{
  "id": 2551354,
  "name": "The People of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, vs. Margaret Brown, Plaintiff in Error",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Brown",
  "decision_date": "1942-01-20",
  "docket_number": "No. 26351",
  "first_page": "262",
  "last_page": "268",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "379 Ill. 262"
    }
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  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill.",
    "id": 8772,
    "name": "Illinois Supreme Court"
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    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
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      "cite": "378 Ill. 436",
      "category": "reporters:state",
      "reporter": "Ill.",
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        2549906
      ],
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:27:51.479321+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "The People of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, vs. Margaret Brown, Plaintiff in Error."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. Justice Farthing\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nMargaret Brown was convicted by a jury in the criminal court of Cook county of the larceny of property of the value of $23.75. Her husband, Samuel Brown, was indicted with her but was granted a severance. As grounds for reversal, she urges the corpus delicti was not proved, a stock-book record was erroneously admitted in evidence, and that prejudicial statements made on the trial deprived her of a fair trial.\nIt was charged by the People that defendant stole a lady\u2019s coat from the Waukegan Dry Goods, Inc., at its place of business in Waukegan, in Lake county, and transported it to Chicago, in Cook county. Under such a state of facts, venue was properly laid in Cook county. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, chap. 38, par. 707.) The People introduced the testimony of three police officers of the city of Chicago, who related an oral confession claimed to have been made to them by Margaret Brown. According to this testimony, about 3 :oo o\u2019clock in the morning of July 29, 1940, she came to the Summerdale police station, in Chicago, and said she wanted to speak to the lientenant. Sergeant James Hackett, who was acting lieutenant, asked her what she wanted. She stated that she was a thief, had never done anything but steal for a living for ten or fifteen years, and that she wanted herself and her husband to be arrested. When asked to be more specific, she told that she had stolen a coat from the Waukegan Dry Goods Store in Waukegan while her husband drove the car around a block, and explained how she had concealed it in a bag covered by the \u201cslacks\u201d she wore. She was also wearing a heavy coat. They then returned to their apartment in Chicago and \u201cSammy\u201d that night telephoned a girl by the name of Peggy Blair, who lived at 5050 Sheridan Road in Chicago, and that she came to the apartment and bought the coat for $30. The reason defendant gave for wanting her husband arrested was that he had been paying attention to his first wife. The officers sent a squad car to get Peggy Blair and the coat. They found her at 5050 Sheridan Road and she had the coat. She admitted having bought it from Brown under the circumstances related by defendant, his wife. She stated defendant had said nothing to her while she was buying the coat. Peggy Blair\u2019s testimony corroborated the defendant\u2019s alleged statements about the sale of the coat. She also said two or three other men were in the apartment on the bed.\nLater in the morning, according to the officers, they asked Margaret Brown if she would take them to Waukegan to the place from which she had stolen the coat, and she assented. They gave her some breakfast and about 9:00 or 9:30 o\u2019clock drove to Waukegan. She pointed to the Waukegan Dry Goods Store and said \u201cThat is the store there.\u201d She further stated that she had taken the coat from the second floor. They parked the car and sergeant Hackett took the coat into the store. Officers Madera and Ruge remained with defendant. Hackett returned in a few minutes with Walter Mack, general manager of the store, Harry Teagarden, another manager, and Margaret Sayles, an employee. They did not recognize defendant, but asked her how she had concealed the coat so as to be able to leave the store with it without being caught. She said that she should not divulge trade secrets. They asked her when she had stolen the coat, and she replied \u201cA week ago Friday.\u201d The officers then took defendant back to Chicago and put her in jail. The next day Hackett asked her if she would sign a statement, but she refused and said \u201cI have told enough, you have got enough to send Sammy and me both away now.\u201d\nMargaret Brown testified at the trial and claimed that she was intoxicated at the time she went to the police station and made the oral confession, and that the officers kept giving her whiskey to drink until they arrived at Waukegan. The officers testified there was an odor of liquor on her breath, but stated definitely that she was not intoxicated. They denied giving her anything to drink except one beer on the way back from Waukegan. She claimed to have been drunk for two or three days before going to the police station, that what she told was untrue, and that she told such a story only because she had had trouble with her husband and was angry at him. Defendant\u2019s husband testified that, among other things he did, he was in the fur business; that he had bought this coat from two other men for $30 and sold it to Peggy Blair for the same price because he knew she wanted such a coat. These two men were not produced at the trial, although he testified he had known one of them for sixteen years.\nMargaret Sayles testified for the People and stated her position was the head of the stock of the fur and coat department of the Waukegan Dry Goods Store. She positively identified the coat claimed to have been stolen by defendant, People\u2019s exhibit No. 1, as one that had been in the stock of the Waukegan Dry Goods, Inc., store, and that they at one time had six of them in stock. She testified the figures \u201c923\u201d on a tape attached to the lining of the coat had been written by her, and that this number was used by the store to indicate that it had been made by a certain manufacturer, and that when a garment was sold the tape bearing this number would be removed by the person making the sale. As above stated, the tape on the lining of the coat claimed to have been stolen by defendant had not been removed and it bore the number \u201c923.\u201d Mrs. Sayles was then handed People\u2019s exhibit No. 3 for identification, which was a page from the store\u2019s stock-report book. She stated that book was in her care, custody and. control; that she did not keep it herself but it was under her control, and that she saw it sometimes once a week, sometimes two or three times a week. She testified the book was used to keep track of the coats that are received in stock, and that as they are sold they are marked out in the book. According to this exhibit, six coats had been received, four of them had been sold and one returned to the manufacturer. The coats were designated in this book merely as \u201c923.\u201d The following was also on this page written in pencil \u201cOne stolen.\u201d She testified this was written by one of the girls who took care of the detailed work. She was cross-examined by defendant\u2019s counsel, and at the close of the redirect examination this page of the record was offered in evidence. The court inquired of defendant\u2019s counsel whether he objected to it and he replied in the negative, and it was received in evidence. The assistant State\u2019s attorney then announced that the People rested its case. Defendant\u2019s attorney moved to instruct the jury to find the defendant not guilty on the ground the People had failed to establish the corpus delicti, and this motion was denied. Margaret Brown\u2019s attorney then further cross-examined Mrs. Sayles, and it developed that she was unable to tell who had made some of the entries in People\u2019s exhibit No. 3, and that she herself had written \u201cOne stolen\u201d after the police had been to the store July 29, 1940, with defendant. At the close of this further cross-examination defendant\u2019s attorney stated \u201cI am renewing the motion, if the court please, to the admission of this exhibit\u201d for the reason it appeared from the cross-examination she was not familiar with the handwriting of some of the notations, could not identify any handwriting except her own, and her notation was based upon hearsay. The court stated he had made no objection to it originally, therefore he could not renew it. The attorney then stated \u201cI will object to it now.\u201d This objection was overruled.\nThe contention that the corpus delicti was not established beyond a reasonable doubt, though it is not expressly so stated, proceeds on the theory that it must be established independently without considering confessions or admissions of the accused. The true rule is that although a mere naked uncorroborated confession is insufficient to convict, the corpus delicti is not required to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt by evidence aliunde the confession or admissions of the accused. It is not essential that the corpus delicti shall be established by evidence other than that which tends to connect the accused with the crime. The same evidence may be used to prove both the existence of the crime and the guilt of the defendant. The test is whether the whole evidence proves the fact a crime was committed and that the accused committed it. (People v. Henderson, 378 Ill. 436; People v. Nachowicz, 340 id. 480; People v. Hauck, 362 id. 266.) Here the confession of defendant was amply corroborated by other circumstances in evidence. In her confession she stated she and her husband sold the coat for $30 to Peggy Blair, who lived at 5050 Sheridan Road. On inquiry, it was found this account of the sale, including the name and address of the buyer and the amount for which it was sold, was correct. Defendant told the officers she had stolen it from the Waukegan Dry Goods Store in Waukegan, and later when they drove to Waukegan she directed them to that store. This coat was identified by Mrs. Sayles as one that the store had had in stock, and indicative of the fact it was stolen was the tape with the number \u201c923\u201d which it was the custom of the employees to remove in case of a sale. These facts and circustances, together with the oral confession, established the 'corpus delicti beyond any reasonable doubt.\nIt is next claimed the objection to the stock-book record should have been sustained because it was not properly proved and was hearsay. It is difficult to see that defendant was greatly injured by the introduction of this exhibit. According to it there was still one coat of this kind in stock, except for the notation \u201cone stolen\u201d which was admittedly written after the police had been to the store. The People did not attempt to connect this up by showing that actually there was not one coat in stock. The error in admitting this exhibit is not sufficient to warrant reversal of the judgment.\nDefendant complains that prejudicial statements were made on the trial which prevented her from having a fair trial. Sergeant Hackett, in relating the confession made by defendant, stated she said she had been in jail in Iowa, Atlantic City, Columbus, and Milwaukee. An objection to this was sustained, that part of the statement ordered stricken, and the court told the witness to confine himself to this particular charge, in narrating the conversation. The other statement claimed to be prejudicial was that, in answer to a question as to whether on the way back from Waukegan defendant pointed out any other store, . sergeant Hackett said she pointed out one in Lake Forest. The court sustained an objection to this line of questioning. Defendant also claims Hackett made gestures in relating the confession of defendant which were prejudicial. However, the court stated for the record he observed no unusual gestures. The harmful effect of these statements was removed by the court .in so far as it was possible to do so, and, in view of the clear proof of guilt shown here, they are insufficient to warrant a reversal.\nThe judgment of the criminal court is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.\nMr. Justice Shaw, dissenting.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. Justice Farthing"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Ode L. Rankin, and C. A. Caplow, for plaintiff in error.",
      "George F. Barrett, Attorney General, and Thomas J. Courtney, State\u2019s Attorney, (Edward E. Wilson, John T. Gallagher, and Melvin S. Rembe, of counsel,) for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "(No. 26351.\nThe People of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, vs. Margaret Brown, Plaintiff in Error.\nOpinion filed January 20, 1942\nRehearing denied March 11, 1942.\nShaw, J., dissenting.\nOde L. Rankin, and C. A. Caplow, for plaintiff in error.\nGeorge F. Barrett, Attorney General, and Thomas J. Courtney, State\u2019s Attorney, (Edward E. Wilson, John T. Gallagher, and Melvin S. Rembe, of counsel,) for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0262-01",
  "first_page_order": 270,
  "last_page_order": 276
}
