{ "id": 2728904, "name": "John W. Lamkin et al. v. The People of the State of Illinois", "name_abbreviation": "Lamkin v. People", "decision_date": "1880-01", "docket_number": "", "first_page": "501", "last_page": "505", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "94 Ill. 501" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill.", "id": 8772, "name": "Illinois Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "4 Mich. 414", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mich.", "case_ids": [ 1930361 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/mich/4/0414-01" ] }, { "cite": "7 Cush. 514", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cush.", "case_ids": [ 1967618 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/mass/61/0514-01" ] }, { "cite": "4 Metc. 111", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Metc.", "weight": 3, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "7 Barb. 331", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Barb.", "case_ids": [ 4886877 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/barb/7/0331-01" ] }, { "cite": "9 Cow. 578", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cow.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "43 N. H. 83", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.H.", "case_ids": [ 4554464 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nh/43/0083-01" ] }, { "cite": "34 Me. 320", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Me.", "case_ids": [ 8846801 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/me/34/0320-01" ] }, { "cite": "13 Ia. 269", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Iowa", "case_ids": [ 2278580 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/iowa/13/0269-01" ] }, { "cite": "87 Ill. 96", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5340523 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/87/0096-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 475, "char_count": 8949, "ocr_confidence": 0.567, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.659200434416629e-07, "percentile": 0.9712344233196607 }, "sha256": "a7ede757a6c2e04adff07cf2c6dd2bbf8ee18520065726e24a15cc98320f41e5", "simhash": "1:5b6df5ec0a1aeca9", "word_count": 1537 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:30:34.542925+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "John W. Lamkin et al. v. The People of the State of Illinois." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. Justice Scholfield\ndelivered the opinion of the Court :\nOn the 22d day of March, 1879, the grand jury of Champaign county returned into the circuit court of that county, then in session, an indictment, containing eight counts, against the plaintiffs in error.\" In each count, but in different phraseology, plaintiffs in error were charged with conspiring, combining, confederating and agreeing together on the 7th day of July, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and seventy-seven, to cheat and defraud Lewis C. Burnett, Sarah E. Burnett and Thomas McCulloch of their goods, chattels and property, etc.\nIn neither count is there any averment that plaintiffs in error were not \u201cusually and publicly resident within this State\u201d since the commission of the alleged offence, nor that they were previously indicted for the same offence, and that such indictment has been quashed or the proceedings thereupon set aside or annulled. Motion was made to quash the indictment, which was overruled by the court. Plaintiffs in error were thereupon placed upon trial, upon which the jury returned a verdict finding each of them guilty as charged in the eighth count of the indictment, assessing the fine of the plaintiff in error Lamkin, at $200, and that of plaintiff in error Lacy at $50. Motions for new trial and in arrest of judgment were made by plaintiffs in error and overruled by the court, and the court then gave judgment upon the verdict of the jury.\nWe held in Garrison v. The People, 87 Ill. 96, that a count in an indictment found in September, 1876, charging a lar- \u2022 ceny to have been committed in January, 1866, without showing that the accused had at anytime been a \u201cperson fleeing from justice,\u201d in the language of the statute of limitation, then in force, was clearly bad, as showing on its face that the offence was barred. See, also, 1 Wharton\u2019s Crim. Law (7th ed.), 446, and authorities referred to in note.\nThe statute of 1874 provides\u2014Division IV of the Criminal Code, p. 398, sec. 315 : \u201c \u00a7 3. All indictments for other felonies\u201d (than murder, manslaughter, arson and forgery) \u201c must be found within three years next after the commission of the crime, except as otherwise provided by law.\u201d\n316. \u201c \u00a7 4. All prosecutions by indictment or otherwise for misdemeanors, or for any fine or forfeiture under any penal statute, shall be commenced within one year and six months from the time of committing the offence or incurring the fine or forfeiture, except as otherwise provided by law.\u201d\n317. \u201c \u00a7 5. No period during which the party charged was not usually and publicly resident within this State shall be included in the time of limitation.\u201d\n318. \u201c \u00a7 6. When an indictment, information or suit is quashed, or the proceedings on the same are set aside or reversed on writ of error, the time during the pendency of such indictment, information or suit so quashed, set aside or reversed shall not be reckoned within the time limited by this act so as to bar any new indictment, information or suit for the same offence.\u201d\nThe latter two sections containing the only exceptions \u201c provided by law \u201d to the period of limitation fixed by the statute, it only remains to inquire whether the offence of which plaintiffs in error were indicted and convicted is a felony or misdemeanor under our statute.\nThe statute says: \u201c A felony is an offence punishable with death or by imprisonment in the penitentiary.\n\u201c Every other offence is a misdemeanor.\u201d Rev. Stat. 1874, p. 394, 277 \u00a7 5, 278 \u00a7 6.\nIt will be noted, \u201c a felony is an offence punishable,\u201d\u2014that is, absolutely punishable, not that may or may not be \u201c punishable with death or by imprisonment in the penitentiary,\u201d while the offence of which plaintiffs in error are indicted and convicted here shall be punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary or by fine. Surely it is no more accurate, in view of this language, to say this offence is punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary than to say it is punishable by fine, and it is impossible to say, under any rule of construction, that we are bound to lay more stress on the language fixing the punishment by confinement in the penitentiary than on that fixing the punishment by fine. On the contrary, the rule of construction applicable here is, unless it clearly appears this offence was intended to be denominated a felony, it shall be denominated a misdemeanor, Wharton, in the first volume of his work on Criminal Law (7th ed.), sec. 444 a, says, in speaking of the construction of statutes of limitation: \u201cHere, the State is the grantor, surrendering by apt of grace its right to prosecute, and declaring the offence to be no longer the subject of prosecution. The statute is not a statute of process, to be scantily and grudgingly applied, but an amnesty, declaring that after a certain time oblivion shall be cast over the offence; that the offender shall be at liberty to return to his country and resume his immunities as a citizen, and that from henceforth he may cease to preserve the proofs of his innocence, for the proofs of his guilt are blotted out. Hence it is that statutes of limitation are to be liberally construed in favor of the defendant, not only because such liberality of construction belongs to all acts of amnesty and grace, but because the very existence of the statute is a recognition and notification by the legislature of the fact that time, while it gradually wears out proofs of innocence, has assigned to it fixed and positive periods in which it destroys proofs of guilt.\u201d\nIt appearing, then, this offence is a misdemeanor, and the face of the indictment disclosing that the offence was committed more than eighteen months before the finding of the indictment without bringing the case within either of the exceptions under which an indictment may be returned after the expiration of that time, the motion to quash should have been sustained, and the court erred in overruling it. For that error the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.\nJudgment reversed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. Justice Scholfield" } ], "attorneys": [ "Mr. E. L. Sweet, for the plaintiffs in error:", "Mr. Jas. K. Edsall, Attorney General, for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "John W. Lamkin et al. v. The People of the State of Illinois.\n1. Indictment\u2014bad when it shows the offence to be barred. An indictment for a misdemeanor showing on its face that the offence was committed more than eighteen months before the finding of the same, without bringing the case within any of the exceptions under which an indictment may be returned after the expiration of that time, is bad, and should be quashed on motion of the defendant.\n2. Criminal law\u2014what is a felony and what a misdemeanor. A felony, under our statute, is an offence punishable with death, or by imprisonment in the penitentiary, while every other offence is a misdemeanor. When the offence may be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary, or by fine only, in the discretion of the court or jury, it is only a misdemeanor, and the eighteen months\u2019 limitation applies to it.\n3. Same\u2014limitation construed liberally. The statute of limitations as to the prosecution for crime is not one of process, to be scantily and grudgingly applied, but it is an amnesty, declaring that after a certain time oblivion shall be cast over the offence. Hence, such statutes are to be liberally construed in favor of defendants.\nWrit op Error to the Circuit Court of Champaign county; the Hon. William E. Nelson, Judge, presiding.\nMr. E. L. Sweet, for the plaintiffs in error:\nThe court erred in not quashing the indictment. It should appear on the face of the indictment that the object of the conspiracy or the means to be employed, is criminal, and an allegation that the purpose \u201c is to cheat and defraud,\u201d without more, does not necessarily imply a criminal object. State v. Jones, 13 Ia. 269; State v. Roberts, 34 Me. 320; State v. Parker, 43 N. H. 83; Lambert v. The People, 9 Cow. 578; March v. The People, 7 Barb. 331.\nIt is not necessarily a punishable crime to cheat and defraud one of his money, goods or estate, or wrongfully and wickedly to obtain his money and other property designedly and with intent to defraud. Therefore, an indictment charging a conspiracy with such intents, and specifying no criminal means designed to be used to effect such intent, is insufficient. Commonwealth v. Hunt, 4 Metc. 111; State v. Roberts, 34 Me. 320; State v. Mayberry, 48 id. 218; Commonwealth v. Shedd, 7 Cush. 514; Alderman v. The People, 4 Mich. 414.\nQualifying epithets, such as \u201c unlawful, deceitful,\u201d etc., are not sufficient, unless the facts averred show the offence. Commonwealth v. Hunt, 4 Metc. 111.\nThe prosecution is barred by the Statute of Limitations. Under the 46th section of the Criminal Code of 1874 the penalty for a violation of said section is imprisonment in the penitentiary or a fine.\nA felony is an offence punishable with death or by imprisonment in the penitentiary. Rev. Stat. 1877, 390, sec. 277; and every other offence is a misdemeanor. Ibid. sec. 278.\nMr. Jas. K. Edsall, Attorney General, for the People." }, "file_name": "0501-01", "first_page_order": 501, "last_page_order": 505 }