, the children take the fee in the land and are entitled to partition.\nAppeal from the Circuit Court of Mercer county; the Hon. William T. Church, Judge, presiding.\nD. A. Hebel, for appellants.\nCooke, Sullivan & Ricks, and Walter L. Mannon, (Homer D. Dines, of counsel,) for appellees." }, "file_name": "0337-01", "first_page_order": 337, "last_page_order": 339 }