{ "id": 5131431, "name": "The People of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, vs. Edward Blumberg, Plaintiff in Error", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Blumberg", "decision_date": "1924-12-16", "docket_number": "No. 16232", "first_page": "567", "last_page": "570", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "314 Ill. 567" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "308 Ill. 323", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5097547 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/308/0323-01" ] }, { "cite": "250 Ill. 427", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3430919 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/250/0427-01" ] }, { "cite": "276 Ill. 236", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4852045 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/276/0236-01" ] }, { "cite": "249 Ill. 348", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5645338 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/249/0348-01" ] }, { "cite": "307 Ill. 87", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5090527 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/307/0087-01" ] }, { "cite": "262 Ill. 152", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4749940 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/262/0152-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 319, "char_count": 6902, "ocr_confidence": 0.802, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.5961689552170427e-07, "percentile": 0.8190742008510921 }, "sha256": "582c5f3b7f794925be3980056d9c3d1757b70bde82ada7b070ea20d43ec38844", "simhash": "1:def096964a36ac51", "word_count": 1198 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:34:24.077932+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "The People of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, vs. Edward Blumberg, Plaintiff in Error." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Justice DeYoung\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe grand jury, at the January, 1923, term of the criminal court of Cook county, returned an indictment against Edward Blumberg, consisting of a single count, which charged that he robbed Elizabeth Hartman of $100 while armed with a pistol. His plea was not guilty. Subsequently, on motion of the State\u2019s attorney, it was \u201cordered that the gun count be waived.\u201d Blumberg thereupon withdrew his plea of not guilty to the indictment and entered a plea of \u201cguilty of plain robbery in manner and form as charged therein.\u201d The record then shows that Blumberg \u201cbeing fully advised by the court that the effect of said plea would be that the defendant would be subject to be sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term of not less than three years nor more than twenty years, he still persisting therein, the court orders said plea to be accepted and entered of record against said defendant.\u201d The testimony of witnesses was heard and Blumberg was adjudged guilty of \u201cplain robbery\u201d and sentenced to the penitentiary. By this writ of error he seeks a reversal of the judgment.\nThe contentions of the plaintiff in error are substantially three: First, that there was no criminal charge against him at the time of his conviction because the only count in the indictment as returned by the grand jury had been waived; second, that the court failed fully to explain to him the consequences of his plea of guilty; and third, that the words \u201cplain robbery\u201d cannot designate any crime other than petit larceny, for the commission of which he could not be sentenced to the penitentiary.\nIn an indictment for robbery the allegation that the defendant was armed with a dangerous weapon does not constitute a separate count but is merely a matter of aggravation. (People v. Boer, 262 Ill. 152.) There was only one count in the indictment, and the purpose of the waiver of the charge that the plaintiff in error was armed with a dangerous weapon was merely that no evidence would be offered of that fact. The trial proceeded upon that assumption and the sentence was for the simple and not for the aggravated offense. While it was inaccurate to refer to the part of the indictment which set forth the matter of aggravation as a count, its erroneous designation could in no way prejudice the plaintiff in error. The waiver was equivalent to a nolle prosequi of the matter of aggravation, which is a separable part of the count. The indictment for robbery remained to support the judgment and sentence. (People v. Cohen, 307 Ill. 87.) The technical error in the use of the word \u201ccount\u201d is one of form and is not sufficient to reverse the judgment. People v. Hartsig, 249 Ill. 348.\nA recital in the record that the defendant was fully advised of.the effect of his plea of guilty shows a sufficient compliance with the statute to warrant a sentence. The language of the court used in warning the defendant is no part of the record. (People v. Harney, 276 Ill. 236; People v. Siracusa, 275 id. 457.) When such a recital is shown of record it must be presumed that the court discharged its duty. (People v. Walker, 250 Ill. 427; People v. Fulimon, 308 id. 235.) In order to overcome the presumption that the court properly performed its duty it must appear from the record that the court erroneously or insufficiently informed the defendant of the effect of his plea of guilty. (People v. Siracusa, supra.) There is no bill of exceptions in this record and no motion of any character was made by the plaintiff in error, nor did he preserve any exception to any ruling of the court.\nThe words \u201cplain robbery,\u201d in the judgment, were intended to distinguish the robbery for which the plaintiff in error was convicted and sentenced from the aggravated offense of robbery while armed with a dangerous weapon. The use of the word \u201cplain\u201d in conjunction with the word \u201crobbery\u201d had no technical meaning. The withdrawal of that part of the charge which referred to the deadly weapon led to the use of the word to show that the aggravated charge was not under consideration by the court. The conviction was for robbery, and the plaintiff in error was properly sentenced to the penitentiary. People v. Pleitt, 308 Ill. 323; People v. Cohen, supra.\nWe find no reversible error in the record. The judgment of the criminal court will be affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Justice DeYoung" } ], "attorneys": [ "Frank W. Derby, for plaintiff in error.", "Edward J. Brundage, Attorney General, Robert E. Crowe, State\u2019s Attorney, and James B. Searcy, (Henry T. Chace, Jr., Edward E. Wilson, and Clyde C. Fisher, of counsel,) for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 16232.\nJudgment affirmed.)\nThe People of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, vs. Edward Blumberg, Plaintiff in Error.\nOpinion filed December 16, 1924.\n1. Criminal law \u2014 allegation that defendant was armed is not a separate count in indictment for robbery. In an indictment for robbery the allegation that the defendant was armed with a dangerous weapon does not constitute a separate count but is merely a matter of aggravation.\n2. Same \u2014 when waiver of \u201cgun count\u201d is not waiver of entire charge in indictment for robbery. Where an indictment for robbery consists of but one count, which charges that the defendant committed the crime while armed with a pistol, a waiver of the \u201cgun count\u201d is not a waiver of the entire charge but is equivalent to a nolle prosequi of the matter of aggravation, and the reference to the matter of aggravation as a count is but a technical error.\n3. Same \u2014 recital in record that defendant was advised of effect of plea of guilty is sufficient. A recital in the record that the defendant was fully advised of the effect of his plea of guilty is a sufficient compliance with the statute to warrant a sentence, and the language which the court uses in warning the defendant is no part of the record.\n4. Same \u2014 fact that defendant was not sufficiently advised of the effect of plea of guilty must be made to appear from record. Where it is recited in the record that the defendant was fully advised of the effect of his plea of guilty it must be presumed that the court discharged its duty, and in order to overcome the presumption it must be made to appear from the record, by bill of exceptions or otherwise, that the court erroneously or insufficiently informed the defendant of the effect of his plea.\n5. Same \u2014 finding defendant guilty of \u201cplain\u201d robbery is sufficient. Where the prosecution has waived its charge of the aggravated offense of robbery with a gun and the defendant pleads guilty to \u201cplain\u201d robbery, the use of the word \u201cplain\u201d in the judgment is sufficient to distinguish the robbery for which the defendant is convicted and sentenced to the penitentiary, and it cannot be contended that it designates only petit larceny.\nWrit op Error to the Criminal Court of Cook county; the Hon. Jacob H. Hopkins, Judge, presiding.\nFrank W. Derby, for plaintiff in error.\nEdward J. Brundage, Attorney General, Robert E. Crowe, State\u2019s Attorney, and James B. Searcy, (Henry T. Chace, Jr., Edward E. Wilson, and Clyde C. Fisher, of counsel,) for the People." }, "file_name": "0567-01", "first_page_order": 567, "last_page_order": 570 }