{
  "id": 2461189,
  "name": "Granderson R. Phares v. Norris S. Barber",
  "name_abbreviation": "Phares v. Barber",
  "decision_date": "1871-09",
  "docket_number": "",
  "first_page": "271",
  "last_page": "276",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "61 Ill. 271"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "Ill.",
    "id": 8772,
    "name": "Illinois Supreme Court"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 29,
    "name_long": "Illinois",
    "name": "Ill."
  },
  "cites_to": [],
  "analysis": {
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    "char_count": 9143,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.602,
    "pagerank": {
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    "sha256": "12b2a983dfd9eb8084b26d40e8b6cb619a6195c4fa8acb283cc6105b8b17d483",
    "simhash": "1:a241a8600893fe93",
    "word_count": 1547
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:22:01.960225+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Granderson R. Phares v. Norris S. Barber."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. Justice Thornton\ndelivered the opinion of the Court:\nAppellant and one Croka were sureties upon a note.executed by them and Huffman, as principal, to appellee.\nIt would be alike unimportant and improper to review the evidence, as the case must be submitted to another jury for the error of the court below in refusing a proper question to be answered which might have elicited competent and material testimony.\nOne of the issues, and the main one, was, whether or not the sureties had been released from their obligation to pay the note by an agreement between them and the payee of the note, upon a sufficient consideration.\nThe existence of such an agreement was positively testified to by appellant and Huffman, and as positively denied by appellee.\nIn rebuttal, appellee introduced as a witness one Ford, who detailed a conversation between appellee and the sureties in regard to an application which they intended to make to Huffman, to prevail upon him to secure the debt in some other manner.\nUpon cross-examination, this witness was asked the following question: \u201cWas anything said in that conversation about releasing Phares and Croka from the note?\u201d Objection was made to the question and sustained by the court, and exception taken.\nThis question should have been answered. Upon cross-examination a party has a right to propound leading questions. The answer would necessarily have been merely affirmative or negative. If affirmative, the natural and necessary inquiry would have been, \u201cWhat was said about releasing them?\u201d\nIt is said that the refusal of the court excluded no fact from the jury. It may have had the same effect. It forestalled inquiry which may have resulted in important testimony.\nCounsel are not bound to disclose the object of questions upon cross-examination when the court can easily see that they are germane to the issue. In such case, it is not necessary to propose to the court to prove any particular fact. Such practice would destroy the power and defeat the ultimate purpose of cross-examination.\nIt is also a well settled rule that, where a witness details a conversation, the party against whom the evidence is offered is entitled to the whole of the conversation, and any action of the court which prevents its obtainment violates this rule of law.\nThe question was proper, and the objection to it should have been overruled.\nIt is also contended that the court erred in excluding the testimony of Huffman as to his understanding of the effect of a mortgage given by him to appellee. The following is the language of the Avitness : \u201cMy understanding was at the time, and still is, that this mortgage Avas given to release the securities and secure the payment of the note. I think Barber understood it in that Avay also.\u201d\nTire purpose in the execution of the mortgage could not be ascertained in this manner. This could only be determined by the acts and declarations of the parties in connection with the instrument.\nIf the term \u201cunderstanding\u201d was used as synonymous Avith \u201copinion,\u201d then the evidence was properly excluded. The mere statement of the case is a sufficient argument to show the impropriety of the Avitness in the expression of an opinion. The very object of impanelling a jury was to exclude all mere opinion and submit to them the facts for their opinions.\nIf the witness employed the word in its common acceptation, the ruling of the court Avas still unquestionably right. Understanding, in common parlance, means a comprehension of 'a particular state of things. The object of the testimony should have been not to obtain the idea of the witness upon undisclosed facts, but to elicit facts to enable the jury to form their conclusion.\nThe testimony was properly excluded.\nWe do not think it was error to refuse the introduction of. the testimony of appellee for the purpose of contradiction, as transcribed from a phonographic report of a former trial between these parties. So far as the record shows, appellee had never seen this transcript of his evidence, and did not even know of its existence. It may have been a fair and.truthful report of his testimony, and it may not.\nThese reports are taken for the convenience of the parties. The legislature has not declared that they shall be evidence upon the trial, or for any purpose, and we have no power to legislate.\nFor the refusal to permit the witness Ford, to answer, the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.\nJudgment reversed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. Justice Thornton"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Mr. D. McCulloch, and Messrs. Wead & Jack, for the appellant.",
      "Messrs. Johnson & Hopkins, for the appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Granderson R. Phares v. Norris S. Barber.\n1. Evidence\u2014admissibility of. In an action on a promissory note by the pa)ree against the maker and his sureties, one of the issues involved was, whether or not the sureties had been released by an agreement between them and the payee upon a sufficient consideration. The existence of such an agreement was positively testified to by one of the sureties and the principal maker, and as positively denied by the payee. In rebuttal the plaintiff introduced a witness who detailed a conversation between the payee and the sureties in regard to an application which they intended to make to the principal maker, to prevail upon him to secure the debt in some other manner. It was also in evidence that the principal maker had executed' to the payee a certain -mortgage. Upon cross-examination the witness was asked if anything was said in that conversation about releasing the sureties from the note. Objection was made to the question and sustained by the court: Held, the question should have been answered.\n2. Same\u2014latitude of cross-examination. The objection to the question that it was leading could not prevail, for, on cross-examination, a party has a right to propound leading questions.\n3. Neither can it be said that the refusal of the court to permit the question to be answered excluded no fact from the jury, for it forestalled inquiry which may have resulted in important testimony.\n4. And counsel are not bound to disclose the object of questions, upon cross-examination, when the court can easily see that they are germane to the issue.\nt 5. Same\u2014conversations between parties. Besides, when a witness details ,a conversation, the party against whom the evidence is offered is entitled to the whole of the conversation.\n6. Same\u2014witness\u2014jury. In respect to the effect of the mortgage given by the principal maker of the note to the payee, on the liability of the sureties, the former testified as follows: \u201cMy understanding was at the time, and still is, that the mortgage was given to release the securities and secure the payment of the note. I think Barber (the payee) understood it in that way also: \u201d Held, the evidence was properly excluded from the jury. The purpose in the execution of the mortgage could only be ascertained by the acts and declarations of the parties in connection with the instrument. The object of the testimony should have been, not to obtain the idea of the witness upon undisclosed facts, but to elicit facts to enable the jury to form their own conclusion.\n- 7. Same\u2014phonographic report of testimony. A transcribed phonographic report of the evidence of a witness given on a'former trial, can not be read for the purpose of contradicting the witness on the subsequent trial. The legislature has not declared that such reports shall be evidence for any purpose.\nAppeal from the Circuit Court of Peoria county; the Hon. S. D. Puterbaugh, Judge, presiding.\nThis was an action of assumpsit, brought by Norris S. Barber against Granderson B. Phares, Thomas J. Huffman and WilliamCroka, on the following promissory note:\n\u201cOn the 1st day of February, 1858, we, or either of us, promise to pay Norris S. Barber, or bearer, of Knox county, Illinois, the sum of $314, it being for value received, with use. Dated Elba, Knox county, Illinois, this 30th day of January, 1857. \u201e\nG. R. Phares, Thomas Huffman, William Croka.\u201d\nThe defendants, Phares and Croka, pleaded as follows:\nFirst\u2014Non-assumpsit.\nSecond\u2014That they signed the said note sued on as securities for Thomas J. Huffman, and that said Huffman after-wards, and before the commencement of this suit, paid the note in personal property, viz: Two horses, set of harness, a plow and a wagon, which were accepted by plaintiff in discharge and payment of said note.\nThird\u2014That they, were sureties, and that plaintiff, after the note was due, on April 12, 1858, extended the time for. the payment of said note to the 6th day of January, 1859, for a valuable consideration, without their knowledge and consent, and took a chattel mortgage from Huffman to secure the debt.\nFourth\u2014That they were sureties, and after, the note became due plaintiff took other and different security from the defendant Huffman, viz: a chattel mortgage on two horses, set of harness, a wagon and a plow, with the agreement that the taking of such other security should release defendants Phares and Croka, from all liability on said note.\nA trial by jury resulted in a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $382.47, from which judgment the defendant Phares appeals.\nMr. D. McCulloch, and Messrs. Wead & Jack, for the appellant.\nMessrs. Johnson & Hopkins, for the appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0271-01",
  "first_page_order": 271,
  "last_page_order": 276
}