{ "id": 5277370, "name": "The Peoples Gas Light and Coke Company, Appellant, vs. Knowlton L. Ames, Jr., Director of Finance, Appellee; The Commonwealth Edison Company, Appellant, vs. Knowlton L. Ames, Jr., Director of Finance, Appellee; The Central Illinois Public Service Company, Appellant, vs. Knowlton L. Ames, Jr., Director of Finance, Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co. v. Ames", "decision_date": "1934-12-20", "docket_number": "Nos. 22738, 22739, 22740", "first_page": "152", "last_page": "161", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "359 Ill. 152" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "166 U. S. 290", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3592671 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/166/0290-01" ] }, { "cite": "289 Mo. 421", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mo.", "case_ids": [ 851857 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mo/289/0421-01" ] }, { "cite": "217 Mass. 427", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mass.", "case_ids": [ 89655 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mass/217/0427-01" ] }, { "cite": "134 Fed. 282", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.", "case_ids": [ 3863580 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f/134/0282-01" ] }, { "cite": "232 U. S. 78", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3672635 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "89" }, { "page": "184, 198" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/232/0078-01" ] }, { "cite": "352 Ill. 441", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5294795 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/352/0441-01" ] }, { "cite": "230 U. S. 352", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3664215 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/230/0352-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 Ill. 209", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2421772 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/291/0209-01" ] }, { "cite": "306 Ill. 377", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5781221 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/306/0377-01" ] }, { "cite": "292 Ill. 236", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4979289 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/292/0236-01" ] }, { "cite": "278 Ill. 562", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4871600 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/278/0562-01" ] }, { "cite": "353 Ill. 86", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5292022 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "94" }, { "page": "189, 193" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/353/0086-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 827, "char_count": 17334, "ocr_confidence": 0.763, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.150095430319156e-07, "percentile": 0.9563018925041575 }, "sha256": "12ac5aa9316d85d384f9a05632da301b3be2a6c0840fbb11c9653713babf8e2d", "simhash": "1:382a99d23ac73b1b", "word_count": 2876 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:53:43.662837+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "The Peoples Gas Light and Coke Company, Appellant, vs. Knowlton L. Ames, Jr., Director of Finance, Appellee. \u2014 The Commonwealth Edison Company, Appellant, vs. Knowlton L. Ames, Jr., Director of Finance, Appellee. \u2014 The Central Illinois Public Service Company, Appellant, vs. Knowlton L. Ames, Jr., Director of Finance, Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Justice Farthing\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe Peoples Gas Light and Coke Company, the Commonwealth Edison Company and the Central Illinois Public Service Company have each appealed from the decrees of the circuit court of Cook county dismissing for want of equity their amended and supplemental bills of complaint. The causes, which were brought directly to this court because they relate to the revenue, have been consolidated here. Appellants sought to restrain Joseph J. Rice, Director of Finance of this State, who has been succeeded in office by appellee, Knowlton L. Ames, Jr., from enforcing against them the provisions of an act entitled, \u201cAn act in relation to a tax upon persons engaged in the business of selling tangible personal property to purchasers for use or consumption,\u201d approved June 28, 1933, effective July 1, 1933. (Laws of 1933, p. 924.) Appellee\u2019s demurrer to the amended and supplemental bill of the gas company was sustained and the bill was dismissed. After appellee\u2019s demurrers were overruled in the other two cases he filed answers, and after the hearings the bills were dismissed for want of equity. '\nWe need not detail the allegations of the pleadings. Appellants are public utility companies doing business under \u201cAn act concerning public utilities,\u201d approved June 29, 1921, in force July 1, 1921, as amended. (Cahill\u2019s Stat. 1933, p. 2185 et seq.; Smith\u2019s Stat. 1933, p. 2227 et seq.) The Peoples Gas Light and Coke Company is engaged in supplying gas to its customers in the city of Chicago. The Commonwealth Edison Company is similarly engaged in furnishing electricity in that city, and the Central Illinois Public Service Company furnishes electricity to the public in four hundred sixty-seven communities, gas in twenty communities and water in nine communities in this State.\nThe sole question presented by this consolidated cause is whether appellants are liable to pay the tax imposed by the Retailers\u2019 Occupation Tax act. Appellants contend that the very nature of the business of public service companies, the circumstances preceding and attending the passage of the act and the language used in the act demonstrate that it was not intended to apply to them. They also contend that they are not engaged in the business of \u201cselling,\u201d and, in any event, they insist that public service companies in furnishing gas or electric service are not engaged in the business of selling \u201ctangible\u201d personal property.\nWe shall consider first the contention that the act was not intended to apply to public service companies. It is fundamental that taxing laws must be strictly construed. They are not to be extended by implication beyond the clear import of the language used. In case of doubt they are construed most strongly against the government and in favor of the tax-payer. (Majestic Utilities Corp. v. Stratton, 353 Ill. 86, 94; People v. Sears, 344 id. 189, 193.) \u201cStrict construction\u201d does not require that words be given the narrowest meaning of which they are susceptible, and words of the act are to be given their full meaning. The proper office of the rule is to help solve ambiguities \u2014 not to compel an immediate surrender to them. Biffer v. City of Chicago, 278 Ill. 562.\nSection 2 of the Retailers\u2019 Occupation Tax act, in so far as it is material here, provides: \u201cA tax is imposed upon persons engaged in the business of selling tangible personal property at retail in this State,\u201d etc. Section 1 defines a \u201csale at retail\u201d as \u201cany transfer of the ownership of, or title to, tangible personal property to the purchaser, for use or consumption and not for re-sale in any form as tangible personal property, for a valuable consideration. Transactions whereby the possession of the property is transferred but the seller retains the title as security for payment of the selling price shall be deemed to be sales.\u201d\nAppellants contend that persons engaged in the business of selling at retail constitute a distinct class well understood by the business world and by people in general. This class, they contend, includes only merchants, jobbers, retail traders and persons engaged generally in the business of selling goods and merchandise as those terms- are thought of in the competitive field of trade and commerce. They say their occupation constitutes a peculiar class of business enterprise entirely distinct and separate from the business of the retailer or retail merchant. This contention is persuasive. Since its beginning the business carried on by public service companies or public utilities has had characteristics peculiar to it. From early times the business of public utilities was deemed to be such as to require the imposition upon it of certain obligations not imposed by law upon other occupations. The term \u201cpublic utility\u201d implies a public use carrying with it the duty to serve the public and treat all persons alike, and it precludes the idea of \u201cservice\u201d which is private in its nature and is not to be obtained by the public. (Springfield Gas Co. v. City of Springfield, 292 Ill. 236; Public Utilities Com. v. Bethany Telephone Ass\u2019n, 270 id. 183.) This distinction was recognized in People v. Wyanet Light Co. 306 Ill. 377, where we held that a company incorporated \u201cto own and operate an electric light, heating and power plant for profit\u201d was not organized for purely manufacturing and mercantile purposes within the meaning of paragraph 4 of section 3 of the Revenue act, and that the capital stock of the company was therefore subject to assessment by the State Tax Commission rather than by the local assessor. We said on page 381: \u201cAppellee belongs to the class of corporations ordinarily known and referred to as public utilities. Such corporations form a particular class by themselves and are regulated by special provisions of our statute known as the Public Utilities act. Merchandise is defined in general as \u2018any movable object of trade or traffic; that which is passed from hand to hand by purchase or sale \u2014 specifically the object of commerce; a commercial commodity or commercial commodities in general; the staple of a mercantile business; commodities, goods or wares bought and sold for gain.\u2019 (Century Diet.) Corporations for purely mercantile purposes are well understood by the people in general. They form quite a large class of corporations and are very different in character from corporations known as public utilities.\u201d\nThe case of Public Utilities Com. v. Springfield Gas Co. 291 Ill. 209, recognizes the same distinction. We there said on page 217: \u201cThe property of the public utility is devoted to the public use. There is always the obligation springing from the nature of the business in which it is engaged \u2014 which private exigency may not be permitted to ignore \u2014 that there shall not be an exorbitant charge for the service rendered. But the State has not seen fit to undertake the service itself, and the private property embarked in it is not placed at the mercy of legislative caprice. It rests secure under the constitutional protection, which extends not merely to the title but to the right to receive just compensation for the service given to the public. (Simpson v. Shepard, 230 U. S. 352.) No direct parallel can be drawn between a private corporation and a public service corporation, for the reason that to a greater or lesser extent the public has acquired an interest in the use of the property devoted to public use, and correlatively the company owes a duty to the public as well as to its stockholders and must charge no more than a reasonable rate for service rendered.\u201d\nThe language just quoted is significant for the reason, also, that it regards public ultilities as rendering service. That the words used were aptly chosen is obvious from a consideration of the Public Utilities act, wherein it is shown that the legislature regards public utilities as engaged in rendering service rather than in selling. Section 10 of that act defines \u201cservice\u201d as follows: \u201cThe term \u2018service,\u2019 when used in this act, is used in its broadest and most inclusive sense, and includes not only the use or accommodation afforded consumers or patrons, but also any product or commodity furnished by any public utility and the plant, equipment, apparatus, appliances, property and facilities employed by, or in connection with, any public utility in performing any service or in furnishing any product or commodity and devoted to the purposes in which such public utility is engaged and to the use and accommodation of the public.\u201d The furnishing of any commodity is thus described by the legislature as \u201cservice.\u201d Section 3 of the same act provides that commissioners may be appointed with power to make valuations and \u201cto estimate proper rates of service of public utilities.\u201d Section 8 empowers the commission to examine utilities \u201cwith respect to the adequacy, security and accommodation afforded by their service.\u201d Section 32 provides: \u201cEvery public utility shall furnish, provide and maintain such service instrumentalities, equipment and facilities as shall promote the safety, health, comfort and convenience of its patrons, employees, and public and as shall be in all respects adequate, efficient, just and reasonable.\u201d\nThe same session of the legislature which passed the Retailers\u2019 Occupation Tax act also amended the Public Utilities act, and again referred to that business as a \u201cservice\u201d when in section 2ya (paragraph 2b) it said: \u201cThe dividend proposed to be paid upon such common stock can reasonably be declared and paid without impairment of the ability of the utility to perform its duty to render reasonable and adequate service at reasonable rates.\u201d Laws of 1933, P- 845-\nThese expressions of the legislature which speak of the utility business as one of rendering service indicate the Retailers\u2019 Occupation Tax act was not intended to include the public utility business, because the act plainly refers to those engaged in the business of selling tangible personal property for use or consumption. It is true, as appellee points out, that the business of public utilities has been referred to by this and other courts as that of \u201cselling,\u201d but in none of the cases cited was the exact nature of the transactions a subject matter for determination. Such expressions cannot prevail over the express declarations by the legislature in the Public Utilities act.\nAppellants also rely upon the rejection of certain amendments which were proposed when the legislature passed both the first and second Retailers\u2019 Occupation Tax acts. A proposal to amend the title of the first act to specifically include all personal property and to extend the act to those rendering service was defeated. Two other amendments introduced at the same time, which expressly included public utilities along with other occupations, were abandoned because of the failure of the amendment to the title. After the first act was declared unconstitutional in Winter v. Barrett, 352 Ill. 441, the present act was passed by the legislature. An attempt was made to amend the present act so as to include public utilities, and more than one hundred other service-rendering occupations by name, and reducing the tax on persons engaged in the business of selling tangible personal property from two per cent to one per cent. This amendment was defeated by one vote.\nIt has been frequently decided that the probative value of the rejection of an amendment will be considered by the courts in construing an act if the language is at all doubtful. (Lapina v. Williams, 232 U. S. 78, 89; Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. International Coal Co. 230 id. 184, 198.) In McDonald & Johnson v. Southern Express Co. 134 Fed. 282, the question was as to the construction of a statute, and the court said: \u201cIt was suggested by the learned Attorney General at the hearing that the act be so construed as to confine its operation to shad caught within the limits of the State. Such interpretation would limit the words of the act and be manifestly against the intent of the legislature which enacted it, for it appears from the agreed statement of facts that an amendment was proposed while the act was on its passage, striking out the words \u2018any shad fish,\u2019 in section 1, and inserting in lieu thereof the words, \u2018any shad fish caught in the waters of the State of South Carolina,\u2019 but the said amendment was rejected, and the court cannot now do by construction what the legislature refused to do by enactment.\u201d This conclusion was also reached in Rea v. Cook, 217 Mass. 427, and Ex parte Oppenstein, 289 Mo. 421. In State v. Lancashire Fire Ins. Co. 51 S. W. (Ark.) 633, it is stated that little weight should be given to rejected amendments in determining the intent of the legislature. The debates of Congress have no great persuasive force in determining the intention of that body, ( United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass\u2019n, 166 U. S. 290,) but the sound rule to be deduced from the authorities is that the rejection of an amendment should be considered and given weight in determining the legislative intent.\nAppellee contends that the amendment to the present act may have been rejected because the members of the .legislature believed public service companies were already covered by the act or because the legislature did not want to reduce the tax from two per cent. The amendment would have reduced the tax on persons already covered by the act and would have imposed a like tax upon the additional occupations named. The issue thus presented to the legislature was whether it would pass the act as it then was or whether it should reduce the rate and increase the class of persons subject to the tax. The fact that the amendment was rejected tends to show that the legislature did not want to tax persons engaged in occupations of rendering service, as distinguished from those selling tangible personal property for use, etc. The fact that public utilities were mentioned in the amendment among the occupations proposed to be taxed also indicates that the legislature considered that public utilities are engaged in rendering service as distinguished from being engaged in the business of selling.\nIn support of their contention that they were not intended to be included within the act, appellants rely upon language used by this court in Winter v. Barrett, 352 Ill. 441, which held unconstitutional the first Retailers\u2019 Occupation Tax act. That decision was handed down shortly before the present act was passed, and in it we used language that would indicate that the act was meant to apply to persons who were free to pass on the tax to the consumer, and that competition between retailers could be relied upon to prevent prices of articles and commodities sold being raised in price more than is necessary actually to protect business men in their attempt to make a fair profit. Public utilities are not free to pass on the tax to the consumer. Their rates are fixed by the Commerce Commission. They would have to apply for an increase in rates or possibly suffer confiscation of their property by the imposition of the tax. They do not operate in a competitive field. With these considerations in mind, if the legislature intended to include such occupations in the act it would have used language to remove the doubt raised by what we said in the Winter case.\nAnother circumstance relied upon by appellants is an opinion of the Attorney General of the State of Pennsylvania construing an act after which they say our act is patterned. The opinion of an Attorney General of another State is a circumstance that is entitled to little weight in arriving at the intention of our legislature. It has no binding force in the jurisdiction where it was rendered, and it is not shown that our legislature knew of its existence.\nFrom a consideration of the circumstances surrounding the enactment of the law, and from the language of the act itself, we are of the opinion that public utilities are not within the scope of the act.\nWhat we have said disposes of this appeal, and there is no need of discussing the further reasons advanced by appellants for holding them without the Retailers\u2019 Occupation Tax act, viz., that they are not engaged in the business of making sales, or, at any rate, that they are not selling tangible personal property.\nThe decrees of the circuit court of Cook county are reversed and the causes are remanded to that court, with directions to enter decrees in accordance with the views herein expressed.\nReversed and remanded, with directions.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Justice Farthing" } ], "attorneys": [ "Cooke, Sullivan & Ricks, Isham, Lincoln & Beale, A. D. Stevens, and Ralph D. Stevenson, (George A. Cooke, Edward H. Fiedler, Harry J. Dunbaugh, and Edward M. Bullard, of counsel,) for appellants.", "Otto Kerner, Attorney General, (James G. Skinner, and Montgomery S. Winning, of counsel,) for appellee.", "E. Bentley Hamilton, amicus curie." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(Nos. 22738, 22739, 22740.\nThe Peoples Gas Light and Coke Company, Appellant, vs. Knowlton L. Ames, Jr., Director of Finance, Appellee. \u2014 The Commonwealth Edison Company, Appellant, vs. Knowlton L. Ames, Jr., Director of Finance, Appellee. \u2014 The Central Illinois Public Service Company, Appellant, vs. Knowlton L. Ames, Jr., Director of Finance, Appellee.\nOpinion filed December 20, 1934\nRehearing denied Feb. 12, 1935.\nCooke, Sullivan & Ricks, Isham, Lincoln & Beale, A. D. Stevens, and Ralph D. Stevenson, (George A. Cooke, Edward H. Fiedler, Harry J. Dunbaugh, and Edward M. Bullard, of counsel,) for appellants.\nOtto Kerner, Attorney General, (James G. Skinner, and Montgomery S. Winning, of counsel,) for appellee.\nE. Bentley Hamilton, amicus curie." }, "file_name": "0152-01", "first_page_order": 152, "last_page_order": 161 }