{ "id": 2476490, "name": "The People ex rel. Bradford Supply Company, Inc., Petitioner, vs. The Circuit Court of Pulaski County et al., Respondents", "name_abbreviation": "People ex rel. Bradford Supply Co. v. Circuit Court", "decision_date": "1946-03-20", "docket_number": "No. 29339", "first_page": "520", "last_page": "528", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "393 Ill. 520" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "258 Ill. 441", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 4725976 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/258/0441-01" ] }, { "cite": "253 Ill. 29", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3443590 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/253/0029-01" ] }, { "cite": "313 Ill. 448", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2435182 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/313/0448-01" ] }, { "cite": "202 Ill. 301", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 847162 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/202/0301-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 Ill. 318", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2515524 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/392/0318-01" ] }, { "cite": "391 Ill. 101", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2512187 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/391/0101-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 639, "char_count": 13927, "ocr_confidence": 0.766, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.992603492531401e-08, "percentile": 0.5384186491181532 }, "sha256": "895e26d2cba2c3f9721d79c11a1de2d7e515e3e398891426045150bf641bf278", "simhash": "1:290486f680925ae8", "word_count": 2369 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:27:36.302064+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "The People ex rel. Bradford Supply Company, Inc., Petitioner, vs. The Circuit Court of Pulaski County et al., Respondents." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Justice Murphy\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis is an original action in mandamus instituted to command respondent Bradley, as judge of the circuit court of Pulaski county, to enter' a decree in a cause pending in said court, entitled \u201cBradford Supply Co. Inc., a corporation, v. R. G. Williams, Trustee, Walter W. Waite et al., No. 3645.\u201d This is the third time the parties to this action have been before this court on some phase of the litigation involved in said cause. (People ex rel. Waite v. Bristow, 391 Ill. 101; Braford Supply Co. Inc. v. Waite, 392 Ill. 318.) Reference is made to those decisions for a full statement of the facts. The statement of facts here will be limited to such as are necessary to show the contentions of the parties.\nIn March, 1941, petitioner entered into a contract whereby it agreed to furnish material and labor in the drilling of an oil well on a 40-acre tract of land located in Pulaski county. After certain material was furnished and labor performed, the contract price was not paid and in August, 1942, petitioner started an action (No. 3645) under the Oil and Gas Wells Lien Act, (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, chap. 82, par. 71 et seq.) to enforce a lien against the 40 acres on which the oil well was drilled. It was alleged that W. L. Richey owned the premises when the contract was made and that R. G. Williams, trustee, Herbert S. Duffy and Walter W. Waite were lessees holding an oil-and-gas lease on the premises. It was further alleged that the contract had been performed by the Bradford Supply Company and that the sum of $1115.56 was due and unpaid. The owner, W. L. Richey, and the persons named as holders of the oil-and-gas leases were named as defendants.\nIt is not necessary to note the action taken by any of the defendants except Walter W. Waite. On September 21, 1942, he filed an answer, and July 8, thereafter, filed what he designated as a \u201ccross complaint.\u201d Two days after the cross complaint was filed, William Phillips and Edward Stewart obtained leave to intervene: They claimed a lien for labor and services furnished in the removal and salvage of the pipe which was the same pipe petitioner had furnished, and for which it claimed a lien. After issues were formed on petitioner\u2019s complaint, the Phillips-Stewart intervening petition, and Waite\u2019s counterclaim, a hearing was had on the two claims first mentioned. This occurred September 11, 1943. A part of an entry on the judge\u2019s minute book of that date is as follows: \u201cIt is stipulated that no claim is being made for a mechanic\u2019s lien against Walter W. Waite made a defendant in this cause.\u201d The minute-book entry contained a recital that the court found that Bradford Supply Company had contracted with defendant R. G. Williams to furnish material and labor, and that there was due it from Williams the sum of $1108.46. The following notation was entered: \u201cDecree for mechanic\u2019s lien as per signed order on file.\u201d It is conceded that no such signed order was presented to respondent to be filed. On the. same date a further entry was made in reference to the Phillips-Stewart claim. It shows that Bradford Supply Company owed Phillips-Stewart $560.\nThe record before us does not disclose that any action was taken on the Waite counterclaim at the time petitioner\u2019s claim and the Phillips-Stewart claim were heard. An entry on the judge\u2019s minute docket, under date of October 27, 1943, and continued to October 28, shows that on those dates Waite\u2019s claim as set forth in his counterclaim was tried before a jury and that a verdict was returned in favor of Waite and against Bradford Supply Company. On November 5, Bradford Supply Company filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a motion for a new trial. On November 9, a minute was entered that both motions were overruled and \u201cjudgment on the verdict in favor of the plaintiff W. Waite and against the defendant Bradford Supply Company, Inc., a corporation, in the sum of $37,500 and costs. Supersedeas bond fixed at $75,000 to be approved as to surety by the clerk of this court.\u201d\nPetitioner contends that its action to enforce the mechanic\u2019s lien was in equity and that the Phillips-Stewart claim and Waite\u2019s counterclaim arose out of the contract which furnished the subject matter of petitioner\u2019s claim. Petitioner also calls attention to the fact that the Phillips-Stewart claim and Waite\u2019s counterclaim were both filed under the same title in cause No. 3645, and that in view of such procedure relating to the same subject matter, the three causes of action should be treated as equity matters and that the judgment or decree entered should be according to established rules of chancery practice. On this hypothesis petitioner invokes the rule of chancery practice, as it existed prior to the adoption of the Civil Practice Act, that orders determining issues raised on original bills or cross bills which are entered before the issues are settled on other pleadings, are interlocutory and remain so until the issues on all the pleadings have been determined. The law under the former practice was that a decree entered in a chancery matter which included issues raised on the original bill and cross bill should be included in a single decree and that a decree so entered was final and appeal-able, and an appeal therefrom brought the whole record before the reviewing court. Village of Harlem v. Suburban Railroad Co. 202 Ill. 301.\nThe prayer of the petition is that a writ of mandamus issued commanding respondent Bradley as judge to enter a decree combining the interlocutory findings made on petitioner\u2019s claim for lien and the Phillips-Stewart claim with a finding and judgment on the Waite counterclaim. 'Although it is claimed that petitioner is entitled to have a final decree on its lien claim, the underlying purpose of this proceeding is to combine all findings, including Waite\u2019s counterclaim, in a single decree, the same to be treated as a final, appeal-able judgment. It is argued that if this were allowed, petitioner would have the right to appeal from such final judgment. Reference to the Bristow and the former Bradford Supply Company .opinions will disclose that petitioner undertook to obtain a review of the judgment entered on Waite\u2019s counterclaim on November 9, 1943, but for reasons stated therein was not successful in either case.\nIt was held in thfe Bristow case that the entry in the judge\u2019s minute book on November 9, 1943, constituted a final judgment of the court and all that remained to be done was for .the clerk to perform the ministerial' duty of extending the minutes into a formal judgment on the record.\nRespondent Bradley concedes that no decree was signed in reference to the findings of September 11, entered on petitioner\u2019s claim for lien and the Phillips-Stewart claim. He states in his answer that he has always been ready to sign such a decree if presented. Said respondent contends that the entry on the judge\u2019s minute book of November 9, 1943, has been declared by this court to be a final judgment, and that it is an action at law separable from the actions to enforce a lien.\nThe pertinent parts of the complaint filed by petitioner to enforce its lien have been stated. The allegations contained in Waite\u2019s answer to petitioner\u2019s complaint and in his counterclaim which are material to this inquiry are substantially as follows: In the answer Waite denied he entered into a contract with petitioner, that he was the owner or lessee of the premises described in the complaint, or that the materials were furnished as claimed. It was alleged \u201cthat the materials furnished by the plaintiff [petitioner herein] to the defendant R G. Williams, trustee, were misrepresented and defective and that plaintiff fraudulently concealed such defects.\u201d The substance of the counterclaim was that Waite owned oil-and-gas leases on lands adjoining the 40-acre tract on which the oil well was drilled, that at the time of making the contract the area covered by his leases had not been tested for oil or gas, that the geological survey showed formations of strata on which there was oil, and that, in view of having it determined that there was oil in that vicinity, he contributed a large amount of money to develop a test well on the 40-acre tract. It is alleged that the well drilled on the tract pierced oil-bearing formations but by reason of defects in the pipe furnished by petitioners, it was impossible to exclude the water from the oil strata, thereby forcing an abandonment of the well. It was alleged that petitioner\u2019s contract with Williams, trustee, required it to furnish pipe suitable for the purpose of drilling said well, that it agreed to furnish a first grade, second-hand pipe, that such pipe was to withstand a pressure of 2000 pounds. It was alleged that the pipe so furnished \u201cwas defective, containing small leak holes in the sides thereof, said pipe was decayed and unfit for the purpose for which it was furnished ; that to conceal the said defects from this defendant and other parties interested in the oil well, the Bradford Supply Company, Inc., fraudulently and deceitfully covered said pipes with a coating of black paint or other black material; that said defects were not known until after said pipes were driven in said well.\u201d\nSection 16 of the Oil and Gas Wells Lien Act provides that the practice, pleadings and proceedings in cases instituted under the act to enforce a lien, shall, insofar as applicable, conform to the provisions of the Civil Practice Act.\nSection 38 of the Civil Practice Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, chap, no, par. 162,) provides that subject to rules \u201cany demand by one or more defendants against one or more plaintiffs, or against one or more co-defendants, whether in the nature of set-off, recoupment, cross-bill in equity or otherwise, and whether in tort or contract, for liquidated or unliquidated damages, or for other relief may be pleaded as a cross-dematid in any action.\u201d\nThe statute is broad and designed to extend the filing of counterclaims to include subjects which were not permitted to be filed by setoff, recoupment or cross bill under the former practice. There is no requirement of statute that the original demand and the counterclaim shall be of the same character. They may be legal, equitable, or both. Nor is it necessary to observe the distinction that formerly existed as to recoupment, which r\u00e9quired that the demand should arise out of the same transaction as plaintiff\u2019s demand. Under this statute, counterclaims may be filed by a defendant against the plaintiff or a codefendant without regard to the effect it may have upon plaintiff\u2019s demand.\nThe extension of the right to file counterclaims of such wide variety necessitated a change in the entering of judgments or decrees. This was accomplished by subparagraph 3 of section 50, (par. 174,) where it was provided \u201cin case a counterclaim is filed, the judgment shall be so drawn as to protect the interests of both parties, and subject to rules, no execution shall be issued until all the issues in the case have been determined by the judgment, except by leave of court.\u201d Subparagraph 3 of section 50 \"disregards the distinctions that previously existed in reference to filing of cross bills, setoffs and recoupments and which were carried into the entry of judgments where such cross demands had been filed. The statute directs that judgments on counterclaims shall be entered, \u201cto protect the interests of the parties.\u201d\nMechanic\u2019s liens were unknown to the common law, (Hoier v. Kaplan, 313 Ill. 448,) and were not allowable in courts of equity. (Schmidt v. Anderson, 253 Ill. 29.) They are creatures of the. statute, but it is not necessary in this case to determine whether petitioner\u2019s action to enforce the lien should be regarded as a statutory action or an action at law, or one in equity, for, whatever it may be, we find that Waite\u2019s counterclaim was not of the same character. There is no basis in this suit to hold that the counterclaim should be treated as related to petitioner\u2019s original action or dependent upon it.\nThe conduct of the parties in stipulating that no claim was made for lien against Waite indicates that the parties considered that Waite\u2019s counterclaim was an action separate and independent from petitioner\u2019s claim for lien. Furthermore, petitioner\u2019s varied attempts to have the judgment of November 9, 1943, reviewed as a final, appealable judgment is evidence that it considered the judgment was in no way related to the judgment entered on the claims for lien. \u2022\nIn the Bristow case, the minutes entered November 9, 1943, were declared to be a judgment against the Bradford Supply Company, and the implications arising out of the opinion in that case and the Bradford Supply case indicate that it was considered to be a final and appealable judgment.\nUnder subparagraph 3 of section 50, the court had the power to enter a judgment on the counterclaim to protect the interests of both parties and we find that the judgment entered was in accord with the statute.\nPetitioner is entitled to have a decree or judgment entered on its claim for lien as shown by the minutes on the judge\u2019s docket under date of September 11, 1943, but respondent Bradley agrees to the signing of such a decree when presented. The writ will not issue to compel the doing .of an act which the person sought to be coerced admits on the record he is willing to do without coercion. People ex rel. Bruce v. Dunne, 258 Ill. 441.\nWrit denied.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Justice Murphy" } ], "attorneys": [ "Wham & Wham, of Centralia, and Henry I. Green, and Oris Barth, both of Urbana, for petitioner.", "Dorothy Wiebourn, and Asa J. Wiebourn, both of Cairo, and Joe Crain, of Mound City, for respondents." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 29339.\nThe People ex rel. Bradford Supply Company, Inc., Petitioner, vs. The Circuit Court of Pulaski County et al., Respondents.\nOpinion filed March 20, 1946\nRehearing denied May 16, 1946.\nWham & Wham, of Centralia, and Henry I. Green, and Oris Barth, both of Urbana, for petitioner.\nDorothy Wiebourn, and Asa J. Wiebourn, both of Cairo, and Joe Crain, of Mound City, for respondents." }, "file_name": "0520-01", "first_page_order": 520, "last_page_order": 528 }