{ "id": 2741873, "name": "F. Ryhiner et al. v. William Feickert", "name_abbreviation": "Ryhiner v. Feickert", "decision_date": "1879-06", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "305", "last_page": "313", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "92 Ill. 305" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "6 Mass. 480", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mass.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "12 Ill. 424", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2578115 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "460" } ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/12/0424-01" ] }, { "cite": "49 Ill. 221", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "3 Gilm. 233", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Gilm.", "case_ids": [ 2463162 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/8/0233-01" ] }, { "cite": "56 Ill. 179", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 817752 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ill/56/0179-01" ] }, { "cite": "1 Scam. 53", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Scam.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "6 Mass. 196", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mass.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "51 Barb. 616", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Barb.", "case_ids": [ 2246515 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/barb/51/0616-01" ] }, { "cite": "44 N. H. 174", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.H.", "case_ids": [ 4561719 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nh/44/0174-01" ] }, { "cite": "28 Ind. 201", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ind.", "case_ids": [ 1507732 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/ind/28/0201-01" ] }, { "cite": "21 Conn. 451", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Conn.", "case_ids": [ 12128110 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/conn/21/0451-01" ] }, { "cite": "12 Gray, 107", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Gray", "case_ids": [ 2086146 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/mass/78/0107-01" ] }, { "cite": "40 N. H. 21", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.H.", "case_ids": [ 458525 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nh/40/0021-01" ] }, { "cite": "73 Ill. 221", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5318519 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/73/0221-01" ] }, { "cite": "24 Ill. 628", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5286894 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/24/0628-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 722, "char_count": 16316, "ocr_confidence": 0.581, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.874331440067538e-07, "percentile": 0.9645504429022695 }, "sha256": "18052e343bed1814bc44e08dbc718363323d48c527eb1252bb3626bb1120aa70", "simhash": "1:0b8f6f5fed2afec6", "word_count": 2913 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:16:34.737984+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "F. Ryhiner et al. v. William Feickert." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Justice Soholfield\ndelivered the opinion of the Court:\nThat a partner may, in general, indorse and transfer a promissory note made payable to his firm, is not questioned. It is also unquestioned law, that if a note be made payable or indorsed to several persons not partners, the transfer can only be by a joint indorsement of all of them. Story on Prom. Notes, \u00a7 125; Chitty on Bills and Notes, (8 Am. Ed.) 52; 2 Parsons on Bills and Notes, 4r-5; 1 Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, \u00a7 684. Says the author last referred to: \u201cIf several persons not partners are payees or indorsees of a bill or note, it must be indorsed by all of them. Either one of the joint payees may authorize the other to indorse for him, and an assignment of this interest in the paper from one to the other carries with it such authority. But there is no presumption of law that one may indorse for the other.\u201d Ubi supra.\nThe question whether there was, in fact, a partnership between appellee and his co-payee, Charles Feickert, is conclusively settled in the negative by the finding of the Appellate Court. (Laws 1877, p. 153, \u00a7 89.)\nThe contention of the appellants, however, is that appellee, by his conduct, induced appellants to believe that appellee and Charles Feickert were partners, and to deal with Charles Feickert under the belief that they were a firm.\nThe facts upon which this is predicated are: 1st. The names of the payees of the notes are abbreviated and written as \u201cChas. & Wm. Feickert,\u201d instead of in full, \u201cCharles Feickert and William Feickert;\u201d and 2d, Charles Feickert had possession of the notes.\nWe can not say, as matter of law, that the mere use of the abbreviated form, instead of writing the name of each of the payees in full, authorised the public to assume they were partners. A firm name might, certainly, be thus expressed. But the abbreviation does not necessarily convey the idea that the names are those of a firm. There are no words expressive of the idea of partnership, company, or association superadded. Such abbreviations as this are frequent in conversation and in writing to avoid the unnecessary repetition of the surname, and may, obviously, be used with quite as much propriety where the design is to express a joint interest merely, as where the design is to express a partnership.\nThe possession of the note by Charles Feickert, under the circumstances, is of no significance. In all cases where notes are payable to joint payees, instead of partners, the actual manual possession of the notes must be in some one of the payees. It is impossible that it can be in all at the same time. The faces of these notes disclose the interest of the holder\u2014that he is joint payee, and that therefore he holds for himself and for all the other payees\u2014and rebut any presumption that might arise otherwise from the mere possession of the notes.\nWhere notes are payable to \u201c bearer,\u201d or to \u201c order,\u201d possession is prima facie evidence of legal ownership. 2 Parsons on Notes and Bills, p. 42. And possession of a note, not indorsed, by one, other than the payee, affords prima facie evidence that he is the equitable owner. But possession by one, shown on the face of the note to be but a joint payee, could be regarded only as prima facie evidence of the title there disclosed. Illustrations of this may be found in the rule applicable to the possession of property by co-tenants. Freeman on Co-tenancy, \u00a7 167; Brown v. Graham, 24 Ill. 628.\nThe further point is made by the counsel for appellants that, conceding that Charles Feickert could not, by his indorsement of the notes, transfer the title of appellee, yet appellants\u2019 title to the notes and their right to collect and appropriate the money due thereon, exists just as effectually by the delivery of the notes for a valuable consideration paid as if the notes had been assigned to them.\nThe principle upon which it is held that the indorsement of one partner binds all the members of the firm is that of agency\u2014that each partner, within the scope of the partnership business, is the agent of all the others\u2014but this has no application to mere joint payees, and hence one can not bind the other by his indorsement. Story on Agency, \u00a7 39. Neither party being the agent, in legal contemplation, of the other, he can no more bind the other by a sale of the note, without indorsement, than he can by a sale of the note with an indorsement. He has no power whatever to dispose of the interest of his co-payee, either legal or equitable, in the note, without the consent of his co-payee.\nNor do we conceive the fact that Charles Feickert was authorized to collect the notes when due as of any controling significance. This only authorized him to collect when due, not to sell or compound the notes. Thompson v. Elliott, 73 Ill. 221; Padfield v. Green, 85 id. 529.\nWe see no cause to disturb the judgment of the Appellate Court, and it is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Justice Soholfield" } ], "attorneys": [ "Mr. G. B. Burnett, for the appellants:", "Messrs. Metcalf & Bradshaw, for the appellee:", "Mr. Fritz E. Scheel, also for the appellee:" ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "F. Ryhiner et al. v. William Feickert.\n1. Negotiable instruments\u2014how transferred when made to joint payees. If a note be made payable to several persons, not partners, it can only be transferred by a joint indorsement of all of them; but when it is made to two or more persons as partners, it may be transferred by the indorsement^ any one of them.\n2. Partnership\u2014what not evidence of. The mere fact that an abbreviated form, as \u201c Chas. & Wm. Feiokert,\u201d instead of \u201c Charles Feiokert and William Feickert,\u201d is used in describing the payees of a note, does not,- as a matter of law, authorize the public to assume they are partners.\n3. Same\u2014possession of .note by one joint payee not evidence of. The possession of a note by one of two joint payees is not evidence that the payees are partners, but is simply prima facie evidence of the title disclosed upon the face of the note.\n4. Joint payees\u2014-power to dispose of note. Neither one of two joint payees being the agent of the other, he can no more bind the other by a sale of the note without indorsement than he can by a sale with indorsement.\n5. Same\u2014authority to collect does not confer authority to sell. The fact that one joint payee is authorized by the other to collect the note when due, does not authorize him to sell or compound it.\nAppeal from the Appellate Court of the Fourth District; the Hon. Tazewell B. Tanner, presiding Justice, and the Hon. David J. Baker and Hon. James C. Allen, Justices.\nThe facts in this case, as found in the Appellate Court, are: On the first of February, 1874, John B. Koehler made his eight promissory notes, bearing that date, and payable to \u201cChas. & Wm. Feickert,\u201d in one, two, three, four, five, six, seven and eight years, for unequal amounts, but aggregating $2,900, all bearing interest at the rate of ten per cent per annum. These notes were secured by a deed of trust on certain real estate, (the description whereof is not important,) to Charles Bosshard, trustee,\u2014and it is recited therein that it is to secure to Charles Feickert and William Feickert payment of their said promissory notes.\nOn the \u2014 day of February, 1876, Charles Feickert, representing that he and William Feickert were partners, sold said notes to appellants, F. Eyhiner and others, for full value, aind indorsed and assigned the same in the following words:\n\u201cWe assign the within note oyer to Messrs. F. Eyhiner & Co., without recourse on us. Chas. & Wm. Feickert.\u201d\nUharles Feickert also further represented, at the time of selling and indorsing said notes, that he and William Feickert were partners under the name of \u201cChas. & Wm. Feickert,\u201d and that, independently of the partnership, he had full authority to assign and sell the notes and receive the money therefor. And at the time appellants purchased the notes they had no notice of any title to the same in appellee outside of what appears upon the face of the notes. Since appellants purchased the notes they have collected from the maker thereof the sum of $180.\nThe notes were given for the purchase money of a farm owned by Charles Feickert and William Feickert, and were left in possession\u201d of Charles Feickert for convenience to the maker in making payment. Charles and William Feickert were never in partnership. Appellee never transferred the notes or deed of trust to the appellants, nor authorized Charles Feickert to do so,\u2014and had no notice of the assignment until in May, 1876. He always protested against the validity of the assignment, and insisted on his right to one-half of the notes. Charles Feickert tended the farm, collected the rents, and attended to the business pertaining to it, until they sold the farm. They carried on the farm together for about four years. Charles Feickert had authority to collect the notes when due, and they were left with him for that purpose.\nAfter the first note became due appellee wrote to Charles Feickert about it, and he replied that the note was not yet paid. Charles Feickert went into bankruptcy in November, 1876, and is worth nothing.\nThe indorsements on the notes are all in the handwriting of Charles Feickert.\nSuit was brought by appellee, before a justice of the peace of Madison county, to recover one-half of the $180 paid to appellants on the notes.\nThe cause was taken by appeal to the circuit court of Madison county, were judgment was rendered in appellee\u2019s favor for $90 and costs of suit. From that judgment an appeal was prosecuted to the Appellate Court of the Fourth District, where the judgment of the circuit court was affirmed. To reverse that judgment the present appeal is prosecuted.\nThe errors assigned are, the Appellate Court erred in affirming and in not reversing .the judgment of the circuit court.\nMr. G. B. Burnett, for the appellants:\nThe notes were payable to \u201cChas. & Wm. Feickert.\u201d Being thus prima facie payable to a firm, Charles Feickert, having them in his possession and claiming to be a member of the firm, could transfer the title to appellants, they having no notice of the non-existence of the partnership.\nThe power of one partner to assign a promissory note payable to a firm of which he is a member will not be disputed. 1 Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, 506.\nA party in possession of a note payable to a firm is presumed to be one of the firm, and prima facie has the right to indorse it in the firm name. Blodgett v. Jackson, 40 N. H. 21.\nOne of two promisees of a promissory note having possession may receive payment or indorse it. Bruce v. Bonney, 12 Gray, 107.\nThe proof shows that Charles and William Feickert were not, in fact, partners; but I insist that so far as this transaction is concerned, appellee, by his conduct, induced appellants to believe they were partners, and to deal with Charles Feickert under the belief that they were a firm.\nWhen one, by words or acts, causes another to believe that the party with whom he deals has authority to-do a particular thing, he becomes responsible for and bound by the acts of the party claiming to have such authority, and he can not afterwards be heard to say that the party had no authority to do the precise thing or one which did not reach so far, and that it was a mistake on the part of the third party. 1 Parsons on Contracts, 39; Cowler v. Bacon, 21 Conn. 451; Ridgley v. Morrison, 28 Ind. 201; Heath v. Bank, 44 N. H. 174; Vibbard v. Rodrick, 51 Barb. 616; Story on Agency, \u00a7 93.\nIn mercantile negotiations, the possession of the contract by the confidence of the party interested is a sufficient token of authority in the party entrusted with it. Errick v. Johnson, 6 Mass. 196.\nThe transfer of a negotiable note without indorsement is a sale or assignment of the debt due to the payee, which he has as much right to sell as he has to dispose of any other species of property. 1 Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, 560.\nThe most that can be claimed by appellee is, that he was a joint owner with his brother of the notes in question, and that his brother was his agent to collect and receive his share of the proceeds, and that the notes were left with him for that purpose. Now, the law is well settled, that if an agent is entrusted with the disposal of negotiable instruments and he disposes of them by sale or pledge, or otherwise, contrary to the orders of his principal, to a bona fide holder without notice, the principal can not reclaim them. Story on Agency, \u00a7 228.\nMessrs. Metcalf & Bradshaw, for the appellee:\nThe plaintiff in the court below was the private owner of one-half the notes, and never transferred or authorized Charles Feickert to assign them. Plaintiff\u2019s interest could only be divested by his indorsement thereon. 1 Scam. 53.\nOn a bill or note payable to several persons (not in partnership) the right to transfer it is in all collectively, not in any individually. Carrick v. Vickery, 2 Douglass, 563; Story on Bills, sec. 197; Sager v. Frick, 7 Watts and Serg. 383; Story on Prom. Notes, sec. 125. And even in case of partnership the right to transfer does not exist after dissolution, unless by death where the whole goes to the survivors. Story on Prom. Notes, p. 141.\nAppellant admits, and the proof shows, that Charles and William Feickert never were partners in fact. And the question is, then, whether William\u2019s interest in these notes can, without his consent or authority, be transferred by Charles. Of course, also, it would be admitted that it could not be done, unless it is shown by the notes and deed of trust that they were partners, or that a prudent business man would so con-elude from the way they are drawn, or that there are facts sufficient in this case from which to infer that Charles had a right as the agent of William to transfer the notes.\nThese notes were payable to \u201c Chas. & Wm. Feickert.\u201d This is not the usual form of designating a firm. There was enough on the face of the notes to put third persons upon inquiry as to the character of ownership in the payees.\nWhatever puts a party upon inquiry amounts in judgment of law to notice, provided the inquiry becomes a duty, as in case of purchasers and creditors, and would lead to a knowledge of the facts by the exercise of ordinary diligence and understanding. Harper v. Ely, 56 Ill. 179; Henneberry v. Morse, id. 394; Babcock v. Lisk, 57 id. 327; Flint v. Lewis, 61 id. 299; Russell v. Hadduck, 3 Gilm. 233; Sturges\u2019 Sons v. Metropolitan Bank, etc., 49 Ill. 221. In these last two cases the court states the rule to be as above stated in cases of commercial paper.\nMr. Fritz E. Scheel, also for the appellee:\nAn examination of the case of Bruce v. Bonney, 12 Gray, 107, cited by counsel for appellants, will show that it does not sustain his view of the law. In that case both payees had transferred the note for value previously to one Micklefield, and possession of the note had been given to Micklefield by and with the consent of both payees. Subsequently, at the request of Micklefield, Merrit, one of the payees, for himself and Asby, indorsed the paper to Micklefield to make a legal title to that which had been before equitably transferred, and the court held, that under such circumstances the indorsement of one of the payees for both, with the previous actual delivery of the note, made a valid title to the indorsee.\nIn the case at bar only one of the payees made the indorsement. using the names of both, but without authority to do so.\nBut even if Charles could be regarded the agent of William, he exceeded the authority claimed for him, and appellants will not be protected. Story on Agency, \u00a7\u00a7 62, 71.\nIt is insisted that Charles Feickert, being in possession of the notes, was prima facie the owner. This court has repeatedly held that a maker makes payment at his peril, and is, when paying to a third person on account of another, bound to know that the person to whom he pays has authority to receive. Holmes v. Field, 12 Ill. 424; Dutcher v. Beckwith, 45 id. 460.\nIt is held in these cases that if a person innocently and in good faith pays to a person not having authority to receive, though he seemingly had it, it is no justification, and he can not resist paying it again.\nSo, in an action by an indorsee of a note against the maker, it is competent for the latter to prove, and it would constitute a good defence to show, that plaintiff held the note for collection only and as agent of the payee. Baker v. Prentiss, 6 Mass. 480." }, "file_name": "0305-01", "first_page_order": 305, "last_page_order": 313 }