{ "id": 2606301, "name": "Jacob Zuckerman v. Adolf Sonnenschein", "name_abbreviation": "Zuckerman v. Sonnenschein", "decision_date": "1871-09", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "115", "last_page": "118", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "62 Ill. 115" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "15 Ill. 311", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 436710 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/15/0311-01" ] }, { "cite": "4 Scam. 30", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Scam.", "case_ids": [ 6095537 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/5/0031-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 267, "char_count": 4370, "ocr_confidence": 0.581, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.08266563031280974 }, "sha256": "93841a35bfc589948c2f6e858b13cd90e060ca8ac7cf43acd28ef2171b9b011b", "simhash": "1:c7bb86ff08ce5c74", "word_count": 760 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:06:21.204499+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Jacob Zuckerman v. Adolf Sonnenschein." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Justice Thornton\ndelivered the opinion of the Court:\nThe slanderous words charged are: \u201cHe is a robber;\u201d \u201che is a thief;\u201d \u201che is a forger;\u201d \u201che gets notes for ten dollars, and changes them to one hundred dollars.\u201d\nSome of the words are actionable per se; and .the law implies malice from the publication of actionable Avoids. This implication, however, may be explained and rebutted by the circumstances.\nBrandt, an attorney, had a note for collection against appellant\u2019s father. The father and son wer\u00e9 both Germans; and the father was unable to converse in the English language. They Avere together in Brandt\u2019s office, at his request, to talk about the note. The slanderous words were then used in the hearing of Brandt, Higby and Hoffman, all attorneys at laAV, in the same office.\nThe plaintiff in the suit below obtained his information of the speaking of the slanderous words from Brandt, who was the attorney in the suit. '\nIt was error to instruct the jury, that if the defendant used words imputing a crime, they must find for plaintiff.\nThe instruction asked by defendant, that if he did not intend imputing a crime by the speaking of the words, he was not guilty, should not have been modified by the court.\nThe intent of the publication should have been submitted to the jury under the proof.\nThe evidence is not satisfactory that appellant spoke the words in any other manner than as a translation from the German into the English language, at the solicitation of Brandt. The conversation about the note, and the publication of the slander charged, were at the same time.\nIf the words were used by appellant merely for the purpose of translating from the German into English, and at the request, and for the information of the attorney, then they might be excusable on account of the cause of publication. There would then be no malice in law; and the malice, in fact, should be determined by the jury. The use of the words might properly come within the range of privileged communications.\nIn McKee v. Ingalls, 4 Scam. 30, the slanderous words were: \u201c You are a thief. If you have got money you stole it.\u201d\nThe general issue only was pleaded; and the court sustained the following instruction as correct:\n\u201c That if the jury believe, from the testimony, that Ingalls, at the time he called McKee a thief, did not intend to impute felony to him, the words are not actionable, and they must find for the defendant.\u201d\nThe controlling consideration is the quo animo. Cummerford v. McAvoy, 15 Ill. 311.\nIn the case of Read v. Ambridge, 6 C. & P. 308, the words were: \u201c He is the most blasted thief in the world, and ought to have been hung, etc.: \u201d \u201c he is a bloody thief: \u201d \u201c he robbed Mrs. Read.\u201d\nDenmar, C. J.,\nin summing up, told the jury: \u201cthat the first question for their consideration was, whether they thought the words showed an intention to impute felony.\u201d\nWords standing alone may import malice, and indicate a wicked intent. Surround them with the circumstances under which they were spoken, and the malice disappears.\nThe judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded.\nJudgment reversed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Justice Thornton Denmar, C. J.," } ], "attorneys": [ "Mr. Adolph Moses, for the appellant.", "Mr. George W. Brandt, for the appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Jacob Zuckerman v. Adolf Sonnenschein.\n1. Slander\u2014Malice. The law implies malice from the publication of actionable words, but this implication may be explained and rebutted by the circumstances.\n2. Same. In a suit for slander it is error to instruct the jury that if the defendant used words imputing a crime, they must find for plaintiff, when the words were spoken under circumstances tending to show a want of malice. In such case the intent of the publication should be left to the jury under the proof.\n3. Same\u2014Malice. When words. imputing the commission of a crime are used by the defendant merely for the purpose of translating the language of another from the German into the English language at the request and for the information of an attorney at law in a matter of business, the law will not infer malice in the defendant. Under such circumstances the use of the words may properly come within the range of privileged communications. If there was malice in fact it must be left to the jury to be found from the evidence.\nAppeal from the Superior Court of Cook County; the Hon. Vm. A. Poster, Judge, presiding.\nThe facts sufficiently appear in the opinion of the Court.\nMr. Adolph Moses, for the appellant.\nMr. George W. Brandt, for the appellee." }, "file_name": "0115-02", "first_page_order": 115, "last_page_order": 118 }