{ "id": 5279474, "name": "Montgomery Leach v. The People of the State of Illinois", "name_abbreviation": "Leach v. People", "decision_date": "1870-01", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "311", "last_page": "319", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "53 Ill. 311" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "8 Johns. 445", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Johns.", "case_ids": [ 2134453 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/johns/8/0445-01" ] }, { "cite": "3 Scam. 83", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Scam.", "case_ids": [ 2471138 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/4/0083-01" ] }, { "cite": "3 Scam. 76", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Scam.", "case_ids": [ 2470976 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/4/0076-01" ] }, { "cite": "4 Sneed, 340", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Sneed,", "case_ids": [ 11266492 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "343-4" } ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/tenn/36/0340-01" ] }, { "cite": "31 Miss. 504", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Miss.", "case_ids": [ 1655656 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/miss/31/0504-01" ] }, { "cite": "13 S. & M. 500", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "S. & M.", "case_ids": [ 1662291 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "503-5" } ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/miss/21/0500-01" ] }, { "cite": "4 Wend. 233", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wend.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "244-5" } ], "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "3 Gilm. 376", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Gilm.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "16 N. Y. 504", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "9 Pick. 495", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pick.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "498" } ], "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "26 Ill. 344", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5244762 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/26/0344-01" ] }, { "cite": "48 Ill. 145", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5229909 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/48/0145-01" ] }, { "cite": "3 Gilm. 368", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Gilm.", "case_ids": [ 2462652 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/8/0368-01" ] }, { "cite": "3 Scam. 76", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Scam.", "case_ids": [ 2470976 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "83" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/4/0076-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 623, "char_count": 16565, "ocr_confidence": 0.551, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.5607389433844905e-07, "percentile": 0.6768836715962977 }, "sha256": "650865c93cd7a3742cd1dc66e2de21d715482c110119067968841f0117a2196b", "simhash": "1:177b4677f2c8b9ba", "word_count": 3006 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:54:19.479696+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Montgomery Leach v. The People of the State of Illinois." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Chief Justice Breese\ndelivered the opinion of the Court:\nThis was an indictment preferred by the grand jury of Adams county, against Montgomery Leach and Byron Leach, and tried at the May term, 1869, of the circuit court of that county, for the murder of Andrew Price. Montgomery Leach was convicted of manslaughter, and sentenced to ten years\u2019 imprisonment. Byron Leach was acquitted.\nA motion for a new trial was overruled, and the judgment of the court pronounced in accordance with the verdict.\nTo reverse this judgment this writ of error is prosecuted, and various errors assigned.\nWe will not undertake to notice all of them with equal particularity, confining ourselves to those most important, and which may be considered as bearing directly on the merits of the case.\nThe two first errors question the ruling of the court as to the competency of two jurors, namely: George Stopher and Thomas Wallace. The objection to these jurors was, that they had formed an opinion of the guilt or innocence of the prisoners.\nThe question involved in this objection has frequently been before this court for consideration. The leading case is Smith v. Eames, 3 Scam. 76, where it was held, if a juror has made up a decided opinion on the merits of the case, either from a personal knowledge of the facts, from the statements of witnesses, from the relations of the parties, or either of them, or from rumor, and that opinion is positive and not hypothetical, and such as will probably prevent him from giving an impartial verdict, the challenge should be allowed. The substance of the rule there announced, is, that a juror is disqualified if he has expressed a decided opinion on the merits of the case. But if a juror says he has no prejudice or bias of any kind, for or against either party, that he has heard rumors in relation to the case but has no personal knowledge of the facts, and from the rumors has formed and expressed an opinion in a particular way, if they are true, without expressing any belief in their truth, he would not be disqualified. This rule was fully recognized by this court, in a capital case, Gardner v. The People, ibid. 83, and may be considered the established doctrine.\nThe bill of exceptions shows that both these jurors had no fixed opinion in the case\u2014an opinion, merely, of a light and transient nature, such as is usually formed by persons in almost every walk of life, upon hearing a current report, and which may be changed by the relation of the next person with whom he might come in contact, and which does not show a conviction of the mind and a fixed conclusion\u2014that, at most, it was hypothetical. In such case the challenge should not be allowed. It is very manifest the minds of these jurors had settled down upon no conviction whether the prisoners were guilty or innocent. Baxter v. The People, 3 Gilm. 368. These jurors were, therefore, competent.\nIt is also objected by the plaintiff in error that the court, on the cross-examination of Daniel Hunsaker, a witness for the prosecution, refused to permit his counsel to put this question to the witness: \u201c did the witness know at the time, that there had been a difficulty between the prisoner and one Joseph Kately ?\u201d\nThe bearing of this question will be understood, when it is stated that the witness testified that on the evening of the homicide, and before it occurred, he saw a knife in Leach\u2019s bosom, and that Leach said, \u201c if his hand was well, he would strike some licks that night.\u201d Now, if the object of this testimony was to show malice against the deceased, and of the cross-examination to induce the jury to believe the remark might have referred to Kately, perhaps it would have been legitimate testimony for the prisoner, had it been preceded by proof that Kately was there present, or expected there. In the absence of such proof, the evidence was properly rejected. Besides, the question was confined to no time.\nIt is also objected, that the court refused to permit the prisoner to prove he was advised by his cousin, Walter Leach, to flee, after committing the homicide. Flight sometimes bears upon its face a consciousness of guilt, whether advised or not. But the prisoner had the benefit of this testimony, through other witnesses, one or more of whom testified that after the deceased fell, Byron Leach, a co-defendant, told the prisoner to get his horse and leave the country.\nSeveral objections are made to the manner in which the court disposed of the instructions on behalf of the prosecution and of the plaintiff in error. The instructions were quite voluminous, and that a court, in disposing of them in the hurry of a trial, should commit some errors, is not remarkable. Some given by the court, perhaps, ought not to have been given, and some refused should have been given; but in all the important legal propositions bearing on the facts proved, we think full justice was done the prisoner. The instructions given on behalf of the prisoner, were as favorable as he had any right to demand, and no court is justified in reversing a judgment, if, on the whole record, it appears justice has been done, and there appears no substantial misdirection of the court by which the prisoner\u2019s rights were injuriously affected. On reading the instructions, we think, as a whole, they fairly stated the law, and deprived the prisoner of none of his rights. Several of the instructions asked by the prisoner and refused by the court, were mere echoes of instructions already given, and for that reason were properly refused.\nUpon the evidence in the record, we are satisfied the homicide was of a most atrocious character, and would have justified the jury in demanding a life for a life. That of Andrew Price was most remorselessly taken away\u2014hack\u2019d to death by a knife in the hands of a man who had said he would have revenge on him for some trifling matter which should not have disturbed the equanimity of any one. The only immediate provocation was a blow with the open hand, or fist, and by an unarmed youth, who could not have expected death from the quarter from which it came. There was no sufficient provocation for the wicked deed. The prisoner knew he was not in danger of great bodily harm when he dealt his murderous blows, and he should be grateful to the jury who tried him, and to his counsel who defended him, for the mild punishment inflicted. It was a murderous act\u2014Andrew Price was causelessly done to death, while engaged in a fight with the prisoner, which there is much in the record to show the prisoner brought on in order to gratify that revenge he confessed was lurking in his bosom.\nThe prisoner has had a fair trial. He has been deprived of none of his rights, and the judgment of the law ought to rest upon him, as pronounced by the circuit court.\nWe see no cause for reversing the judgment, and it must be affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Chief Justice Breese" } ], "attorneys": [ "Messrs. Wabbeh & Wheat, and Messrs. Wheat & Maecy, for the plaintiff in error,", "Mr. W. G. Ewing, State\u2019s Attorney, and Mr. 1ST. Bushnell, for the people," ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Montgomery Leach v. The People of the State of Illinois.\n1. Junoits\u2014competency, as to a pre-existing opinion. It has been held, that if a juror has made up a decided opinion on the merits of the case, either from a personal knowledge of the facts, from the statements of witnesses, from the relations of the parties, or either of them, or from rumor, and that opinion is positive, and not hypothetical, and such as will probably prevent him from giving an impartial verdict, a challenge for cause should be allowed.\n2. But where a juror says he has no prejudice or bias of any kind, for or against either party; that he has heard rumors in relation to the case but has no personal knowledge of the facts, and from the rumors has formed and expressed an opinion in a particular way, if they are true, without expressing any belief in their truth, he would not be disqualified. And this rule has been recognized in a capital case.\n3. Where it appears a juror has no fixed opinion in the case, but an opinion merely of a light and transient nature, such as is usually formed by persons in almost every walk of life upon hearing a current report, and which may be changed by the relation of the next person with whom he might come in contact, and which does not show a conviction of the mind and a final conclusion, and an opinion which, at most, is but hypothetical, a challenge on the ground that he has formed or expressed an opinion should not be allowed.\n4. Evidence\u2014in a criminal case\u2014upon a question of malice. Where a party was on trial for murder, one of the witnesses for the prosecution, on his examination in chief, testified that on the evening of the homicide, at the place where it occurred, but before its occurrence, he saw a knife in the prisoner\u2019s bosom, who said if his hand was well he would strike some licks that night. On cross-examination, the defendant\u2019s counsel asked the witness if he knew at the time that there had been a difficulty between the prisoner and another person, not the deceased? Held: if the object of this testimony was to show malice against the deceased, and of the cross-examination to induce the jury to believe the remark might have referred to another person, it would, perhaps, have been legitimate testimony for the prisoner, had it been preceded by proof that such other person was there present or expected there. But in the absence of such proof the evidence was properly rejected; and besides, the question should have been confined with reference to time.\nWrit of Error to the Circuit Court of Adams county; the Hon. Joseph Sibley, Judge, presiding.\nThis was an indictment for murder, charging Byron Leach and Montgomery Leach with the murder of Andrew F. Price. Upon the trial, Montgomery Leach was convicted of manslaughter, and sentenced to ten years\u2019 imprisonment, and Byron Leach was acquitted. To reverse the judgment of the court below this writ of error is prosecuted, and among the errors assigned is the overruling of defendant\u2019s challenge, for cause, of the two jurors, George Stopher and Thomas Wallace. The following examination will show the ground of objection.\nGeorge Stopher was called as a juror, and on voir dire was examined by the State\u2019s Attorney as follows:\nQuestion. \u201c Have you formed or expressed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendants ?\u201d\nAnswer. \u201c Well, partly I have, from what I have heard.\u201d Q. \u201c Have you formed an opinion ?\u201d\nA. \u201c Well, yes sir, I may say I have, according to the way I have heard.\u201d\nQ. \u201c Have you expressed that opinion ?\u201d\nA. \u201c I do not know that I have\u2014I would not be positive.\u201d Q. \u201c From what information you have thus far had, have you formed an opinion in your mind as to the guilt or innocence of these young men ?\u201d\nA. \u201cYes sir, I have.\u201d\nQ. \u201c Do you mean the opinion you speak of that you have formed, is a fixed opinion upon the case ?\u201d\nA. \u201c No sir, I have never formed any fixed opinion 'about it.\u201d\n\u201c The state of your mind is open to receive evidence ?\u201d ,A. \u201c Yes sir.\u201d\nQ. You have no idea of the case now that would be in the way of your hearing and judging upon the evidence as it would be given you in the jury box ?\u201d\nA. \u201c I do not know that I have.\u201d\nThereupon the State\u2019s Attorney accepted the juror.\nHe was then examined by defendants\u2019 counsel as follows: Question. \u201c You said you had heard an account of this transaction ?\u201d\nAnswer. \u201cYes sir.\u2019\u2019\nQ. \u201c And had on that formed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of these defendants ?\u201d\nA. \u201c Partly, from the information I have heard. If the thing was as I heard it, I did form an opinion.\u201d\nQ. \u201c Did you believe what you heard at the time you heard it?\u201d\nA. \u201c I do not believe everything I hear.\u201d\nQ. \u201c When you heard whatever you did hear, did you then form an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendants?\u201d A. \u201cI formed an opinion if it was as I heard it, if not as I heard it, I hade no opinion.\u201d\nQ. \u201c Did you, or not, take as true what you heard, on which you formed an opinion ?\u201d\nA. \u201cI can\u2019t say for certain whether I did or not.\u201d\nQ. \u201c You have no such fixed opinion but what you could be governed by the evidence in the case, but that you did form an opinion upon what you had heard about it ?\u201d\nA. \u201c Yes sir, that is the way I feel about it. I have formed an opinion, partly, from what I have heard. When I hear anything, I form an opinion according to the way I hear it. I can only say what I have said about it. I have formed an opinion upon what I heard, if it turns out to be true.\u201d\nQ. \u201c You have heard what purported to be the facts in the case ?\u201d\nA. \u201c I have heard the case all through. I have heard it spoken of. I formed an opinion at the time I heard it, the way I heard it. I did not form a solid opinion.\u201d\nQ. \u201c You heard what purported to be the facts in the case ?\u201d A. \u201cYes sir. If the facts were just as I heard them, I would have an opinion, partly. I could not say what I would do when I heard the case. I might have an opinion that a thing was so and so, then afterwards change.\u201d\nQ. \u201c I understood you to say you heard what purported to be the facts in the case, and did form an opinion ?\u201d\nA. \u201c As I told you before, I had partly formed an opinion in the case, but I never made up my mind how the thing would be until I heard the case. My opinion may be one thing; then it might change when I heard the thing.\u201d\nQ. \u201c But you did form an opinion upon what you heard, and if the facts turn out as you heard them, you would have an opinion ?\u201d\nA. \u201c I might have. I don\u2019t form any opinion upon anything until I hear it.\u201d\nThe foregoing was all the examination of Stopher on voir dire. Defendants\u2019 counsel challenged him for cause, because he had formed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendants ; challenge for cause overruled, and exception by defendants. Defendants then challenged Stopher peremptorily, and this challenge was allowed.\nThomas Wallace was called as a juryman, and his examination on voir dire by State\u2019s Attorney was as follows:\nQuestion. \u201c Have you formed or expressed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendants in this case ?\u201d\nAnswer. \u201c I can not say but what I have, partially, from what I have heard and read. I read most of it.\u201d\nQuestion by the Court. \u201c Is your opinion based upon the fact that if what you heard and read about the case should turn out to be true, then you have an opinion ?\u201d\nA. \u201c It was my opinion; if it was as I heard it, I had an opinion, if not, then I had no opinion.\u201d\nQuestion by the Court. \u201c Have you formed any other opinion, except in the manner you have stated ?\u201d\nA. \u201cI have not formed an opinion in any other way, except in case that what I have stated should turn out to 'be true.\u201d\nThereupon Wallace was accepted by the State\u2019s Attorney. He was then examined by defendants\u2019 counsel, as follows : Question. \u201c You say, from what you have read and heard, you have formed an opinion as to the guilt or'innocence of the defendants ?\u201d\nAnswer. \u201c I have read most of the transactions in the papers. I merely formed an opinion from what I read in the papers.\u201d Q. \u201c From what you read, you formed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendants ?\u201d\nA. \u201c Yes sir, from what I read.\u201d\nQ. \u201cYou have that opinion still?\u201d\nA. \u201c Yes sir, as I before stated.\u201d\nThe foregoing comprises all the statements of Wallace on voir dire. Defendants challenged him for cause, on the ground that he had formed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendants. The court overruled this challenge, and defendants excepted. Defendants then challenged him peremptorily, and this challenge was allowed by the court.\nMessrs. Wabbeh & Wheat, and Messrs. Wheat & Maecy, for the plaintiff in error,\non the question of the competency of jurors, cited the following authorities. Collins et al. v. The People, 48 Ill. 145; Gray v. The People, 26 Ill. 344; Commonwealth v. Knapp, 9 Pick. 495, 498; Cancemi v. The People, 16 N. Y. 504; Baxter v. The People, 3 Gilm. 376; People v. Mather, 4 Wend. 233, 244-5; Ex parte Vermilyea, 6 Cowen, 555-6, 562-6; Coleman v. Hagerman, cited, 6 Cowen, 564; Nelmes v. State, 13 S. & M. 500, 503-5; Colton v. State, 31 Miss. 504; Touts v. State, 7 Ohio State R. 471, 472, 474, 475, 476; Northfleet v. State, 4 Sneed, 340, 343-4; Irvine v. Kean, 14 S. & R. 292; Trimble v. State, 2 Greene (Iowa), 404.\nMr. W. G. Ewing, State\u2019s Attorney, and Mr. 1ST. Bushnell, for the people,\nas opposed to the position of the counsel for the defendant on the question of the competency of jurors, cited the following authorities. Smith v. Eames, 3 Scam. 76; Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cushing, 295; Ex parte Vermilyea, 6 Cowen, 565; Gardner v. The People, 3 Scam. 83; Durell v. Mosher, 8 Johns. 445." }, "file_name": "0311-01", "first_page_order": 315, "last_page_order": 323 }