{
  "id": 5273949,
  "name": "The People of the State of Illinois ex rel. Hiram M. Chase. v. Erastus S. Williams et al.",
  "name_abbreviation": "People ex rel. Chase v. Williams",
  "decision_date": "1870-09",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "178",
  "last_page": "180",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "55 Ill. 178"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill.",
    "id": 8772,
    "name": "Illinois Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [],
  "analysis": {
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    "ocr_confidence": 0.53,
    "pagerank": {
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    "sha256": "201811e4975d0f94ce42d95e43baab9d63da767c15a05a8470fd9c7a7424a9a8",
    "simhash": "1:38dd6aeee6fa47b7",
    "word_count": 859
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:50:07.666540+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "The People of the State of Illinois ex rel. Hiram M. Chase. v. Erastus S. Williams et al."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Per Curiam :\nThis is an application to this court for a mandamus, to compel the judges of the circuit court to refer a certain cause pending therein, on the chancery side thereof, and in which a default had been taken, to the relator as master in chancery, to take proofs, etc. pursuant to the practice of the court.\nAn alternative writ has been allowed, to which respondents have demurred. The writ alleges, in substance, that on the sixth of September, 1865, the relator received an appointment as master in chancery in the city of Chicago, Cook county, from the judge of the recorder\u2019s court of the city of Chicago; that he gave and filed the proper bond, and took, subscribed and filed the proper oath of office, and has ever since held said office, and filled said appointment; that on the sixth day of September, 1869, he was re-appointed by the judge of said court, by an appointment in writing, and duly entered of record, in which he is appointed \u201c master in chancery in the city of Chicago, in said county of Cook, Illinois,\u201d \u201cto have and to hold said office for and during the term prescribed by law, and until his successor is appointed,\u201d etc.; that he again gave the requisite bond, and took the oath prescribed by law, and has since continued to act and fill said office of master in chancery.\nThe writ then recites the pendency of said chancery suit, the default of the defendants therein, and a motion by complainant\u2019s solicitor in said cause, that the same be referred to relator as master in chancery; the refusal of the court so to do on the ground that the judges had no right to recognize relator as master in chancery.\nMany other facts are alleged, but the above are deemed sufficient for the purposes of this case.\nBefore and at the time of the act creating the recorder\u2019s court, there was a statute which declared, that \u201c the several circuit courts of this State shall have power to appoint in each county a master in chancery, who shall hold his office,\u201d etc. Gross\u2019 Stat. Chap. 21, p. 95.\nThe first section of the act creating the recorder\u2019s court of the city of Chicago, contains the provision following: \u201c Said court, and the judge and clerk thereof, shall, respectively, have the like power, authority, jurisdiction and perform the like duties as the circuit court, and the judge and clerk thereof, in relation to all matters, suits, prosecutions and proceedings within the city of Chicago, so far as the same are not otherwise limited by this act.\u201d\nIt was doubtless under the power conferred by this provision, that these appointments were made. The relator, however, received them in the terms above set forth, and has ever since exercised the powers and performed the duties of the office.\nThe sixth section of the schedule to the new constitution is thus: \u201c All persons now \u25a0 filling any office or appointment, shall continue in the exercise of the duties thereof, according to their respective commissions or appointments, unless by this constitution it is otherwise directed.\u201d\nWhether the appointment of relator was originally legal or not, is a question into which we will not inquire in this proceeding. He is undoubtedly an officer de facto, and his acts would be valid as to the public and third persons, and where parties to suits, or counsel, desire to avail themselves of his services as master, the circuit court might, with entire propriety, permit them so to do. It is not a case where there are contestants for an office, nor a quo warranto to inquire into his right to the office which he has been filling. The court, however, are of opinion, that the act sought to have performed by the circuit court is of a discretionary character, and its performance can not be compelled by mandamus.\nDemurrer sustained and peremptory writ denied.\nMandamus denied.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Per Curiam :"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Mr. Emery A. Stores, for the relator.",
      "Mr. Melville W. Fuller, for the respondents."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "The People of the State of Illinois ex rel. Hiram M. Chase. v. Erastus S. Williams et al.\n1. Masteb in chanceby in the city of Chicago\u2014officer de facto. In a proceeding to compel the judges of the circuit court of Cook county to recognize a person who was appointed master in chancery by the recorder\u2019s court of the city of Chicago, prior to the adoption of the new constitution of 1870, and to refer causes to him, in that capacity, it was held, whether there was authority for his appointment originally or not, he is an officer de facto, and his acts would be valid as to the public and third persons.\n2. Mandamus\u2014discretionary powers. Whether a circuit court shall refer causes to a particular master in chancery, for the purpose of taking proofs, etc. on the request of a party, is discretionary with that court, and a performance of the act can not be compelled by mandamus.\nThis was an application to this court for a writ of mandamus, the ground for which is set forth in the opinion of the court.\nMr. Emery A. Stores, for the relator.\nMr. Melville W. Fuller, for the respondents."
  },
  "file_name": "0178-01",
  "first_page_order": 178,
  "last_page_order": 180
}