{ "id": 5259339, "name": "Fred Landry, Appellant, vs. E. G. Shinner & Co., Inc., Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Landry v. E. G. Shinner & Co.", "decision_date": "1931-06-18", "docket_number": "No. 20751", "first_page": "579", "last_page": "586", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "344 Ill. 579" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "3 Gilm. 547", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Gilm.", "case_ids": [ 2463607 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/8/0547-01" ] }, { "cite": "283 Ill. 550", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2417563 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/283/0550-01" ] }, { "cite": "316 Ill. 123", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5143087 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/316/0123-01" ] }, { "cite": "296 Ill. 254", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5057030 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "372" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/296/0254-01" ] }, { "cite": "299 Ill. 189", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5023174 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/299/0189-01" ] }, { "cite": "292 Ill. 440", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4981827 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/292/0440-01" ] }, { "cite": "286 Ill. 606", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4934316 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/286/0606-01" ] }, { "cite": "269 Ill. 27", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4798733 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "139" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/269/0027-01" ] }, { "cite": "321 Ill. 466", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5167010 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/321/0466-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 568, "char_count": 10754, "ocr_confidence": 0.755, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.0716864024003395e-07, "percentile": 0.8573777853457866 }, "sha256": "835abdb77a399ac5577025005a7f4ad662e5bd4e577a88410a012efb3560997a", "simhash": "1:1559e44280bf8cbb", "word_count": 1869 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:14:30.907411+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Fred Landry, Appellant, vs. E. G. Shinner & Co., Inc., Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Justice Heard\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAppellant, Fred Landry, a minor, by his next friend, Henry Landry, brought suit in the superior court of Cook county against appellee, E. G. Shinner & Co., Inc., for personal injuries. A demurrer was sustained to appellant\u2019s declaration, and appellant electing to stand by it, judgment in bar of the action was entered, from which an appeal was taken to this court, the constitutionality of a statute being involved.\nAppellee in its brief arid argument states: \u201cFor the purposes of this appeal\"it may be conceded that on July 21, 1928, when the plaintiff was fifteen years old, he was injured while in defendant\u2019s employ; that in such employment the plaintiff was required to clean a certain meat-chopper, and that his employment in that capacity was absolutely prohibited by the Child Labor act of 1917 as amended in 1921, which was then in force. It is also not disputed that the enterprise in which the plaintiff was employed was one to which the Workmen\u2019s Compensation act of 1927 applied, and that if the plaintiff had been an adult no right of action at law would have existed.\u201d\nSection 5 of the Workmen\u2019s Compensation act of 1927 is as follows :\n\u201cSec. 5. Term employee defined \u2014 The term \u2018employee\u2019 as used in this act, shall be construed to mean * * *\n\u201c2. Every person in the service of another under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written, including persons whose employment is outside of the State of Illinois where the contract of hire is made within the State of Illinois, and including aliens, and minors who, for the purpose of this act shall be considered the same and have the same power to contract, receive payments and give quittances therefor, as adult employees,\u201d etc.\nParagraph (k) of section 8 of the same act is as follows: \u201cIn case the injured employee is under sixteen years of age at the time of the injury and is illegally employed, the amount of compensation payable under paragraphs b, c, d, e and f of this section shall be increased fifty percentum, provided, however, that nothing herein contained shall be construed to repeal or amend the provisions of ah act concerning child labor, approved June 26, 1917, as subsequently amended relating to the employment of minors under the age of sixteen years.\u201d\nIf these provisions are valid appellant\u2019s remedy was under the Workmen\u2019s Compensation act and the demurrer was properly sustained. e\nIt is contended by appellant that- paragraph {k) of section 8 is unconstitutional as being contrary to public policy, and that the policy of preserving the health and lives of children by forbidding their employment in certain industries dangerous to their health, their lives or their limbs was first adopted by the legislature of the State of Illinois on June 17, 1891, and that later acts covering this same subject, extensively and with considerable detail, show that the protection of children under these circumstances has been the policy of this State on the subject ever since. The public policy of a State is to be found embodied in its constitution, its statutes, and, when these are silent on the subject, in the decisions of its courts. The public policy of a State, when not fixed by the constitution, is not unalterable but varies upon any given question with changing legislation thereon, and any action which by legislation, or, in the absence of legislation thereon, by the decisions of the court, has been held contrary to the public policy of the State is no longer contrary to such public policy when such action is expressly authorized by subsequent legislative enactment. (People v. City of Chicago, 321 Ill. 466; Lincoln Park Coal Co. v. Wabash Railway Co. 338 id. 82.) If paragraph {k) is a valid enactment then it is not contrary to the public policy of this State.\nSection 13 of article 4 of the constitution of this State provides: \u201cNo act hereafter passed shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title.\u201d It is contended by appellant that the first part of paragraph {k) of section 8, by providing for compensation for minors illegally employed, repeals the Child Labor laws of this State without making any reference to such repeal in the title of the act. He cites Galpin v. City of Chicago, 269 Ill. 27, and Lyons v. Police Pension Board, 255 id. 139, to the effect that where a statute repeals by implication a former statute the title to such repealing act must contain a reference to such repeal. Paragraph (Ze) does not purport to repeal, or in fact repeal, the Child Labor law or any portion thereof, but, on the contrary, expressly states an intention not to do so. The Child Labor law is wholly a penal law and is in nowise affected by the enactment of paragraph (Ze). The only effect that paragraph has with reference thereto is to transfer a remedy of a minor not given by the Child Labor law but accruing to a minor by reason of a violation thereof, from a suit in trespass for personal injuries to a claim for such injuries under the Workmen\u2019s Compensation act. There is no vested right of one injured to any particular remedy, and a transfer of remedies is clearly within the scope of legislative enactment. Gones v. Fisher, 286 Ill. 606; Johnson v. Choate, 284 id. 214; Green v. Red Cross Medical Service Co. 232 id. 616.\nIt is contended by appellant that paragraph (k) of section 8 of the Workmen\u2019s Compensation act is in direct conflict with section 5 of the same act, as by section 5 the term \u201cemployee\u201d is restricted to persons in the service of another under contracts of hire, express or implied, and by paragraph (k) the term \u201cemployee\u201d is applied to one under sixteen years of age who is illegally employed at the time of the injury, and that in cases arising under paragraph (k) there can be no contract of hire. Section 5 of the act, prior to its amendment in 1927, included \u201cminors who are legally permitted to work under the laws of this State.\u201d By the amendment of 1927 the words \u201cwho are legally permitted to work under the laws of this State\u201d were stricken out, and by the terms of the amendment it was made to apply to every person in the service of another under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written, including minors.\u201d The principal object in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature. (Fowler v. Johnston City and Big Muddy Coal Co. 292 Ill. 440.) The plain and obvious meaning of the language used by the legislature is the safest guide to follow in construing any act, as the court has no right to read into the statute words that are not found therein either by express inclusion or by fair implication. (Illinois Publishing Co. v. Industrial Com. 299 Ill. 189.) In ascertaining the intention of the legislature in enacting a statute the whole act must be given consideration, together with the state of the law prior to its adoption, any changes made by the act and the apparent motive for them. City of Rockford v. Schultz, 296 Ill. 254; City of Chicago v. Max, 289 id. 372.\nAppellant cites DeKam v. City of Streator, 316 Ill. 123, and Penn v. Bornman, 102 id. 523, in support of his contention. These cases do not support his contention. They only recognize the distinction between valid and invalid contracts, and each of them recognizes that where the word \u201ccontract\u201d is used it does not necessarily mean \u201cvalid contract.\u201d In the DeKam case it was said: \u201cThe contract was void because it was prohibited by law.\u201d The other authorities cited recognize the same distinction. Words found in a statute are to be construed, as in other instruments, in accordance with their ordinary use and meaning. (Ruda v. Industrial Board, 283 Ill. 550.) An agreement which produces no legal obligation is often called a void contract. In Williston on Contracts (vol. 3, p. 2866,) it is said: \u201cTo assert that all unlawful agreements are ipso facto no contracts and void is opposed to many decisions and unfortunate in its consequences, for it may protect a guilty defendant from paying damages to an innocent plaintiff. Doubtless a statute may, and sometimes does, make an agreement absolutely void, but even though a statute so states in terms, \u2018void\u2019 has sometimes been held to mean \u2018voidable,\u2019 and unless no other conclusion is possible from the words of a statute it should not be held to make agreements contravening it totally void.\u201d In Ferguson v. Sutphen, 3 Gilm. 547, the court said: \u201cIt does not follow because a statute declares a certain contract to be void that either of the contracting parties can take advantage of it. A statute may declare a contract to be void and still but one of the parties be guilty of its violation. Enactments of this character are often made for the purpose of protecting one class of nien fr.om the oppression and impositions of another class of men, and in such cases the really guilty party is never allowed any relief under the statute or permitted to set up the statute as a defense to relief sought by the other party.\u201d\nA contract of hiring a minor in violation of the Child Labor law is an illegal contract, and while it is commonly called void it is not absolutely void in all its aspects. If it were, then no claim for damages could be based on injuries received by a minor while performing services under such contract. It is void in the sense that it is unenforceable by either party to it, but it is not absolutely void in all of its aspects with relation to damages resulting to the minor through the performance of services under such illegal contract of hiring. The contract of hiring alleged in the declaration was an illegal contract and unenforceable by either party and the services rendered under it were rendered under a contract \u2014 i. e., an illegal contract \u2014 which was not absolutely void but had sufficient virility to fix the relation between appellee and Fred Landry as that of master and servant. The intention of the legislature is clearly expressed in the language which it has used, and it is clear from such language that it was its intention that paragraph (Ze) of section 8 should apply to all minors and not be limited to minors who were legally permitted to work under the laws of this State.\nAppellant\u2019s remedy being under the Workmen\u2019s Compensation act and -not by a suit at law, the court properly sustained the demurrer to the declaration and entered judgment in bar of the action.\nThe judgment is affirmed.\n, Judgment affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Justice Heard" } ], "attorneys": [ "Finn & Miller, for appellant.", "Mayer, Meyer, Austrian & Platt, (Carl Meyer, David F. Rosenthal, and Jacob X. Schwartz, of counsel,) for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 20751.\nFred Landry, Appellant, vs. E. G. Shinner & Co., Inc., Appellee.\nOpinion filed June 18, 1931.\nFinn & Miller, for appellant.\nMayer, Meyer, Austrian & Platt, (Carl Meyer, David F. Rosenthal, and Jacob X. Schwartz, of counsel,) for appellee." }, "file_name": "0579-01", "first_page_order": 579, "last_page_order": 586 }