{
  "id": 8501724,
  "name": "John Gillilan v. Samuel Myers",
  "name_abbreviation": "Gillilan v. Myers",
  "decision_date": "1863-04",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "525",
  "last_page": "529",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "31 Ill. 525"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill.",
    "id": 8772,
    "name": "Illinois Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "13 Ill. 604",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
      "case_ids": [
        2582176
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0,
      "case_paths": [
        "/ill/13/0604-01"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
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    "char_count": 7973,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.462,
    "pagerank": {
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    "simhash": "1:bc4f7e155926d482",
    "word_count": 1456
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:01:21.455791+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "John Gillilan v. Samuel Myers."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. Justice Bbeese\ndelivered the opinion of the Court.\nThis was an action of assumpsit brought by the appellee against the appellant in the Superior Court of Chicago. The declaration contained a count for goods, wares and merchandise sold and delivered, and the money counts. Issues were made up, a trial by jury was had, and a verdict for the appellee.\nIt is not material to examine the pleadings in the cause, as no question is made upon them. No exceptions were taken to the instructions, and the only question presented is, should the court have granted a new trial ?\nThis depends upon the evidence. To maintain the issue on the part of the plaintiff he introduced the following evidence :\n\u201cAlgonquin, June 8, 1857.\n\u201cMr. Myees : Sir \u2014 You will please take up my note payable to Samuel Smith, for two hundred and two dollars, with ten per cent, interest from the first of April, and it will be right as we talked. JOHN gtllila\u00edt. ''\nIndorsed on this writing, was the following:\n\u201c$205.87. Received, Chicago, June 8, 1857, from Samuel Myers, two hundred and five dollars and eighty-seven cents, being in full for my note and interest, dated March 16, 1857, against John Gillilan. S. J. Smith.\u201d\nThe defendant\u2019s counsel admitted the signatures of the defendant and of S. J. Smith to the instruments in writing, to be genuine, and consented they be read in evidence, and admitted that the defendant sent the letter above described, directed to the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff, on the ninth day of June, 1857, at the request of the defendant, took up the note made by the defendant as requested, and paid the sum of two hundred and five dollars and eighty-seven cents in taking up the note, which was the amount of principal and interest then due upon the note.\nSmith, who was called as a witness for the defendant, stated that he brought such a paper as the above, and saw Myers in Chicago and gave the paper to him, and he took up the note and paid the amount he was requested by Gillilan to pay \u2014 thinks this is the paper. Myers first said, \u201c I don\u2019t know about this,\u201d turned to some one in the store and said, \u201c Has any arrangement been made ? \u201d Some one said it had. Mjers paid the money \u2014 thinks the amount stated in his receipt\u2014 does not pretend to give the language used by Myers, nor the other man \u2014 don\u2019t know what it relates to \u2014 knows he got the money of Myers, and that is all he cared for \u2014 he delivered the paper to Myers and he paid the money \u2014 has no doubt that Myers paid two hundred and five dollars and eighty-seven cents, to take up Gillilan\u2019s note at Gillilan\u2019s request.\nThis is all the material portion of the evidence, and on it, the defendant makes the point, that the writing sent by him to Myers, was, substantially, a bill of exchange, and the presumption of law is, that he had, at the time of drawing the bill, funds in Myers\u2019 hands. It is the doctrine, we believe, that a bill of exchange is presumed to be drawn on funds with the understanding between the drawer and drawee, that it is an appropriation of the funds of the former in the bands of the latter, and acceptance is an admission that it was so drawn, and of such a relation between the parties. 1 Parsons on Notes and Bills, 323; Raborg v. Peyton, 2 Wheaton, 385; Hortsman v. Henshaw, 11 Howard, (U. S.) 177. Is this a bill of exchange ?\nThe essential qualities of such an instrument are said to be, that it must be payable at all events, not dependent on any contingency, nor payable out of a particular fund; and that 1 it be for the payment of money only, and not for the performance of any other act, or in the alternative. 1 Parsons on Bills and Notes, 30, 52.\nThis writing is made payable on the contingency that Smith presents the note, which he may never do, and is like the case of Kelly v. Hemmingway, 13 Ill. 604. The writing has few of the essentials of a bill of exchange, but is a mere letter of request to take up a certain note if it is presented.\nThe case cited in 6 Cowen, 108, Cook v. Satterlee, is directly in point. There the plaintiff declared, in assumpsit, that on the 25th of July, 1825, W. F. & C. E. Clarke, according to> the usage and custom of merchants, etc., made their certain bill of -exchange, etc., dated on that day, directed to the defendant, by which they requested the' defendant, ninety days after date, to pay to the plaintiff or bearer four hundred dollars, and take up their note given to William and Henry B. Cook for that amount, dated April 19, 1825, which bill the defendant on the same day accepted, etc. There was a demurrer to the declaration, and judgment thereon for the defendant.\nThe court, after defining the essentials of a bill of exchange, say, is not the instrument declared on payable upon a contingency ? From the face of the instrument itself it appears the drawers had, on the 19th of April preceding its date, given their note for four hundred dollars, to William and H. B. Cook, and the object of drawing the instrument in question was, to .take up that note. The engagement of the acceptors must be construed according to what is required of them by the drawers. The note was supposed to be in possession of the payee or holder of the bill, and the payment of the money and taking np the note of the drawers, must be simultaneous acts. The acceptors could not take up the note until it was presented, nor were they bound to pay the money until the plaintiff was ready, and offered to enable them to take up the note.\nIt was held by the court, that the instrument was payable on a contingency, and is the same as if it had been said, \u201c Pay W. C. four hundred dollars, on his giving up our note,\u201d etc.\nWe see no difference in principle between that case and this. The instrument here was drawn on Myers, for the purpose of taking up drawer\u2019s note in the hands of Smith. Myers accepted the request, with that understanding, and he could only pay the money when the note was presented and delivered up. f\nWe are of opinion that this request was not a bill of exchange, and therefore, the presumption did not exist, that the writer or drawer had funds in the hands of Myers, the drawee, and that his acceptance and payment was an admission thereof.\nA new trial was properly refused, and the judgment must be affirmed. Judgment affirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. Justice Bbeese"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Messrs. Chase & MunsoN, for the appellant.",
      "Messrs. King & Scott, for the appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "John Gillilan v. Samuel Myers.\n1. _ Bill c\u00ae Exchange \u2014 presumption that drawee has funds. It is the doctrine that a hill of exchange is presumed to he drawn on funds, with the understanding between the drawer and drawee, that it is an appropriation of the funds of the former in the hands of the latter.\n2. Same \u2014 what its acceptance admits. The acceptance of a hill of exchange is an admission hy the acceptor that the hill is drawn upon funds of the drawer in his hands.\n. 3. Same \u2014 its essential qualities. The essential qualities of a hill of exchange are that it must he payable at all events, not dependent on any contingency, nor payable out of a particular fund ; and that it be for the payment of money only, and not for the performance of any other act, or in the alternative.\n4. Same \u2014 what is not such, an instrument. This instrument was held not to he a hill of exchange : \u201cMr. Myers : Sir \u2014 You will please take up my note payable to Samuel J. Smith, for two hundred and two dollars, with ten per cent, interest from the first of April, and it .will he all right as we talked. John GriLLiLAN.\" The writing is a mere letter of request, and payable on the contingency that Smith should present the not\u00e9, which he might never do.\n5. That instrument not being a hill of exchange, no presumption could arise that the writer or drawer had funds in the hands of Myers, the drawee, and that his acceptance, and payment of the note to Smith, was an admission thereof.\nAppeal from the Superior Court of Chicago.\nThe pleadings and proofs in this ease are set forth in the opinion of the court.\nMessrs. Chase & MunsoN, for the appellant.\nMessrs. King & Scott, for the appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0525-01",
  "first_page_order": 527,
  "last_page_order": 531
}