{
  "id": 2578282,
  "name": "Wakem & McLaughlin, Appellant, vs. John Stelle, State Treasurer, et al. Appellees",
  "name_abbreviation": "Wakem & McLaughlin v. Stelle",
  "decision_date": "1937-06-11",
  "docket_number": "No. 24073",
  "first_page": "499",
  "last_page": "502",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "366 Ill. 499"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill.",
    "id": 8772,
    "name": "Illinois Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [],
  "analysis": {
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    "simhash": "1:e1eb14908c957715",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:21:20.816080+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Wakem & McLaughlin, Appellant, vs. John Stelle, State Treasurer, et al. Appellees."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. Justice Orr\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe construction of a statute relating to the manufacture of alcoholic beverages is sought by this appeal. The public revenue is involved and the case therefore comes to us directly from the circuit court of Cook county.\nAppellant is engaged in operating a bonded warehouse and in the wholesale purchase, distribution and bottling of alcohol and spirits as defined by \u201cAn act relating to alcoholic liquors,\u201d approved January 31, 1934. (Smith-Hurd Stat. 1935, chap. 43, art. 1, sec. 2, par. 95.) It is admitted that in some instances appellant adds distilled water to the alcohol or spirits which it bottles. Another section of the act, (sec. 1(6), art. 5, par. 115,) permits one licensed as an importing distributor to purchase alcohol or spirits in barrels, casks or other bulk containers and to bottle \u201csuch alcoholic liquors before re-sale thereof,\u201d but all bottles or containers so filled must be sealed, labeled, stamped and otherwise made to comply with all regulations governing manufacturers in the preparation and bottling of alcohol and spirits. Appellant had regularly paid the fee for an importing distributor\u2019s license, $250 per annum, and upon 'the recommendation of the Illinois Liquor Control Commission, had been duly licensed as such by the Department of Finance.\nOn July 1, 1934, the Illinois Liquor Control Commission ruled that one who purchases alcohol or spirits in barrels, kegs or other bulk containers, and adds distilled water when it bottles the same, is a manufacturer and must obtain a manufacturer\u2019s license to engage in such practice. This ruling was based on the definition of the word \u201cmanufacture\u201d in article 1, section 2 (8), paragraph 95, of said act, which states, in part, that \u201cthe word \u2018manufacture\u2019 means to distill, rectify, ferment, brew, make, mix, concoct, process, blend, bottle or fill an original package with any alctiholic liquor, and includes blending but does not include the mixing or other preparation of drinks for serving by those persons authorized and permitted in this act to serve drinks for consumption on the premises where sold.\u201d The fee for a manufacturer\u2019s license is $2500 per annum. On December 3, 1935, appellant paid to the Illinois Liquor Control Commission the sum of $1041.67 as a pro-rated license fee to manufacture alcohol and spirits for the period ending April 30, 1936, and on June 17, 1936, it also paid $2500 for a manufacturer\u2019s license for the fiscal license period which commenced July 1, 1936, and expires June 3\u00b0, 1937. These fees for the manufacturer\u2019s licenses were paid under written protest, with the explanation that appellant should be privileged to engage in the practice of adding distilled water to alcohol or spirits bottled, under its importing distributor\u2019s license. Injunction suits were filed in due course by appellant, to restrain the transfer of these protested payments to the general revenue fund, and temporary injunctions were granted restraining such transfers. On January 4, 1937, the trial court sustained motions to dismiss the complaints, and dissolved the temporary injunctions restraining the transfer of the funds to the State Treasury. It was from this final decree that the appeal was taken.\nAppellant\u2019s contention is that the addition of distilled water to alcohol or spirits, when bottling the same, does not require it to obtain a manufacturer\u2019s license, as it is privileged to engage in this practice under its importing distributor\u2019s license.\nA reading of the legislative definition of what constitutes manufacturing shows that under the act in question, (art. 1, sec. 2, par. 7,) a \u201cmanufacturer\u201d includes a \u201cbottler or person who fills or refills an original package, and others engaged in * * * bottling alcoholic liquors as above defined.\u201d The statutory definition of the words \u201coriginal package\u201d (art. 1, sec. 2, par. 6,) is \u201cany bottle, flask, jug, can, cask, barrel, keg, hogshead or other receptacle or container, whatsoever, used * * * to contain and to convey any alcoholic liquor.\u201d Paragraph 8 of the same section further provides in part that \u201cthe word \u2018manufacture\u2019 means to distill, rectify, ferment, brew, make, mix, concoct, process, blend, bottle or fill an original package with any alcoholic liquor.\u201d The statute does not mention or prohibit the mixing of distilled water with alcohol and spirits, but expressly includes those engaged in the bottling of any such mixture. It thus clearly appears, from legislative definition, that any person who bottles alcoholic liquors, regardless of their dilution with water or other liquid, is a manufacturer.\nA reading and comparison of the statutory limitations imposed upon any person licensed as an importing distributor indicate that the legislature did not contemplate that water, or any other ingredient, should be added to the liquor so purchased or imported before its bottling for resale. The phrase \u201cthe bottling of such alcoholic liquors before re-sale thereof\u201d indicates a limitation of bottling only to \u201csuch\u201d liquors as had previously been purchased; and the word \u201cre-sale\u201d likewise can only mean a sale of the same liquor, unchanged in degree or quality. An importing distributor who dilutes or mixes with water the alcoholic liquors purchased, and then bottles the resulting mixture before its distribution to others, is obviously not making a \u201cre-sale\u201d of the same kind or quality of liquor he purchased, but is making a new sale of a different product. While the bottle might contain some of the identical liquor purchased, it would also contain water, or other ingredient, not originally purchased for \u201cre-sale.\u201d A reasonable construction would seem to give one licensed as an importing distributor the right to bottle and re-sell only such liquors as he purchases, and not some new mixture or flavor obtained by adding other liquids or materials to the original purchase. One holding a manufacturer\u2019s license is expressly permitted to fill a bottle or other original package with \u201cany\u201d alcoholic liquors, (art. 1, sec. 2, par. 8,) while an importing distributor is limited by the terms of the act to bottling \u201csuch\u201d specific alcoholic liquors as he has purchased for \u201cre-sale,\u201d and none others. The circuit court therefore properly held that appellant was required by its practice to obtain a manufacturer\u2019s license.\nThe decree is affirmed.\nDecree affirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. Justice Orr"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Allen H. Schultz, for appellant.",
      "Otto Kerner, Attorney General, (M. Raymond Wallenstein, and Montgomery S. Winning, of counsel,) for appellees."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "(No. 24073.\nWakem & McLaughlin, Appellant, vs. John Stelle, State Treasurer, et al. Appellees.\nOpinion filed June 11, 1937.\nAllen H. Schultz, for appellant.\nOtto Kerner, Attorney General, (M. Raymond Wallenstein, and Montgomery S. Winning, of counsel,) for appellees."
  },
  "file_name": "0499-01",
  "first_page_order": 499,
  "last_page_order": 502
}