{ "id": 2505496, "name": "The People ex rel. Victor L. Schlaeger, County Collector, Appellee, vs. Reilly Tar & Chemical Corporation, Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "The People ex rel. Schlaeger v. Reilly Tar & Chemical Corp.", "decision_date": "1945-01-17", "docket_number": "Nos. 28288, 28289", "first_page": "434", "last_page": "454", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "389 Ill. 434" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "379 Ill. 594", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2551804 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/379/0594-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 Ill. 415", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2576582 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/367/0415-01" ] }, { "cite": "387 Ill, 450", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2495572 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/387/0450-01" ] }, { "cite": "375 Ill. 590", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2535186 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/375/0590-01" ] }, { "cite": "387 Ill. 62", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2496908 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/387/0062-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 Ill. 276", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5234558 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/337/0276-01" ] }, { "cite": "309 Ill. 387", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5104875 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/309/0387-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 Ill. 281", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5234912 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/337/0281-01" ] }, { "cite": "324 Ill. 254", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2444291 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/324/0254-01" ] }, { "cite": "266 Ill. 55", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4786090 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/266/0055-01" ] }, { "cite": "257 Ill. 208", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4716814 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/257/0208-01" ] }, { "cite": "163 Ill. 616", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5509619 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/163/0616-01" ] }, { "cite": "171 Ill. 293", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3177441 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/171/0293-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 Ill. 289", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3230998 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/187/0289-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 Ill. 123", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5618043 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/215/0123-01" ] }, { "cite": "231 Ill. 514", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5635727 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/231/0514-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 Ill. 40", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3173841 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/172/0040-01" ] }, { "cite": "296 Ill. 46", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5057431 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/296/0046-01" ] }, { "cite": "375 Ill. 411", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2536296 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/375/0411-01" ] }, { "cite": "376 Ill. 112", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2540661 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/376/0112-01" ] }, { "cite": "373 Ill. 124", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2530599 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/373/0124-01" ] }, { "cite": "380 Ill. 633", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2555002 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/380/0633-01" ] }, { "cite": "353 Ill. 518", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5292624 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/353/0518-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1233, "char_count": 36944, "ocr_confidence": 0.784, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.084693779947956e-07, "percentile": 0.9090223020724374 }, "sha256": "49f41164f4a68cf8092c9eba1ab0ac6fe88489bb29b13e7557bd274368dfd837", "simhash": "1:32a6a62a671a40d1", "word_count": 5736 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:15:43.220958+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "The People ex rel. Victor L. Schlaeger, County Collector, Appellee, vs. Reilly Tar & Chemical Corporation, Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Justice Wilson\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant, Reilly Tar & Chemical Corporation, having previously paid its taxes in full, under protest, filed objections in the county court of Cook county to an application of the county collector for judgments against and orders for the sale of real estate for the nonpayment of certain taxes for the years 1941 and 1942 levied by the city of Chicago and the board of education of the city. From the judgments overruling these objections for the years 1941 and 1942, respectively, the taxpayer has prosecuted separate appeals. The appeals have been consolidated for consideration and opinion, the issues involved being identical. Objections to the taxes for 1941, only, will be considered. Disposition of them, it is agreed, will be decisive with respect' to like objections for the year 1942.\nDefendant interposed objections to eighteen items included in the appropriation ordinance of the city of Chicago and the tax levy ordinance, aggregating $135,200. The items range from $1000 to $25,000. Only five exceed $7000. Illustrative items are:\n3-S-25 Committee on Buildings and Zoning\nFor expenses of the Sub-committee on Re-\nzoning of the city.........................$ 2,000.00\n3-S-85 Committee on License\nOperating expense of committee............ 4,600.00\n8-S-5 Chicago Recreation Commission\nOperating expense of commission........... 23,000.00\n8-S-35 Committee on Standards & Tests\nOperating expense of committee............ 1,000.00\nDefendant charged that the items quoted and the other fourteen are not itemized as required by law and are, consequently, void. Applicable principles have been frequently stated. The right of a taxpayer to have stated separately what are the purposes for which public money is appropriated is firmly established, and a levy not sufficiently definie to apprise him of the purpose for which the money is to be expended is invalid. (People ex rel. Schaefer v. New York, Chicago and St. Louis Railroad Co. 353 Ill. 518.) His right to have separately stated the purpose for which public money is appropriated or a tax levied is a substantial right of which he may not be deprived. (People ex rel. Toman v. Signode Steel Strapping Co. 380 Ill. 633.) On the other hand, it is equally settled that specification of each particular item of expense for which a levy is made is not required. A single appropriate general purpose is sufficient to include every expenditure although there be many items. . (People ex rel. Lindheimer v. Hamilton, 373 Ill. 124.) This is especially true where it is difficult to determine, in advance, the exact amount of the various items. In short, itemization requirements must be accorded a common-sense construction. People ex rel. Toman v. Estate of Otis, 376 Ill. 112.\nEach of the challenged appropriations bears an \u201cS\u201d designation. This letter, according to an exhibit consisting of \u201cClassification of Accounts and Commodity Code\u201d explaining the classification of expenditures, refers to \u201cTemporarily Unclassified Items.\u201d A detailed explanation follows: \u201cExpenditures for specific purposes which are required to be further itemized as expended according to standard accounts. Appropriation shall be made to this account only when it is impracticable to estimate in advance the classification under standard accounts and the items shall be classified under the proper standard accounts as expended.\u201d The appropriations are for committees of the city council. No part can be for salaries or other compensation of the members of the committees, for the reason .that the members are aldermen who receive the maximum salary permitted by statute. Operating expenses necessarily include salaries for clerical assistance, travel, and the purchase of supplies and printing. Typewriters, desks, chairs, or other items of equipment would constitute capital expenditures, and not \u201coperating expense,\u201d as defendant asserts. It further appears that where an appropriation for a committee is substantial, in comparison with the total amount of appropriations, it has been itemized in considerable detail. It does not follow that, because appropriations of $94,274 for the Committee on Finance, $135,000 for the Chicago Plan Commission, and $41,000 for the Public Vehicle License Commission permit of itemization, an appropriation of $1000 for the Committee on Standards & Tests also lends itself to itemization. The \u201coperating expense\u201d of the seventeen committees and Chicago Recreation Commission states but a single general purpose, and adequate light is given the taxpayer of the purpose for which the money is to be expended. The objections to the committee appropriations and levies were properly overruled.\nNext, defendant objected to the following item in the appropriation and levy ordinances:\n\u201c63-K-30 For hire of teams, carts and motor trucks as needed at the rates specified:\nMotor trucks, tractors, trailers and other equipment at established rates Team hire at not to exceed $11.75 per day Carts at not to exceed $8.00 per day \u25a0 Single horses and drivers on weed cutters\nat $8.00 per day....................... $2,420,000\u201d\nThe gist of the objection is that the quoted item is indefinite, vague, and not properly itemized. An appropriation of the city of Chicago for the year 1937, similar to the appropriation quoted, was involved in People ex rel. Toman v. Sage, 375 Ill. 411. The item commenced: \u201cFor hire of teams, carts and motor trucks as needed at the rates specified and for the purchase of waste collection equipment when approved by the city council: Motor trucks at established rates.\u201d This court decided that \u201cpurchase\u201d and \u201chire\u201d were separate purposes, one representing a capital investment and the other a current expense, and that the amount for each should have been separately stated. The 1941 appropriation ordinance, conformably to our decision in the Sage case, omitted the words, \u201cand for the purchase of waste collection equipment when approved by the city council.\u201d Between the words \u201cMotor trucks\u201d and \u201cat established rates\u201d were inserted the words \u201ctractors, trailers and other equipment.\u201d Defendant concedes that the appropriation now assailed \"satisfies the objection involved in the Sage case. It complains, nevertheless, that it is uncertain, vague, indefinite and unintelligible.\nIn People ex rel. Gibbons v. Clark, 296 Ill. 46, the appropriation and tax levy ordinances of the city- of Chicago contained the following: \u201cFor cleaning of streets, collection and removal of garbage, ashes and miscellaneous refuse, and for the repair of unimproved streets, sidewalks and miscellaneous street work, and for the maintenance and operation of buildings and equipment in connection therewith, $3,510,000.\u201d This court observed that if the appropriation had been made \u201cfor cleaning streets and alleys\u201d it would have specified a distinct object and purpose and would have been a legal appropriation, adding: \u201cBecause the city council went farther and grouped under the general heading many details embraced within the general purpose furnishes no valid ground for holding the tax levy void.\u201d The appropriation considered in the Clark case included as one of the details of the single general purpose of cleaning streets, \u201cmaintenance and operation of buildings and equipment in connection therewith.\u201d In the present case, the appropriation is considerably narrower in its scope than the appropriation approved in the.Clark case. Here, the item appears in the list of appropriations for the Bureau of Streets and is found among several items under the subdivision \u201cStreet and Alley Cleaning Division.\u201d It should be considered in its proper perspective with the entire appropriation for the Bureau of Streets, and, when so considered, it states a single purpose, namely, the removal of waste material from the streets and alleys of Chicago. Incident to the execution of this general purpose, it is necessary to hire teams, carts, motor trucks, tractors, trailers, and like equipment. Defendant\u2019s argument that the words \u201cother \u25a0 equipment\u201d cast doubt upon the object of the appropriation is' without merit. These words follow the specific enumeration \u201cmotor trucks, tractors and trailers.\u201d The familiar principle of ejusdem generis is applicable. (Spalding v. People, 172 Ill. 40.) Defendant asserts that it cannot ascertain from the appropriation what portion of the money will be expended for trucks, tractors, trailers, and other equipment, respectively. It does not stand in an isolated position in this regard. Obviously, the city itself could not, at the time of the passage of the ordinance, know how many trucks, trailers, and tractors would be required. Upon the authority of People v. Sage, 375 Ill. 411, and People v. Clark, 296 Ill. 46, the second objection was properly overruled.\nThe 1941 appropriation ordinance of the board of education contained appropriations for the building fund upon which the tax levy ordinance is based. Defendant objected to fifteen items, alleging that they were illegally charged against the building fu'nd; that the board levied $52,000,000 for educational purposes for the year 1941, the maximum amount allowed by the applicable statute, (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, chap. 122, par. 212a,) and that, if the items assailed are educational and not building fund charges, they were not only charged to the wrong fund but also constitute a levy for educational fund purposes in excess of the maximum legal amount. The items assailed appear in the ordinance, as follows:\n3-R-641 Shipments and Removals......................$20,000\n3-R-641 Refinishing Seats and Desks................... 65,000\n3-R-641 Replace Stolen Equipment..................... 1,000\n3-R-676 Workman\u2019s Compensation..................... 15,000\n3-R-676 Unused School Property....................... 3,000\n3-R-634 Auto Replacements..............\"............. 1,500\n3-R-634 Auto Repairs ................................ 3,500\n3-R-625 Window Shade Repairs........................ 25,000\n3-R-641 Moving Mechanical Equipment................. 5,000\n3-S-741 Inventory Equipment (New Seats and Desks)... 65,000\n3-S-741 New Cots.................................... 1,000\n3-S-741 Lunch Room Equipment.......................327,000\n3-S-741 New Curtains............................... 1,000\n3-S-741 Physical Education Equipment Rehabilitation....25,000\n3-S-741 Other Equipment \u2014 Rehabilitation .............. 25,000\nDetermination of whether these items are legally chargeable to the building fund is, in turn, dependent upon the construction of section 189% of the School Law. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, chap. 122, par. 212a.) So far as relevant, section 189Li ordains: \u201c(A) For the purpose of establishing and supporting free schools for not fewer than nine months in each year and defraying all the expenses of the same of every description; for the purpose of building, repairing and improving school houses, or procuring school land, furniture, fuel, libraries and apparatus and for all other necessary incidental expenses in each * * * city, having a population of five hundred thousand or more inhabitants, * * * the board of education and the authorities of such * * * city, * * * shall be authorized to levy annually, upon all the taxable property of the * * * city, a tax for building purposes and the purchase of school grounds * * *; and to levy annually, * * * for educational purposes a tax * * *; provided, further, that any sum expended or obligations incurred for the improvement, repair or benefit of school buildings and property shall be paid from that portion of the tax levied for building purposes and the purchase of school grounds, but after the year 1930, no part of the salaries or wages of persons employed in connection with the custody, heating or cleaning of school grounds and buildings and equipment therein shall be paid from such tax for building purposes and the purchase of school grounds.\u201d\nAn understanding of section 189^ will be aided by a review of earlier legislation on the same subject. Section 43 of the School Law of 1857, as amended in 1859, authorized school districts to levy taxes for the purpose of establishing and supporting free schools, and defraying all the expenses incident thereto,' of every description; for the purpose of repairing and improving school houses; of procuring furniture, fuel, libraries and apparatus, and for all other necessary incidental expenses. It was further provided that the directors of school districts might also appropriate for the purchase of libraries and apparatus, any surplus funds, after all necessary school expenses were paid. (Laws of 1859, p. 161.) Section 44 authorized the directors to ascertain the amount of money required for school purposes during the ensuing year and to certify the requisite rate percentage to the county clerk. The funds so raised were directed to be appropriated by the directors to the various objects and purposes for which they were intended. The statute did not, however, specify any specific proportion to be devoted to any designated purpose. Nor was there any limitation on the rate or the amount to be applied to any specific purpose. In 1872, a complete revision of the School Law was made. (Laws of 1871-72, p. 700.) Section 43 of the new act was substantially the same as section 43 of the earlier statute. The rate of taxation was limited \u201cnot to exceed two per cent for educational and three per cent for building purposes,\u201d but the rates were not required to be certified separately. Section 44 authorized a certificate for one amount, only, to be levied as a special tax for school purposes on the taxable property of the district. In 1889, another revision of the School Law became effective. (Laws of 1889, p. 256.) Sections 43 and 44 of the act of 1872 now appear as sections 1 and 2 of article 8 of the revised law. The directors were required, for the first time, to certify separately the amounts required for school purposes and building purposes. As amended in 1889, the School Law contained no definition of the terms \u201ceducational\u201d and \u201cbuilding\u201d purposes. Numerous decisions involving the construction of the School Law of 1889 stated the intention.of the statute was that all of the current ordinary expenses of the schools, including ordinary repairs, were to be covered by the taxes to be levied within the two per cent for educational purposes, and that tile additional taxes to be levied within the three per cent for building purposes were intended solely to provide the means to meet the special occasion of the building of a school house. In particular, the words \u201cfor building purposes\u201d were construed to be special and applicable only to the building of school houses and matters incident thereto, whereas the words \u201cfor educational purposes,\u201d on the other hand, were general and applied to all matters for which a board of directors might levy school taxes. Accordingly, heating, repairing, papering and painting a school house, replacing a steam heating plant with another, changing sewers in connection with a building and constructing walks around it, were not building purposes, but, instead, constituted educational purposes. People ex rel. Rea v. Toledo, St. Louis and Western Railroad Co. 231 Ill. 514; Illinois Southern Railway Co. v. People ex rel. Ebers, 215 Ill. 123; Wabash Railroad Co. v. People ex rel. Patterson, 187 Ill. 289; O\u2019Day v. People ex rel. Kinsey, 171 Ill. 293; Chicago and Alton Railroad Co. v. People ex rel. Wood, 163 Ill. 616.\nIn 1907, the General Assembly amended section 1 of article 8 of the act of 1889 t\u00b0 fix the amount to be levied for educational and building purposes each at two and one-half per cent, and added this proviso: \u201cincidental expenses as herein used shall not include any sum expended or obligation incurred for the improvement, repair or benefit of the school buildings, or property, but all such sums and obligations shall be paid from that portion of the tax levied for building purposes.\u201d (Laws of 1907, p. 519.) A general revision of the School Law was made in 1909, sections 1 and 2 of article 8 of the act of 1889 becoming sections 189 and 190 of the act of 1909. These sections made no change in the purpose for which the directors had been authorized to levy taxes since 1859, but a proviso, practically the same as the quoted proviso, was added to section 189. No change pertinent to the issue presented here was made between 1909 and 1921. In the year last named, the word \u201cbuilding\u201d was inserted before \u201crepairing of,\u201d and the words \u201cor procuring school land,\u201d substituted for the words \u201cof procuring\u201d between the words \u201cschool houses\u201d and \u201cfurniture,\u201d so that the second clause read, \u201cfor the purpose of building, repairing and improving school houses, or procuring school land, furniture, fuel, libraries and apparatus,\u201d (Laws of 1921, p. 818,) instead of \u201cfor the purpose of repairing and improving school houses, of procuring furniture, fuel, libraries, and apparatus.\u201d Laws of 1909, p. 394.\nThe proviso in the amendment of 1907, and incorporated substantially unchanged in the acts of 1909 and 1921, to the effect that the term \u201cincidental expenses\u201d should not include any sum expended or obligation incurred for the improvement, repair or benefit of school buildings or property, but that all such sums and obligations should be paid out of the portion of the tax levy for building purposes, transferred those items of expense from the educational fund to the building fund. All other expenses authorized in the first part of section 189 for \u201cfurniture, fuel, libraries and apparatus, and for all other necessary incidental expenses in each district\u201d remained payable from the tax authorized for educational fund purposes. (People ex rel. Gleghorn v. Chicago and Alton Railroad Co. 257 Ill. 208; People ex rel. Quisenberry v. Bates, 266 Ill. 55; Llewellyn v. Board of Education 324 Ill. 254.) In People ex rel Risinger v. Cummins, 337 Ill. 281, this court said: \u201cThe items of expense for light and fuel and the purchase of desks and equipment do not come under the terms of the proviso [section 189 of the School Law]. The purpose of procuring furniture, fuel, libraries and apparatus is specifically mentioned among the purposes for which a tax may be levied. These are not building purposes unless so declared by the statute, and it is not so declared in the proviso.\u201d In People ex rel. Reeves v. Bell, 309 Ill. 387, this court observed: \u201cThe authority to levy a tax for building purposes is intended to provide for the needs of the district for building, repairing and improving the school house and property for the ensuing year and not to provide a fund for possible future needs. The expenses of the district for educational purposes cannot be paid out of a tax levied for building purposes but the tax levied for building purposes must be expended for that purpose, only.\u201d\nIn 1930, and subsequent to the decisions in the Cummins and Bell cases, section i8gj4 was enacted. This new section relates solely to school districts having a population of 500,000 or more inhabitants, and is identical to section 189, to the extent relevant to the issue presented for our consideration. Section 189 is still in force, and is applicable to school districts having a smaller population. Section 189)4$ defines and describes the purpose for which educational and building fund taxes may be levied in substantially the same verbiage employed in section 189. Where a statute is re-enacted in substantially the same language as a former statute which has been judicially considered, the presumption obtains that the General Assembly re-enacted the statute in view of such construction. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, chap. 131, par. 2; People ex rel. Carnine v. Illinois Central Railroad Co. 337 Ill. 276.) It necessarily follows that sections 189 and 189)4$ are to be construed in the same manner, after the addition of section 189)4$ in 1930, as section 189 had been construed prior to the amendment. From a review of the legislation on the subject and earlier decisions, it appears that building fund taxes can be levied only (1) for the purpose of building, repairing and improving school houses and for purchasing school lands, and (2) for expenses or obligations incurred for the improvement, repair or benefit of school buildings and property. Educational fund taxes can be levied (1) for the purpose of procuring furniture, fuel, libraries and apparatus and (2) for meeting all necessary incidental expenses of every kind, character and description other than expenses payable from the building fund, as prescribed by statute, (or from certain special funds, namely, the free text-book, playground, or teachers\u2019-pension fund.)\nApplication of the law to the appropriations attacked here impels the conclusion that they are educational fund items and not legitimate charges against the building fund. Preceding the four items for \u201cShipments and Removals,\u201d \u201cRefinishing Seats and Desks,\u201d \u201cReplace Stolen Equipment\u201d and \u201cMoving Mechanical Equipment\u201d are the letters and figures \u201c3-R-641.\u201d According to the \u201cKey to the 1941 Budget Code,\u201d the figure 3 represents the fund from or to which each amount appropriated is to be paid or charged and, in particular,\" denotes that these four items are charged to the building fund. \u201cR,\u201d the fund letter, indicates the standard account to which the appropriation is chargeable. Reference to the \u201cSummary Classification of Standard Accounts\u201d discloses that \u201cR\u201d indicates \u201cRepairs and Replacements,\u201d under \u201cBuildings.\u201d The number \u201c641\u201d represents the function or the character of the expense for which the appropriation is made. In the \u201cSub-Classification of Standard Accounts\u201d the number \u201c641\u201d relates to \u201cFurniture and Equipment,\u201d more particularly described as \u201cSeats, desks, chairs, stools, couches, tables, clocks, manual training, domestic science and gymnasium equipment, cork carpets, rugs, draperies, stage curtains, pictures,\u201d etc. It is manifest that the four items relate to repairs and replacements of furniture and equipment under account number \u201c641,\u201d which section 189% of the School Law ordains must be charged to the educational fund and, conversely, are not chargeable to the building fund. People v. Cummins, 337 Ill. 281, specifically declares that the \u201cpurchase of desks and equipment\u201d must be charged to the educational fund.\nSix items,' \u201cInventory Equipment (New Seats and Desks),\u201d \u201cNew Cots,\u201d \u201cLunchroom Equipment,\u201d \u201cNew Curtains,\u201d \u201cPhysical Education Equipment Rehabilitation,\u201d and \u201cOther- Equipment Rehabilitation,\u201d have the designation 3-S-741 preceding them. The letter \u201cS\u201d refers to the \u201cConstruction and Betterments\u201d account and the number \u201c741\u201d indicates that the items are for \u201cCapital Outlay,\u201d listing the same items appearing with number \u201c641.\u201d The difference is that \u201c641\u201d relates to repairs and replacements and \u201c741\u201d to the purchase of these same items. They are not proper charges against the building fund.\n\u25a0 Two items, \u201cWorkman\u2019s Compensation\u201d and \u201cUnused School Property,\u201d bear the designations 3-R-676. The figure \u201c676\u201d indicates that these items were charged to \u201cMiscellaneous Minor Repairs.\u201d Neither of these items is for the improvement, repair, or benefit of school buildings and property. A direct, and not a remote or incidental, connection with a proper building purpose is required.\nTwo other items, \u201cAuto Replacements\u201d and \u201cAuto Repairs,\u201d are preceded by the designation \u201c3-R-634.\u201d These items are charged to the \u201cRepairs and Replacements\u201d account of the building fund, the number \u201c634\u201d indicating that they are for \u201cAuto Repairs.\u201d These appropriations are clearly within expenses incurred either for apparatus or \u201call other necessary incidental expenses.\u201d\nThe fifteenth and last item, \u201cWindow Shade Repairs,\u201d bears the designation \u201c3-R-625.\u201d Again, the letter \u201cR\u201d refers to the \u201cRepairs and Replacements\u201d account of the building fund and the number \u201c625\u201d to \u201cFurnishings and Fittings, Blackboards, Window Shades, Fire Alarms, Flouse Telephones.\u201d This last appropriation also falls within the term \u201capparatus\u201d or the expression \u201call other necessary incidental expenses.\u201d\nOver the objection of defendant, Alfred E. Bolt, auditor for the board of education, testified, according to the board, for the purpose of showing \u201cwhy\u201d the fifteen items objected to were charged to the building fund. Defendant objected to his testimony upon the ground that, parol testimony could not be introduced to explain, alter, vary, or enlarge the official record of the board of education required by law to be kept. It is well settled that where public records of proceedings are required to be kept, the records cannot be contradicted, added to, nor supplemented by parol evidence. (People ex rel. County Collector of Whiteside County v. Roth, 387 Ill. 62; People ex rel. Toman v. Chicago Heights Terminal Transfer Railroad Co. 375 Ill. 590.) Bolt\u2019s testimony did more than explain the precise nature of the items under consideration, for the reason that his testimony tended to vary or'modify the budget. His testimony reflects his conclusion with respect to what the board of education intended to do when it approved the budget. This, we have recently decided, cannot be done. (People ex rel. Franklin v. Wabash Railroad Co. 387 Ill, 450.) The board of education has an official budget code which was introduced in evidence, and to which we have referred. This code is one of its official records, is incorporated by reference into the budget, and is intended to explain and supplement the words used in the appropriations. (People ex rel. Lindheimer v. Hamilton, 373 Ill. 124; People ex rel. Gill v. White, 367 Ill. 415.) Not only did Bolt\u2019s testimony attempt to explain the language employed in the appropriations but it, in many instances, directly contradicts the budget code of the board for whom he testified. We need not consider, in detail, the numerous conflicts between Bolt\u2019s testimony and the pertinent portions of the budget code. Referring to the first challenged item \u201c3-R-641 Shipments and Removals $20,000,\u201d Bolt testified that this charge was a building maintenance item and consisted of expense incurred in shipping and removing building and maintenance machinery such as furnaces and accessorial heating apparatus and air-conditioning machinery from and to school buildings and between school buildings owned by the board of education. According to the budget code, the figure \u201c641\u201d indicates that the appropriation relates to \u201cFurniture and Equipment\u201d and, in \"particular, \u201cSeats, desks, chairs, stools, couches, tables, clocks, manual training, domestic science and gymnasium equipment, cork carpets, rugs, draperies, stage curtains, pictures,\u201d etc. We fail to perceive how any of the quoted items has any connection with furnaces, accessorial heating apparatus or air-conditioning machinery. Moreover, Bolt\u2019s testimony is in further conflict with the budget code, as the figure \u201c662\u201d is captioned the \u201cHeating, Ventilation and Heat Regulation\u201d account of the building fund, and the number \u201c666\u201d covers maintenance expenses for \u201cMachinery, Motors, Pumps, Engines, Belting, Pulleys, Furnaces, Stoves,\u201d etc., likewise an account of the building fund. Apart from the fact that Bolt\u2019s testimony does not support the board, it flatly contradicts the records kept by the board of education and introduced by it in evidence, and was inadmissible. We shall not unduly lengthen this opinion by referring to his so-called explanation of each of the remaining fourteen items. We deem it sufficient to state that a careful examination of his testimony discloses that it fails to support the appropriation and resultant levy in a single instance. Defendant\u2019s objection to the fifteen appropriations considered should have been sustained.\nDefendant also interposed objections to the taxes of the board of education produced by appropriations for the bureaus of finance, purchases and engineering, and the department of law. Included for the year 1941 are appropriations aggregating $503,361 for the bureau of finance, the.bureau of purchases, $98,620, the department of law, $114,132, and the bureau of engineering, $181,391. These appropriations -include numerous items, all, according to the key number at the left of each, charged to the educational fund. Portions of the total appropriations for each of the three bureaus named and the department of law are allocated to various funds other than the educational fund by prorata lump sum deductions. The appropriations for the bureau of purchas\u00e9s are illustrative. From the total of $98,620, deductions amounting to $33,500 are made for the prorata share of \u201cabove expenses\u201d chargeable to: building fund $23,000, free text book fund $8000, school playground fund $2500. Defendant charges that the amounts of the appropriations allocated to the building fund, the free text book fund and the school playground fund aire, in each instance, illegal because the various items which enter into the totals are educational fund charges which cannot legally be charged to any other fund. Defendant further charges that the amounts of the appropriations allocated to the building, free textbpok and school playground funds entered into the computation of the tax levies for the respective funds for the year 1941 and produce an equivalent amount of 1941 taxes for these funds which are void. According to the taxpayer, the board of education has levied its maximum rate for educational purposes and, notwithstanding this fact, attempts to charge to other funds expenses which are, without question, educational purposes, the result being not only that the appropriations are illegally charged to the wrong funds but that the error, if corrected by charging the appropriations to the educational fund, would increase the levy for the educational fund beyond the maximum limit of $52,000,000 permitted by law.\nBolt, the auditor, testified, over defendant\u2019s objection, that the challenged deductions from the educational fund consist of amounts necessary to defray the administrative expense (1) incident to the acquisition and maintenance of school buildings and grounds, (2) in acquiring and furnishing free textbooks, and (3) of controlling, managing, and operating playgrounds owned by the board of education. He testified, further, that the budget lists hundreds of employees who devote a part of their time to necessary work for the benefit of buildings and property, incidental to the furnishing of free textbooks and in connection with the control, management, and operation of playgrounds by the board. He added that, in the administration of the duties of the board, many employees in the bureaus of finance, purchases and engineering and the law department perform services for the benefit of more than one fund, and that the deductions in controversy are made so as to allocate the expense to each fund served by the employees in proportion to the amount of work done for each fund. Bolt pointed out that, in acquiring land and constructing buildings, much legal work is required, namely, the drafting of contracts, the prosecution of condemnation actions, the vacation of alleys, and the examination of titles. Further, the witness stated that the furnishing of free textbooks, the management and operation of playgrounds, and. the purchase, repair and maintenance of school buildings and properties necessitate numerous transactions requiring the handling of vast sums of money. Bolt also testified that the salary checks of employees rendering service for the several funds are drawn against the educational fund, adding that it would be impractical and uneconomical to set up separate accounting and clerical staffs for each fund or to draw separate checks on each fund representing the proportion of time of each employee\u2019s work allocated to each fund.\nAs previously stated, the board of education levied.the maximum amount permissible for educational fund purposes for the year 1941 and 1942. As defendant points out, if the portions of the appropriations now considered are improperly charged to the building, free textbook- and playground funds, they are not only illegally charged to the wrong fund but, also, represent expenditures in excess of the maximum allowed by statute for educational purposes. The scope of proper building fund charges and educational fund charges has been described. In particular, the building fund is special, being limited to the specific purposes d\u00e9fined in the statute, namely, building, repairing and improving-school houses, or improving school lands, and expenditures or obligations incurred for the improvement, repair or benefit of school buildings and property. In like fashion, the free textbook fund (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, chap. 122, par. 212a,) and the playground fund (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, chap. 122, par. 343,) are special and limited to the purposes set forth in the applicable statutes. Recourse to the appropriations involved in the objections discloses that all items included are general administrative, operating expenses. The appropriations for the bureau of purchases consist almost wholly of items for the salaries of purchasing agents, accountants, stenographers and clerks. Smaller items appear under the headings: \u201cCommunication and Transportation,\u201d \u201cSpecial and Miscellaneous Service,\u201d including \u201csuppers\u201d and \u201crepairs to office devices.\u201d The same observation applies to the appropriation items of the other two bureaus and the department of law. The expenses listed in considerable detail affirmatively demonstrate that they are not \u201cfor building purposes,\u201d namely, special purposes, applying solely to the building of school houses and matters incident thereto. (People ex rel. Toman v. Chicago Great Western Railroad Co. 379 Ill. 594.) The expenses are general operating expenses of the board,\u2014 educational fund charges. Section 189^ of the School Law affords no basis for charging any part of them to the building fund. Our examination of the appropriations discloses that the only items qualifying as legitimate building fund expenses are appropriations under the heading \u201cBureau of Engineering\u201d for two bricklayers, $13.60 per day, and one bricklayer\u2019s helper, $8.80 per day. Here, however, no specific amount is appropriated for these three employees and charged to the building fund. The objections to the appropriations for administrative expenses should have been sustained.\nThe board of education argues that the items assailed are \u201cdeductions from appropriations payable from the Educational Fund. The deductions are not set up as appropriations. Appropriations to offset deductions necessarily appear in other portions of the budget, but no objection has been made to corresponding appropriations made elsewhere in the budget to pay the respective amounts charged pro rata to the various funds.\u201d Upon the trial, the board\ndid not claim, and specifically, its witness, Bolt, did not testify that the challenged \u201cdeductions\u201d did not enter into the computation of the tax levy and the tax rates objected to. The so-called deductions are in no real sense actual deductions. Moreover, its statement to the effect that appropriations to offset the deductions necessarily appear in other portions of the budget is not supported by any reference to either the record or the abstract. Indeed,.its own explanation that the deductions are merely a method of allocating the total amount of the appropriations originally charged to the educational fund among the building and other funds to be benefited by the services for which the appropriations were made refute its assertion that the deductions did not enter into the computation of tax rates for the several funds and produce the rates assailed.\nThe judgment of the county court of Cook county, to the extent it overruled defendant\u2019s objections to the taxes levied by the city of Chicago, is affirmed. So far.as it overruled the objections to taxes levied by the board of education, the judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded, with directions to sustain these objections.\nAffirmed in part and reversed in part\nand remanded, with directions.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Justice Wilson" } ], "attorneys": [ "Scott, MacLEish & Falk, (Robert S. Cushman, and John J. O\u2019Brien, Jr., of counsel,) all of Chicago, for appellant.", "Thomas J. Courtney, State\u2019s Attorney, Barnet Modes, Corporation Counsel, William J. Tuohy, State\u2019s Attorney on rehearing, Jacob Shamberg, Richard S. Folsom, and Kirkland, Fleming, Green, Martin & Ellis, (Joseph B. Fleming, Joseph H. PlEck,. Edward C. Caldwell, Joseph E. Grossman, Otho S. Fasig, Emmett Harrington, and J. Herzl Segal, of counsel,) all of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(Nos. 28288, 28289.\nThe People ex rel. Victor L. Schlaeger, County Collector, Appellee, vs. Reilly Tar & Chemical Corporation, Appellant.\nOpinion filed January 17, 1945\nRehearing denied March 19, 1945.\nScott, MacLEish & Falk, (Robert S. Cushman, and John J. O\u2019Brien, Jr., of counsel,) all of Chicago, for appellant.\nThomas J. Courtney, State\u2019s Attorney, Barnet Modes, Corporation Counsel, William J. Tuohy, State\u2019s Attorney on rehearing, Jacob Shamberg, Richard S. Folsom, and Kirkland, Fleming, Green, Martin & Ellis, (Joseph B. Fleming, Joseph H. PlEck,. Edward C. Caldwell, Joseph E. Grossman, Otho S. Fasig, Emmett Harrington, and J. Herzl Segal, of counsel,) all of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0434-01", "first_page_order": 434, "last_page_order": 454 }