{ "id": 2682567, "name": "The People of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, vs. John W. Molz, Plaintiff in Error", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Molz", "decision_date": "1953-06-26", "docket_number": "No. 32625", "first_page": "183", "last_page": "192", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "415 Ill. 183" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "300 Ill. 279", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2427138 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/300/0279-01" ] }, { "cite": "386 Ill. 414", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2492942 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/386/0414-01" ] }, { "cite": "376 Ill. 602", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2541324 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/376/0602-01" ] }, { "cite": "349 Ill. 230", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2604379 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/349/0230-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 Ill. 602", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2592471 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/362/0602-01" ] }, { "cite": "372 Ill. 549", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2526689 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/372/0549-01" ] }, { "cite": "400 Ill. 444", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5307174 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/400/0444-01" ] }, { "cite": "394 Ill. 511", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2472172 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/394/0511-01" ] }, { "cite": "307 Ill. 316", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5091707 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/307/0316-01" ] }, { "cite": "317 Ill. 33", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5147461 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "38" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/317/0033-01" ] }, { "cite": "287 U.S. 216", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 369836 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/287/0216-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 804, "char_count": 16728, "ocr_confidence": 0.782, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.083392634527697e-07, "percentile": 0.9379205119680722 }, "sha256": "0d3e8e04fad9c8f155b045a585c2458e2c92b8d1280b5007994e0f19adc28fb8", "simhash": "1:b668f78c13a8d0ad", "word_count": 2837 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:25:56.421548+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "The People of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, vs. John W. Molz, Plaintiff in Error." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Justice Maxwell\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe plaintiff in error, John W. Molz, hereinafter designated defendant, has sued out this writ of error to review the judgment of the circuit court of Clinton County sentencing him, on a plea of guilty to armed robbery, to a minimum term of ten years and a maximum term of twenty years. Error is assigned on the trial court\u2019s treatment of his application for probation.\nOn January 15, 1952, the defendant and his nephew and codefendant were arrested at their homes in Salem, by the sheriff of Clinton County, accompanied by the sheriff of Marion County, and were taken to the Clinton County jail. Subsequently, both defendant and his co-defendant signed confessions admitting the armed robbery of one Edward Hoffman, proprietor of a filling station at Beckemeyer, on the night of January 14, 1952. Defendant\u2019s confession, although not admitted in evidence, was recited in counsel\u2019s arguments and is set out in full in his brief and argument. This confession stated that when defendant returned from his work at United Contracting Company, Salem, about 4:30 or 5:00 P.M. June 14, his nephew and codefendant, Alva Wayne Letsinger, was at his home; that his nephew, whom he called Wayne, had not had steady work, told him he needed money and said, \u201cHow about pulling a job tonight \u2014 I said no;\u201d that Wayne suggested they meet at \u201cJoe\u2019s\u201d tavern after supper; that after supper he and his wife went to the tavern, about 8 :oo P.M. he drove his wife home, procured a 22-calibre pistol which he placed in the glove compartment of the car, and returned to the tavern and met Wayne. They had several drinks together and then drove to Beckemeyer, arriving there about 10:00 P.M.; that on the way there Wayne again said he needed money and suggested they hold up someone. Upon arriving in Beckemeyer, they parked at a tavern, sat in the car talking about what job to do and defendant stated he \u201ctried to talk him out of doing any.\u201d Defendant then went into a tavern, had a couple of drinks, and when he returned to the car Wayne suggested they hold up the \u201cPhillips 66\u201d station. Defendant took the pistol from the glove compartment, put it in his overall bib, and drove up to that station just as it was closing. They drove past the \u201cShell\u201d filling station, operated by Edward Hoffman, noted that he was alone, turned around and drove back there, parked the car between the building and the pumps. From this point we quote defendant\u2019s confession, as it appears in his brief and argument filed in this court: \u201cWayne and I went into the station and Edward Hoffman was in there. I walked first and Wayne was behind me. I had my 22 pistol in my overall bib. We walked in the door and I asked Hoffman if he had any coffee. He said no but that we could get some down at the tavern as they served it. I started back to the door and Wayne punched me with his elbow. I pulled out my 22 pistol and turned around and said to Hoffman, \u2018this is a hold up.\u2019 Hoffman backed up and pulled a pistol out of his pocket. Then Wayne ran toward Hoffman and clinched him. He grabbed the arm of Hoffman in which he had the gun and also held his arms. They scuffled and Hoffman\u2019s gun went off. I went in behind Wayne and grabbed Hoffman\u2019s arm that he had the gun in and Wayne grabbed Hoffman\u2019s gun. Then Hoffman said, \u2018he\u2019s got my gun.\u2019 I turned him loose and he grabbed at my gun and then ran out the front door. When he got outside he hollered \u2018help\u2019 several times. We ran out the front door, got into our car and drove off. We drove to Self\u2019s tavern in Wamac, south of Centraba. Got there about 11:30 or 12:00 that night. We stayed there only a few minutes. Then we drove back to Salem. I drove to my home. Wayne got out there and walked home from there. He took Hoffman\u2019s 38 pistol with him. My Dodge sedan has reflector shields over the headlights. Dated this 18th day of January, 1952.\u201d\nThe record discloses that Edward Hoffman, then 70 years of age, died of a heart attack at his home at 1:3o A.M. the following morning. No evidence was adduced, however, to attribute the death to the robbery.\nOn March 28, 1952, the Clinton County grand jury returned a true bill of indictment charging defendant and his codefendant with armed robbery. Upon arraignment on the same day they were furnished with copies of the indictment, lists of witnesses and jurors, and at 12:15 P.M., they advised the court they wished to plead guilty. The court refused to accept their pleas, appointed counsel for them and recessed to 1:3o P.M. At that time they appeared with their appointed counsel, and, being questioned by the court, advised him they had conferred with their counsel and wanted to enter their pleas of guilty. The court thereupon advised them of their right to trial by jury and admonished them as to the consequences of their pleas; they persisted therein and the court accepted their pleas and adjudged them guilty of armed robbery as charged in the indictment. Defendants\u2019 counsel stated that they wished to make application for probation, and the court stated \u201cThey have that right, and their cases will be referred to the probation officer for investigation and report.\u201d\nOn April 18, 1952, the probation officer filed a report in the office of the circuit clerk of Clinton County. This report stated that the probation officer had letters from the sheriff of Marion County, defendant\u2019s employer, and a fellow worker, all attesting defendant\u2019s good conduct in Illinois; also letters from a former associate judge and defendant\u2019s family doctor from Reed Springs, Missouri, defendant\u2019s former home. The report further showed defendant had been married ten years, had a wife and three small children whom he had always supported. The report also stated that the officer had talked with citizens of Beclcemeyer, including members of deceased\u2019s family, and that they opposed probation. Accompanying the report was a letter from a police judge with a petition for the allowance of probation signed by 84 citizens of Stone County, Missouri, attesting to the excellent reputation of defendant and his parents as upright, law-abiding citizens.\nOn April 22, 1952, the defendants appeared in court with their counsel and the State\u2019s Attorney, and the following hearing was'had. The court stated he had received the reports of the probation officer and asked the State\u2019s Attorney if he had anything to say. The State\u2019s Attorney then stated that he opposed probation for either of the defendants, recited the details of the crime and argued against any leniency being extended to them. Counsel for defendants thereupon argued to the court what he deemed to be the extenuating circumstances of the offense, emphasizing the previous good record of the defendant, and asked for probation for both defendants. Upon the conclusion of counsel\u2019s statement, the court asked each defendant if he had anything to say and each replied in the negative. The court then asked them to stand up and stated: \u201cIt isn\u2019t a question of vengeance; it\u2019s a question of what\u2019s for the public good. I can\u2019t see that it would be for the public good if a crime of this kind should go unpunished. It works a hardship on the family, but you knew you had your family. It\u2019s unfortunate that they be made to suffer, but you are the men who committed the crime, and if every man who committed a crime were released or released on probation simply because he had a family there would be no punishment.\u201d Then followed the pronouncement of sentence as to each defendant.\nWe have recited the circumstances of this offense, the probation officer\u2019s report, and the procedure in some detail because defendant\u2019s contention that \u201cThe court, the State\u2019s Attorney and the probation officer have treated this petition with a lightness and carelessness bordering on complete contempt and disregard for the wishes of the legislature and the rights of the accused,\u201d focuses our attention upon those details.\nDefendant\u2019s specific contentions can be consolidated into four objections, (1) the order referring the application for probation to the probation officer did not comply with the statute in that it failed to direct the officer what to do; (2) the court failed to enter an order denying the application for probation before passing sentence; (3) the probation officer\u2019s report does not show that a proper investigation was made and does not contain the facts required by the Probation Act, and (4) the defendant has been deprived of due process in that he had no notice of the hearing on his application for probation, he was not furnished a copy of the probation officer\u2019s report, had no notice of its filing, and was deprived of an opportunity to prepare and present his case.\nA just, fair and legal determination of the specific complaints of defendant requires, first, that we consider the fundamental principles underlying and giving rise to the theory of suspended sentences, now regulated by our probation systems. Constitutionally, there is no right to probation. After a plea of guilty a prisoner \u201cstands convicted, he faces punishment, he cannot insist on terms or strike a bargain.\u201d (Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216; 53 S. Ct. 154). As a matter of constitutional rights, therefore, the rule of \u201cstrict law\u201d which demanded fixed punishment for a crime according to its classification was perfectly justified and not objectionable. A trend away from this strict rule developed, not from any rights vested in the individual, but from the idea that society might be benefited by vesting in a judge, a probation officer or some authority, discretion to adjust the penalty to the individual and to the circumstances of the offense. This system is known to the criminologists as \u201cindividualization of punishment.\u201d Its real purpose is not to deal sympathetically or charitably with the individual but in the theory that by benefiting the particular individual, society will be the real beneficiary in that the individual will become a useful member of society rather than an habitual criminal and a menace and burden as a chronic offender. (C.J.S., Criminal Law, sec. 1618.) All our probation systems are based on these principles and our statutes must therefore be read, interpreted and applied to accomplish the purpose for which they are intended.\nThe first rule of law, then, is that the granting or refusing of an application for probation generally rests within the sound discretion of the court, this discretion to be exercised primarily for the benefit of society, and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused. (People v. Miller, 317 Ill. 33, 38; People v. Bonheim, 307 Ill. 316; People ex rel. Barrett v. Bardens, 394 Ill. 511.) Our reports are replete with statements by this court that this discretion is not even reviewable. (People v. Syer, 400 Ill. 444; People v. Denning, 372 Ill. 549; People v. Racine, 362 Ill. 602; People v. Wheeler, 349 Ill. 230.) The only modification or relaxation of this rule which we have been able to find in this State appears in People v. Donovan, 376 Ill. 602. In that case the defendant asked to be released on probation, the court heard the statements of the prosecution in regard to the defendant\u2019s admissions of the commission of the offense, and summarily denied probation, knowing nothing and making no inquiry of any kind about the defendant or the circumstances of the offense. We there said, at page 606, \u201cIt is obvious that where the facts are not shown and are not inquired into, the denial of probation is an arbitrary and unauthorized exercise of the power.\u201d\nIn People v. Hughes, 386 Ill. 414, wherein defendant objected to the court\u2019s failure to hear evidence in mitigation or aggravation, as required by statute, before passing sentence, we held that the record need not show the evidence heard by the court, that such evidence need not be preserved or that the court make any special findings on the evidence. We further there said that the burden of showing the illegality of the proceeding rests upon a defendant seeking reversal of the judgment.\nWe conclude therefore that denial of an application for probation, after a hearing in substantial compliance with the statute, cannot be set aside by this court unless the defendant affirmatively shows the trial court\u2019s decision was purely arbitrary.\nThe record in the instant case does not meet this test. \u25a0 This record discloses that defendant\u2019s application for probation was referred to the probation officer for investigation and report; that that officer did investigate defendant\u2019s past record and his status as a law-abiding citizen, his home life and his reputation, and that report included every fact or circumstance favorable to the defendant, including the opinions and recommendations of his and his family\u2019s acquaintances and friends. The record further shows that this report was before the court at the hearing, that the court was fully informed by counsel for defendant as well as counsel for the people as to all the circumstances of the offense, as to all extenuating circumstances in behalf of defendant that his counsel desired to present, and that defendant himself was given ample opportunity to present anything further he might wish before the court ruled on his application, and he stated to the court there was nothing further. The court was fully advised as to all the matters which should be taken into consideration in exercising his discretion in granting or denying probation, especially as to all matters which the defendant desired to present, and we are, therefore, unable to find that the court\u2019s ruling was arbitrary or that he did not know, and made no effort to inquire into, the circumstances as required by statute.\nDefendant\u2019s objections as to the failure of the court or the clerk to enter a formal order specifically commanding the probation officer as to what should be done in the investigation and report, or the failure of the court to either orally or by the entry of an order deny the application for probation, cannot justify reversing the trial court\u2019s judgment. The statute itself advises the probation officer what he must do when the application is referred to him and this record shows that the probation officer substantially complied with that statute. (People v. Miller, 317 Ill. 33.) The act of the court in sentencing the defendant on his plea is a sufficient denial of the application for probation and no formal denial is deemed necessary. The defendant has not pointed out and we are unable to perceive how such irregularities did or could prejudice the defendant or make the court\u2019s action arbitrary. As we have heretofore stated, one adjudged guilty of a criminal offense is not entitled to probation as a matter of right (People v. Miller, 317 Ill. 33,) and therefore, when the record discloses that the defendant was given the opportunity to present his application, when an investigation and report, deemed adequate by the trial judge to inform him of the circumstances he considers in exercising his discretion, has been made and considered, and defendant fails, as here, to show that he has been prejudiced in any manner, the exercise of the trial court\u2019s discretion in denying probation is not reviewable by this court.\nWe agree with the defendant\u2019s contention that the record in a probation hearing should be complete so as to show what was done at such hearing and the court here should have entered a formal order denying defendant\u2019s application. The entry of such order is indispensable when probation is granted in order for the court to retain jurisdiction, (People v. Cahill, 300 Ill. 279,) but where probation is not granted and the defendant is sentenced after a hearing on his application, the entry of a formal order denying his application for probation is not essential to the validity of the sentence. The exercise of the power to grant or deny probation should be in conformity with the statute, but informalities or irregularities which do not prejudice the defendant in any manner may be disregarded. C.J.S. vol. 24, page 179.\nThe defendant here had a fair hearing on his application for probation, the court effectively denied that application in the exercise of his discretion, and we cannot say that the court abused that discretion or acted in an arbitrary manner.\nThe judgment of the trial court is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Justice Maxwell" } ], "attorneys": [ "Eldon E. HazlET, of Carlyle, for plaintiff in error.", "Ivan A. Elliott, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Joseph B. Schlarman, State\u2019s Attorney, of Carlyle, for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "(No. 32625.\nThe People of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, vs. John W. Molz, Plaintiff in Error.\nOpinion filed, June 26, 1953.\nEldon E. HazlET, of Carlyle, for plaintiff in error.\nIvan A. Elliott, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Joseph B. Schlarman, State\u2019s Attorney, of Carlyle, for the People." }, "file_name": "0183-01", "first_page_order": 183, "last_page_order": 192 }